Model Civil Jury Instructions
Michigan Supreme Court
We are pleased to provide electronic copies of civil jury instructions adopted by the
Committee on Model Civil Jury Instructions. MCR 2.512. The Committee is composed of
attorneys and judges whose duty is to ensure that the Model Civil Jury Instructions are
concise, understandable, conversational, unslanted, and not argumentative. The Committee
has authority to amend or repeal existing instructions and, when appropriate, adopt new
instructions, although the instructions do not have the force and effect of a court rule. The
Committee is comprised of the following members:
Hon. Michael F. Gadola, Chair
Julie Clement, Reporter
Benjamin J. Aloia
Matthew Aneese
Robert L. Avers
Hilary A. Ballentine
Matthew J. Boettcher
Hon. Stephen L. Borrello
Debra A. Freid
Hon. Michael L. Jaconette
Amy M. Johnston
Hon. Annette Jurkiewicz-Berry
Hon. Charles T. LaSata
C. Thomas Ludden
Stefanie R. Reagan
Jennifer B. Salvatore
Daniel J. Schulte
Richard J. Suhrheinrich
Emily G. Thomas
Randy J. Wallace
Adam Winn
Hon. Christopher P. Yates
UPDATED: July 9, 2024
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Table of Contents
Rule 2.512 Instructions to the Jury 0-1
CHAPTER 1 Preliminary Instructions Before Jury Selection 1-1
Introductory Directions to the Court ................................................................................................................................. 1-2
M Civ JI 1.01 Introductory Comments................................................................................................................................ 1-3
M Civ JI 1.02 Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel............................................................................................... 1-4
M Civ JI 1.03 Explanation of Jury Selection and Voir Dire .................................................................................................. 1-5
M Civ JI 1.04 Juror Oath Before Voir Dire........................................................................................................................... 1-6
M Civ JI 1.05 Prospective Jurors—Health and Other Problems ......................................................................................... 1-7
M Civ JI 1.10 Juror Oath Following Selection ..................................................................................................................... 1-8
CHAPTER 2 Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn 2-1
M Civ JI 2.01 Responsibilities of Judge and Jury................................................................................................................. 2-2
M Civ JI 2.02 Description of Trial Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 2-3
M Civ JI 2.02A Cameras in the Courtroom ......................................................................................................................... 2-5
M Civ JI 2.03 Jury Deliberation; Jurors as Triers of Fact ..................................................................................................... 2-6
M Civ JI 2.04 Jury Must Only Consider Evidence; What Evidence Is / Prohibited Actions by Jurors.................................. 2-7
M Civ JI 2.05 Jurors to Keep Open Minds [ Instruction Deleted ] .................................................................................... 2-10
M Civ JI 2.06 Jurors to Keep Open Minds......................................................................................................................... 2-11
M Civ JI 2.07 Jurors Not to Consider Information Received outside Presence of Court [ Instruction Deleted ].............. 2-13
M Civ JI 2.08 Objections; Out-of-Presence Hearings........................................................................................................ 2-14
M Civ JI 2.09 Court to Instruct on Law ............................................................................................................................. 2-15
M Civ JI 2.10 Inability to Hear Witness or See Exhibit...................................................................................................... 2-16
M Civ JI 2.11 Questions by Jurors Allowed....................................................................................................................... 2-17
M Civ JI 2.12 Caution about Publicity in Cases of Public Interest [ Instruction Deleted ] ................................................ 2-18
M Civ JI 2.13 Note Taking by Jurors Allowed / Not Allowed ............................................................................................ 2-19
M Civ JI 2.14 Reference Documents................................................................................................................................. 2-20
CHAPTER 3 Cautionary Instructions 3-1
M Civ JI 3.01 Faithful Performance of Duties; Jury to Follow Instructions......................................................................... 3-2
M Civ JI 3.02 Facts to Be Determined from Evidence ........................................................................................................ 3-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 3.03 Admission of Evidence .................................................................................................................................. 3-4
M Civ JI 3.04 Attorneys’ Statements Not Evidence; Admission by Attorney [ Instruction Deleted ] ................................. 3-5
M Civ JI 3.05 Corporations Entitled to Unprejudiced Treatment....................................................................................... 3-6
M Civ JI 3.06 Whether Party Is Insured Is Irrelevant .......................................................................................................... 3-7
M Civ JI 3.07 Evidence Introduced for a Limited Purpose.................................................................................................. 3-8
M Civ JI 3.08 Judge’s Opinion as to Facts Is to Be Disregarded [ Instruction Deleted ]...................................................... 3-9
M Civ JI 3.09 Jury to Consider All the Evidence................................................................................................................ 3-10
M Civ JI 3.10 Circumstantial Evidence.............................................................................................................................. 3-11
M Civ JI 3.11 Jurors May Take into Account Ordinary Experience and Observations...................................................... 3-12
M Civ JI 3.12 Jury View of Premises / Scene / Object ...................................................................................................... 3-13
M Civ JI 3.13 Fact Judicially Noticed................................................................................................................................. 3-14
M Civ JI 3.15 Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness .................................................................................................... 3-15
M Civ JI 3.16 Interim Commentary by Attorneys ............................................................................................................. 3-17
M Civ JI 3.17 Summary of Evidence by Judge................................................................................................................... 3-18
CHAPTER 4 Credibility and Weight 4-1
M Civ JI 4.01 Credibility of Witnesses ................................................................................................................................ 4-2
M Civ JI 4.01A Support Persons or Animals........................................................................................................................ 4-4
M Civ JI 4.02 Witness Need Not Be Believed [ Recommend No Instruction ].................................................................... 4-5
M Civ JI 4.03 Inherently Improbable Testimony [ Recommend No Instruction ]............................................................... 4-6
M Civ JI 4.04 Witness Willfully False [ Recommend No Instruction ]................................................................................. 4-7
M Civ JI 4.05 Party Competent as a Witness [ Recommend No Instruction ] .................................................................... 4-8
M Civ JI 4.06 Witness Who Has Been Interviewed by an Attorney.................................................................................... 4-9
M Civ JI 4.07 Weighing Conflicting Evidence—Number of Witnesses ............................................................................. 4-10
M Civ JI 4.08 One Witness against a Number [ Recommend No Instruction ] ................................................................. 4-11
M Civ JI 4.09 Credibility of Special Categories of Witnesses and Weight of Evidence [ Recommend No Instruction ] ... 4-12
M Civ JI 4.10 Weighing Expert Testimony ........................................................................................................................ 4-13
M Civ JI 4.11 Consideration of Deposition Evidence ........................................................................................................ 4-14
M Civ JI 4.12 Hospital and Business Records [ Recommend No Instruction ] .................................................................. 4-15
CHAPTER 5 Impeachment 5-1
M Civ JI 5.01 Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness [ Renumbered to M Civ JI 3.15 ]................................................... 5-2
M Civ JI 5.02 Impeachment of a Party by Prior Inconsistent Statement [ Instruction Deleted ] ....................................... 5-3
M Civ JI 5.03 Impeachment by Proof of Conviction of Crime............................................................................................. 5-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 6 Failure to Produce 6-1
M Civ JI 6.01 Failure to Produce Evidence or a Witness .................................................................................................... 6-2
M Civ JI 6.02 Failure of Opposite Party to Testify in Case Involving “Dead Man’s Statute” [ Recommend No Instruction ] 6-
4
CHAPTER 7 Theories 7-1
M Civ JI 7.01 Theories of the Parties .................................................................................................................................. 7-2
CHAPTER 8 Definition of Burden of Proof 8-1
M Civ JI 8.01 Definition of Burden of Proof........................................................................................................................ 8-2
CHAPTER 10 Negligence: General Instructions 10-1
M Civ JI 10.01 Definitions Introduced .............................................................................................................................. 10-2
M Civ JI 10.02 Negligence of Adult—Definition ............................................................................................................... 10-3
M Civ JI 10.03 Ordinary Care—Adult—Definition [ Instruction Deleted ]........................................................................ 10-5
M Civ JI 10.04 Duty to Use Ordinary Care— Adult—Plaintiff........................................................................................... 10-6
M Civ JI 10.05 Duty to Use Ordinary Care—Adult—Defendant ....................................................................................... 10-7
M Civ JI 10.06 Ordinary Care—Minor—Definition ........................................................................................................... 10-8
M Civ JI 10.07 Conduct Required for Safety of Child........................................................................................................ 10-9
M Civ JI 10.08 Presumption of Ordinary Care—Death Case .......................................................................................... 10-10
M Civ JI 10.09 Presumption of Ordinary Care—Loss of Memory Case .......................................................................... 10-12
CHAPTER 11 Comparative Negligence 11-1
M Civ JI 11.01 Comparative Negligence—Definition ....................................................................................................... 11-2
M Civ JI 11.02 Negligence—Not an Issue as to One or More Plaintiffs............................................................................ 11-3
CHAPTER 12 Statutes and Ordinances Affecting Negligence 12-1
M Civ JI 12.01 Violation of Statute—Negligence.............................................................................................................. 12-2
M Civ JI 12.02 Excused Violation of Statute ..................................................................................................................... 12-3
M Civ JI 12.03 Violation of Ordinance by Defendant ....................................................................................................... 12-4
M Civ JI 12.04 Violation of Ordinance by Plaintiff............................................................................................................ 12-6
M Civ JI 12.05 Violation by Defendant of Rules or Regulations Promulgated Pursuant to Statutory Authority.............. 12-8
M Civ JI 12.06 Violation by Plaintiff of Rules or Regulations Promulgated Pursuant to Statutory Authority .................. 12-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 12.07 Violation of Statute or Ordinance by Minor [ No Instruction Prepared ]................................................ 12-10
CHAPTER 13 Other Special Factors Affecting Negligence 13-1
M Civ JI 13.01 Physical Disability...................................................................................................................................... 13-2
M Civ JI 13.02 Intoxication as Affecting Negligence......................................................................................................... 13-3
M Civ JI 13.03 Mental Illness—Adult................................................................................................................................ 13-4
M Civ JI 13.04 Duty of One in Imminent Peril and Responsibility of the Person Causing the Perilous Situation [ Recommend
No Instruction ] ................................................................................................................................................................ 13-5
M Civ JI 13.05 Unavoidable Accident [ Recommend No Instruction ].............................................................................. 13-6
M Civ JI 13.06 Assumption of Risk [ No Instruction Prepared ]........................................................................................ 13-7
M Civ JI 13.07 Attempted Rescue of One in Imminent Peril by a Person Who Did Not Cause Such Peril [ Instruction Deleted ]
13-8
M Civ JI 13.08 Presumption That Child Under Seven Years Is Incapable of Negligence .................................................. 13-9
M Civ JI 13.09 Effect of Parent’s Negligence on Claim of Child...................................................................................... 13-10
CHAPTER 14 Subsequent Negligence—Intentional Misconduct 14-1
M Civ JI 14.01 Subsequent Negligence (Last Clear Chance)—Helpless or Inattentive Plaintiff [ Instruction Deleted ] ... 14-2
M Civ JI 14.02 Willful and Wanton Misconduct—Common Law [ Instruction Deleted ] ................................................. 14-3
M Civ JI 14.10 Gross Negligence—Definition ................................................................................................................... 14-4
M Civ JI 14.11 Wanton Misconduct—Definition .............................................................................................................. 14-7
M Civ JI 14.12 Willful Misconduct—Definition................................................................................................................. 14-8
M Civ JI 14.20 Emergency Medical Services Act—Explanation ........................................................................................ 14-9
M Civ JI 14.21 Emergency Medical Services Act—Burden of Proof ............................................................................... 14-10
CHAPTER 15 Proximate Cause (Negligence) 15-1
M Civ JI 15.01 Definition of Proximate Cause .................................................................................................................. 15-2
M Civ JI 15.01A Definition of The Proximate Cause ......................................................................................................... 15-3
M Civ JI 15.02 Definition of Proximately Contributed [ Instruction Deleted ] ................................................................. 15-4
M Civ JI 15.03 More Than One Proximate Cause ............................................................................................................. 15-5
M Civ JI 15.04 Causation by Multiple Defendants............................................................................................................ 15-7
M Civ JI 15.05 Intervening Negligence or Conduct of Person Not a Party [ Instruction deleted ] ................................... 15-8
M Civ JI 15.06 Intervening Outside Force (Other Than Person)....................................................................................... 15-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 16 Burden of Proof (Negligence) 16-1
M Civ JI 16.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof [ Renumbered to M Civ JI 8.01 ].................................................................. 16-2
M Civ JI 16.02 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases on the Issues and Legal Effect Thereof [INSTRUCTION DELETED] . 16-3
M Civ JI 16.02A Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases...................................................................................................... 16-4
M Civ JI 16.03 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases on the Issues and Legal Effect Thereof, Including the Issues of
Contributory Negligence and Subsequent Negligence (Last Clear Chance) or Intentional Misconduct [ Instruction Deleted ]
16-6
M Civ JI 16.04 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases on Affirmative Defenses Other Than Contributory Negligence..... 16-7
M Civ JI 16.05 Burden of Proof and Legal Effect Thereof in Negligence Cases—Complaint and Counterclaim .............. 16-8
M Civ JI 16.06 Burden of Proof and Legal Effect Thereof in Negligence Cases—Third-Party Complaint—Contribution Only.
16-11
M Civ JI 16.07 Evenly Balanced Evidence [ Recommend No Instruction ] ..................................................................... 16-13
M Civ JI 16.08 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or After March 28, 1996) ............. 16-14
CHAPTER 17 Admitted Liability (Negligence) 17-1
M Civ JI 17.01 Admitted Liability...................................................................................................................................... 17-2
CHAPTER 19 Premises Liability (Negligence) 19-1
M Civ JI 19.01 Invitee, Licensee, Trespasser—Definitions (Relationship Disputed)......................................................... 19-2
M Civ JI 19.02 Possessor of Land—Definition .................................................................................................................. 19-4
M Civ JI 19.03 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Invitee....................................................... 19-5
M Civ JI 19.04 Duty of Plaintiff to Use Ordinary Care in Self-Service Store or Store Displaying Goods [ Instruction Deleted ]
19-6
M Civ JI 19.05 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to a Business Invitee Regarding the Natural
Accumulation of Ice and Snow......................................................................................................................................... 19-7
M Civ JI 19.06 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Licensee.................................................... 19-8
M Civ JI 19.07 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Trespasser .............................................. 19-10
M Civ JI 19.07A Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Child Trespasser for Artificial Conditions. 19-
12
M Civ JI 19.08 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Trespasser Whose Presence Is Known or Should
Have Been Known to Possessor [ Instruction Deleted ] ................................................................................................. 19-13
M Civ JI 19.09 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Persons Traveling along Adjacent Street or Way
19-14
M Civ JI 19.10 Nondelegable Duty of Possessor or Occupier of Land, Premises, or Place of Business.......................... 19-15
M Civ JI 19.11 Landlord’s Nondelegable Duty for Negligent Repairs Made by an Independent Contractor ................. 19-16
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 25 Products Liability 25-1
M Civ JI 25.01 Definition of Proximate Cause—Warranty ............................................................................................... 25-2
M Civ JI 25.02 More Than One Proximate Cause—Warranty .......................................................................................... 25-3
M Civ JI 25.03 Causation—Multiple Defendants with Warranty and Negligence Counts................................................ 25-4
M Civ JI 25.04 Causation—Multiple Defendants with Warranty Counts Only................................................................. 25-5
M Civ JI 25.11 Express Warranty—Definition .................................................................................................................. 25-6
M Civ JI 25.12 Express Warranty—Burden of Proof......................................................................................................... 25-8
M Civ JI 25.21 Implied Warranty—Definition ................................................................................................................ 25-10
M Civ JI 25.22 Implied Warranty—Burden of Proof....................................................................................................... 25-12
M Civ JI 25.31 Negligent Production—Definition........................................................................................................... 25-14
M Civ JI 25.32 Negligent Production—Burden of Proof................................................................................................. 25-15
M Civ JI 25.41 Comparative Negligence—Burden of Proof [ Instruction Deleted ] ....................................................... 25-18
M Civ JI 25.45 Breach of Warranty: Comparative Fault—Burden of Proof (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or After March 28,
1996) .............................................................................................................................................................................. 25-19
CHAPTER 30 Malpractice 30-1
M Civ JI 30.01 Professional Negligence/Malpractice ....................................................................................................... 30-2
M Civ JI 30.02 Informed Consent ..................................................................................................................................... 30-3
M Civ JI 30.03 Burden of Proof......................................................................................................................................... 30-4
M Civ JI 30.04 Medical Malpractice: Cautionary Instruction on Medical Uncertainties .................................................. 30-5
M Civ JI 30.05 Medical Malpractice: Permissible Inference of Malpractice from Circumstantial Evidence (Res Ipsa Loquitur)
30-6
M Civ JI 30.10 Medical Malpractice: Exceptions to Cap................................................................................................... 30-7
M Civ JI 30.20 Medical Malpractice: Loss of Opportunity to Survive or Achieve a Better Result [ Instruction Deleted ] 30-8
M Civ JI 30.30 Medical Malpractice: Vicarious Tort Liability Based on Ostensible Agency............................................ 30-10
CHAPTER 35 First-Party Benefits Action 35-1
Introductory Directions to the Court ............................................................................................................................... 35-2
M Civ JI 35.01 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Explanation of Statute.................................................................... 35-5
M Civ JI 35.02 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Burden of Proof............................................................................ 35-10
M Civ JI 35.03 No-Fault: Benefits from First-Party Actions ............................................................................................ 35-13
M Civ JI 35.04 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Statutory Interest......................................................................... 35-17
M Civ JI 35.05 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Damages—Setoff for Governmental Benefits [ Instruction Deleted ] ...
35-19
M Civ JI 35.06 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Damages—Setoff; Coordinated Benefits [ Instruction Deleted ] . 35-20
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 36 Third-Party Tort Action 36-1
Introductory Directions to the Court ............................................................................................................................... 36-2
M Civ JI 36.01 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Serious Impairment of Body Function—Definition (To Be Used in Cases in Which
1995 PA 222 Applies) ....................................................................................................................................................... 36-4
M Civ JI 36.01A No-Fault Auto Negligence: Serious Impairment of Body Function—Definition (To Be Used in Cases in Which
2019 PA 22 Applies) ......................................................................................................................................................... 36-7
M Civ JI 36.01B No-Fault Auto Negligence: Noneconomic Loss Damages for Non-Continuing Serious Impairment Threshold
Injury ................................................................................................................................................................................ 36-8
M Civ JI 36.02 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Mental or Emotional Injury............................................................................ 36-9
M Civ JI 36.03 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Permanent Serious Disfigurement............................................................... 36-10
M Civ JI 36.04 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Elements of Proof—Explanation of Noneconomic-Economic Distinction for
Michigan Resident Plaintiff ............................................................................................................................................ 36-11
M Civ JI 36.04A No-Fault Auto Negligence: Elements of Proof—Explanation of Noneconomic-Economic Distinction for Out-
of-State Resident Plaintiff .............................................................................................................................................. 36-13
M Civ JI 36.05 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Noneconomic Loss (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995 PA 222
Does Not Apply) ............................................................................................................................................................. 36-14
M Civ JI 36.06 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Economic and/or Noneconomic Loss for Michigan Resident
Plaintiff ........................................................................................................................................................................... 36-15
M Civ JI 36.06A No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Economic and Non-Economic Loss of Out-of-State Resident
Plaintiff ........................................................................................................................................................................... 36-19
M Civ JI 36.11 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Serious Impairment of Body Function—Definition (To Be Used in Cases in Which
1995 PA 222 Applies) ..................................................................................................................................................... 36-22
M Civ JI 36.15 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Economic and/or Noneconomic Loss ............................. 36-23
CHAPTER 38 Agency 38-1
M Civ JI 38.01 Agency Relationship: Definitions of Agent and Principal.......................................................................... 38-2
M Civ JI 38.10 Agency: Apparent Agency Relationship .................................................................................................... 38-3
M Civ JI 38.20 Vicarious Tort Liability Based on Ostensible Agency (For Cases Other Than Medical Malpractice) ......... 38-4
CHAPTER 40 Multiple Plaintiffs 40-1
M Civ JI 40.01 Two or More Plaintiffs—Separate Consideration—Repeating Instructions ............................................. 40-2
M Civ JI 40.02 Assessment of Damages ........................................................................................................................... 40-3
CHAPTER 41 Multiple Defendants 41-1
M Civ JI 41.01 Two or More Defendants—Separate Consideration—Repeating Instructions......................................... 41-2
M Civ JI 41.02 Damages Where There Is No Allocation of Fault Between Defendants ................................................... 41-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 41.03 Multiple Parties and Pleadings Where Jury May Not Be Able to Apportion Damages [ Instruction Deleted ].
41-4
M Civ JI 41.04 Damages Not to Be Allocated Among Joint Tort-Feasors [ Instruction Deleted ] ..................................... 41-5
CHAPTER 42 Allocation of Fault (Personal Injury Action) 42-1
M Civ JI 42.01 Allocation of Fault of Parties..................................................................................................................... 42-2
M Civ JI 42.05 Allocation of Fault of Parties and Identified Nonparties........................................................................... 42-3
CHAPTER 43 Contribution Among Tort-Feasors 43-1
M Civ JI 43.01A Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault [ Instruction Deleted ] .......................................... 43-2
M Civ JI 43.01B Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault (Bifurcation) [ Instruction Deleted ] ..................... 43-4
CHAPTER 45 Wrongful Death 45-1
M Civ JI 45.01 Wrongful Death—Explanation of Statute ................................................................................................. 45-2
M Civ JI 45.02 Wrongful Death—Damages ...................................................................................................................... 45-3
CHAPTER 50 Basic Instructions—Person and Property 50-1
Damages Introduction...................................................................................................................................................... 50-2
M Civ JI 50.01 Measure of Damages—Personal and Property......................................................................................... 50-3
M Civ JI 50.02 Elements of Damage — Pain and Suffering, Etc........................................................................................ 50-5
M Civ JI 50.03 Elements of Damage—Disability and Disfigurement ................................................................................ 50-7
M Civ JI 50.04 Element of Damage—Aggravation of Preexisting Ailment or Condition .................................................. 50-8
M Civ JI 50.05 Element of Damage—Medical Expenses .................................................................................................. 50-9
M Civ JI 50.06 Element of Damage—Loss of Earning Capacity—Past and Future—Adult Plaintiff, Emancipated Minor .. 50-
10
M Civ JI 50.07 Element of Damage—Loss of Future Earning Capacity—Unemancipated Minor Plaintiff ..................... 50-11
M Civ JI 50.08 Element of Damage—Miscellaneous Expense........................................................................................ 50-12
M Civ JI 50.09 Element of Damage—Personal Property ................................................................................................ 50-13
M Civ JI 50.10 Defendant Takes the Plaintiff As He/She Finds Him/Her........................................................................ 50-14
M Civ JI 50.11 Inability to Determine Extent of Aggravation of Injuries ........................................................................ 50-15
M Civ JI 50.21 Personal Injury Action: Definition of Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss Damages; Separation of Future
Damages by Year............................................................................................................................................................ 50-16
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 51 Property Damage 51-1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 51-2
M Civ JI 51.01 Measure of Damages—Personal Property................................................................................................ 51-3
M Civ JI 51.02 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Cost of Repair Less Than Difference in Value... 51-4
M Civ JI 51.03 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Irreparable Damage with Salvage .................... 51-5
M Civ JI 51.04 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Irreparable Damage and No Salvage................ 51-6
M Civ JI 51.05 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Dispute Whether Cost of Repair Is Less Than
Difference in Value........................................................................................................................................................... 51-7
M Civ JI 51.06 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Cost of Repair with Loss in Value after Repair . 51-8
M Civ JI 51.07 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Dispute Whether Cost of Repair plus Loss in Value
after Repair Is Less Than Difference in Value................................................................................................................... 51-9
CHAPTER 52 Injury to Spouse or Parent 52-1
M Civ JI 52.01 Measure of Damages—Injury to Spouse................................................................................................... 52-2
M Civ JI 52.02 Measure of Damages for Child of Injured Parent ..................................................................................... 52-4
CHAPTER 53 Particular Factors in Computing Damages 53-1
M Civ JI 53.01 Statutory Mortality Table—Injury Case [ Instruction Deleted ] ................................................................ 53-2
M Civ JI 53.02 Statutory Mortality Table—Death Case [ Instruction Deleted ]................................................................ 53-3
M Civ JI 53.03 Future Damages (Non-personal Injury Action)—Reduction to Present Cash Value ................................. 53-4
M Civ JI 53.03A Future Damages (Personal Injury Action)—Reduction to Present Cash Value....................................... 53-5
M Civ JI 53.04 Interest—As Part of Damages................................................................................................................... 53-6
M Civ JI 53.05 Mitigation of Damages—Failure to Exercise Ordinary Care ..................................................................... 53-8
M Civ JI 53.06 Effect of Inflation on Future Damages ...................................................................................................... 53-9
CHAPTER 60 Jury Deliberations 60-1
M Civ JI 60.01 Jury Deliberations ..................................................................................................................................... 60-2
M Civ JI 60.01A Cameras in the Courtroom ..................................................................................................................... 60-5
M Civ JI 60.02 Deadlocked Jury ........................................................................................................................................ 60-6
CHAPTER 65 Forms of Verdicts: General 65-1
M Civ JI 65.01 Forms of Verdicts: Single Defendant without Counterclaim [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]......................... 65-2
M Civ JI 65.02 Forms of Verdicts: Single Defendant with Counterclaim [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] .............................. 65-3
M Civ JI 65.03 Forms of Verdicts: Multiple Defendants with No Counterclaims [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] ................. 65-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 65.04 Forms of Verdicts: Multiple Defendants with One or More Counterclaims [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] . 65-5
CHAPTER 66 Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence 66-1
M Civ JI 66.01 Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence................................................................................................ 66-2
M Civ JI 66.01A Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence (Personal Injury Action)....................................................... 66-4
M Civ JI 66.02 Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence—Property Damage (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or after March
28, 1996) ........................................................................................................................................................................ 66-10
M Civ JI 66.03 Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence—Personal Injury Action (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or after
March 28, 1996) ............................................................................................................................................................. 66-13
CHAPTER 67 Forms of Verdicts: Michigan No-Fault Automobile Insurance Law 67-1
M Civ JI 67.01 Form of Verdict: No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action .............................................................................. 67-2
M Civ JI 67.02 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Noneconomic Loss [ Form of Verdict Deleted ].................. 67-6
M Civ JI 67.02A Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Noneconomic Loss (and Allocation of Fault) [ Form of Verdict
Deleted ]........................................................................................................................................................................... 67-7
M Civ JI 67.03 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic Loss [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]......................... 67-8
M Civ JI 67.03A Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic Loss (and Allocation of Fault) [ Form of Verdict
Deleted ]........................................................................................................................................................................... 67-9
M Civ JI 67.04 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
67-10
M Civ JI 67.04A Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss (and Allocation of Fault)
[ Form of Verdict Deleted ] ............................................................................................................................................ 67-11
M Civ JI 67.15 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss—Comparative Negligence
Not an Issue [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]........................................................................................................................ 67-12
M Civ JI 67.16 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss—and Comparative
Negligence/Multiple Defendants/Allocation of Fault (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995 PA 222 Applies) [ Form of Verdict
Deleted ]......................................................................................................................................................................... 67-13
M Civ JI 67.17 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: (As Applicable) Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss—and
Comparative Negligence/Single or Multiple Defendants/Allocation of Fault................................................................ 67-14
CHAPTER 68 Forms of Verdicts: Product Liability 68-1
M Civ JI 68.01 Form of Verdict: Products Liability............................................................................................................ 68-2
M Civ JI 68.01A Form of Verdict: Products Liability (Personal Injury Action)................................................................... 68-4
M Civ JI 68.03 Form of Verdict: Products Liability—Personal Injury Action (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or After March 28,
1996) ................................................................................................................................................................................ 68-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 70 Forms of Verdicts: Medical Malpractice 70-1
M Civ JI 70.01 Form of Verdict: Special Questions in Medical Malpractice Cases (Limitation on Noneconomic Damages) ...
70-2
CHAPTER 72 Forms of Verdicts: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors 72-1
M Civ JI 72.01A Form of Verdict: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] ....... 72-2
M Civ JI 72.01B Form of Verdict: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault (Bifurcation) [ Form of Verdict
Deleted ]........................................................................................................................................................................... 72-3
CHAPTER 73 Forms of Verdicts: Damages of Spouse of Injured Plaintiff 73-1
M Civ JI 73.01 Form of Verdict: Damages of Spouse of Injured Plaintiff.......................................................................... 73-2
CHAPTER 75 Dram Shop Actions 75-1
Dram Shop Actions—Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 75-2
M Civ JI 75.01 Dram Shop—Explanation of Statute ....................................................................................................... 75-10
M Civ JI 75.02 Dram Shop—Definitions ......................................................................................................................... 75-11
M Civ JI 75.11 Dram Shop—Sale to Minor: Burden of Proof.......................................................................................... 75-13
M Civ JI 75.12 Dram Shop—Sale to Visibly Intoxicated Person: Burden of Proof .......................................................... 75-15
M Civ JI 75.13 Dram Shop—Contributing to Occurrence Not a Defense ....................................................................... 75-16
CHAPTER 80 Dog Bite Actions 80-1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 80-2
M Civ JI 80.01 Dog Bite Statute—Explanation ................................................................................................................. 80-3
M Civ JI 80.02 Dog Bite Statute—Burden of Proof........................................................................................................... 80-4
M Civ JI 80.03 Dog Bite Statute—Definition of Provocation ............................................................................................ 80-5
M Civ JI 80.04 Dog Bite Statute—Lawfully on Property ................................................................................................... 80-6
M Civ JI 80.05 Dog Bite Statute—Lawfully on Property of Dog Owner............................................................................ 80-7
CHAPTER 85 Emergency Vehicles 85-1
M Civ JI 85.01 Exemption of Emergency Vehicles from Certain Statutory Regulations................................................... 85-2
M Civ JI 85.02 Requirement of Due Care by Operator of an Emergency Vehicle ............................................................ 85-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 90 Condemnation 90-1
Introductory Directions to the Court ............................................................................................................................... 90-3
M Civ JI 90.01 Pretrial Instruction: Nature of Condemnation Action............................................................................... 90-5
M Civ JI 90.02 Power of Eminent Domain ........................................................................................................................ 90-7
M Civ JI 90.03 Burden of Proof [ Recommend No Instruction ] ....................................................................................... 90-8
M Civ JI 90.04 Absence of Fault........................................................................................................................................ 90-9
M Civ JI 90.05 Just Compensation—Definition .............................................................................................................. 90-10
M Civ JI 90.06 Market Value—Definition ....................................................................................................................... 90-11
M Civ JI 90.07 Special Purpose Property ........................................................................................................................ 90-12
M Civ JI 90.08 Assessed Value........................................................................................................................................ 90-13
M Civ JI 90.09 Highest and Best Use .............................................................................................................................. 90-14
M Civ JI 90.10 Possibility of Rezoning ............................................................................................................................ 90-15
M Civ JI 90.11 Refusal to Rezone.................................................................................................................................... 90-16
M Civ JI 90.12 Partial Taking........................................................................................................................................... 90-17
M Civ JI 90.13 Date of Valuation .................................................................................................................................... 90-19
M Civ JI 90.14 Date of Valuation: Early Date of Taking .................................................................................................. 90-20
M Civ JI 90.15 Effect of Proposed Public Improvement ................................................................................................. 90-21
M Civ JI 90.16 Comparable Market Transactions........................................................................................................... 90-22
M Civ JI 90.17 Easements............................................................................................................................................... 90-24
M Civ JI 90.18 Total Taking............................................................................................................................................. 90-25
M Civ JI 90.19 Benefits ................................................................................................................................................... 90-26
M Civ JI 90.20 Compensation for Fixtures; Definition.................................................................................................... 90-27
M Civ JI 90.21 Fixtures: Election to Remove—Compensation ....................................................................................... 90-28
M Civ JI 90.22 Effect of View .......................................................................................................................................... 90-29
M Civ JI 90.22A Valuation Witnesses [DELETED]............................................................................................................ 90-30
M Civ JI 90.23 Range of Testimony ................................................................................................................................ 90-31
M Civ JI 90.24 Mechanics of Verdict .............................................................................................................................. 90-32
M Civ JI 90.30 Going Concern......................................................................................................................................... 90-33
M Civ JI 90.31 Business Interruption.............................................................................................................................. 90-34
CHAPTER 97 Child Protection Proceedings 97-1
M Civ JI 97.01 Preliminary Instructions to Prospective Jurors ......................................................................................... 97-4
M Civ JI 97.02 Selection of Fair and Impartial Jury........................................................................................................... 97-5
M Civ JI 97.03 Challenges ................................................................................................................................................. 97-6
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 97.04 Brief Description ....................................................................................................................................... 97-7
M Civ JI 97.05 Introduction to Parties, Counsel, and Witnesses...................................................................................... 97-8
M Civ JI 97.06 Reading of Petition.................................................................................................................................... 97-9
M Civ JI 97.07 Juror Oath Before Voir Dire .................................................................................................................... 97-10
M Civ JI 97.08 Seating of Jurors...................................................................................................................................... 97-11
M Civ JI 97.09 Juror Oath Following Selection ............................................................................................................... 97-12
M Civ JI 97.10 Description of Trial Procedure ................................................................................................................ 97-13
M Civ JI 97.11 Function of Judge and Jury...................................................................................................................... 97-14
M Civ JI 97.12 Jury Must Only Consider Evidence; What Evidence Is; Prohibited Actions by Jurors ............................. 97-15
M Civ JI 97.13 Judging Credibility and Weight of Evidence............................................................................................ 97-18
M Civ JI 97.14 Questions Not Evidence .......................................................................................................................... 97-20
M Civ JI 97.15 Court’s Questioning Not Reflective of Opinion....................................................................................... 97-21
M Civ JI 97.16 Questions by Jurors Allowed................................................................................................................... 97-22
M Civ JI 97.17 Objections ............................................................................................................................................... 97-23
M Civ JI 97.18 Disregard Out-of-Presence Hearings ...................................................................................................... 97-24
M Civ JI 97.19 Jurors Not to Discuss Case ...................................................................................................................... 97-25
M Civ JI 97.20 Recesses .................................................................................................................................................. 97-27
M Civ JI 97.21 Caution about Publicity in Cases of Public Interest................................................................................. 97-28
M Civ JI 97.22 Visiting Scene/Conducting Experiments ................................................................................................. 97-29
M Civ JI 97.23 Notetaking by Jurors Allowed ................................................................................................................. 97-30
M Civ JI 97.24 Notetaking Not Allowed.......................................................................................................................... 97-31
M Civ JI 97.25 Inability to Hear Witness or See Exhibit.................................................................................................. 97-32
M Civ JI 97.26 Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel......................................................................................... 97-33
M Civ JI 97.27 Number of Jurors .................................................................................................................................... 97-34
M Civ JI 97.28 Instructions to be Taken as a Whole....................................................................................................... 97-35
M Civ JI 97.29 Deliberations and Verdict ....................................................................................................................... 97-36
M Civ JI 97.30 Maintaining an Open Mind ..................................................................................................................... 97-37
M Civ JI 97.31 Duties of Judge and Jury ......................................................................................................................... 97-38
M Civ JI 97.32 Evidence.................................................................................................................................................. 97-39
M Civ JI 97.33 Witnesses-Credibility .............................................................................................................................. 97-41
M Civ JI 97.34 Circumstantial Evidence.......................................................................................................................... 97-43
M Civ JI 97.35 Statutory Grounds................................................................................................................................... 97-44
M Civ JI 97.36 Definitions ............................................................................................................................................... 97-46
M Civ JI 97.37 Standard of Proof.................................................................................................................................... 97-48
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 97.38 No Duty to Present Evidence .................................................................................................................. 97-49
M Civ JI 97.39 Treatment of One Child as Evidence of Treatment of Another Child ..................................................... 97-50
M Civ JI 97.40 Improvement in Circumstances Not Controlling..................................................................................... 97-51
M Civ JI 97.41 Not Necessary to Prove Each Fact Alleged.............................................................................................. 97-52
M Civ JI 97.42 Unfit Home by Reason of Neglect or Cruelty—Res Ipsa Loquitur........................................................... 97-53
M Civ JI 97.43 Findings Re: Statutory Grounds .............................................................................................................. 97-54
M Civ JI 97.43A Legitimate Practice of Religious Beliefs ............................................................................................... 97-56
M Civ JI 97.44 Court to Determine Disposition .............................................................................................................. 97-57
M Civ JI 97.45 Not a Criminal Proceeding ...................................................................................................................... 97-58
M Civ JI 97.46 Deliberations and Verdict ....................................................................................................................... 97-59
M Civ JI 97.47 Communications with the Court ............................................................................................................. 97-61
M Civ JI 97.48 Exhibits.................................................................................................................................................... 97-62
M Civ JI 97.49 Verdict..................................................................................................................................................... 97-63
M Civ JI 97.50 Dismissal of Extra Juror ........................................................................................................................... 97-64
M Civ JI 97.51 Bailiff’s Oath............................................................................................................................................ 97-65
M Civ JI 97.52 Begin Deliberations ................................................................................................................................. 97-66
M Civ JI 97.60 Form of Verdict: Statutory Grounds Alleged........................................................................................... 97-67
M Civ JI 97.61 Form of Verdict: One Statutory Ground Alleged [ Instruction Deleted] ................................................. 97-71
CHAPTER 100 Rent Action—Residential Property 100-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 100-2
M Civ JI 100.01 Rent Action: Explanation of Statutes; Defense of Failure to Keep Premises Fit for Use Intended / Failure to
Repair / Noncompliance with Health or Safety Laws / Retaliatory Rent Increase......................................................... 100-7
M Civ JI 100.02 Rent Action: Burden of Proof................................................................................................................ 100-9
CHAPTER 101 Termination Action—Residential Property 101-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 101-2
M Civ JI 101.01 Termination Action: Explanation of Statutes ........................................................................................ 101-7
M Civ JI 101.02 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—Explanation of Statute................................................ 101-8
M Civ JI 101.03 Termination Action: Issues—Notice of Termination / Retaliatory Termination................................. 101-10
M Civ JI 101.04 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—Tenant Burden of Proof ........................................... 101-11
M Civ JI 101.05 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—Landlord Burden of Proof......................................... 101-13
M Civ JI 101.06 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—Tenant Burden of Proof on Complaint within Ninety Days..
101-15
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 105 Employment Discrimination 105-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 105-3
M Civ JI 105.01 Employment Discrimination Statute (Disparate Treatment)—Explanation.......................................... 105-4
M Civ JI 105.02 Employment Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)—Definition ......................................................... 105-5
M Civ JI 105.03 Employment Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)—Cautionary Instruction as to Business Judgment 105-
6
M Civ JI 105.04 Employment Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)—Burden of Proof................................................ 105-7
M Civ JI 105.04A Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof —Retaliation ............................................................ 105-8
M Civ JI 105.05 Employment Discrimination (Constructive Discharge)—Definition...................................................... 105-9
M Civ JI 105.10 Employment Discrimination—Sexual Harassment—Explanation....................................................... 105-10
M Civ JI 105.12 Employment Discrimination—Quid Pro Quo Harassment—Burden of Proof..................................... 105-11
M Civ JI 105.14 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—Burden of Proof—Employer
Defendant .................................................................................................................................................................... 105-13
M Civ JI 105.18 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—Burden of Proof—Unwelcome
Sexual Conduct or Communication.............................................................................................................................. 105-14
M Civ JI 105.20 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—Sexually Hostile Work
Environment................................................................................................................................................................. 105-15
M Civ JI 105.24 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—Employer Liability ........... 105-16
M Civ JI 105.26 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—Notice ............................. 105-17
M Civ JI 105.28 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—Prompt Remedial Action 105-18
M Civ JI 105.30 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—Damages—Tangible Employment
Act Not Required.......................................................................................................................................................... 105-19
M Civ JI 105.32 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—Burden of Proof—Employee
Defendant .................................................................................................................................................................... 105-20
M Civ JI 105.41 Employment Discrimination—Mitigation of Damages for Loss of Compensation.............................. 105-21
M Civ JI 105.42 Employment Discrimination—Mitigation of Damages for Loss of Compensation: Conditional and
Unconditional Offers by Defendant ............................................................................................................................. 105-23
CHAPTER 106 Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act 106-1
M Civ JI 106.01 Employment Discrimination Statute—Explanation .............................................................................. 106-3
M Civ JI 106.05 Employment Discrimination—Disability—Definition............................................................................ 106-4
M Civ JI 106.07A Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—Disability................................................................ 106-6
M Civ JI 106.07C Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—Physical or Mental Examinations .......................... 106-7
M Civ JI 106.07D Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—Accommodation.................................................... 106-8
M Civ JI 106.07E Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—Retaliation ........................................................... 106-10
M Civ JI 106.09 Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Duty of Employer ..................................... 106-11
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 106.11A Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Equipment or Device 106-12
M Civ JI 106.11B Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Equipment or Device 106-13
M Civ JI 106.11C Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Equipment or Device 106-14
M Civ JI 106.11D Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Readers or Interpreters 106-
15
M Civ JI 106.11E Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Reader or Interpreter 106-16
M Civ JI 106.21 Public Accommodation Statute—Explanation—Accommodation...................................................... 106-17
M Civ JI 106.23 Public Accommodation—Disability—Definition ................................................................................. 106-18
M Civ JI 106.25 Public Accommodation—Definition.................................................................................................... 106-19
M Civ JI 106.27 Public Service—Definition................................................................................................................... 106-20
M Civ JI 106.29 Public Accommodation—Burden of Proof.......................................................................................... 106-21
M Civ JI 106.29A Public Accommodation—Burden of Proof—Retaliation .................................................................. 106-22
M Civ JI 106.30 Educational Institution Statute—Explanation..................................................................................... 106-23
M Civ JI 106.31 Accommodation—Educational Institution—Definition ...................................................................... 106-25
M Civ JI 106.33 Accommodation—Educational Institution—Disability—Definition.................................................... 106-26
M Civ JI 106.35 Accommodation—Educational Institution—Burden of Proof ............................................................ 106-27
M Civ JI 106.36 Educational Institution—Burden of Proof—Retaliation ..................................................................... 106-28
CHAPTER 107 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act 107-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 107-2
M Civ JI 107.01 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Explanation ....................................................................................... 107-3
M Civ JI 107.02 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Protected Activity—Definition.......................................................... 107-4
M Civ JI 107.03 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Causation .......................................................................................... 107-6
M Civ JI 107.04 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Good Faith Belief .............................................................................. 107-7
M Civ JI 107.11 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Distinction in Standard of Proof Between “Report” and “About to Report”
107-8
M Civ JI 107.15 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Burden of Proof................................................................................. 107-9
CHAPTER 108 Public Accommodations 108-1
M Civ JI 108.01 Public Accommodation or Services; Prohibited Practices—Explanation .............................................. 108-2
M Civ JI 108.02 Public Accommodation—Definition...................................................................................................... 108-3
M Civ JI 108.03 Public Service—Definition..................................................................................................................... 108-4
M Civ JI 108.04 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Disparate Treatment—Definition................. 108-5
M Civ JI 108.06 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Burden Of Proof ........................................... 108-6
M Civ JI 108.06A Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination-Burden of Proof-Retaliation ......................... 108-7
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 108.07 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Sexual Harassment—Explanation ................ 108-8
M Civ JI 108.09 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Quid Pro Quo Harassment—Burden of Proof 108-
9
M Civ JI 108.11 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Hostile Environment Harassment—Burden of Proof
108-10
M Civ JI 108.12 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Hostile Environment Harassment—Unwelcome
Sexual Conduct or Communication—Definition .......................................................................................................... 108-11
M Civ JI 108.13 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Hostile Environment Harassment—Sexually Hostile
Environment—Definition ............................................................................................................................................. 108-12
CHAPTER 110 Wrongful Discharge 110-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 110-2
M Civ JI 110.01 Introductory Instruction Where Wrongful Discharge Is Combined with Other Claims ........................ 110-3
M Civ JI 110.05 Wrongful Discharge: Employment Relationship Terminable at Will Unless Terms or Conditions to the
Contrary ......................................................................................................................................................................... 110-4
M Civ JI 110.06 Wrongful Discharge: Employment Policies or Terms or Conditions of the Employment Contract ...... 110-5
M Civ JI 110.07 Wrongful Discharge: Employment Policies or Terms or Conditions of the Employment Contract—Express or
Implied ........................................................................................................................................................................... 110-7
M Civ JI 110.10 Wrongful Discharge: Good or Just Cause Contract or Policy—Burden of Proof ................................... 110-8
M Civ JI 110.11 Wrongful Discharge: Satisfaction Contract or Policy—Burden of Proof ............................................. 110-11
M Civ JI 110.12 Wrongful Discharge: Special Conditions or Performance Standards—Burden of Proof..................... 110-13
M Civ JI 110.13 Wrongful Discharge: Procedural Terms or Conditions—Burden of Proof .......................................... 110-14
M Civ JI 110.20 Wrongful Discharge: Mitigation of Damages [ No Instruction Prepared ].......................................... 110-15
CHAPTER 112 Franchise Investment Law 112-1
M Civ JI 112.01 Franchise Investment Law; Prohibited Practices—Explanation............................................................ 112-2
M Civ JI 112.02 Franchise—Definition ........................................................................................................................... 112-3
M Civ JI 112.03 Franchisee and Franchisor—Definition................................................................................................. 112-4
M Civ JI 112.04 Offer or Offer to Sell—Definition.......................................................................................................... 112-5
M Civ JI 112.05 Person—Definition................................................................................................................................ 112-6
M Civ JI 112.06 Sale or Sell—Definition ......................................................................................................................... 112-7
M Civ JI 112.07 Franchise Fee—Definition..................................................................................................................... 112-8
M Civ JI 112.08 Payment for Goods and Services as Franchise Fee ............................................................................... 112-9
M Civ JI 112.09 Payments That Do Not Constitute a Franchise Fee............................................................................. 112-10
M Civ JI 112.10 Franchise Investment Law—Burden of Proof ..................................................................................... 112-11
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 113 Consumer Protection Act 113-1
M Civ JI 113.01 Trade or Commerce; Prohibited Practices-Explanation........................................................................ 113-2
M Civ JI 113.02 Unfair, Unconscionable, or Deceptive Methods, Acts, or Practices ..................................................... 113-3
M Civ JI 113.03 Trade or Commerce-Definition ............................................................................................................. 113-4
M Civ JI 113.04 Loss—Definition ................................................................................................................................... 113-5
M Civ JI 113.05 Material—Definition ............................................................................................................................. 113-6
M Civ JI 113.07 Bona Fide Error—Definition.................................................................................................................. 113-7
M Civ JI 113.09 Unfair, Unconscionable, or Deceptive Methods, Acts, or Practices—Burden of Proof ........................ 113-8
CHAPTER 114 Invasion of Privacy Act 114-1
M Civ JI 114.01 Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion into Another’s Private Affairs—Elements ............................................ 114-2
M Civ JI 114.02 Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion Into Another’s Private Affairs—Burden of Proof ................................. 114-3
M Civ JI 114.03 Invasion of Privacy—Public Disclosure of Private Facts—Elements ..................................................... 114-4
M Civ JI 114.04 Invasion of Privacy—Public Disclosure of Private Facts—Burden of Proof........................................... 114-5
M Civ JI 114.05 Invasion of Privacy—Publicity Which Places Plaintiff in a False Light—Elements ................................ 114-6
M Civ JI 114.06 Invasion of Privacy—Publicity Which Places Plaintiff in a False Light—Burden of Proof...................... 114-7
CHAPTER 115 Assault and Battery 115-1
M Civ JI 115.01 Assault—Definition ............................................................................................................................... 115-2
M Civ JI 115.02 Battery—Definition ............................................................................................................................... 115-3
M Civ JI 115.05 Assault and Battery—Defense of Self-Defense..................................................................................... 115-4
M Civ JI 115.06 Assault and Battery—Defense of Consent by Voluntarily Entering a Mutual Affray ............................ 115-5
M Civ JI 115.07 Assault and Battery—Provocation by Mere Words Not a Defense ...................................................... 115-6
M Civ JI 115.08 Assault and Battery—Defense— Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest.................................................... 115-7
M Civ JI 115.09 Battery—Defense—Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officer in Lawful Arrest .................................. 115-8
M Civ JI 115.20 Assault—Burden of Proof ..................................................................................................................... 115-9
M Civ JI 115.21 Battery—Burden of Proof ................................................................................................................... 115-10
M Civ JI 115.30 Partial Privilege of Merchant as to Exemplary Damages and Damages for Mental Anguish—False Arrest,
False Imprisonment, Assault, Battery, Libel, Slander................................................................................................... 115-11
CHAPTER 116 False Arrest and Imprisonment 116-1
M Civ JI 116.01 False Arrest—Definition........................................................................................................................ 116-2
M Civ JI 116.02 False Imprisonment—Definition ........................................................................................................... 116-3
M Civ JI 116.05 False Arrest—Law Enforcement Officer—Probable Cause to Arrest for Felony without Warrant....... 116-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 116.06 False Arrest—Defense—Right of Private Citizen to Arrest ................................................................... 116-6
M Civ JI 116.07 False Arrest—Arrest with Warrant ....................................................................................................... 116-7
M Civ JI 116.20 False Arrest—Burden of Proof .............................................................................................................. 116-8
M Civ JI 116.21 False Imprisonment—Burden of Proof ................................................................................................. 116-9
CHAPTER 117 Malicious Prosecution 117-1
M Civ JI 117.01 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding....................................................................................... 117-2
M Civ JI 117.02 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding: Burden of Proof ........................................................... 117-3
M Civ JI 117.03 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding: Termination in Favor of Accused................................. 117-5
M Civ JI 117.04 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding: Probable Cause............................................................ 117-6
M Civ JI 117.20 Malicious Prosecution—Civil Proceeding.............................................................................................. 117-8
M Civ JI 117.21 Malicious Prosecution—Civil Proceeding—Burden of Proof ................................................................ 117-9
CHAPTER 118 Libel and Slander 118-1
M Civ JI 118.01 Libel—Definition ................................................................................................................................... 118-2
M Civ JI 118.02 Slander—Definition............................................................................................................................... 118-3
M Civ JI 118.03 Libel, Slander—Statement of and Concerning the Plaintiff .................................................................. 118-4
M Civ JI 118.04 Libel, Slander—Meaning of a Statement .............................................................................................. 118-5
M Civ JI 118.05 Libel, Slander—Burden of Proof ........................................................................................................... 118-6
M Civ JI 118.06 Libel or Slander of Public Figure or Public Person (Actual Malice) ....................................................... 118-8
M Civ JI 118.07 Libel, Slander—Common-Law Qualified Privilege (Actual Malice) ..................................................... 118-10
M Civ JI 118.08 Libel or Slander of Private Person—Nonprivileged Communication .................................................. 118-11
M Civ JI 118.19 Libel-Actual Damages (Public Figure or Public Person)....................................................................... 118-12
M Civ JI 118.20 Libel—Economic Damages (Private Individual)................................................................................... 118-13
M Civ JI 118.21 Libel—Exemplary Damages................................................................................................................. 118-14
CHAPTER 119 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 119-1
M Civ JI 119.01 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress—Burden of Proof ............................................................. 119-2
CHAPTER 125 Tortious Interference With Contract 125-1
M Civ JI 125.01 Tortious Interference with Contract: Elements .................................................................................... 125-2
M Civ JI 125.02 Tortious Interference with Contract: Contract/Consideration—Definitions ........................................ 125-3
M Civ JI 125.03 Tortious Interference with Contract: Intent—Definition...................................................................... 125-4
M Civ JI 125.04 Tortious Interference with Contract: Improper—Definition ................................................................ 125-5
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 125.05 Tortious Interference with Contract: Breach—Definition .................................................................... 125-7
CHAPTER 126 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy 126-1
M Civ JI 126.01 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy: Elements ........................................ 126-2
M Civ JI 126.02 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy: Business Relationship or Expectancy—
Definition........................................................................................................................................................................ 126-4
M Civ JI 126.03 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy: Intent—Definition.......................... 126-5
M Civ JI 126.04 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy: Improper—Definition .................... 126-6
CHAPTER 128 Fraud and Misrepresentation 128-1
M Civ JI 128.01 Fraud Based on False Representation................................................................................................... 128-2
M Civ JI 128.02 Fraud Based on Failure to Disclose Facts (Silent Fraud)........................................................................ 128-4
M Civ JI 128.03 Fraud Based on Bad-Faith Promise ....................................................................................................... 128-6
M Civ JI 128.04 Innocent Misrepresentation ................................................................................................................. 128-8
M Civ JI 128.10 Material Fact—Definition ..................................................................................................................... 128-9
M Civ JI 128.11 Reliance—Definition ........................................................................................................................... 128-10
CHAPTER 130 Promissory Estoppel 130-1
M Civ JI 130.01 Promissory Estoppel.............................................................................................................................. 130-2
M Civ JI 130.05 Promissory Estoppel: Promise—Definition........................................................................................... 130-5
CHAPTER 140 Contract Action—UCC 140-1
M Civ JI 140.01 Contract Action—UCC: Explanation and Burden of Proof .................................................................... 140-3
M Civ JI 140.02 Contract Action—UCC: Offer and Acceptance...................................................................................... 140-5
M Civ JI 140.03 Contract Action—UCC: Acceptance with Different or Additional Terms.............................................. 140-6
M Civ JI 140.04 Contract Action—UCC: Enforceability of Contract: Statute of Frauds.................................................. 140-7
M Civ JI 140.05 Contract Action—UCC: Contract Terms—Written Acceptance or Confirmation with Different or Additional
Terms ............................................................................................................................................................................. 140-9
M Civ JI 140.11 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Acceptance of Nonconforming Goods.............................................. 140-11
M Civ JI 140.12 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Revocation of Acceptance ................................................................ 140-13
M Civ JI 140.13 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Rejection of Goods—Installment Contract....................................... 140-15
M Civ JI 140.14 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Rejection of Goods or Part of the Goods.......................................... 140-17
M Civ JI 140.15 Contract Action—UCC: Anticipatory Repudiation—Definition ........................................................... 140-19
M Civ JI 140.21 Contract Action—UCC: Lost or Damaged Goods (Risk of Loss—Absence of Breach) ......................... 140-20
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 140.22 Contract Action—UCC: Lost or Damaged Goods (Risk of Loss—Seller’s Breach) ............................... 140-22
M Civ JI 140.23 Contract Action—UCC: Lost or Damaged Goods (Risk of Loss—Buyer’s Breach) ............................... 140-23
M Civ JI 140.31 Contract Action—UCC: Resale by Seller—Private Sale ....................................................................... 140-24
M Civ JI 140.32 Contract Action—UCC: Resale by Seller—Public Sale......................................................................... 140-25
M Civ JI 140.41 Contract Action—UCC: Express Warranty—Definition....................................................................... 140-26
M Civ JI 140.42 Contract Action—UCC: Express Warranty—Burden of Proof ............................................................. 140-27
M Civ JI 140.43 Contract Action—UCC: Implied Warranty of Merchantability—Definition ........................................ 140-28
M Civ JI 140.44 Contract Action—UCC: Implied Warranty of Merchantability—Elimination or Modification ............ 140-29
M Civ JI 140.45 Contract Action—UCC: Implied Warranty of Merchantability—Burden of Proof .............................. 140-31
M Civ JI 140.51 Contract Action—UCC: Warranty of Title (Ownership)....................................................................... 140-33
M Civ JI 140.52 Contract Action—UCC: Warranty of Title (Encumbrances) ................................................................ 140-34
M Civ JI 140.53 Contract Action—UCC: Warranty of Title (Ownership and Encumbrances—Burden of Proof).......... 140-35
CHAPTER 141 Contract Damages—UCC 141-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 141-2
M Civ JI 141.01 Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Delivery of Nonconforming Goods Which the Buyer Accepts—
Buyer’s Damages............................................................................................................................................................ 141-3
M Civ JI 141.02 Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Failure to Deliver/Repudiation/Delivery of Nonconforming
Goods Rejected/Acceptance Rightfully Revoked—Buyer’s Damages............................................................................ 141-5
M Civ JI 141.11 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonpayment after Acceptance—Seller’s Action for Price 141-
7
M Civ JI 141.12 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonpayment—Goods Identified to the Contract—No Resale—
Seller’s Action for Price .................................................................................................................................................. 141-8
M Civ JI 141.13 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonpayment—Lost or Damaged Goods—Seller’s Action for
Price ............................................................................................................................................................................... 141-9
M Civ JI 141.14 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonacceptance or Repudiation—Seller Resells— Seller’s
Damages....................................................................................................................................................................... 141-10
M Civ JI 141.15 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonacceptance or Repudiation—Seller’s Damages .... 141-11
CHAPTER 142 Contracts 142-1
M Civ JI 142.01 Introduction and Burden of Proof......................................................................................................... 142-3
M Civ JI 142.10 Offer—Defined...................................................................................................................................... 142-5
M Civ JI 142.11 Duration of Offer................................................................................................................................... 142-6
M Civ JI 142.12 Revocation of Offer............................................................................................................................... 142-7
M Civ JI 142.13 Acceptance............................................................................................................................................ 142-8
M Civ JI 142.14 Time of Acceptance............................................................................................................................... 142-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 142.15 Counteroffer ....................................................................................................................................... 142-10
M Civ JI 142.16 Consideration...................................................................................................................................... 142-11
M Civ JI 142.17 Adequacy of Consideration................................................................................................................. 142-12
M Civ JI 142.18 Need Not Be in Writing ....................................................................................................................... 142-13
M Civ JI 142.19 Modification........................................................................................................................................ 142-14
M Civ JI 142.20 Breach of Contract/Substantial Performance..................................................................................... 142-16
M Civ JI 142.21 Time of Performance .......................................................................................................................... 142-17
M Civ JI 142.22 Conditions Precedent.......................................................................................................................... 142-18
M Civ JI 142.30 Introduction to Damages .................................................................................................................... 142-19
M Civ JI 142.31 Contract Damages: Benefit of Bargain................................................................................................ 142-20
M Civ JI 142.32 Lost Profits .......................................................................................................................................... 142-21
M Civ JI 142.33 Reliance Damages ............................................................................................................................... 142-22
M Civ JI 142.34 Consequential Damages...................................................................................................................... 142-23
M Civ JI 142.35 Mitigation............................................................................................................................................ 142-24
M Civ JI 142.40 Duress ................................................................................................................................................. 142-25
M Civ JI 142.41 Waiver................................................................................................................................................. 142-26
M Civ JI 142.42 Impracticability ................................................................................................................................... 142-27
M Civ JI 142.43 Frustration of Purpose ........................................................................................................................ 142-28
M Civ JI 142.50 Introduction to Contract Interpretation ............................................................................................. 142-29
M Civ JI 142.51 Must Consider All Parts of Contract.................................................................................................... 142-30
M Civ JI 142.52 Effect of Incorporated Documents...................................................................................................... 142-31
M Civ JI 142.53 Words Given Ordinary Meaning ......................................................................................................... 142-32
M CIV JI 142.53A Giving Effect to Every Word ............................................................................................................. 142-33
M Civ JI 142.54 Custom and Usage of Trade / Business / Industry .............................................................................. 142-34
M Civ JI 142.55 Conduct of Parties............................................................................................................................... 142-35
M CIV JI 142.56 Determining the Meaning of Ambiguous Language in an Agreement ............................................... 142-36
M CIV JI 142.57 Interpretation Against the Drafter ..................................................................................................... 142-37
M Civ JI 142.60 Affirmative Defense—Release ............................................................................................................ 142-38
M Civ JI 142.61 Affirmative Defense—Failure of Performance.................................................................................. 142-39
CHAPTER 143 Sales Representatives' and Commissions Act 143-1
M Civ JI 143.01 Commission—Defined .......................................................................................................................... 143-2
M Civ JI 143.02 Principal—Defined ................................................................................................................................ 143-3
M Civ JI 143.03 Sales Representative—Defined............................................................................................................. 143-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 143.10 Payment of Commissions Due At The Time of Contract Termination .................................................. 143-5
M Civ JI 143.11 Payment of Commissions That Become Due After Contract Termination............................................ 143-6
M Civ JI 143.12 When Commissions Become Due ......................................................................................................... 143-7
M Civ JI 143.20 Failure to Pay Commissions Due At Time of Termination..................................................................... 143-8
M Civ JI 143.21 Failure to Pay Commissions Due After Termination ............................................................................. 143-9
M Civ JI 143.22 Actual Damages / Intentional Failure to Pay Commissions When Due............................................... 143-10
CHAPTER 170-180 Probate 170-180-1
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 170-180-1
CHAPTER 170 Will Contests 170-1
M Civ JI 170.01 Will Contests: Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel................................................................ 170-3
M Civ JI 170.02 Will Contests: Will/Codicil—Definition ................................................................................................. 170-4
M Civ JI 170.03 Will Contests: Holographic Will—Definition ......................................................................................... 170-5
M Civ JI 170.04 Will Contests: Cautionary Instruction as to Decedent’s Right to Leave Property by a Will .................. 170-6
M Civ JI 170.05 Will Contests: Letter, Deed, Bill of Sale, Contract as a Will................................................................... 170-7
M Civ JI 170.08 Will Contests: Will—Writings Intended as Wills ................................................................................... 170-9
M Civ JI 170.11 Will Contests: Will Signed by Another for Decedent .......................................................................... 170-11
M Civ JI 170.12 Will Contests: Decedent Signing Will by Mark.................................................................................... 170-12
M Civ JI 170.13 Will Contests: Requirements for Witnessing Will ............................................................................... 170-13
M Civ JI 170.15A Will Contests: Proving Execution of Self-Proved Wills...................................................................... 170-14
M Civ JI 170.15B Will Contests: Proving Execution of Will That Is Not Self-Proved..................................................... 170-15
M Civ JI 170.16 Will Contests: Proving Execution of Will Where Witnesses Cannot Be Found [ Instruction Deleted ] 170-16
M Civ JI 170.17A Will Contests: Execution—Witness Not Remembering or Denying Contents of Witnessing Clause (Self-
Proved Will).................................................................................................................................................................. 170-17
M Civ JI 170.17B Will Contests: Execution—Witness Not Remembering or Denying Contents of Witnessing Clause (Will That
Is Not Self-Proved) ....................................................................................................................................................... 170-18
M Civ JI 170.21 Will Contests: Lost, Destroyed or Otherwise Unavailable Will ........................................................... 170-19
M Civ JI 170.31 Will Contests: Revocation of Will by Physical Means ......................................................................... 170-20
M Civ JI 170.32 Will Contests: Revocation—Presumption from Failure to Produce Original Will Retained by Decedent 170-
22
M Civ JI 170.33 Will Contests: Revocation—Presumption from Failure to Produce Executed Duplicate Will Retained by
Decedent...................................................................................................................................................................... 170-23
M Civ JI 170.34 Will Contests: Conditional Revocation of Will (Dependent Relative Revocation) .............................. 170-24
M Civ JI 170.41 Will Contests: Mental Capacity—Definition ....................................................................................... 170-25
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
M Civ JI 170.42 Will Contests: Mental Capacity—Will Made before or after Adjudication of Incompetency, after
Commitment or While under Guardianship or Conservatorship ................................................................................. 170-26
M Civ JI 170.43 Will Contests: Insane Delusion—Definition ........................................................................................ 170-27
M Civ JI 170.44 Will Contests: Undue Influence—Definition; Burden of Proof ........................................................... 170-28
M Civ JI 170.45 Will Contests: Existence of Presumption of Undue Influence—Burden of Proof [ Instruction Deleted ] 170-
30
M Civ JI 170.46 Will Contests: Fraud in Procurement of Will....................................................................................... 170-32
M Civ JI 170.51 Will Contests: Burden of Proof............................................................................................................ 170-33
CHAPTER 171 Mental Illness 171-1
M Civ JI 171.01 Mental Illness: Involuntary Treatment—Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel ...................... 171-2
M Civ JI 171.02 Mental Illness: Involuntary Treatment—Elements and Burden of Proof ............................................. 171-3
CHAPTER 172 Guardians and Conservators 172-1
M Civ JI 172.01 Appointment of Guardian or Conservator or Termination of Guardianship or Conservatorship: Defining
Legal Names of Parties and Counsel .............................................................................................................................. 172-2
M Civ JI 172.02 Appointment of Guardian of an Adult .................................................................................................. 172-3
M Civ JI 172.03 Termination of Guardianship of an Adult ............................................................................................. 172-5
M Civ JI 172.11 Appointment of Conservator of an Adult ............................................................................................. 172-6
M Civ JI 172.12 Termination of Conservatorship of an Adult ........................................................................................ 172-8
CHAPTER 173 Bank Accounts 173-1
M Civ JI 173.01 Determination of Title to Bank Accounts—Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel................... 173-2
M Civ JI 173.02 Determination of Title to Bank Account ............................................................................................... 173-3
CHAPTER 174 Felonious and Intentional Killing 174-1
M Civ JI 174.01 Felonious and Intentional Killing—Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel ............................... 174-2
M Civ JI 174.02 Felonious and Intentional Killing—Definition ....................................................................................... 174-4
M Civ JI 174.03 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Aiding and Abetting—Definition ..................................................... 174-6
M Civ JI 174.11 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Self-Defense—Definition................................................................. 174-8
M Civ JI 174.12 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Defense of Others—Definition ...................................................... 174-10
M Civ JI 174.13 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Legal Insanity—Definition ............................................................. 174-11
M Civ JI 174.14 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Accident—Definition ..................................................................... 174-13
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 175 Pretermitted Heirs 175-1
M Civ JI 175.01 Pretermitted Heirs—Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel ..................................................... 175-2
M Civ JI 175.02 Omission of Child or Issue of Deceased Child in Will As a Result of Mistake or Accident .................... 175-3
M Civ JI 175.11 Omission of Spouse in Will As a Result of Oversight or Mistake .......................................................... 175-5
M Civ JI 175.12 Omission of Spouse in Will Made Prior to Marriage Where There Are Transfers Made in Lieu of Will
Provision......................................................................................................................................................................... 175-6
CHAPTER 176 Claims for Services Rendered 176-1
M Civ JI 176.01 Claim for Services Rendered—Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel...................................... 176-2
M Civ JI 176.02 Claim for Services Rendered ................................................................................................................. 176-3
CHAPTER 178 Pretermitted Heirs (EPIC) 178-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 178-2
M Civ JI 178.01 Pretermitted Heirs: Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel (EPIC) ............................................ 178-4
M Civ JI 178.02 Pretermitted Child: Will Executed Prior to Birth or Adoption of Child Omitted from Will (EPIC)......... 178-5
M Civ JI 178.03 Pretermitted Child: Omission of Living Child from Will Because of Mistaken Belief Child Is Dead (EPIC)......
178-8
M Civ JI 178.12 Pretermitted Spouse: Will Executed Prior to Marriage (EPIC) ............................................................ 178-10
CHAPTER 179 Trust Contests 179-1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 179-2
M Civ JI 179.01 Trust Contests: Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel.............................................................. 179-3
M Civ JI 179.02 Trust Contests: Definitions.................................................................................................................... 179-4
M Civ JI 179.03 Trust Contests: Creation of a Trust ....................................................................................................... 179-5
M Civ JI 179.04 Trust Contests: Sufficient Mental Capacity—Definition ....................................................................... 179-6
M Civ JI 179.05 Trust Contests: Intention to Create a Trust .......................................................................................... 179-7
M Civ JI 179.06 Trust Contests: Trust Need Not Be in Writing....................................................................................... 179-8
M Civ JI 179.07 Trust Contests: Cautionary Instruction as to Settlor’s Right to Leave Property by a Trust................... 179-9
M Civ JI 179.10 Trust Contests: Undue Influence—Definition—Burden of Proof........................................................ 179-10
M Civ JI 179.12 Trust Contests: Fraud in Procurement of Trust................................................................................... 179-12
M Civ JI 179.15 Trust Contests: Revocation or Amendment of Trust .......................................................................... 179-13
M Civ JI 179.20 Trust Contests: Burden of Proof.......................................................................................................... 179-14
M Civ JI 179.25 Trust Contests: Existence of Presumption of Undue Influence—Burden of Proof [ Instruction Deleted ].....
179-16
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
CHAPTER 180 Attorney Fees 180-1
M Civ JI 180.01 Attorney Fees—Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel............................................................. 180-2
M Civ JI 180.02 Attorney Fees—Explanation of Statute ................................................................................................ 180-3
M Civ JI 180.03 Attorney Fees—Reasonable Value of Legal Services ............................................................................ 180-4
CHAPTER 190-241 Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2 190-241-1
M Civ JI 190.01 Form of Verdict: Dram Shop—Sale to Minor ................................................................................. 190-241-3
M Civ JI 190.02 Form of Verdict: Dram Shop—Sale to Visibly Intoxicated Person ................................................. 190-241-9
M Civ JI 195.01 Form of Verdict: Paternity [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]................................................................ 190-241-14
M Civ JI 196.01 Form of Verdict: Landlord-Tenant—Rent Action ......................................................................... 190-241-15
M Civ JI 196.02 Form of Verdict: Landlord-Tenant--Termination Action .............................................................. 190-241-16
M Civ JI 197.01 Form of Verdict: Child Protection Proceeding [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] ................................. 190-241-17
M Civ JI 208.01 Form of Verdict: Libel................................................................................................................... 190-241-18
M Civ JI 220.01 Form of Verdict: Will Contests ..................................................................................................... 190-241-21
M Civ JI 220.05 Form of Verdict: Will Contests—Lost, Destroyed or Otherwise Unavailable Will ....................... 190-241-23
M Civ JI 221.01 Form of Verdict: Mental Illness--Involuntary Treatment............................................................. 190-241-24
M Civ JI 222.01 Form of Verdict: Appointment of Guardian of Adult ................................................................... 190-241-25
M Civ JI 222.02 Form of Verdict: Termination of Guardianship of Adult .............................................................. 190-241-26
M Civ JI 222.11 form of Verdict: Appointment of Conservator of Adult............................................................... 190-241-27
M Civ JI 222.12 Form of Verdict: Termination of Conservatorship of Adult ......................................................... 190-241-28
M Civ JI 223.01 Form of Verdict: Determination of Title to Bank Accounts.......................................................... 190-241-29
M Civ JI 224.01 Form of Verdict: Felonious and Intentional Killing....................................................................... 190-241-30
M Civ JI 225.02 Form of Verdict: Omission of Child or Issue of Deceased Child in Will As a Result of Mistake or Accident ...
190-241-31
M Civ JI 225.11 Form of Verdict: Omission of Spouse in Will As a Result of Oversight or Mistake ...................... 190-241-32
M Civ JI 225.12 Form of Verdict: Omission of Spouse in Will Made Prior to Marriage Where There Are Transfers Made in
Lieu of Will Provision............................................................................................................................................. 190-241-33
M Civ JI 226.01 Form of Verdict: Claim for Services Rendered ............................................................................. 190-241-34
M Civ JI 228.02 Form of Verdict: Pretermitted Child: Will Executed Prior to Birth or Adoption of Child Omitted from Will
(EPIC) ..................................................................................................................................................................... 190-241-36
M Civ JI 228.03 Form of Verdict: Pretermitted Child: Omission of Living Child from Will Because of Mistaken Belief Child is
Dead (EPIC)............................................................................................................................................................ 190-241-37
M Civ JI 228.12 Form of Verdict: Pretermitted Spouse: Will Executed Prior to Marriage (EPIC).......................... 190-241-38
M Civ JI 230.01 Form of Verdict: Attorney Fees.................................................................................................... 190-241-39
M Civ JI 241.01 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Delivery of Nonconforming Goods Which the
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Buyer Accepts........................................................................................................................................................ 190-241-40
M Civ JI 241.02 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Failure to Deliver/Repudiation/Delivery of
Nonconforming Goods Rejected ........................................................................................................................... 190-241-42
M Civ JI 241.14 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonacceptance or Repudiation—Seller
Resells—Seller’s Damages..................................................................................................................................... 190-241-44
M Civ JI 241.15 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages--UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonacceptance or Repudiation--Seller’s
Damages................................................................................................................................................................ 190-241-46
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Michigan Supreme Court Rule 2.512-1
Rule 2.512
Instructions to the Jury
(A) Request for Instructions.
(1) At a time the court reasonably directs, the parties must file written requests
that the court instruct the jury on the law as stated in the requests. In the
absence of a direction from the court, a party may file a written request for jury
instructions at or before the close of the evidence.
(2) In addition to requests for instructions submitted under subrule (A)(1), after
the close of the evidence, each party shall submit in writing to the court a
statement of the issues and may submit the party’s theory of the case regarding
each issue. The statement must be concise, be narrative in form, and set forth
as issues only those disputed propositions of fact that are supported by the
evidence. The theory may include those claims supported by the evidence or
admitted.
(3) A copy of the requested instructions must be served on the adverse parties
in accordance with MCR 2.107.
(4) The court shall inform the attorneys of its proposed action on the requests
before their arguments to the jury.
(5) The court need not give the statements of issues or theories of the case in
the form submitted if the court presents to the jury the material substance of
the issues and theories of each party.
(B) Instructing the Jury.
(1) At any time during the trial, the court may, with or without request, instruct
the jury on a point of law if the instruction will materially aid the jury in
understanding the proceedings and arriving at a just verdict.
(2) Before or after arguments or at both times, as the court elects, the court
shall instruct the jury on the applicable law, the issues presented by the case,
and, if a party requests as provided in subrule (A)(2), that party’s theory of the
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Rule 2.512-2 Michigan Supreme Court
case.
(C) Objections. A party may assign as error the giving of or the failure to give an instruction
only if the party objects on the record before the jury retires to consider the verdict (or, in
the case of instructions given after deliberations have begun, before the jury resumes
deliberations), stating specifically the matter to which the party objects and the grounds for
the objection. Opportunity must be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the
jury.
(D) Model Civil Jury Instructions.
(1) The Committee on Model Civil Jury Instructions appointed by the Supreme
Court has the authority to adopt model civil jury instructions (M Civ JI) and to
amend or repeal those instructions approved by the predecessor committee.
Before adopting, amending, or repealing an instruction, the committee shall
publish notice of the committee’s intent, together with the text of the
instruction to be adopted, or the amendment to be made, or a reference to the
instruction to be repealed, in the manner provided in MCR 1.201. The notice
shall specify the time and manner for commenting on the proposal. The
committee shall thereafter publish notice of its final action on the proposed
change, including, if appropriate, the effective date of the adoption,
amendment, or repeal. A model civil jury instruction does not have the force
and effect of a court rule.
(2) Pertinent portions of the instructions approved by the Committee on Model
Civil Jury Instructions or its predecessor committee must be given in each
action in which jury instructions are given if
(a)they are applicable,
(b)they accurately state the applicable law, and
(c)they are requested by a party.
(3)Whenever the committee recommends that no instruction be given on a
particular matter, the court shall not give an instruction unless it specifically
finds for reasons stated on the record that
(a) the instruction is necessary to state the applicable law accurately, and
(b) the matter is not adequately covered by other pertinent model civil jury
instructions.
(4)This subrule does not limit the power of the court to give additional
instructions on applicable law not covered by the model instructions.
Michigan Supreme Court Rule 2.512-3
Rule 2.512 Instructions to the Jury
Additional instructions, when given, must be patterned as nearly as practicable
after the style of the model instructions and must be concise, understandable,
conversational, unslanted, and nonargumentative.”
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Rule 2.512-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 1-1
CHAPTER 1
Preliminary Instructions Before
Jury Selection
Introductory Directions to the Court ............................................................................. 1-2
M Civ JI 1.01 Introductory Comments............................................................................ 1-3
M Civ JI 1.02 Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel........................................... 1-4
M Civ JI 1.03 Explanation of Jury Selection and Voir Dire .............................................. 1-5
M Civ JI 1.04 Juror Oath Before Voir Dire ...................................................................... 1-6
M Civ JI 1.05 Prospective Jurors—Health and Other Problems ..................................... 1-7
M Civ JI 1.10 Juror Oath Following Selection ................................................................. 1-8
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 1-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introductory Directions to the Court
These instructions utilize masculine and feminine pronouns. In the use of these instructions,
trial judges are directed to follow the requirements of MCR 1.109 concerning the use of
personal pronouns when referencing the parties to litigation or others who have expressed
a preferred form of address or personal pronoun. Trial judges are further directed to adhere
to the dictates of MCR 1.109 when addressing jurors collectively (e.g., “members of the
jury,” rather than “ladies and gentlemen”) and individually.
History
Introductory Directions to the Court were added July 2024.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 1-3
Chapter 1: Preliminary Instructions Before Jury Selection
M Civ JI 1.01 Introductory Comments
[ Good morning / Good afternoon]. I am Judge , and it is my pleasure to welcome you to
the ______________ Court.
You have been called here today for possible selection as a juror in a civil case. The remarks
which I am about to make are intended as an outline of the trial of this case so that you may
be generally aware of what occurs during a trial and some of the legal principles that control
the conduct of civil cases.
I know that jury duty may be a new experience for some of you. Jury duty is one of the most
serious duties that members of a free society are asked to perform. Our system of self-
government could not exist without it.
The jury is an important part of this court. The right to a jury trial is an ancient tradition and
part of our heritage. The parties have a right to a jury that is selected fairly, that comes to
the case without bias, and that will attempt to reach a verdict based on the evidence
presented. Because you are making very important decisions in this case, you are to
evaluate the evidence carefully and avoid decisions based on generalizations, prejudices,
sympathies, stereotypes, or biases. The law and your oath demand that you return a just
verdict, based solely on the evidence, your reason and common sense, and these
instructions. As jurors, your sole duty is to find the truth and do justice. Each side in a trial
is entitled to jurors who keep open minds until the time comes to decide the case. Take the
time you need to reflect carefully about the evidence. You must each reach your own
conclusions about this case individually, but you should do so only after listening to and
considering the opinions of the other jurors, who may have different backgrounds and
perspectives from yours. Working together will help achieve a fair result.
History
Amended January 1993, October 1993, September 2007, July 2019, May 2023, July 2024.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 1-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 1.02 Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel
This is a civil case involving [ Describe case briefly. ], which I will explain more fully later.
The person bringing this case is called the plaintiff. The plaintiff is [ State plaintiff? name
and indicate where seated. ]. The lawyer for the plaintiff is [ State lawyers’ name and
indicate where seated. ]. The person defending the case brought by the plaintiff is called the
defendant. The defendant is [ State defendants’ name and indicate where seated. ]. The
lawyer for the defendant is [ State lawyers’ name and indicate where seated. ]. [ Describe
the function of other persons seated at the counsel table. ].
History
Amended January 1993, October 1993, September 2007.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 1-5
Chapter 1: Preliminary Instructions Before Jury Selection
M Civ JI 1.03 Explanation of Jury Selection and Voir Dire
A trial begins with jury selection. The purpose of this process is to obtain information about
you that will help us choose a fair and impartial jury to hear this case.
During jury selection [ the lawyers and ] I will ask you questions. The questions are meant
to find out if you know anything about the case. Also, we need to find out if you have any
opinions or personal experiences that might influence you for or against a party or witness.
One of these could cause you to be excused, even though you may be otherwise qualified
to be a juror.
The questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs, and experiences. The law
requires that we get this information so that an impartial jury can be chosen. They are not
meant to be an unreasonable prying into your private life.
If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say so. If you do understand it, you
should answer it truthfully and completely. Please do not hesitate to speak freely about
anything you believe we should know.
During jury selection you may be excused from serving on the jury in one of two ways.
First, I may excuse you for cause; that is, I may decide that there is a valid reason why you
cannot or should not serve in this case. The second way to be excused is by one of the
lawyers. The law gives the lawyers for each side the right to excuse a limited number of
jurors without giving any reason for doing so. If you are excused, don’t feel bad or take it
personally.
During the course of the jury selection process, if there is any matter you wish to discuss in
private, please raise your hand or write a note to the bailiff.
History
M Civ JI 1.03 was added September 1980. Amended October 1993, March 1996,
September 2007.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 1-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 1.04 Juror Oath Before Voir Dire
I will now ask you to swear or affirm to answer truthfully, fully, and honestly all the
questions that you will be asked about your qualifications to serve as a juror in this case.
Please stand and raise your right hand.
“Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you will truthfully and completely answer all
questions about your qualifications to serve as jurors in this case?”
History
M Civ JI 1.04 was added October 1993. Amended September 2007.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 1-7
Chapter 1: Preliminary Instructions Before Jury Selection
M Civ JI 1.05 Prospective Jurors—Health and Other Problems
(a) The witnesses who may be called in this case are: [ read list of witnesses without
designation of party who will call them ]. Does anyone know the [ defendant / defendants
], the [ plaintiff / plaintiffs ], or any of the lawyers or witnesses?
(b) We think this trial will last for [ number of days / number of weeks ]. If you believe that
the length of the trial will be a real hardship for you, please let me know now.
(c) Some of you may have health problems that would prevent you from serving on a jury.
Does anyone have a physical, mental, or other problem that may prevent you from serving
on the jury? For example, does anyone have a medical problem that makes you unable to
sit for two or three hours at a time? Does anyone have a sight or hearing problem?
(d) Under guidelines established by the Michigan Supreme Court, I have approved a media
request for cameras to be used during trial. I’ll discuss this more later, but one of the rules
is that you cannot be filmed or photographed. However, if you believe that the presence of
the cameras will interfere with your ability to concentrate and render a fair and impartial
verdict, raise your hand.
Note on Use
Subsection (d) would only be read if the trial judge has allowed cameras in the courtroom
as permitted by Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 1989-1. The subsection
contemplates follow-up questions if a juror indicates his or her ability to concentrate or
render a fair verdict would be impaired.
History
M Civ JI 1.05 was added October 1993. Amended March 1996, September 2007, October
2013.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 1-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 1.10 Juror Oath Following Selection
I will now ask you to swear or affirm to perform your duty to try the case justly and to reach
a true verdict. Please stand and raise your right hand.
“Do you solemnly swear or affirm that, in this case now before the court, you will justly
decide the questions submitted to you, that, unless you are discharged by the court from
further deliberation, you will render a true verdict, and that you will render your verdict
only on the evidence introduced and in accordance with the instructions of the court, so help
you God?”
History
M Civ JI 1.10 was added October 1993. Amended September 2007.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-1
CHAPTER 2
Preliminary Instructions After
Jury Is Sworn
M Civ JI 2.01 Responsibilities of Judge and Jury............................................................. 2-2
M Civ JI 2.02 Description of Trial Procedure .................................................................. 2-3
M Civ JI 2.02A Cameras in the Courtroom ..................................................................... 2-5
M Civ JI 2.03 Jury Deliberation; Jurors as Triers of Fact ................................................. 2-6
M Civ JI 2.04 Jury Must Only Consider Evidence; What Evidence Is / Prohibited Actions by
Jurors.............................................................................................................................. 2-7
M Civ JI 2.05 Jurors to Keep Open Minds [ Instruction Deleted ] ................................ 2-10
M Civ JI 2.06 Jurors to Keep Open Minds..................................................................... 2-11
M Civ JI 2.07 Jurors Not to Consider Information Received outside Presence of Court
[ Instruction Deleted ] .................................................................................................. 2-13
M Civ JI 2.08 Objections; Out-of-Presence Hearings.................................................... 2-14
M Civ JI 2.09 Court to Instruct on Law ......................................................................... 2-15
M Civ JI 2.10 Inability to Hear Witness or See Exhibit.................................................. 2-16
M Civ JI 2.11 Questions by Jurors Allowed................................................................... 2-17
M Civ JI 2.12 Caution about Publicity in Cases of Public Interest [ Instruction
Deleted ]....................................................................................................................... 2-18
M Civ JI 2.13 Note Taking by Jurors Allowed / Not Allowed ........................................ 2-19
M Civ JI 2.14 Reference Documents............................................................................. 2-20
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 2-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 2.01 Responsibilities of Judge and Jury
Now I am going to briefly explain to you my responsibilities as judge and your
responsibility as jurors.
My responsibilities as the judge in this trial are to make sure that the trial is run fairly and
efficiently, to make decisions about evidence, and to instruct you about the law that applies
to this case. You must take the law as I give it to you. Nothing I say is meant to reflect my
own opinions about the facts of the case.
Your responsibility as jurors is to decide what the facts of the case are. This is your job, and
no one else’s. You must think about all the evidence and all the testimony and then decide
what each piece of evidence means and how important you think it is.
History
Amended January 1993, September 2007.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-3
Chapter 2: Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn
M Civ JI 2.02 Description of Trial Procedure
Now I will briefly explain the general order of procedure in the trial from this point forward.
First, the lawyer for the plaintiff makes an opening statement in which [ he / she ] outlines
[ his / her ] theory of the case. The lawyer for the defendant can then make an opening
statement, or [ he / she ] can wait until later. These opening statements are not evidence.
They are only intended to assist you in understanding the viewpoints and claims of the
parties.
After the opening statements, we will begin the taking of evidence. Plaintiff’s lawyer will
present evidence first. [ He / she ] may call witnesses to testify and may also offer exhibits
such as documents or physical objects. Defendant’s lawyer has a right to cross-examine the
witnesses called by the plaintiff. Following the plaintiff’s presentation, the defendant has
the opportunity to present evidence. Plaintiff’s lawyer has a right to cross-examine the
witnesses called by the defendant. [ During the taking of evidence the lawyers may be
allowed to present interim commentary regarding evidence that has been submitted. This
commentary is not evidence. Like the opening statements, it is only intended to assist you
in understanding the viewpoints and claims of the parties. ]
After all the evidence has been presented, the lawyers for each side will make their closing
arguments to you in support of their cases. You are again reminded that the statements of
the lawyers are not evidence but are only intended to help you in understanding the
evidence and the way each side sees the case. You must base your decision only on the
evidence.
In this case, the Plaintiff has brought [ a claim / claims ] involving [ state nature of claims ].
[ Insert instructions regarding the elements of all civil claims (including definitions of legal
terms), legal presumptions, and burdens of proof. ]
Because no one can predict the course of a trial, these instructions may change at the end
of the trial; if so, you should follow the instructions given at the conclusion of the trial. You
will be given a written copy of the instructions I have just read for your use during the trial.
Note on Use
The words “plaintiff” and “defendant” may be replaced by “petitioner” and “respondent”
in cases in which the latter terms are used to describe the parties.
Because the elements of civil claims may include legal terms, e.g. proximate cause,
ordinary care, invitee, licensee, and allowable expenses, definitions of those legal terms
should also be given.
The bracketed language should not be given if the court has determined before trial that
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 2-4 Michigan Supreme Court
interim commentary will not be permitted. If interim commentary is permitted, M Civ JI
3.16 should be given immediately before the commentary.
Comment
The 2011 amendments reflect the amendments to MCR 2.513(A) and (D) ordered by the
Michigan Supreme Court on June 29, 2011, which became effective September 1, 2011.
These amendments require the court to include in its preliminary instructions the elements
of all civil claims, as well as legal presumptions and burdens of proof. Additionally, the
court is given discretion to permit the parties to present interim commentary.
History
Amended January 1993, September 2007, October 2011.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-5
Chapter 2: Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn
M Civ JI 2.02A Cameras in the Courtroom
In order to increase public knowledge of court proceedings and to make the courts as open
as possible, the Michigan Supreme Court allows cameras in courtrooms as long as certain
guidelines are followed. One of those guidelines is that no one is allowed to film or
photograph you, so you will not end up on television or in the newspaper.
The presence of cameras does not make this case more important than any other. All trials
are equally important to the parties. You should not draw any inferences or conclusions
from the fact that cameras are present at this particular trial. Also, since the news media is
generally able to decide what portions of the trial they wish to attend, their attendance may
be periodic from day to day. You are not to concern yourself with why certain witnesses
are filmed or photographed and others are not. Whether a particular witness is filmed or
photographed is not any indication as to the value of, or weight to be given to, that witness’s
testimony.
Your complete attention must be focused on the trial. You should ignore the presence of
the cameras. If you find at any time that you are unable to concentrate because of the
cameras, please notify me immediately through the bailiff so that I can take any necessary
corrective action.
Note on Use
This instruction would only be given if the trial judge has allowed cameras in the courtroom
as permitted by Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 1989-1. M Civ JI 60.01A
would also be given before the jury deliberates.
History
M Civ JI 2.02A was added October 2013. Amended July 2017.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 2-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 2.03 Jury Deliberation; Jurors as Triers of Fact
After all of the evidence has been presented and the lawyers have given their arguments, I
will give you detailed instructions about the rules of law that apply to this case. Then you
will go to the jury room to decide on your verdict.
The responsibility of the jury is to determine the facts. You are the judges of the facts. You
determine the weight, effect, and value of the evidence, as well as the credibility of the
witnesses. You must consider and weigh the testimony of all witnesses who appear before
you, and you determine whether to believe any witnesses and the extent to which any
witness should be believed. It is your responsibility to consider any conflicts in testimony
which may arise during the course of the trial. Your decision as to any fact in the case is
final. On the other hand, it is your duty to accept the law as I instruct you.
History
Amended January 1993, September 2007.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-7
Chapter 2: Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn
M Civ JI 2.04 Jury Must Only Consider Evidence; What Evidence Is /
Prohibited Actions by Jurors
(1)Your determination of the facts in this case must be based only upon the evidence
admitted during the trial. Evidence consists of the sworn testimony of the witnesses. It also
includes exhibits, which are documents or other things introduced into evidence.
*(It may also include some things which I specifically tell you to consider as evidence.)
(2)There are some things presented in the trial that are not evidence, and I will now explain
what is not evidence:
(a)The lawyers’ statements, commentaries, and arguments are not
evidence. They are only meant to help you understand the evidence and
each side’s legal theories. You should only accept things the lawyers say
that are supported by the evidence or by your own common sense and
general knowledge. However, an admission of a fact by a lawyer is
binding on [ his / her ] client.
(b)Questions by the lawyers, you or me to the witnesses are not evidence.
You should consider these questions only as they give meaning to the
witnesses’ answers.
(c)My comments, rulings, [ summary of the evidence, ] and instructions
are also not evidence. It is my duty to see that the trial is conducted
according to the law, and to tell you the law that applies to this case.
However, when I make a comment or give an instruction, I am not trying
to influence your vote or express a personal opinion about the case. If you
believe that I have an opinion about how you should decide this case, you
must pay no attention to that opinion. You are the only judges of the facts,
and you should decide this case from the evidence.
(3)In addition, you are not to consider anything about the case from outside of the
courtroom as it is not evidence admitted during the trial. Under the law, the evidence you
consider to decide the case must meet certain standards. For example, witnesses must swear
to tell the truth, and the lawyers must be able to cross-examine them. Because information
obtained outside of the courtroom does not have to meet these standards, it could give you
incorrect or misleading information that might unfairly favor one side, or you may begin to
improperly form an opinion on information that has not been admitted. This would
compromise the parties’ right to have a verdict rendered only by the jurors and based only
on the evidence you hear and see in the courtroom. So, to be fair to both sides, you must
follow these instructions. I will now describe some of the things you may not consider from
outside of the courtroom:
(a)Newspaper, television, radio and other news reports, emails, blogs and
social media posts and commentary about this case are not evidence.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 2-8 Michigan Supreme Court
Until I discharge you as jurors, do not search for, read, listen to, or watch
any such information about this case from any source, in any form
whatsoever.
(b)Opinions of people outside of the trial are not evidence. You are not to
discuss or share information, or answer questions, about this case at all in
any manner with anyone—this includes family, friends or even
strangers—until you have been discharged as a juror. Dont allow anyone
to say anything to you or say anything about this case in your presence. If
anyone does, advise them that you are on the jury hearing the case, ask
them to stop, and let me know immediately.
(c)Research, investigations and experiments not admitted in the
courtroom are not evidence. You must not do any investigations on your
own or conduct any research or experiments of any kind. You may not
research or investigate through the Internet or otherwise any evidence,
testimony, or information related to this case, including about a party, a
witness, an attorney, a court officer, or any topics raised in the case.
(d)Except as otherwise admitted in trial, the scene is not evidence. You
must not visit the scene of the occurrence that is the subject of this trial. If
it should become necessary that you view or visit the scene, you will be
taken as a group. You must not consider as evidence any personal
knowledge you have of the scene.
(4)To avoid even the appearance of unfairness or improper conduct on your part, you must
follow the following rules of conduct:
(a)While you are in the courtroom and while you are deliberating, you are
prohibited altogether from using a computer, cellular telephone or any
other electronic device capable of making communications. You may use
these devices during recesses so long as your use does not otherwise
violate my instructions.
(b)Until I have discharged you as a juror, you must not talk to any party,
lawyer, or witness even if your conversation has nothing to do with this
case. This is to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
(5)If you discover that any juror has violated any of my instructions about prohibited
conduct, you must report it to me.
(6)After you are discharged as a juror, you may talk to anyone you wish about the case.
Until that time, you must control your natural desire to discuss the case outside of what I’ve
said is permitted.
Note on Use
*Use the sentence in parentheses if it is applicable.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-9
Chapter 2: Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn
If a fact is admitted by a lawyer, this shall be explained to the jury as binding on his or her
client to the extent of the admission, regardless of evidence to the contrary.
If a specific admission, such as negligence or contributory negligence, is made, then the
court should explain that particular admission to the jury when giving the instructions on
that subject.
Comment
Occasionally lawyers argue on matters that are within their personal knowledge but are not
of record, or in the heat of forensic attack will make statements not based on the evidence.
Ordinarily this is objected to and a request is made to instruct the jury to disregard the
statement, but it is impossible or impractical to object to every such statement. It is
therefore proper to inform the jury that arguments and statements of counsel not based on
the evidence should be disregarded. Dalm v Bryant Paper Co, 157 Mich 550; 122 NW 257
(1909).
For admissions on the pleadings, see MCR 2.111(E); for admissions by a lawyer in the
course of trial, see Ortega v Lenderink, 382 Mich 218; 169 NW2d 470 (1969).
Subsection (2)(c) is so worded to inform the jury that comments the judge might make on
the evidence are not binding on them. Cook v Vineyard, 291 Mich 375; 289 NW 181 (1939).
Since the remarks and rulings of the trial judge may erroneously be interpreted by the jury
as comments on the evidence, this instruction is proper. Mawich v Elsey, 47 Mich 10; 10
NW 57 (1881).
The bracketed language reflects the amendment to MCR 2.513(M) effective September 1,
2011. This amendment permits the court to sum up the evidence under certain conditions.
Any summary of the evidence by the court should be immediately preceded by M Civ JI
3.17.
History
Amended January 1993, September 2007, January 2014.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 2-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 2.05 Jurors to Keep Open Minds [ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
This instruction was deleted by the Committee in October 2011. The instruction was
deleted because its provisions were consolidated with M Civ JI 2.06 in response to the
amendment of MCR 2.513. The new consolidated instruction has been designated M Civ
JI 2.06.
History
Amended February 1991, January 1993, September 2007. Deleted October 2011.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-11
Chapter 2: Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn
M Civ JI 2.06 Jurors to Keep Open Minds
(1) Because the law requires that cases be decided only on the evidence presented during
the trial and only by the deliberating jurors, you must keep an open mind and not make a
decision about anything in the case until after you have (a) heard all of the evidence, (b)
heard the closing arguments of counsel, (c) received all of my instructions on the law and
the verdict form, and (d) any alternate jurors have been excused. At that time, you will be
sent to the jury room to decide the case. Sympathy must not influence your decision. Nor
should your decision be influenced by prejudice or bias regarding disability, gender or
gender identity, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin,
socioeconomic status or any other factor irrelevant to the rights of the parties.
Each of us may have biases about or certain perceptions or stereotypes of other people. We
may be aware of some of our biases, though we may not share them with others. We may
not be fully aware of some of our other biases.
As jurors, you are being asked to make very important decisions in this case. You must not
let prejudice or public opinion influence your decision. You must not be biased in favor of
or against any party, witness, or lawyer because of his or her disability, gender or gender
identity, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin, socioeconomic
status or any other factor irrelevant to the rights of the parties.
Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence presented. You must carefully evaluate
the evidence and resist any urge to reach a verdict that is influenced by bias for or against
any party, witness, or lawyer.
Take the time you need to reflect carefully about the evidence. I caution you to avoid
reaching conclusions that may have been influenced by unintended stereotypes or
associations. You must each reach your own conclusions about this case individually, but
you should do so only after listening to and considering the opinions of the other jurors,
who may have different backgrounds and perspectives from yours. Working together will
help achieve a fair result.
As you deliberate with your fellow jurors, it is important to keep an open mind about the
evidence, including how it may be viewed through different perspectives. I encourage you
to explain to your fellow jurors the reasons why you believe the evidence supports your
decision to vote a certain way. It is equally important for you to listen to your fellow jurors,
and to carefully consider any differing points of view.
(2)
[ Alternative A ] (Before you are sent to the jury room to decide the case, you may
discuss the case among yourselves during recesses in the trial, but there are strict rules that
must be followed.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
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First, you may only discuss the case when (a) all of you are together, (b) you are all in the
jury room, and (c) no one else is present in the jury room. You must not discuss the case
under any other circumstances. The reason you may not discuss the case with other jurors
while some of you are not present is that all of you are entitled to participate in all of the
discussions about the case.
Second, as I stated before, you must keep an open mind until I send you to the jury room to
decide the case. Your discussions before then are only tentative.
Third, you do not have to discuss the case during the trial. But if you choose to do so, you
must follow the rules I have given you.)
[ Alternative B ] (Before you are sent to the jury room to decide the case, you are not to
discuss the case even with the other members of the jury. This is to ensure that all of you
are able to participate in all of the discussions about the case, and so that you do not begin
to express opinions about the case until it has been submitted to you for deliberation.)
Note on Use
The court will choose between Alternative A or B in paragraph 2 based on the court's
decision whether to permit the jurors to discuss the evidence among themselves during trial
recesses.
Comment
M Civ JI 2.05 and 2.06 were deleted in October 2011 and combined into a new instruction
that was designated M Civ JI 2.06. This action reflected the September 2011 amendment to
MCR 2.513(K), which granted the court discretion to permit juror discussion of the
evidence during trial recesses. In January 2014, a large portion of M Civ JI 2.06 was
transferred to M Civ JI 2.04.
The May 2023 amendments were drawn from amended instructions suggested by the
American College of Trial Lawyers and are "designed to counter cognitive flaws and focus
jurors' attention, increase their use of deliberative thought, mitigate ‘confirmation bias,
and broaden participation during jury deliberation." Improving Jury Deliberations
through Jury Instructions Based on Cognitive Science, American College of Trial
Lawyers, February 2019.
History
Adopted October 2011. Amended January 2014, July 2019, May 2023.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-13
Chapter 2: Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn
M Civ JI 2.07 Jurors Not to Consider Information Received outside
Presence of Court [ Instruction Deleted ]
History
This instruction was deleted by the Committee September 1, 2009. The instruction was
deleted because its provisions were combined with MCJI 2.06 in response to the
amendment of MCR 2.511.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 2-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 2.08 Objections; Out-of-Presence Hearings
A trial follows established rules of procedure and evidence. During the trial the lawyers
might make objections and motions. I will rule on these objections and motions according
to the law. Don’t conclude from any of my rulings that I have an opinion on the case or that
I favor one side or the other. If I sustain an objection to a question and do not permit the
witness to answer, don’t guess what the answer might have been or draw any inference
from the question itself.
Sometimes the lawyers and I are required to consider objections and motions outside your
hearing. We may take care of these matters at the bench or in my chambers, or I may excuse
you so that we can take care of them in the courtroom. It is impossible to predict when such
a conference may be required or how long it will last. I will conduct these conferences so
as to use as little of your time as possible. I may also have to take care of other matters
which have nothing to do with this case. Do not concern yourselves with any of these
matters which must be decided out of your presence or hearing.
History
Amended January 1993, September 2007.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-15
Chapter 2: Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn
M Civ JI 2.09 Court to Instruct on Law
I might give you more instructions during the course of the trial, and at the end of the trial
I will give you detailed instructions about the law you are to apply to the case.
History
M Civ JI 2.09 was added September 1980. Amended September 2007.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 2-16 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 2.10 Inability to Hear Witness or See Exhibit
Please let me know immediately if you cannot hear a witness or see what is being
demonstrated.
Note on Use
Following this instruction, the Court may explain to the jury the anticipated schedule of
recesses and adjournments as well as any expected interruptions or distractions, the
availability of restaurants, restrooms, etc.
History
M Civ JI 2.10 was added September 1980. Amended October 1993.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-17
Chapter 2: Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn
M Civ JI 2.11 Questions by Jurors Allowed
During the testimony of a witness, you might think of an important question that you
believe will help you better understand the facts in this case. Please wait to ask the question
until after the witness has finished testifying and both sides have finished their questioning.
If your question is still unanswered, write the question down, raise your hand, and pass the
question to the bailiff. The bailiff will give it to me. Do not ask the witness the question
yourself, show the question to the other jurors, or announce what the question is.
There are rules of evidence that a trial must follow. If your question is allowed under those
rules, I will ask the witness your question. If your question is not allowed, I will either
rephrase it or I will not ask it at all.
Note on Use
If questions from jurors are allowed, this instruction may be used. The questioning of, and
the method of such questioning of, witnesses by jurors is within the discretion of the trial
judge. The court does not have to allow such questioning, but must recognize that it has
discretion to do so. People v Heard, 388 Mich 182 (1972).
MCR 2.513(I), as amended by the Michigan Supreme Court effective September 1, 2011,
requires, among other things, the court to employ a procedure that ensures that the parties
have an opportunity outside the hearing of the jury to object to the questions.
Comment
MCR 2.513(I).
History
M Civ JI 2.11 was added October 1993. Amended October 1994, September 2007, October
2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 2-18 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 2.12 Caution about Publicity in Cases of Public Interest
[ Instruction Deleted ]
History
This instruction was deleted by the Committee September 1, 2009. The instruction was
deleted because its provisions were combined with MCJI 2.06 in response to the
amendment of MCR 2.511.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 2-19
Chapter 2: Preliminary Instructions After Jury Is Sworn
M Civ JI 2.13 Note Taking by Jurors Allowed / Not Allowed
(a) *(You may take notes during the trial if you wish, but of course you don’t have to. If
you do take notes, you should be careful that it does not distract you from paying attention
to all the evidence. When you go to the jury room to decide your verdict, you may use your
notes to help you remember what happened in the courtroom. If you take notes, do not let
anyone see them. After you have begun your deliberations, it is then permissible to allow
other jurors to see your notes. [ You must turn your notes over to the bailiff during
recesses. ] The notes will be destroyed at the end of the trial.)
(b) *(I do not believe that it is helpful for you to take notes because you might not be able
to give your full attention to the evidence. So please do not take any notes while you are in
the courtroom.)
Note on Use
*The court may use paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), depending on whether the jurors are
allowed to take notes.
If paragraph (a) is given, the bracketed sentence in that paragraph may be read if the court
wants to assure that notes are not seen by anyone except the jurors.
Paragraph (b) should be given only when a juror requests to take notes and the court decides
not to allow note taking.
Comment
The 2011 amendment reflects the amendment to MCR 2.513(H) ordered by the Michigan
Supreme Court on June 29, 2011, which became effective September 1, 2011. This
amendment requires the court to ensure that all juror notes are collected and destroyed at
the conclusion of trial. The amended instruction informs the jurors of that fact.
History
M Civ JI 2.13 was added October 1993. Amended December 1994, October 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 2-20 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 2.14 Reference Documents
You will now be given [ a reference document / reference documents / a notebook ]
including [ describe contents, including list of witnesses, relevant statutory provisions,
documents ]. [ The parties have stipulated that the contents of the (document / documents /
notebook) are admitted as exhibits. ] [ In the event (one / one or more of) the (document /
documents / contents of the notebook) (is / are) not admitted, you must disregard (it / them)
at the end of the trial. ] You must turn your [ reference document / reference documents /
notebook ] over to the bailiff during recesses. The [ reference document / reference
documents / notebook ] will be destroyed at the end of the trial.
Note on Use
Jurors may be told that they can write in their notebook. Because jurors may have written
in their notebook, any additions to the notebook made during trial should be made by court
personnel or the jurors in order to prevent the parties from observing any writings made by
the jurors.
Comment
The 2011 adoption of this instruction reflects the amendment to MCR 2.513(E) ordered by
the Michigan Supreme Court on June 29, 2011, which became effective September 1, 2011.
This amendment gives the court the discretion to authorize or require counsel to provide the
jurors with a reference document or notebook. Informing the jurors that the reference
document/notebook will be destroyed is consistent with MCR 2.513(H), which provides
that the court is to ensure that all juror notes are collected and destroyed at the conclusion
of trial.
History
M Civ JI 2.14 was added October 2011.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 3-1
CHAPTER 3
Cautionary Instructions
M Civ JI 3.01 Faithful Performance of Duties; Jury to Follow Instructions..................... 3-2
M Civ JI 3.02 Facts to Be Determined from Evidence .................................................... 3-3
M Civ JI 3.03 Admission of Evidence .............................................................................. 3-4
M Civ JI 3.04 Attorneys’ Statements Not Evidence; Admission by Attorney [ Instruction
Deleted ]......................................................................................................................... 3-5
M Civ JI 3.05 Corporations Entitled to Unprejudiced Treatment................................... 3-6
M Civ JI 3.06 Whether Party Is Insured Is Irrelevant ...................................................... 3-7
M Civ JI 3.07 Evidence Introduced for a Limited Purpose.............................................. 3-8
M Civ JI 3.08 Judge’s Opinion as to Facts Is to Be Disregarded [ Instruction Deleted ].. 3-9
M Civ JI 3.09 Jury to Consider All the Evidence............................................................ 3-10
M Civ JI 3.10 Circumstantial Evidence.......................................................................... 3-11
M Civ JI 3.11 Jurors May Take into Account Ordinary Experience and Observations.. 3-12
M Civ JI 3.12 Jury View of Premises / Scene / Object .................................................. 3-13
M Civ JI 3.13 Fact Judicially Noticed............................................................................. 3-14
M Civ JI 3.15 Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness ................................................ 3-15
M Civ JI 3.16 Interim Commentary by Attorneys ......................................................... 3-17
M Civ JI 3.17 Summary of Evidence by Judge............................................................... 3-18
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 3-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 3.01 Faithful Performance of Duties; Jury to Follow
Instructions
Members of the jury, the evidence and argument in this case have been completed and I will
now instruct you on the law. That is, I will explain the law that applies to this case.
Faithful performance by you of your duties is vital to the administration of justice.
The law you are to apply in this case is contained in these instructions, and it is your duty
to follow them. In other words, you must take the law as I give it to you. You must consider
them as a whole and not pick out one or some instructions and disregard others.
Following my instructions you will go to the jury room and deliberate and decide on your
verdict.
Comment
This instruction is designed to prevent jurors from capriciously selecting one of several
statements of law and using it in their deliberations out of context with the whole charge.
People v Gardner, 143 Mich 104 (1906); Kempsey v McGinniss, 21 Mich 123 (1870).
History
M Civ JI 3.01 was SJI 1.01(1), (2). Amended January 1982, September 2007.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 3-3
Chapter 3: Cautionary Instructions
M Civ JI 3.02 Facts to Be Determined from Evidence
It is your duty to determine the facts from evidence received in open court. You are to apply
the law to the facts and in this way decide the case. Sympathy must not influence your
decision. Nor should your decision be influenced by prejudice regarding disability, gender
or gender identity, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin,
socioeconomic status or any other factor irrelevant to the rights of the parties.
Each of us may have biases about or certain perceptions or stereotypes of other people. We
may be aware of some of our biases, though we may not share them with others. We may
not be fully aware of some of our other biases. Our biases often affect how we act,
favorably or unfavorably, toward someone. Bias can affect our thoughts, how we
remember, what we see and hear, whom we believe or disbelieve, and how we make
important decisions. Witnesses can have the same implicit biases. As jurors you are being
asked to make very important decisions in this case. You must not let bias, prejudice, or
public opinion influence your decision. You must not be biased in favor of or against any
party, witness, or lawyer because of his or her disability, gender or gender identity, race,
religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin, socioeconomic status or any
other factor irrelevant to the rights of the parties. Your verdict must be based solely on the
evidence presented. You must carefully evaluate the evidence and resist any urge to reach
a verdict that is influenced by bias for or against any party, witness, or lawyer.
Comment
The subject matter of this instruction is often covered in greater detail by a number of
separate instructions outlining the duties of the jury and admonishing them as to what
should not enter into their deliberations. To inform the jury that they are to find the facts
from the evidence, and to then apply the law to those facts, is the rule set forth in the
Michigan cases. Souvais v Leavitt, 50 Mich 108; 15 NW 37 (1883); Wisner v Davenport, 5
Mich 501 (1858); Erickson v Sovars, 356 Mich 64; 45 NW2d 844 (1959).
The prohibition against sympathy or prejudice is equally applicable to both parties.
Moreover, it is sufficient to caution the jury once against allowing sympathy and prejudice
to enter into their consideration of the case. Doyle v Dobson, 74 Mich 562; 42 NW 137
(1889).
The November 2021 amendment added gender identity to the list of things that should not
influence the jury’s decision.
History
M Civ JI 3.02 was SJI 1.01(3). Amended February 1991. Amended July 2019. Amended
November 2021.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 3-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 3.03 Admission of Evidence
When you discuss the case and decide on your verdict, you may only consider the evidence
that has been admitted in this case. Evidence includes only the sworn testimony of
witnesses [, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else I told you to consider as
evidence ]. The admission of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. From time to
time it has been my duty as judge to rule on the admissibility of evidence. You must not
concern yourselves with the reasons for these rulings, and you must not consider *(any
exhibit to which an objection was sustained or) any testimony *(or exhibit) which was
ordered stricken.
Note on Use
*Omit the references to exhibits if there are no exhibits.
Comment
Although some rulings on evidence are made out of the jury's hearing, the great bulk of such
rulings are made in the presence of the jury, who hear not only the reasons for objections
but often the reasons for rulings as well. Whether offered evidence is admitted or excluded,
the jury may be influenced by what it hears, and, consequently, it is proper to tell them of
the Court's duty in these matters and admonish them to ignore stricken or excluded
evidence and the reasons for the rulings.
History
M Civ JI 3.03 was SJI 1.01(4). Amended January 1992, October 2017.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 3-5
Chapter 3: Cautionary Instructions
M Civ JI 3.04 Attorneys’ Statements Not Evidence; Admission by
Attorney [ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
This instruction was deleted by the Committee in January 2014. The instruction was deleted
because its provisions were consolidated with M Civ JI 2.04 in order to streamline the
instructions and make them more understandable and logical for the jurors.
History
M Civ JI 3.04 was SJI 1.01(5). Amended September 2007, October 2011. Deleted January
2014.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 3-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 3.05 Corporations Entitled to Unprejudiced Treatment
The corporation [ plaintiff / defendant ] in this case is entitled to the same fair and
unprejudiced treatment as an individual would be under like circumstances, and it is your
duty to decide the case with the same impartiality you would use in deciding a case between
individuals.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given only in those cases where there are both corporate and
individual parties.
Comment
The subject matter of this instruction is an exception to the general rule prohibiting the
singling out of evidence or a particular party or witness. In view of the possibility that some
jurors might have various attitudes prejudicial to corporations, a jury should be informed
that a corporation is to be treated no differently from an individual. Cornell v Manistee &
N R Co, 117 Mich 238; 75 NW 472 (1898).
History
M Civ JI 3.05 was SJI 1.01(6).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 3-7
Chapter 3: Cautionary Instructions
M Civ JI 3.06 Whether Party Is Insured Is Irrelevant
Whether a party is insured has no bearing whatever on any issue that you must decide. Don't
even discuss or speculate about insurance.
Note on Use
This instruction is to be used only where the subject of liability insurance has been brought
out during the trial and has no bearing on any of the issues. It has no application, for
example, in an action on an insurance policy.
Comment
Rule 411 of the Michigan Rules of Evidence provides that” [ e ]vidence that a person was
or was not insured against liability is not admissible to prove whether the person acted
negligently or otherwise wrongfully.” See also MCL 500.3030. MRE 411 further provides
that “the court may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as proving a witness’s
bias or prejudice or – if controverted – proving agency, ownership or control.” See also
Gegan v Kemp, 302 Mich 218 (1942) (insurance adjuster’s statements used for
impeachment).
Where insurance coverage of a party has been improperly disclosed, an instruction that it
has no bearing on the case is proper. Ehlers v Barbeau, 291 Mich 528 (1939); see also
Cassidy v McGovern, 86 Mich App 321 (1978) (tort action under Michigan no-fault act).
The January 2024 amendments are housekeeping changes reflecting stylistic revisions to
the Michigan Rules of Evidence that became effective January 1, 2024.
History
M Civ JI 3.06 was SJI 1.01(7). Amended September 2007, January 2024.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 3-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 3.07 Evidence Introduced for a Limited Purpose
Whenever evidence was received for a limited purpose or limited to [ one party / certain
parties ], you must not consider it for any other purpose or as to any other [ party / parties ].
Note on Use
This instruction should be used only when evidence has been limited to a specific purpose
or to specific parties. When used, the particular evidentiary limitation as to purpose or party
shall be explained, either here or under another more appropriate instruction. (An example
of such use would be where evidence was introduced on negligence of one plaintiff but it
was not applicable to another of the parties plaintiff. In the section on negligence, the Court
should specifically point out that the particular evidence that was admitted as to party A is
not binding on party B.)
Comment
This instruction should be used when evidence has been restricted to a given purpose, or
admitted against one or more but not all of the parties. An example of the first limitation
occurs when prior inconsistent statements are admitted solely for impeachment purposes
and not as substantive evidence. See MRE 801. Similarly, evidence may be admissible
against one party while inadmissible as to another.
Rule 105 of the Michigan Rules of Evidence is consistent with this instruction. It requires
that on request the Court instruct the jury as to the restriction on the evidence.
History
M Civ JI 3.07 was SJI 1.01(8).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 3-9
Chapter 3: Cautionary Instructions
M Civ JI 3.08 Judge’s Opinion as to Facts Is to Be Disregarded
[ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
This instruction was deleted by the Committee in January 2014. The instruction was deleted
because its provisions were consolidated with M Civ JI 2.04 in order to streamline the
instructions and make them more understandable and logical for the jurors.
History
Amended October 2011. Deleted January 2014.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 3-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 3.09 Jury to Consider All the Evidence
In determining whether any fact has been proved, you shall consider all of the evidence
bearing on that fact without regard to which party produced the evidence.
Note on Use
If evidence has been received for a limited purpose or is limited to a particular party or
parties, M Civ JI 3.07 must also be given.
Comment
This instruction states the familiar principle that once evidence is admitted, it is in the case
for all purposes and every party is entitled to the benefit of the evidence whether he or she
or the adversary produced it.
History
M Civ JI 3.09 was SJI 1.02.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 3-11
Chapter 3: Cautionary Instructions
M Civ JI 3.10 Circumstantial Evidence
Facts can be proved by direct evidence from a witness or an exhibit. Direct evidence is
evidence about what we actually see or hear. For example, if you look outside and see rain
falling, that is direct evidence that it is raining.
Facts can also be proved by indirect or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is
evidence that normally or reasonably leads to other facts. So, for example, if you see a
person come in from outside wearing a raincoat covered with small drops of water, that
would be circumstantial evidence that it is raining.
Circumstantial evidence by itself, or a combination of circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence, can be used to prove or disprove a proposition. You must consider all the
evidence, both direct and circumstantial.
History
M Civ JI 3.10 is a revision of SJI 1.03. Amended February 1981, September 2007.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 3-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 3.11 Jurors May Take into Account Ordinary Experience and
Observations
You have a right to consider all the evidence in the light of your own general knowledge
and experience in the affairs of life, and to take into account whether any particular
evidence seems reasonable and probable. However, if you have personal knowledge of any
particular fact in this case, that knowledge may not be used as evidence.
Comment
Because jurors have been told it is their duty to determine the facts from evidence produced
in open court, M Civ JI 3.02, it is proper also to inform them that they may rely on their
general intelligence and knowledge of affairs. Rajnowski v Detroit, BC & A R Co, 74 Mich
15 (1889).
History
M Civ JI 3.11 was SJI 1.04. Amended September 2007.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 3-13
Chapter 3: Cautionary Instructions
M Civ JI 3.12 Jury View of Premises / Scene / Object
Your view of the [ premises / scene / object ] was intended to help you understand the
evidence. You are not to consider as evidence anything you may have learned from the
view which was not covered by the testimony *(and exhibits) received in evidence.
Note on Use
This instruction should be used only when the Court has permitted a view of something
other than an exhibit and has determined that the view does not constitute evidence.
Appropriate designation of the kind of view may be selected instead of the bracketed words.
This instruction may be given even though the court convenes at the scene and takes
testimony, because the jury still might have seen or heard things not covered by the
testimony. The instruction may be given before or at the time of the view.
If the court has determined that a jury view does constitute evidence, this instruction should
not be given. See Note on Use to M Civ JI 3.03.
*The words in parentheses may be used if appropriate.
In condemnation cases, M Civ JI 90.22 should be given in lieu of this instruction.
Comment
The authority to have the jury view the scene comes from MCR 2.513(J).
Generally the jury can consider information obtained by them from the view only to assist
them in understanding evidence presented in open court, Valenti v Mayer, 301 Mich 551;
4 NW2d 5 (1942); but in some cases, the view itself may be evidence. Sunday v Wolverine
Service Stations, 265 Mich 19; 251 NW 402 (1933).
The jury view is appropriate in all civil actions, but is completely discretionary with the trial
judge. MCR 2.513(J).
History
M Civ JI 3.12 was SJI 1.04(A).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 3-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 3.13 Fact Judicially Noticed
In this case, you must accept it as a fact that [ identify fact judicially noticed ].
Note on Use
This instruction should be used only in cases in which a fact has been judicially noticed.
The instruction conforms with Rule 201(f) of the Michigan Rules of Evidence. Rule 201(f)
provides: “In a civil case, the court must instruct the jury to accept the noticed fact as
conclusive.”
Comments
The January 2024 amendments are housekeeping changes reflecting stylistic revisions to
the Michigan Rules of Evidence that became effective January 1, 2024.
History
M Civ JI 3.13 was added February 1, 1981. Amended January 2024.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 3-15
Chapter 3: Cautionary Instructions
M Civ JI 3.15 Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness
If you decide that a witness said something earlier that is not consistent with what the
witness said at this trial, you may consider the earlier statement in deciding whether to
believe the witness, but you may not consider it as proof of the facts in this case.
However, there [ is an exception / are exceptions ]. You may consider an earlier statement
as proof of the facts in this case if:
(a) the statement was made by the plaintiff, the defendant, or an agent or
employee of either party; or
(b) the statement was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, [ describe other proceeding ], or in a deposition; or
(c) the witness testified during the trial that the earlier statement was true.
Note on Use
This instruction should not be given if all prior inconsistent statements of witnesses are
admissible as substantive evidence.
If all prior inconsistent statements are admissible only for credibility, only the first
paragraph of this instruction should be given.
If some prior inconsistent statements of witnesses are admissible for credibility and some as
substantive evidence, both paragraphs of this instruction should be given, but the trial judge
should select only the subsections of paragraph two that are applicable.
Comment
A witness may be impeached through a showing of prior statements inconsistent with his or
her testimony. Gilchrist v Gilchrist, 333 Mich 275 (1952); Michigan Pipe Co v North
British & Mercantile Insurance Co, 97 Mich 493 (1893); Geerds v Ann Arbor R Co, 181
Mich 12 (1914). A prior inconsistent statement given under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, may also be considered as
substantive evidence. MRE 801(d)(l)(A). If the witness adopts by admission the truth of the
prior inconsistent statement, that may also become substantive evidence. Schraff v Fila, 371
Mich 238 (1963).
Prior inconsistent conduct that is not intended as an assertion is admissible as competent
proof, but conduct intended as an assertion is subject to the hearsay objection. MRE 801(a),
(c).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 3-16 Michigan Supreme Court
A statement offered against a party that is his or her own statement is admissible as
substantive evidence. MRE 801(d)(2). The same is true if the statement is made by a person
authorized by a party to make a statement on the subject (MRE 801(d)(2)(C)), or a statement
by a party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of the agency or employment
and made while the relationship existed (MRE 80l(d)(2)(D)).
The January 2024 amendments are housekeeping changes reflecting stylistic revisions to
the Michigan Rules of Evidence that became effective January 1, 2024.
History
M Civ JI 3.15 (former M Civ JI 5.01) was SJI 3.01. Amended December 1982, November
1983, August 1991, October 1993, February 1998. Renumbered from M Civ JI 5.01 to M
Civ JI 3.15 January 1999. Amended September 2007, January 2024.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 3-17
Chapter 3: Cautionary Instructions
M Civ JI 3.16 Interim Commentary by Attorneys
At this juncture in the trial, the court finds it appropriate to allow each party to provide
interim commentary. The lawyers’ commentaries are not evidence. They are only meant to
help you understand the evidence and each side’s legal theories. You should only accept
things that the lawyers say that are supported by the evidence or by your own common
sense and general knowledge. All of my earlier instructions regarding basing your decision
on the evidence and law continue to apply.
Note on Use
The court may place reasonable time limits on the interim commentary.
Comment
The 2011 adoption of this instruction reflects the amendment to MCR 2.513(D) ordered by
the Michigan Supreme Court on June 29, 2011, which became effective September 1, 2011.
This amendment gives the court discretion to permit the parties to present interim
commentary.
History
M Civ JI 3.16 was added October 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 3-18 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 3.17 Summary of Evidence by Judge
I will now summarize the evidence for you. It is intended only as a summary and you should
consider all of the evidence when deciding this case, even if I do not mention all of the
evidence in this summary. Remember that it is your job to decide what the facts of this case
are. This is your job and nobody else’s. It is for you to determine the weight of the evidence
and the credit to be given to the witnesses, and you are free to decide that something I have
not mentioned, but which has been admitted into evidence, is significant to your decision.
You are not bound by my summary of the evidence. [ Summary is then given. ]
Again, it is for you to determine for yourself the weight of the evidence and the credit to be
given to the witnesses. You are not bound by my summation.
Comment
The 2011 adoption of this instruction reflects the amendment to MCR 2.513(M) ordered by
the Michigan Supreme Court on June 29, 2011, which became effective September 1, 2011.
This amendment permits the court to sum up the evidence under certain conditions.
History
M Civ JI 3.17 was added October 2011.
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CHAPTER 4
Credibility and Weight
M Civ JI 4.01 Credibility of Witnesses ............................................................................ 4-2
M Civ JI 4.01A Support Persons or Animals.................................................................... 4-4
M Civ JI 4.02 Witness Need Not Be Believed [ Recommend No Instruction ]................ 4-5
M Civ JI 4.03 Inherently Improbable Testimony [ Recommend No Instruction ]........... 4-6
M Civ JI 4.04 Witness Willfully False [ Recommend No Instruction ]............................. 4-7
M Civ JI 4.05 Party Competent as a Witness [ Recommend No Instruction ] ................ 4-8
M Civ JI 4.06 Witness Who Has Been Interviewed by an Attorney................................ 4-9
M Civ JI 4.07 Weighing Conflicting Evidence—Number of Witnesses ......................... 4-10
M Civ JI 4.08 One Witness against a Number [ Recommend No Instruction ] ............. 4-11
M Civ JI 4.09 Credibility of Special Categories of Witnesses and Weight of Evidence
[ Recommend No Instruction ]..................................................................................... 4-12
M Civ JI 4.10 Weighing Expert Testimony .................................................................... 4-13
M Civ JI 4.11 Consideration of Deposition Evidence .................................................... 4-14
M Civ JI 4.12 Hospital and Business Records [ Recommend No Instruction ] .............. 4-15
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 4-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 4.01 Credibility of Witnesses
(1) You are the judges of the facts in this case, and you must determine which witnesses to
believe and what weight to give to their testimony. You do not have to accept or reject
everything a witness says. You are free to believe all, none, or part of any witness’s
testimony.
(2) In deciding which testimony you believe, you should rely on your own common sense
and everyday experience. However, in deciding whether you believe a witness’s testimony,
you must set aside any bias or prejudice you have based on the witness’s disability, gender
or gender identity, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin,
socioeconomic status or any other factor irrelevant to the rights of the parties.
(3) There is no fixed set of rules for judging whether you believe a witness, but it may help
you to think about these questions:
(a) Was the witness able to see or hear clearly? How long was the witness
watching or listening? Was anything else going on that might have distracted
the witness?
(b) Does the witness seem to have a good memory?
(1) Human memory is not like video recordings that a witness can simply
replay to remember precisely what happened;
(2) when a witness has been exposed to statements, conversations,
questions, writings, documents, photographs, media reports, and opinions
of others, the accuracy of their memory may be affected; and
(3) a witness's memory, even if testified to in good faith, and with a high
degree of confidence, may be inaccurate.
(c) What is the witness’s demeanor while testifying? Does the witness seem
to be making
an honest effort to tell the truth, or does the witness seem to evade
the questions or argue with the lawyers?
(d) Does the witness’s age or maturity affect how you judge his or her
testimony?
(e) Does the witness have any bias or prejudice, motives for testifying, or any
personal interest in how this case is decided?
(f) Have there been any promises, threats, suggestions, or other influences that
Michigan Supreme Court Page 4-3
Chapter 4: Credibility and Weight
affect how the witness testifies?
(g) In general, does the witness have any special reason to tell the truth, or any
special reason to lie?
(h) All in all, how reasonable does the witness’s testimony seems when you
think about all the other evidence in the case?
Comment
Instructions including the credibility factors in this instruction have been approved in
numerous cases by the Michigan Supreme Court. See, e.g., Hitchcock v Davis, 87 Mich
629; 49 NW 912 (1891); Lovely v Grand Rapids & I R Co, 137 Mich 653; 100 NW 894
(1904); Foley v Detroit & M R Co, 193 Mich 233; 159 NW 500 (1916); Vinton v Plainfield
Twp, 208 Mich 179; 175 NW 403 (1919).
History
M Civ JI 4.01 was SJI 2.01. Amended January 1993, September 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 4-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 4.01A Support Persons or Animals
You [ are about to hear / have heard ] testimony from a witness who I [ will allow / have
allowed ] to be accompanied by a support [ person / animal ]. You should disregard the
support [ person / animal ]’s presence and decide the case based solely on the evidence
presented. You should not consider the witness’s testimony to be any more or less credible
because of the [ person / animal ]’s presence. You must not allow the use of a support [
person / animal ] to influence your decision in any way.
History
M Civ JI 4.01A was added April 2019.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 4-5
Chapter 4: Credibility and Weight
M Civ JI 4.02 Witness Need Not Be Believed [ Recommend No
Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instruction that the “witness need not be believed” be
given. An instruction of this type is not necessary where M Civ JI 4.01 is given, as that
instruction adequately covers credibility factors.
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that it is for the jury to determine whether to believe
the testimony of a witness, even though it is uncontradicted, where other circumstances or
parts of his or her testimony are inconsistent with his or her story. Preuschoff v B Stroh
Brewing Co, 132 Mich 107; 92 NW 945 (1903); Michigan Pipe Co v Michigan Fire &
Marine Insurance Co, 92 Mich 482; 52 NW 1070 (1892). Counsel can adequately cover the
subject in argument.
History
M Civ JI 4.02 was SJI 2.02.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 4-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 4.03 Inherently Improbable Testimony [ Recommend No
Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no “inherently improbable testimony” instruction be
given. An instruction of this type is not necessary where M Civ JI 4.01 is given, as that
instruction adequately covers credibility factors.
The trial judge may point out inherently improbable testimony if he or she chooses to
comment upon the evidence. Cook v Vineyard, 291 Mich 375; 289 NW 181 (1939).
Whether or not this is done is, of course, within the discretion of the trial judge.
However, a specific instruction on this point is argumentative and invades the province of
the jury. Counsel can adequately cover the subject in argument.
History
M Civ JI 4.03 was SJI 2.03.
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Chapter 4: Credibility and Weight
M Civ JI 4.04 Witness Willfully False [ Recommend No Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instruction on the “willfully false witness” be given.
An instruction of this type is not necessary where M Civ JI 4.01 is given, as that instruction
adequately covers credibility factors.
The Michigan Supreme Court has approved an instruction that if the jury finds that a
witness has willfully sworn falsely as to a material fact, and the jury should be of the
opinion that such false swearing rendered the witness incredible as a whole, they have a
right to disregard his or her entire testimony. O’Rourke v O’Rourke, 43 Mich 58; 4 NW 531
(1880). One case held it is error to refuse such an instruction where the evidence supports
it. Ketchum v Fillingham, 162 Mich 704; 127 NW 702 (1910).
The instruction, however, has been criticized on the basis that questions concerning
credibility of witnesses are the sole province of the jury; if the instruction is given, the jury
should also be instructed that no rule of law prevents their giving credit to parts of a
witness’s testimony they believe to be true. Hillman v Schwenk, 68 Mich 293; 36 NW 77
(1888); see also Jewell v Kelley, 155 Mich 301; 118 NW 987 (1909).
History
M Civ JI 4.04 was SJI 2.04.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 4-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 4.05 Party Competent as a Witness [ Recommend No
Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instruction on the “party competent as a witness” be
given.
M Civ JI 4.01 informs the jury that they may consider any interest or bias a witness has in
determining his or her credibility. It will cover the interest of a party witness, and the
committee recommends that no separate instruction on this subject be given. A separate
instruction may place undue emphasis upon particular aspects of the evidence.
An instruction which mentioned the interest of an individual party by name or otherwise
was disapproved in Seitz v Starks, 144 Mich 448; 108 NW 354 (1906).
History
M Civ JI 4.05 was SJI 2.05.
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Chapter 4: Credibility and Weight
M Civ JI 4.06 Witness Who Has Been Interviewed by an Attorney
It has been brought out that a lawyer *(or a representative of a lawyer) has talked with a
witness. There is nothing wrong with a lawyer *(or a representative of a lawyer) talking
with a witness for the purpose of learning what the witness knows about the case and what
testimony the witness will give.
Note on Use
*The words in parentheses should be used if appropriate.
Comment
This instruction is unnecessary unless the fact of an interview has been mentioned during
the trial. The Court may wish to give this instruction at the time this fact is brought out.
This instruction was approved in Socha v Passino, 405 Mich 458 (1979).
History
M Civ JI 4.06 was SJI 2.06. Amended January 1993, September 2007.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 4-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 4.07 Weighing Conflicting Evidence—Number of Witnesses
Although you may consider the number of witnesses testifying on one side or the other
when you weigh the evidence as to a particular fact, the number of witnesses alone should
not persuade you if the testimony of the lesser number of witnesses is more convincing.
Comment
An instruction that weight of the evidence does not mean the number of witnesses was
approved in Strand v Chicago & W M R Co, 67 Mich 380; 34 NW 712 (1887), and
American Seed Co v Cole, 174 Mich 42; 140 NW 622 (1913). However, any instruction on
this subject should make it clear that the ultimate decision is for the jury. King v Ann Arbor
R Co, 137 Mich 487; 100 NW 783 (1904); Spalding v Lowe, 56 Mich 366; 23 NW 46
(1885). Therefore, this instruction should be given in conjunction with M Civ JI 4.01.
History
M Civ JI 4.07 is a revision of SJI 2.07. Amended April 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 4-11
Chapter 4: Credibility and Weight
M Civ JI 4.08 One Witness against a Number [ Recommend No
Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no “one witness against a number” instruction be given.
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that it is error to point out cases where one witness
was to be believed against many. Butler v Detroit, Y & AA R Co, 138 Mich 206; 101 NW
232 (1904); Harrison v Green, 157 Mich 690; 122 NW 205 (1909); Lendberg v Brotherton
Iron Mining Co, 75 Mich 84; 42 NW 675 (1889). Such instructions have been criticized as
suggesting that the trial Court believed one side’s witnesses over the other.
This type of charge is unwarranted where M Civ JI 4.01 and 4.07 are given.
History
M Civ JI 4.08 was SJI 2.08.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 4-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 4.09 Credibility of Special Categories of Witnesses and
Weight of Evidence [ Recommend No Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instructions on the credibility of special categories of
witnesses be given. Such a charge has not been the usual practice and it would seem that
these special categories of witnesses, e.g., eyewitnesses, employees, etc., would be
adequately covered under M Civ JI 4.01. Counsel can cover such matters more properly in
argument.
History
M Civ JI 4.09 was SJI 2.09.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 4-13
Chapter 4: Credibility and Weight
M Civ JI 4.10 Weighing Expert Testimony
You have heard opinion testimony from one or more witnesses who have been offered as
experts. As in the case of other witnesses, you are free in your considered judgment to
accept all, part, or none of the testimony of an expert witness.
Comment
The factors listed in former M Civ JI 90.22A are left to argument of counsel. These factors
may include, but are not limited to, the length and diversity of the witness’s experience; the
professional attainments of the witness; whether the witness is regularly retained by
diverse, responsible persons and thus has a widespread professional standing to maintain;
and the experience that the witness has had in dealing with the nature of the issue about
which [ he / she ] has testified.
History
M Civ JI 4.10 was SJI 2.10. Adopted October 2018. Comment amended January 2019.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
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M Civ JI 4.11 Consideration of Deposition Evidence
[ Members of the jury. You are now going to hear a summary of a deposition that was taken.
A deposition is the sworn testimony of a party or witness taken before trial. All parties and
their lawyers had the right to be present and to ask questions. The summary was prepared
to more efficiently present this evidence. You are also being given a copy of the summary
so you can follow along as it is being read. You are to give this evidence the same
consideration as you would have given it had the witness testified in open court. ]
During the trial, [ you heard testimony from a deposition/ you were read the summary of a
deposition ]. A deposition is the sworn testimony of a party or witness taken before trial.
All parties and their lawyers had the right to be present and to ask questions. [ The summary
was prepared to more efficiently present this evidence. ]
You are to give this evidence the same consideration as you would have given it had the [
witness / witnesses ] testified in open court.
Note on Use
The bracketed language in the first paragraph should be given if a deposition summary is
read to the jury as contemplated by MCR 2.513(F).
Comment
The Court may wish to give this instruction at the time a deposition is read or shown to the
jury, see MCR 2.512(B)(l), and to explain why the deposition is admissible, see MCR
2.308(A). Instructions that deposition evidence should be given the same fair consideration
as testimony produced in open court have been approved. Coburn v Moline, EM & WR Co,
243 Ill 448; 90 NE 741 (1909); Pyle v McNealy, 227 Mo App 1035; 62 SW2d 921 (1933);
see also 3 Callaghan’s Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d ed) § 35.104.
The 2011 amendment reflects the amendment to MCR 2.513(F) ordered by the Michigan
Supreme Court on June 29, 2011, which became effective September 1, 2011. This
amendment calls for the court to encourage the use of written deposition summaries in lieu
of full depositions.
History
M Civ JI 4.11 was JI 2.11. Amended January 1988, September 2007, October 2011, July
2024.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 4-15
Chapter 4: Credibility and Weight
M Civ JI 4.12 Hospital and Business Records [ Recommend No
Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instruction be given concerning hospital and business
records. An instruction on this subject is not necessary and would place undue emphasis
upon particular portions of the evidence.
In Siirila v Barrios, 398 Mich 576; 248 NW2d 171 (1976), the Michigan Supreme Court,
quoting with approval SJI 2.12 (now M Civ JI 4.12), held that the trial judge properly
refused to give a requested instruction that the jury may consider as evidence matter
contained in a hospital record and absence of an entry in that record.
History
M Civ JI 4.12 was SJI 2.12.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 4-16 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 5-1
CHAPTER 5
Impeachment
M Civ JI 5.01 Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness [ Renumbered to
M Civ JI 3.15 ] ................................................................................................................. 5-2
M Civ JI 5.02 Impeachment of a Party by Prior Inconsistent Statement [ Instruction
Deleted ]......................................................................................................................... 5-3
M Civ JI 5.03 Impeachment by Proof of Conviction of Crime......................................... 5-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 5-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 5.01 Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness [ Renumbered
to M Civ JI 3.15 ]
History
M Civ JI 5.01 was SJI 3.01. Amended December 1982, November 1983, August 1991,
October 1993, February 1998. Renumbered to M Civ JI 3.15 January 1999.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 5-3
Chapter 5: Impeachment
M Civ JI 5.02 Impeachment of a Party by Prior Inconsistent
Statement [ Instruction Deleted ]
History
M Civ JI 5.02 was SJI 3.01(A). Amended November 1983. Deleted October 1993.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 5-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 5.03 Impeachment by Proof of Conviction of Crime
In deciding whether you should believe a witness, you may consider the fact that
the
witness has been convicted of a crime, and you may give that fact the weight you
believe it deserves under the circumstances.
Note on Use
This instruction applies to both a nonparty witness and a witness who is a party.
Comment
Evidence of a criminal conviction may be used for the purpose of drawing in question a
witness’s credibility. This evidence is admissible if elicited from the witness or established
by public record during cross-examination. MRE 609(a). The conviction must be of a crime
punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, or the conviction must
involve theft, dishonesty, or false statement. The Court must determine that the probative
value outweighs its prejudicial effect and must articulate on the record the factors
considered. MRE 609(a)(l), (2).
The January 2024 amendments are housekeeping changes reflecting stylistic revisions to
the Michigan Rules of Evidence that became effective January 1, 2024.
History
M Civ JI 5.03 is a revision of SJI 3.02. Amended April 1981, January 2024.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 6-1
CHAPTER 6
Failure to Produce
M Civ JI 6.01 Failure to Produce Evidence or a Witness ................................................ 6-2
M Civ JI 6.02 Failure of Opposite Party to Testify in Case Involving “Dead Man’s Statute”
[ Recommend No Instruction ]....................................................................................... 6-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 6-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 6.01 Failure to Produce Evidence or a Witness
(a)*(The [ plaintiff / defendant ] in this case has not offered [ the testimony of [ name ] /
[ identify exhibit ] ]. As this evidence was under the control of the [ plaintiff / defendant ]
and could have been produced by [ him / her ], and no reasonable excuse for the [ plaintiff’s
/ defendant’s ] failure to produce the evidence was given, you may infer that the evidence
would have been adverse to the [ plaintiff / defendant ].)
(b)†(The [ plaintiff / defendant ] in this case has not offered [ the testimony of [ name ] /
[ identify exhibit ] ]. As no reasonable excuse for the [ plaintiff’s / defendant’s ] failure to
produce this evidence was given, you may infer that the evidence would have been adverse
to the [ plaintiff / defendant ], if you believe that the evidence was under the control of the
[ plaintiff / defendant ] and could have been produced by [ him / her ].)
(c)**(The [ plaintiff / defendant ] in this case has not offered [ the testimony of [ name ] /
[ identify exhibit ] ]. As this evidence was under the control of the [ plaintiff / defendant ]
and could have been produced by [ him / her ], you may infer that the evidence would have
been adverse to the [ plaintiff / defendant ], if you believe that no reasonable excuse for
[ plaintiff’s / defendant’s ] failure to produce the evidence has been shown.)
(d)††(The [ plaintiff / defendant ] in this case has not offered [ the testimony of [ name ] /
[ identify exhibit ] ]. You may infer that this evidence would have been adverse to the
[ plaintiff / defendant ] if you believe that the evidence was under the control of the
[ plaintiff / defendant ] and could have been produced by [ him / her ], and no reasonable
excuse for [ plaintiff’s / defendant’s ] failure to produce the evidence has been shown.)
Note on Use
The words “plaintiff” and “defendant” may be replaced by “petitioner” and “respondent”
in cases in which the latter terms are used to describe the parties.
If requested, the appropriate one of the above instructions should be given under the
following circumstances:
*Instruction a should be given when the Court finds that—
1.the evidence was under the control of the (plaintiff) (defendant) and could have been
produced by him or her;
2.no reasonable excuse for (plaintiff’s) (defendant’s) failure to produce the evidence has
been shown; and
3.the evidence would have been material, not merely cumulative, and not equally available
Michigan Supreme Court Page 6-3
Chapter 6: Failure to Produce
to the opposite party.
†Instruction b should be given when a question of fact arises in regard to “control” in
subparagraph 1 above, and the Court finds in the affirmative in regard to subparagraphs 2
and 3 above.
**Instruction c should be given when a question of fact arises in regard to “reasonable
excuse” in subparagraph 2 above, and the Court finds in the affirmative in regard to
subparagraphs 1 and 3 above.
††Instruction d should be given when a question of fact arises in regard to both “control”
and “reasonable excuse” in subparagraphs 1 and 2 above, and the Court finds in the
affirmative in regard to subparagraph 3 above.
Comment
For general authority on the above instructions, see Vergin v Saginaw, 125 Mich 499; 84
NW 1075 (1901); Dowagiac Manufacturing Co v Schneider, 181 Mich 538; 148 NW 173
(1914); Fontana v Ford Motor Co, 278 Mich 199; 270 NW 266 (1936); Ward v
Consolidated Rail Corp, 472 Mich 77 (2005).
For authority on the limitation in regard to “control,” see Prudential Insurance Co v Cusick,
369 Mich 269; 120 NW2d 1 (1963); Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594; 101 NW2d 365
(1960); Brandt v C F Smith & Co, 242 Mich 217; 218 NW 803 (1928); in regard to
“reasonable excuse,” see Cole v Lake Shore & M S R Co, 81 Mich 156; 45 NW 983 (1890);
Leeds v Masha, 328 Mich 137; 43 NW2d 92 (1950); in regard to “material,” see Dowagiac
Manufacturing Co; in regard to “merely cumulative,” see Barringer; in regard to “equally
available,” see Urben v Public Bank, 365 Mich 279; 112 NW2d 444 (1961); Barringer;
DeGroff v Clark, 358 Mich 274; 100 NW2d 214 (1960); Macklem v Warren Construction
Co, 343 Mich 334; 72 NW2d 60 (1955); Holmes v Jones, 41 Mich App 63; 199 NW2d 538
(1972); Kaniewski v Emmerson, 44 Mich App 737; 205 NW2d 812 (1973). See also United
States v Beekman, 155 F2d 580, 584 (CA 2, 1946); Prudential Insurance Co.
History
M Civ JI 6.01 was SJI 5.01.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 6-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 6.02 Failure of Opposite Party to Testify in Case Involving
“Dead Man’s Statute” [ Recommend No Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instruction be given on the failure of the opposite party
to testify in a case involving the “dead man’s statute.”
If heirs, assigns, devisees, legatees, or personal representatives were parties to a suit, the
former dead man’s statute, MCL 600.2160, 617.64, prevented testimony by an adverse
party as to matters which, if true, must have been equally within the knowledge of the
deceased person. The prohibition was absolute if the statutory conditions were met.
The present statute, MCL 600.2166, represents an effort to loosen the strictures of the prior
law. It applied originally only to actions against the person “incapable of testifying,” but
1969 PA 63 and GCR 1963, 608 extended it to actions “by” as well as “against.” Under the
statute and rule the opposite party’s testimony was admissible if “some material portion of
his testimony is supported by some other material evidence tending to corroborate his
claim.”
In 1978, GCR 1963, 608 was abolished and MRE 601 was adopted. It provides generally
that any person is competent to be a witness. The committee commentary to rule 601
indicates that it changes present law by not requiring exclusion of testimony on grounds
covered by the Michigan dead man’s statute. In James v Dixon, 95 Mich App 527; 291
NW2d 106 (1980), the court of appeals held that the dead man’s statute was impliedly
abrogated by the adoption of MRE 601.
History
M Civ JI 6.02 was SJI 5.02.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 7-1
CHAPTER 7
Theories
M Civ JI 7.01 Theories of the Parties .............................................................................. 7-2
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 7-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 7.01 Theories of the Parties
These are the theories of the parties. I express no preference as to which, if any, you will
accept.
[ State the parties’ theories of the case ].
Comment
The present provision concerning the Court’s charge to the jury on issues in the case and
theories of the parties is found in MCR 2.512(A)(2), (B)(2):
Rule 2.512 Instructions to Jury
(A) Request for Instructions.
* * *
(2) In addition to requests for instructions submitted under subrule (A)(1), after the close
of the evidence, each party shall submit in writing to the court a statement of the issues and
may submit the party’s theory of the case regarding each issue. The statement must be
concise, be narrative in form, and set forth as issues only those disputed propositions of fact
that are supported by the evidence. The theory may include those claims supported by the
evidence or admitted.
* * *
(B) Instructing the Jury.
* * *
(2) Before or after arguments or at both times, as the court elects, the court shall instruct
the jury on the applicable law, the issues presented by the case, and, if a party requests as
provided in subrule (A)(2), that party’s theory of the case.
It is the duty of the trial Court to present to the jury the material issues of the case, whether
requested to or not. Barton v Gray, 57 Mich 662; 24 NW 638 (1885); Daigle v Berkowitz,
273 Mich 140; 262 NW 652 (1935); De Forest v Soules, 278 Mich 557; 270 NW 785
(1936); Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich 396; 295 NW 201 (1940); Jorgenson v Howland, 325
Mich 440; 38 NW2d 906 (1949); Brown v Nichols, 337 Mich 684; 60 NW2d 907 (1953);
Martiniano v Booth, 359 Mich 680; 103 NW2d 502 (1960); Sakorraphos v Eastman Kodak
Stores, Inc, 367 Mich 96; 116 NW2d 227 (1962).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 7-3
Chapter 7: Theories
The jury should not be instructed on issues that are not found in the pleadings, Pettibone v
Smith, 37 Mich 579 (1877); Denman v Johnston, 85 Mich 387; 48 NW 565 (1891); Curth
v New York Life Insurance Co, 274 Mich 513; 265 NW 749 (1936), unless supported by the
evidence in accordance with MCR 2.118(C). There should not be submitted as issues those
propositions of fact that are admitted or have not been disputed. Richardson v Coddington,
45 Mich 338; 7 NW 903 (1881); Lange v Perley, 47 Mich 352; 11 NW 193 (1882); Vitaioli
v Berklund, 296 Mich 56; 295 NW 557 (1941); Houck v Snyder, 375 Mich 392; 134 NW2d
689 (1965). The same is true with issues raised but not supported by the evidence. Litvin v
Joyce, 329 Mich 56; 44 NW2d 867 (1950); White v Grismore, 333 Mich 568; 53 NW2d
499 (1952).
The trial judge need not give the charge in the form submitted by counsel, so long as the
substance of such requested charge, if proper, is covered. Ferries v Copco Steel &
Engineering Co, 344 Mich 345; 73 NW2d 850 (1955); Schattilly v Yonker, 347 Mich 660;
81 NW2d 343 (1957); Horst v Tikkanen, 370 Mich 65; 120 NW2d 808 (1963).
History
M Civ JI 7.01 was added April 1981 and replaced SJI 20.01, 25.12, 25.22 and 27.03.
Amended January 1988, February 1989.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 7-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 8-1
CHAPTER 8
Definition of Burden of Proof
M Civ JI 8.01 Definition of Burden of Proof.................................................................... 8-2
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 8-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 8.01 Definition of Burden of Proof
(a) I have just listed for you the propositions on which the [ plaintiff / defendant ] has the
burden of proof. For the [ plaintiff / defendant ] to satisfy this burden, the evidence must
persuade you that it is more likely than not that the proposition is true.
You must consider all the evidence regardless of which party produced it.
(b) I have just listed for you the propositions on which the [ plaintiff / defendant ] has the
burden of proof. In this case the [ plaintiff / defendant ] must prove those propositions by
clear and convincing evidence. This means that [ plaintiff / defendant ] must do more than
merely persuade you that the proposition is probably true. To be clear and convincing, the
evidence must be strong enough to cause you to have a clear and firm belief that the
proposition is true.
You must consider all the evidence regardless of which party produced it.
(c) Because of the issues presented in this case, the [ plaintiff / defendant ] must meet
different burdens of proof on the claims [ he / she / it / they ] make[ s ].
On the following propositions, [ list the propositions ], [ plaintiff / defendant ] has the
burden of proof. For the [ plaintiff / defendant ] to satisfy this burden, the evidence must
persuade you that it is more likely than not that the proposition is true.
On the following propositions, [ list the propositions ], the [ plaintiff / defendant ] has an
additional burden of proof. On these listed propositions, the [ plaintiff / defendant ] must
prove those propositions by clear and convincing evidence. This means that [ plaintiff /
defendant ] must do more than merely persuade you that the proposition is probably true.
To be clear and convincing, the evidence must be strong enough to cause you to have a clear
and firm belief that the proposition is true.
You must consider all the evidence regardless of which party produced it.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given directly after M Civ JI 14.21, 16.02A, 16.04, 16.05, 16.06,
25.12, 25.22, 25.32, 25.45, 30.03, 35.02, 36.05, 36.06, 36.15, 75.11, 75.12, 80.02, 100.02,
101.04, 101.05, 101.06, 105.04, 105.012, 105.14, 105.32, 106.07A, 106.07C, 106.07D,
106.29, 106.35, 107.15, 110.10, 110.11, 110.12, 110.13, 115.20, 115.21, 116.20, 116.21,
117.02, 117.21, 118.05, 140.01, 140.42, 140.45, 140.53, 142.01, 170.45, 170.51, and
171.02.
Only the paragraph that applies should be read. For example, paragraph (c) is to be used
Michigan Supreme Court Page 8-3
Chapter 8: Definition of Burden of Proof
where there is a mixed burden of proof because of the nature of the claims brought.
Comment
The revised instruction makes clearer that the evidence in support of a proposition must
have a qualitative as well as a quantitative character. In other words, the evidence must do
more than simply outweigh that against it. A jury may disbelieve the evidence proffered in
support of a proposition even when that evidence is unopposed. In that situation, although
the evidence quantitatively outweighs that opposed to it, qualitatively it does not meet the
burden of proof because the jury must still be persuaded that the evidence supports a finding
that the proposition is true. Strand v Chicago & W M R Co, 67 Mich 380 (1887); Four
States Coal Co v Ohio & Michigan Coal Co, 228 Mich 360 (1924); Hanna v McClave, 273
Mich 571 (1935); Cook v Vineyard, 291 Mich 375 (1939); Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465
Mich 29 (2001).
In re Martin, 450 Mich 204 (1995); In re Chmura, 464 Mich 58 (2001).
History
M Civ JI 8.01 (former M Civ JI 16.01) was SJI 21.01. Amended October 1984.
Renumbered from M Civ JI 16.01 to M Civ JI 8.01 November 1998. Amended September
2007.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 8-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 10-1
CHAPTER 10
Negligence: General Instructions
M Civ JI 10.01 Definitions Introduced .......................................................................... 10-2
M Civ JI 10.02 Negligence of Adult—Definition ........................................................... 10-3
M Civ JI 10.03 Ordinary Care—Adult—Definition [ Instruction Deleted ].................... 10-5
M Civ JI 10.04 Duty to Use Ordinary Care— Adult—Plaintiff....................................... 10-6
M Civ JI 10.05 Duty to Use Ordinary Care—Adult—Defendant ................................... 10-7
M Civ JI 10.06 Ordinary Care—Minor—Definition ....................................................... 10-8
M Civ JI 10.07 Conduct Required for Safety of Child.................................................... 10-9
M Civ JI 10.08 Presumption of Ordinary Care—Death Case ...................................... 10-10
M Civ JI 10.09 Presumption of Ordinary Care—Loss of Memory Case ...................... 10-12
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 10-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 10.01 Definitions Introduced
I shall now give you the definitions of some important legal terms. Please listen carefully
to these definitions so that you will understand the terms when they are used later.
Note on Use
This instruction may be given as a transition from the General Instructions to the applicable
definitions.
History
M Civ JI 10.01 is a revision of SJI 10.00.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 10-3
Chapter 10: Negligence: General Instructions
M Civ JI 10.02 Negligence of Adult—Definition
Negligence is the failure to use ordinary care. Ordinary care means the care a reasonably
careful *person would use. Therefore, by “negligence,” I mean the failure to do something
that a reasonably careful *person would do, or the doing of something that a reasonably
careful *person would not do, under the circumstances that you find existed in this case.
The law does not say what a reasonably careful *person using ordinary care would or would
not do under such circumstances. That is for you to decide.
Note on Use
*Use of the word “person” may be inappropriate depending on the nature of the defendant’s
activity. Laney v Consumers Power Co, 418 Mich 180; 341 NW2d 106 (1983).
This instruction is not intended to apply to the defendant in a malpractice case. See M Civ
JI 30.01 and 30.02.
This instruction should not be used in a case involving co-participants in a recreational
activity. Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73; 597 NW2d 517 (1999) (co-
participants owe each other a duty not to act recklessly).
Comment
Authority for this instruction appears in numerous cases, some of which are Detroit & M R
Co v Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99, 118 (1868); Knarian v South Haven Sand Co, 361 Mich
631, 643; 106 NW2d 151, 157 (1960); Muth v W P Lahey’s, Inc, 338 Mich 513, 523; 61
NW2d 619, 623 (1953); Reedy v Goodin, 285 Mich 614, 620; 281 NW 377, 379 (1938);
and Frederick v Detroit, 370 Mich 425, 435; 121 NW2d 918, 922 (1963); Case v
Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1; 615 NW2d 17 (2000).
Under Michigan law, the standard of conduct required may differ depending on the activity,
trade, occupation, or profession, but the degree of care does not change. It is always what
a reasonably careful person engaged in a particular activity, trade, occupation, or profession
would do or would refrain from doing under the circumstances then existing. Frederick;
Laney. It is ordinarily error to instruct a jury on the specific standard of conduct. Case (in
this stray-voltage case, the court held it was reversible error to instruct the jury that
defendant had a duty to inspect and repair electrical wires); but see Schultz v Consumers
Power, 443 Mich 445; 506 NW2d 175 (1993), which approved that standard of conduct in
a case involving dangers from high-voltage electricity.
The general rule for a child as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts §283A, is that “the
standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 10-4 Michigan Supreme Court
reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.”
However, there is an exception to this rule where the child is engaging in an adult activity.
The exception is set forth in comment c to §283A, which states as follows:
An exception to the rule stated in this Section may arise where the child engages in an
activity which is normally undertaken only by adults, and for which adult qualifications are
required. As in the case of one entering upon a professional activity which requires special
skill (see §299A), he may be held to the standard of adult skill, knowledge, and
competence, and no allowance may be made for his immaturity. Thus, for example, if a boy
of fourteen were to attempt to fly an airplane, his age and inexperience would not excuse
him from liability for flying it in a negligent manner. The same may be true where the child
drives an automobile. In this connection licensing statutes, and the examinations given to
drivers, may be important in determining the qualifications required; but even if the child
succeeds in obtaining a license he may thereafter be required to meet the standard
established primarily for adults.
It is not clear whether the court or jury decides whether the activity is one normally
undertaken only by adults.
The Michigan Supreme Court considered this exception in Constantino v Wolverine
Insurance Co, 407 Mich 896; 284 NW2d 463 (1979). Reversing an unpublished court of
appeals opinion, the supreme court said that “the instruction that the appellee driver was not
held to the same standard of conduct as an adult was erroneous. When a minor engages in
a dangerous and adult activity, e.g., driving an automobile, he is charged with the same
standard of conduct as an adult.” See also Osner v Boughner, 180 Mich App 248; 446
NW2d 873 (1989). The adult standard of care applies even if the minor is a student driver.
Stevens v Veenstra, 226 Mich App 441; 573 NW2d 341 (1997).
History
M Civ JI 10.02 is a revision of SJI 10.01 and SJI 10.02. Amended February 1, 1981, June
1998.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 10-5
Chapter 10: Negligence: General Instructions
M Civ JI 10.03 Ordinary Care—Adult—Definition [ Instruction
Deleted ]
Comment
This instruction was deleted by the committee June 1998. The subject matter of this
instruction is now part of M Civ JI 10.02.
History
M Civ JI 10.03 was SJI 10.02. Deleted June 1998.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 10-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 10.04 Duty to Use Ordinary Care— Adult—Plaintiff
It was the duty of the plaintiff, in connection with this occurrence, to use ordinary care for
[ [ his / her ] own safety / and / the safety of [ his / her ] property ].
Note on Use
If the plaintiff is age 18 or over, this instruction should be used with M Civ JI 10.02,
Negligence of Adult—Definition. If the plaintiff is under age 18, refer to the Comment
following M Civ JI 10.02.
If the conduct of a person other than plaintiff was involved in the occurrence, substitute
name or other descriptive term in the instruction.
This instruction should not be used if the injury results from participation in a recreational
activity; coparticipants in such activity owe each other a duty not to act recklessly. Ritchie-
Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73; 597 NW2d 517 (1999)
Comment
This instruction is supported by Detroit & M R Co v Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99 (1868), and
Mack v Precast Industries, Inc, 369 Mich 439; 120 NW2d 225 (1963).
History
M Civ JI 10.04 was SJI 10.03.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 10-7
Chapter 10: Negligence: General Instructions
M Civ JI 10.05 Duty to Use Ordinary Care—Adult—Defendant
It was the duty of the defendant, in connection with this occurrence, to use ordinary care
for the safety of [ the plaintiff / and / plaintiff’s property ].
Note on Use
If the defendant or other person whose conduct was involved in the occurrence is age 18 or
over, this instruction should be used with M Civ JI 10.02, Negligence of Adult—Definition.
If the plaintiff is under age 18, refer to the Comment following M Civ JI 10.02.
If the conduct of a person other than defendant was involved in the occurrence, substitute
name or other descriptive term in the instruction.
This instruction should not be used if the injury results from participation in a recreational
activity; coparticipants in such activity owe each other a duty not to act recklessly. Ritchie-
Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73; 597 NW2d 517 (1999)
Comment
This instruction is supported by Detroit & M R Co v Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99 (1868);
Knarian v South Haven Sand Co, 361 Mich 631, 643; 106 NW2d 151, 157 (1960); and
Ryder v Murphy, 371 Mich 474, 478; 124 NW2d 238, 240 (1963).
History
M Civ JI 10.05 was SJI 10.04.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 10-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 10.06 Ordinary Care—Minor—Definition
A minor is not held to the same standard of conduct as an adult. When I use the words
“ordinary care” with respect to [ the minor / [ name of minor ] ], I mean that degree of care
which a reasonably careful minor of the age, mental capacity and experience of [ the minor
/ [ name of minor ] ] would use under the circumstances which you find existed in this case.
It is for you to decide what a reasonably careful minor would do or would not do under such
circumstances.
Note on Use
This instruction should not be used if the minor is engaged in an adult activity that is
dangerous, such as driving an automobile. Constantino v Wolverine Ins Co, 407 Mich 896;
284 NW2d 463 (1979). See also the Comment following M Civ JI 10.02. In such cases, M
Civ JI 10.04 or M Civ JI 10.05 should be used.
When a plaintiff is under age seven, use M Civ JI 13.08. No instruction is needed if
defendant is under age seven.
Substitute name or other descriptive term for “the minor” when appropriate.
Comment
The degree of care to be exercised by a minor over age seven is that which a reasonably
careful person of the same age, capacity and experience would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances. Baker v Alt, 374 Mich 492; 132 NW2d 614 (1965); Tyler v Weed,
285 Mich 460; 280 NW 827 (1938); Easton v Medema, 246 Mich 130; 224 NW 636 (1929);
Trudell v Grand Trunk R Co, 126 Mich 73, 78; 85 NW 250, 252 (1901); Baker v Flint & P
M R Co, 68 Mich 90; 35 NW 836 (1888); Cooper v Lake Shore & M S R Co, 66 Mich 261;
33 NW 306 (1887); Daniels v Clegg, 28 Mich 32 (1873); East Saginaw City R Co v Bohn,
27 Mich 503 (1873); Hargreaves v Deacon, 25 Mich 1, 2 (1872).
If the child is under age seven, he or she cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. Baker.
If the child is under age seven, he or she cannot be guilty of negligence or intentional tort
and the suit must be dismissed. Queen Insurance Co v Hammond, 374 Mich 655; 132
NW2d 792 (1965).
History
M Civ JI 10.06 was SJI 10.05.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 10-9
Chapter 10: Negligence: General Instructions
M Civ JI 10.07 Conduct Required for Safety of Child
The law recognizes that children act upon childish instincts and impulses. If you find the
defendant knew or should have known that a child or children were or were likely to be in
the vicinity, then the defendant is required to exercise greater vigilance and this is a
circumstance to be considered by you in determining whether reasonable care was used by
the defendant.
Note on Use
This instruction is to be used in appropriate cases where the plaintiff seeks damages for
injury to a minor. If the conduct of a person, e.g., agent, driver, etc., other than defendant
was involved in the occurrence, substitute name or other descriptive term in the instruction.
This instruction should be given immediately after M Civ JI 10.03.
See Bolser v Davis, 62 Mich App 731; 233 NW2d 845 (1975), where defendant’s
knowledge that there were homes along the road on which she was driving was a fact from
which a jury could infer that she knew or should have known that a child or children were
or were likely to be in the vicinity, and therefore the evidence was sufficient to make this
instruction appropriate.
Comment
The law recognizes that children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childish
instincts and impulses. Powers v Harlow, 53 Mich 507, 515; 19 NW 257, 260 (1884);
Edgerton v Lynch, 255 Mich 456, 460; 238 NW 322, 323–324 (1931). Michigan law
requires greater vigilance toward children than toward adults, although the degree of care
does not change. See Comment, M Civ JI 10.02.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 10-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 10.08 Presumption of Ordinary Care—Death Case
Because [ name of decedent ] has died and cannot testify, you may infer that [ he / she ]
exercised ordinary care for [ his / her ] safety *(and for the safety of others) at and before
the time of the occurrence. However, you should weigh all the evidence in determining
whether the decedent exercised due care.
Note on Use
This instruction can be given only in a case involving negligence or a willful and wanton
action, when one or both of the parties (or a person acting for one of the parties) is deceased.
*The phrase in parentheses should be used if appropriate.
In certain circumstances, it may not be appropriate to use this instruction. Where there is
clear, positive and credible evidence showing negligence by the deceased, this instruction
should not be given. Potts v Shepard Marine Construction Co, 151 Mich App 19; 391
NW2d 357 (1986); see also Gillett v Michigan United Traction Co, 205 Mich 410; 171 NW
536 (1919). Also, MCL 600.5805(12) limits the use of presumptions in certain products
liability actions: “for a product that has been in use for not less than 10 years, the plaintiff,
in proving a prima facie case, must do so without benefit of any presumption.” In Johnson
v White, 430 Mich 47, 49 n1; 420 NW2d 87, 88 n1 (1988), the Michigan Supreme Court
addressed the issue of the trial court’s refusal to give an instruction on the presumption of
due care and concluded:
Because the error was harmless, if error at all, we do not address the question
whether the instruction on the presumption of due care, M Civ JI 10.08, remains
viable where principles of comparative negligence are applied.
Comment
The presumption of ordinary care originally appeared in Teipel v Hilsendegen, 44 Mich
461, 462; 7 NW 82, 82 (1880).
Other cases dealing with this presumption include: Weller v Mancha, 351 Mich 50; 87
NW2d 134 (1957); Weller v Mancha (On Rehearing), 353 Mich 189; 91 NW2d 352 (1958);
Hill v Harbor Steel & Supply Corp, 374 Mich 194; 132 NW2d 54 (1965); Bolser v Davis,
62 Mich App 731; 233 NW2d 845 (1975).
If plaintiff and defendant are deceased, then both are entitled to the presumption. Detroit
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v Powe, 348 Mich 548; 83 NW2d 292 (1957); Booth
v Bond, 354 Mich 561; 93 NW2d 161 (1958).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 10-11
Chapter 10: Negligence: General Instructions
This is a proper instruction even though the burden of proving contributory negligence is
now on the defendant. Mack v Precast Industries, Inc, 369 Mich 439, 454; 120 NW2d 225,
232 (1963).
History
Amended December 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 10-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 10.09 Presumption of Ordinary Care—Loss of Memory Case
[ If you find that / Since ] [ plaintiff / defendant ] has a loss of memory concerning the facts
of this case and it was caused by the occurrence, you may infer that the [ plaintiff /
defendant ] was not negligent. However, you should weigh all the evidence in determining
whether the [ plaintiff / defendant ] was or was not negligent.
Note on Use
This instruction can be given only in a case involving negligence or a willful and wanton
action, when one or both of the parties (or a person acting for one of the parties) is suffering
from loss of memory related to injuries received in the accident.
In certain products liability actions, this instruction should not be used: “for a product that
has been in use for not less than 10 years, the plaintiff, in proving a prima facie case, must
do so without benefit of any presumption.” MCL 600.5805(12). For other circumstances in
which this instruction may not be appropriate, see Note on Use to M Civ JI 10.08 and
Comment below.
Comment
The above instruction is to be given in cases where either of the parties is suffering from
loss of memory. Knickerbocker v Samson, 364 Mich 439, 448; 111 NW2d 113, 117–118
(1961), see also Shaw v Bashore, 353 Mich 31; 90 NW2d 688 (1958). The loss of memory
must be related to injuries received in the accident. Thompson v Southern Michigan
Transportation Co, 261 Mich 440, 446; 246 NW 174, 176 (1933). However, medical
evidence does not necessarily have to be presented to prove the injury caused the amnesia.
Knickerbocker.
In two cases involving claims of traumatic amnesia, the trial court’s refusal to give a
presumption of due care instruction was upheld as a proper exercise of discretion. Tien v
Barkel, 351 Mich 276; 88 NW2d 552 (1958); Holloway v Cronk, 76 Mich App 577; 257
NW2d 175 (1977).
History
Amended December 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 11-1
CHAPTER 11
Comparative Negligence
M Civ JI 11.01 Comparative Negligence—Definition ................................................... 11-2
M Civ JI 11.02 Negligence—Not an Issue as to One or More Plaintiffs........................ 11-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 11-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 11.01 Comparative Negligence—Definition
The total amount of damages that the plaintiff would otherwise be entitled to recover shall
be reduced by the percentage of plaintiff’s negligence that contributed as a proximate cause
to [ his / her ] [ injury / property damage ].
This is known as comparative negligence.
*(The plaintiff, however, is not entitled to noneconomic damages if [ he / she ] is more than
50 percent at fault for [ his / her ] injury.)
Note on Use
This instruction should be given where there is a question for the jury as to the negligence
of one or more of the plaintiffs. If there is no such question, see M Civ JI 11.02
Negligence—Not an Issue as to One or More Plaintiffs.
*This paragraph should be deleted if the case was filed before March 28, 1996. See 1995
PA 161, §3.
Comment
See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), and MCL 600.2959,
added by 1995 PA 161.
History
M Civ JI 11.01 was added September 1980. Amended June 1997.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 11-3
Chapter 11: Comparative Negligence
M Civ JI 11.02 Negligence—Not an Issue as to One or More Plaintiffs
You must not consider whether there was negligence on the part of the [ plaintiff, [ name
of plaintiff ] / plaintiffs, [ names of plaintiffs ] ], *(because [ explain briefly ]).
Note on Use
If there is a question for the jury as to the negligence of one or more plaintiffs, but not as to
other plaintiffs, both M Civ JI 11.01 and M Civ JI 11.02 should be given.
*The words in parentheses may be added if appropriate.
History
M Civ JI 11.02 is a revision of SJI 11.02. Amended September 1980.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 11-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 12-1
CHAPTER 12
Statutes and Ordinances
Affecting Negligence
M Civ JI 12.01 Violation of Statute—Negligence.......................................................... 12-2
M Civ JI 12.02 Excused Violation of Statute ................................................................. 12-3
M Civ JI 12.03 Violation of Ordinance by Defendant ................................................... 12-4
M Civ JI 12.04 Violation of Ordinance by Plaintiff........................................................ 12-6
M Civ JI 12.05 Violation by Defendant of Rules or Regulations Promulgated
Pursuant to Statutory Authority................................................................................... 12-8
M Civ JI 12.06 Violation by Plaintiff of Rules or Regulations Promulgated Pursuant to
Statutory Authority ...................................................................................................... 12-9
M Civ JI 12.07 Violation of Statute or Ordinance by Minor [ No Instruction
Prepared ]................................................................................................................... 12-10
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 12-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 12.01 Violation of Statute—Negligence
We have a state statute which provides that [ here quote or paraphrase the applicable part
of the statute as construed by the courts ].
If you find that the [ defendant / plaintiff ] violated this statute before or at the time of the
occurrence, you may infer that the [ defendant / plaintiff ] was negligent. *(You must then
decide whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence.)
Note on Use
*If a sudden emergency or other excuse for the violation of the statute is an issue in the case,
omit the last sentence of this instruction and add M Civ JI 12.02.
This instruction should be given only if defendant or plaintiff has alleged a statutory
violation as a ground for negligence, and only if—
the statute is intended to protect against the result of the violation;
the plaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the statute; and
the evidence will support a finding that the violation was a proximate
contributing cause of the occurrence.
If applicable, this instruction should be given in close association with the applicable
instructions defining proximate cause. See M Civ JI 15.01–15.06.
If there is no dispute or question that the statute was violated, and if there is no claim of
excuse for the violation, then the jury may be instructed that the plaintiff or defendant was
negligent as a matter of law, and only the remaining issues should be submitted to the jury.
Comment
Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117; 243 NW2d 270 (1976); Klanseck v Anderson Sales &
Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78; 393 NW2d 356 (1986).
History
M Civ JI 12.01 and 12.02 were added September 1980. They replace SJI 12.01 through
12.04.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 12-3
Chapter 12: Statutes and Ordinances Affecting Negligence
M Civ JI 12.02 Excused Violation of Statute
However, if you find that [ defendant / plaintiff ] used ordinary care and was still unable to
avoid the violation because of [ state here the excuse claimed ], then [ his / her ] violation
is excused.
If you find that [ defendant / plaintiff ] violated this statute and that the violation was not
excused, then you must decide whether such violation was a proximate cause of the
occurrence.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given immediately following M Civ JI 12.01 and only where the
evidence would support a finding that a legal excuse existed.
Comment
See MRE 301 and cases collected in Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117; 243 NW2d 270
(1976). See also Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78; 393 NW2d 356
(1986).
Five categories of excused violations are indicated by Restatement (Second) of Torts §288
A, at 32–33:
(a)the violation is reasonable because of the actor’s incapacity;
(b)he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance;
(c)he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d)he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
(e)compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others.
History
M Civ JI 12.01 and 12.02 were added September 1980. They replace SJI 12.01 through
12.04.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 12-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 12.03 Violation of Ordinance by Defendant
The [ city / township / village / [ other political subdivision ] ] of ________________ has
an ordinance which provides that [ here quote or paraphrase the applicable part of the
ordinance as construed by the courts ].
If you find that defendant violated this ordinance before or at the time of the occurrence,
such violation is evidence of negligence which you should consider, together with all the
other evidence, in deciding whether defendant was negligent. If you find that defendant was
negligent, you must then decide whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the
[ injury / damage ] to plaintiff.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given only if—
the ordinance is intended to protect against the injury involved;
the plaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the ordinance; and
the evidence will support a finding that the violation was a proximate cause of
the injury involved.
If applicable, it should be given in close association with the applicable instructions
defining proximate cause. See M Civ JI 15.01–15.06. If there is no dispute or question as
to a violation of the ordinance, then the jury should be so instructed, leaving, however, the
question as to whether such violation constituted negligence, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, to the jury. A suggested alternative is as follows:
[ It is conceded / There is no question ] that defendant violated this ordinance at
the time of the occurrence. You should consider this fact, together with all the
other evidence, in deciding whether defendant was negligent. If you find that
defendant was negligent, you must then decide whether such negligence was a
proximate cause of the [ injury / damage ] to plaintiff.
Where both statute and ordinance violations are involved, the instructions should not
attempt to analyze the difference in treatment, this being more appropriately left to
argument of counsel.
Comment
In Michigan, violation of an ordinance is only evidence of negligence, Stinson v Payne, 231
Mich 158; 203 NW 831 (1925); Smith v Grand Rapids R Co, 240 Mich 637; 216 NW 439
Michigan Supreme Court Page 12-5
Chapter 12: Statutes and Ordinances Affecting Negligence
(1927); Baker v Saginaw City Lines, Inc, 366 Mich 180; 113 NW2d 912 (1962), which is
to be considered, in connection with other evidence, in determining whether a party was
negligent.
History
M Civ JI 12.03 was SJI 12.05.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 12-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 12.04 Violation of Ordinance by Plaintiff
The [ city / township / village / [ other political subdivision ] ] of ________________ has
an ordinance which provides that [ here quote or paraphrase the applicable part of the
ordinance as construed by the courts ].
If you find that plaintiff violated this ordinance before or at the time of the occurrence, such
violation is evidence of negligence which you should consider, together with all the other
evidence, in deciding whether plaintiff was negligent. If you find that plaintiff was
negligent, you must then decide whether such negligence was a proximate contributing
cause of the [ injury / damage ] to plaintiff.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given only if—
the ordinance is intended to protect against the result of the violation;
the plaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the ordinance; and
the evidence will support a finding that the violation was a proximate
contributing cause of the injury involved.
If applicable, it should be given in close association with the applicable instructions
defining proximate cause. See M Civ JI 15.01–15.06. If there is no dispute or question as
to a violation of the ordinance, then the jury should be so instructed, leaving, however, the
question as to whether such violation constituted negligence, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, to the jury. A suggested alternative is as follows:
[ It is conceded / There is no question ] that plaintiff violated this ordinance at the
time of the occurrence. You should consider this fact, together with all the other
evidence, in deciding whether plaintiff was negligent. If you find that plaintiff
was negligent, you must then decide whether such negligence was a proximate
contributing cause of the [ injury / damage ] to plaintiff.
Where both statute and ordinance violations are involved, the instructions should not
attempt to analyze the difference in treatment, this being more appropriately left to
argument of counsel.
Comment
See Comment to M Civ JI 12.03.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 12-7
Chapter 12: Statutes and Ordinances Affecting Negligence
History
M Civ JI 12.04 was SJI 12.06.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 12-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 12.05 Violation by Defendant of Rules or Regulations
Promulgated Pursuant to Statutory Authority
The [ name of state agency ] in Michigan has adopted certain regulations pursuant to
authority given to it by a state statute. [ Rule / Rules ] ________ of [ name of state agency ]
[ provides / provide ] that [ here quote or paraphrase applicable parts of regulation(s) as
construed by the courts ].
If you find that defendant violated [ this regulation / one or more of these regulations ]
before or at the time of the occurrence, such [ violation / violations ] [ is / are ] evidence of
negligence which you should consider, together with all the other evidence, in deciding
whether defendant was negligent. If you find that defendant was negligent, you must then
decide whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the [ injury / damage ] to
plaintiff.
Note on Use
See Note on Use to M Civ JI 12.03.
Comment
Violations of regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory authority are only evidence of
negligence in Michigan. Douglas v Edgewater Park Co, 369 Mich 320; 119 NW2d 567
(1963); Juidici v Forsyth Twp, 373 Mich 81; 127 NW2d 853 (1964).
History
M Civ JI 12.05 was SJI 12.07.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 12-9
Chapter 12: Statutes and Ordinances Affecting Negligence
M Civ JI 12.06 Violation by Plaintiff of Rules or Regulations
Promulgated Pursuant to Statutory Authority
The [ name of state agency ] in Michigan has adopted certain regulations pursuant to
authority given to it by a state statute. [ Rule / Rules ] ________ of [ name of state agency ]
[ provides / provide ] that [ here quote or paraphrase applicable parts of regulation(s) as
construed by the courts ].
If you find that plaintiff violated [ this regulation / one or more of these regulations ] before
or at the time of the occurrence, such [ violation / violations ] [ is / are ] evidence of
negligence which you should consider, together with all the other evidence, in deciding
whether plaintiff was negligent. If you find that plaintiff was negligent, you must then
decide whether such negligence was a proximate contributing cause of the [ injury /
damage ] to plaintiff.
Note on Use
See Note on Use to M Civ JI 12.04.
Comment
See Comment to M Civ JI 12.05.
History
M Civ JI 12.06 was SJI 12.08.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 12-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 12.07 Violation of Statute or Ordinance by Minor [ No
Instruction Prepared ]
Comment
No instruction on the violation of a statute or ordinance by a minor has been prepared by
the committee because the Michigan cases have not distinguished between minors’ and
adults’ violations of statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations. Ertzbischoff v Smith, 286
Mich 306; 282 NW 159 (1938); Strong v Kittenger, 300 Mich 126; 1 NW2d 479 (1942);
Brown v Tanner, 281 Mich 150; 274 NW 744 (1937); Rotter v Detroit United R Co, 205
Mich 212; 171 NW 514 (1919). Where a minor is engaged in an activity for which adult
qualifications are required, such as driving an automobile, the general rule is that the
standard to be applied is the same as for an adult. Restatement (Second) of Torts §283 A,
at 14. The Michigan Supreme Court dealt with this in Constantino v Wolverine Insurance
Co, 407 Mich 896; 284 NW2d 463 (1979). Reversing an unpublished Court of Appeals
opinion, the Supreme Court said that “the instruction that the appellee driver was not held
to the same standard of conduct as an adult was erroneous. When a minor engages in a
dangerous and adult activity, e.g., driving an automobile, he is charged with the same
standard of conduct as an adult.”
No cases have been found in Michigan which discuss the question of the effect of an actor’s
minority on the issue of his or her statutory or ordinance violation where primary
negligence is involved. In other jurisdictions, apparently the situation is the same. Anno:
Child’s violation of statute or ordinance as affecting question of his negligence or
contributory negligence, 174 ALR 1170, at 1198–1200.
The majority of jurisdictions considering the effect of a statutory or ordinance violation by
a minor upon the question of his or her contributory negligence have held that the minor’s
age, mental capacity and experience must be considered in determining whether the
violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes contributory negligence. That is, if the
minor’s conduct is reasonable for persons of like age, mental capacity and experience, then
the jury should be instructed that, in determining whether the minor violated the statute or
ordinance, they should consider whether he or she had the mental and physical capacity to
comply with it. 174 ALR 1170, at 1174–1178; 7A Am Jur 2d, Automobiles & Highway
Traffic, §498, at 725.
Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the view that minority is to be considered in
determining whether a particular violation will be excused. §288 A (2)(a), at 32–33.
Where a child is under the age of seven, the issue of negligence or contributory negligence
should not be submitted to the jury, as he or she cannot be guilty of negligence, Queen
Insurance Co v Hammond, 374 Mich 655; 132 NW2d 792 (1965), or contributory
negligence, Baker v Alt, 374 Mich 492; 132 NW2d 614 (1965).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 12-11
Chapter 12: Statutes and Ordinances Affecting Negligence
History
M Civ JI 12.07 was SJI 12.09.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 12-12 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 13-1
CHAPTER 13
Other Special Factors Affecting
Negligence
M Civ JI 13.01 Physical Disability.................................................................................. 13-2
M Civ JI 13.02 Intoxication as Affecting Negligence..................................................... 13-3
M Civ JI 13.03 Mental Illness—Adult............................................................................ 13-4
M Civ JI 13.04 Duty of One in Imminent Peril and Responsibility of the Person
Causing the Perilous Situation [ Recommend No Instruction ] .................................... 13-5
M Civ JI 13.05 Unavoidable Accident [ Recommend No Instruction ].......................... 13-6
M Civ JI 13.06 Assumption of Risk [ No Instruction Prepared ].................................... 13-7
M Civ JI 13.07 Attempted Rescue of One in Imminent Peril by a Person Who Did
Not Cause Such Peril [ Instruction Deleted ] ................................................................ 13-8
M Civ JI 13.08 Presumption That Child Under Seven Years Is Incapable of
Negligence.................................................................................................................... 13-9
M Civ JI 13.09 Effect of Parent’s Negligence on Claim of Child.................................. 13-10
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 13-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 13.01 Physical Disability
One who is ill or otherwise physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care
that a reasonably careful person who has the same illness or physical disability would use.
Note on Use
This instruction does not apply where voluntary intoxication or mental illness is involved.
For the appropriate instructions in those cases see M Civ JI 13.02 and M Civ JI 13.03.
Comment
Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness, deafness, short stature, a clubfoot, or
the weakness of age or sex, are treated as part of the circumstances under which a
reasonable person must act. Thus the standard of conduct for a blind person becomes that
of a reasonable person who is blind. Restatement (Second) of Torts §283 C, at 18.
The same allowance is made for physical illness. Thus a heart attack or a temporary
dizziness due to a fever or nausea or other similar illnesses is regarded merely as
circumstances to be taken into account in determining what the reasonable person would
do. Id.
This rule has been recognized in Michigan. See Daniels v Clegg, 28 Mich 32, 41 (1873);
Clemens v Sault Ste Marie, 289 Mich 254, 256; 286 NW 232, 233–234 (1939).
The rule has been applied in the following Michigan cases: Armstrong v Cook, 250 Mich
180; 229 NW 433 (1930) (fainting); Covert v Randall, 298 Mich 38, 42; 298 NW 396, 397
(1941) (deaf mute); and Jakubiec v Hasty, 337 Mich 205, 212; 59 NW2d 385, 388 (1953)
(deaf mute).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 13-3
Chapter 13: Other Special Factors Affecting Negligence
M Civ JI 13.02 Intoxication as Affecting Negligence
It has been claimed that [ name ] had been drinking [ alcoholic beverage ]. According to
the law, one who voluntarily impairs his or her abilities by drinking is held to the same
standard of care as a person whose abilities have not been impaired by drinking. It is for
you to decide whether [ name ]’s conduct was, in fact, affected by drinking and whether, as
a result, [ he / she ] failed to exercise the care of a reasonably careful person under the
circumstances which you find existed in this case.
Note on Use
If it is claimed that a statute or ordinance was violated, give appropriate instructions from
M Civ JI 12.01, 12.03 and 12.04.
This instruction may be inappropriate where a person is suffering from delirium tremors
rather than intoxication. Thornton v City of Flint, 39 Mich App 260; 197 NW2d 485 (1972).
Comment
Michigan recognizes that intoxication is a factor the jury may consider in deciding whether
a person is negligent or contributorily negligent. Devlin v Morse, 254 Mich 113; 235 NW
812 (1931). One who voluntarily disables himself or herself through the consumption of
alcoholic beverages is nevertheless held to the same standard of conduct as a reasonably
careful person who is sober. See Strand v Chicago & W M R Co, 67 Mich 380; 34 NW 712
(1887). It is for the jury to decide whether an intoxicated person exercised reasonable care.
Fors v LaFreniere, 284 Mich 5, 11; 278 NW 743, 745 (1938).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 13-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 13.03 Mental Illness—Adult
An adult who is disabled by reason of mental illness must still observe the same standard
of care which a normal and reasonably careful person would exercise under the
circumstances which existed in this case.
Comment
No Michigan cases have been found on this subject.
However, the general rule outside of Michigan is that unless the actor is a child, mental
illness does not relieve him or her from liability for conduct which does not conform to the
standards of a reasonable person under like circumstances. Restatement (Second) of Torts
§283 B, at 16–17.
History
M Civ JI 13.03 is a revision of SJI 13.03. Amended February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 13-5
Chapter 13: Other Special Factors Affecting Negligence
M Civ JI 13.04 Duty of One in Imminent Peril and Responsibility of
the Person Causing the Perilous Situation [ Recommend No
Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instruction be given on either the duty of one in
imminent peril or the responsibility of the person causing the perilous situation.
The degree of care required of one confronted with imminent peril does not vary merely
because of the unusual circumstances. The standard is neither higher nor lower, the inquiry
remaining the same as to whether the one sought to be charged with negligence or
contributory negligence acted as a reasonably careful person would act under the same or
similar circumstances. Triestram v Way, 286 Mich 13, 17; 281 NW 420, 421 (1938).
The liability of one causing a perilous situation is governed by the general principles of
negligence law.
The committee recommends that no special instruction be given concerning this matter.
The principles suggested are treated in part by instructions on negligence (M Civ JI 10.02
and 11.01) and sudden emergency (M Civ JI 12.02). Any additional instructions may be
misleading and argumentative and the matter should be left for argument by counsel.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 13-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 13.05 Unavoidable Accident [ Recommend No Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instruction be given on “unavoidable accident.”
The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that in most cases an instruction that the “accident”
was “unavoidable” constitutes a false and immaterial issue. Lober v Sklar, 357 Mich 166,
170; 97 NW2d 617, 619 (1959); see also McClarren v Buck, 343 Mich 300, 303; 72 NW2d
31, 32 (1955).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 13-7
Chapter 13: Other Special Factors Affecting Negligence
M Civ JI 13.06 Assumption of Risk [ No Instruction Prepared ]
Comment
The committee has prepared no instruction on “assumption of risk.”
Since Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23; 133 NW2d 136 (1965), was decided, the doctrine
of assumption of risk has applied only in cases between employee and employer for injuries
incurred in the course of employment where the statutory bar of the Worker’s Disability
Compensation Act is not applicable, and in cases where it is claimed there has been an
express contractual assumption of risk.
These situations arise infrequently and the principles involved have not been sufficiently
defined to permit the drafting of appropriate instructions.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 13-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 13.07 Attempted Rescue of One in Imminent Peril by a
Person Who Did Not Cause Such Peril [ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
Former M Civ JI 13.07 was deleted because the subject matter of that instruction is covered
by the general negligence instructions. See Solomon v Shuell, 435 Mich 104; 457 NW2d
669 (1990).
History
M Civ JI 13.07 was added September 1980. Deleted February 1991.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 13-9
Chapter 13: Other Special Factors Affecting Negligence
M Civ JI 13.08 Presumption That Child Under Seven Years Is
Incapable of Negligence
You must not consider whether there was negligence on the part of [ name of child ],
because, under the law, a child of [ his / her ] age cannot be charged with negligence.
Note on Use
This instruction may be used only when the plaintiff was under seven at the time of the
occurrence. If there is a jury issue as to the child’s age, this instruction must be modified.
Comment
Before Michigan’s adoption of comparative negligence in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405
Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), it was held that a child under seven cannot be guilty of
contributory negligence. Baker v Alt, 374 Mich 492; 132 NW2d 614 (1965).
History
M Civ JI 13.08 is a revision of SJI 11.03. Amended September 1980.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 13-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 13.09 Effect of Parent’s Negligence on Claim of Child
You must not consider whether there was negligence on the part of [ name of child ]’s
parents, because, under the law, any negligence on the part of the parents cannot affect a
claim on behalf of the child.
Note on Use
There are no reported decisions on the impact, if any, of MCL 600.2957 in a case involving
a claim for a child’s injury. If the court determines that a parent can be named as a nonparty
under MCL 600.2957, then this instruction should not be given. The cases discussed in this
use note and the comment were all decided prior to the enactment of MCL 600.2957.
This is a cautionary instruction that is to be used only in a case involving a claim on behalf
of an injured child in which the parent’s negligence is not a defense to the child’s claim but
the parent’s negligence has been improperly injected into the lawsuit in the evidence or in
argument of counsel. Conners v Benjamin I Magid, Inc, 353 Mich 628; 91 NW2d 875
(1958); Elbert v Saginaw, 363 Mich 463; 109 NW2d 879 (1961). However at least one
Michigan case has held that a cautionary instruction will not cure the error of injecting
parental negligence in a lawsuit in which it is not a defense. Lapasinskas v Quick, 17 Mich
App 733; 170 NW2d 318 (1969).
See the comment below for Michigan case law on the legal effect of a parent’s negligence
in cases involving the injury or death of a child.
Comment
Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich
638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), Michigan cases held that a parent’s negligence may not be
imputed to a child so as to bar the child’s cause of action for his or her injuries. Conners;
Elbert; Nielsen v Henry H Stevens, Inc, 359 Mich 130; 101 NW2d 284 (1960).
In a case involving a claim on behalf of a child for the child’s injuries that was consolidated
for trial with the parent’s claim for consequential damages due to injury to the child, the
court distinguished between the child’s case in which the parent’s negligence is not a
defense and the parent’s cause of action for which the parent’s own negligence is a defense.
Nielsen, 359 Mich at 133–137; 101 NW2d at 287–289 (concurring opinion of Justice
Black). (Because of this distinction and the possibility of prejudicing the child’s case,
Justice Black cautioned against the dangers of consolidation.)
The distinction in the treatment of parental negligence between the child’s cause of action
and the parent’s cause of action has been applied in cases involving the death of a child. In
a case in which the child did not die instantly, where the cause of action was for the child’s
Michigan Supreme Court Page 13-11
Chapter 13: Other Special Factors Affecting Negligence
own damages prior to death (case brought under the former Survival Act), the court held
that the mother’s negligence is not a defense even though the parents were the sole heirs
and distributees of the child’s estate. Love v Detroit J & C R Co, 170 Mich 1; 135 NW 963
(1912). But where the cause of action was brought under the former Death Act for a
parent’s consequential damages due to the death of a child, courts have held that a parent’s
negligence is a defense, at least to the extent of his or her own recovery. Feldman v Detroit
United R Co, 162 Mich 486; 127 NW 687 (1910); McCann v Detroit, 234 Mich 268; 207
NW 923 (1926); Flintoff v Muskegon Traction & Lighting Co, 208 Mich 527; 175 NW 438
(1919). See McCann for a discussion of the distinction between Death and Survival Act
cases.
This distinction in the treatment of parental negligence in cases involving the death of a
child survived both the consolidation of the former Death and Survival Acts into the
Wrongful Death Act and the adoption of comparative negligence. In Byrne v Schneider’s
Iron & Metal, Inc, 190 Mich App 176; 475 NW2d 854 (1991), the court held that the
parent’s negligence cannot reduce an award to the estate for the conscious pain and
suffering of the child (even though such award will inure to the benefit of the parents), but
the parent’s negligence can reduce a parent’s recovery for the loss of the deceased child’s
services and society and companionship:
We conclude that the reasoning set forth in Feldman, McCann, and Nielsen is still
persuasive; it remains in keeping with the objective of a fair apportionment of damages
under the doctrine of comparative negligence. See Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich
638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979). The parent’s comparative negligence is relevant under the
wrongful death statute where recovery is sought for damages sustained by the parent
because of the wrongful death of the child. However, the comparative negligence of the
parent may not be imputed to the recovery attributable to the child’s damages.
Byrne, 190 Mich App at 189; 475 NW2d at 860.
History
M Civ JI 13.09 was SJI 11.04.
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Page 13-12 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 14-1
CHAPTER 14
Subsequent Negligence
Intentional Misconduct
M Civ JI 14.01 Subsequent Negligence (Last Clear Chance)—Helpless or Inattentive
Plaintiff [ Instruction Deleted ]..................................................................................... 14-2
M Civ JI 14.02 Willful and Wanton Misconduct—Common Law [ Instruction
Deleted ]....................................................................................................................... 14-3
M Civ JI 14.10 Gross Negligence—Definition ............................................................... 14-4
M Civ JI 14.11 Wanton Misconduct—Definition .......................................................... 14-7
M Civ JI 14.12 Willful Misconduct—Definition............................................................. 14-8
M Civ JI 14.20 Emergency Medical Services Act—Explanation .................................... 14-9
M Civ JI 14.21 Emergency Medical Services Act—Burden of Proof ........................... 14-10
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 14-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 14.01 Subsequent Negligence (Last Clear Chance)—Helpless
or Inattentive Plaintiff [ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
The doctrine of last clear chance as a separate defense to contributory negligence has been
superseded by the adoption of pure comparative negligence. Petrove v Grand Trunk W R
Co (On Remand), 437 Mich 31; 464 NW2d 711 (1991). In addition, the doctrine of last
clear chance as a formulation of gross negligence has been discarded. Jennings v
Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 521 NW2d 230 (1994).
History
M Civ JI 14.01 was a revision of SJI 14.01. Deleted August 1991.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 14-3
Chapter 14: Subsequent Negligence—Intentional Misconduct
M Civ JI 14.02 Willful and Wanton Misconduct—Common Law
[ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
Comparative fault should be applied in all actions filed on or after March 28, 1996, that are
based on tort or another legal theory and seek damages for personal injury, property
damage, or wrongful death. 1995 PA 249 (MCL 600.2957). Fault is defined to include “an
act, an omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach
of a legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that
is a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.” 1995 PA 249 (MCL 600.6304(8)).
Prior law held that comparative negligence should be applied in all common-law tort
actions sounding in negligence where defendant’s misconduct falls short of being
intentional. Vining v Detroit, 162 Mich App 720; 413 NW2d 486 (1987); lv denied, 430
Mich 892 (1988).
History
Deleted July 1988.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 14-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 14.10 Gross Negligence—Definition
Gross negligence means conduct or a failure to act that is so reckless that it demonstrates a
substantial lack of concern for whether an injury will result.
Note on Use
This instruction may be used in cases arising under the government tort liability act, MCL
691.1407(2)(c), if gross negligence is an issue for the jury in the case. Tallman v
Markstrom, 180 Mich App 141; 446 NW2d 618 (1989); Vermilya v Dunham, 195 Mich
App 79; 489 NW2d 496 (1992).
This instruction may also be used in cases arising under the statutes limiting the liability of
certain governmental units to gross negligence in regard to off-road recreational vehicles,
MCL 324.81131, and snowmobiles, MCL 324.82124, and the statutes making the
insurance commissioner and his or her representatives immune from civil liability for
conduct not amounting to gross negligence, MCL 500.214. All of these statutes contain the
definition of gross negligence from the government tort liability act.
This instruction may be combined with the definitions of wanton, M Civ JI 14.11, and
willful, M Civ JI 14.12, misconduct, if appropriate. M Civ JI 14.20, Emergency Medical
Services Act—Explanation, and M Civ JI 14.21, Emergency Medical Services Act—
Burden of Proof, provide a model for such instructions.
The committee takes no position on the application of this instruction in a context other than
the statutes discussed in this use note and comment.
Comment
The definition of gross negligence in M Civ JI 14.10 comes from the government tort
liability act. MCL 691.1407(2)(c). Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 521 NW2d 230
(1994), adopted this definition as the standard for gross negligence under the Emergency
Medical Services Act. In adopting this definition, Jennings discarded the common-law
definition of gross negligence (also called last clear chance, subsequent negligence, etc.) as
both outdated in a comparative negligence system and inconsistent with the legislative
intent to shield emergency medical services workers from liability for ordinary negligence.
The “last clear chance” formulation of gross negligence had been applied in cases involving
both the Emergency Medical Services Act and the recreational use statute. Burnett v City
of Adrian, 414 Mich 448; 326 NW2d 810 (1982).
The committee notes that the term gross negligence is used but not defined in other statutes
that share the purpose of immunizing against liability for ordinary negligence. The
threshold for liability in most of these statutes is gross negligence, but many add willful and
Michigan Supreme Court Page 14-5
Chapter 14: Subsequent Negligence—Intentional Misconduct
wanton misconduct, bad faith conduct, or other terms without defining them.
The following statutes dealing with health and medical assistance uniformly limit liability
to “gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct” (sometimes adding “good faith
conduct”):
specific medical personnel who render medical care at the scene of an
emergency or perform physical examinations or emergency care in
competitive sports situations, MCL 691.1501
specific medical personnel who are not under a duty to respond but do
respond to life-threatening emergencies in hospitals or medical care
facilities, MCL 691.1502
block parent volunteers who aid minors in emergencies, MCL 691.1505
registered members of national ski patrol systems who provide emergency
care, MCL 691.1507
municipal or private ambulance drivers or attendants, or police officers or
firefighters who provide first aid at the scene of emergencies, MCL
41.711a
school administrators, teachers, or other designated school employees who
administer medication to pupils with written permission, MCL 380.1178
health personnel who participate in free immunization programs, MCL
333.9203
 persons who voluntarily render cardiopulmonary resuscitation or use an
automated external defibrillator, MCL 691.1504
peace officers who are involved in mental illness admissions, MCL
330.1427b
 persons who file petitions to have others treated or committed for mental
illness, MCL 330.1439
peace officers, staff of approved service programs, and certain others who
deal with apparently incapacitated substance abusers, MCL 330.1282.
There is also a statute that protects members of the state health planning council or
employees of that office from criminal or civil liability except for “wanton and willful
misconduct.” MCL 325.2021.
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Page 14-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Several statutes provide partial immunity in disaster relief or other emergency situations.
The emergency management act limits the liability of various disaster relief workers as well
as of landowners who provide shelter, MCL 30.411, and allows for a directive limiting the
liability of suppliers of voluntary or private assistance, MCL 30.407. Similar statutes
provide partial immunity for volunteers in hazardous spill remedial actions. MCL
324.20302. The environmental response act sets limitations on costs and damages resulting
from the release or the threat of release of hazardous substances, MCL 324.20131, and
limits liability in response activities MCL 324.20126. Another statute limits liability for
civil damages for those who provide emergency telephone services, MCL 484.1604
(repealed effective December 31, 2006, see 1999 PA 79).
Three statutes give landowners, lessees, and tenants partial immunity; all set the threshold
at “gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct.” The recreational use act limits the
liability of landowners, tenants, or lessees for injury to persons (usually gratuitous users)
on the property for outdoor recreation or agricultural, fishing, or hunting purposes. MCL
324.73301. The recreational trespass act limits the liability of owners, tenants, or lessees
for injury to persons on the land with consent for recreational or trapping use who have not
paid valuable consideration. MCL 324.73107. Another statute protects landowners who
lease their land for habitat development and hunter access. MCL 324.43556.
Finally, two sections of the Insurance Code protect various persons from liability for
statements made concerning insureds or applicants for insurance, MCL 500.2124, or acts
or omissions relating to the exchange of claim information, MCL 500.2130, unless there is
gross negligence or bad faith with malice in fact.
History
M Civ JI 14.10 was added September 1995.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 14-7
Chapter 14: Subsequent Negligence—Intentional Misconduct
M Civ JI 14.11 Wanton Misconduct—Definition
Wanton misconduct means conduct or a failure to act that shows such indifference to
whether harm will result as to be equal to a willingness that harm will result.
Note on Use
This instruction may be used in combination with M Civ JI 14.10 and 14.12 in cases arising
under the recreational use statute, Burnett v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448; 326 NW2d 810
(1982); and the good Samaritan act, Higgins v Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corp, 154
Mich App 752; 398 NW2d 520 (1986). It should also be applicable to most other limited
tort liability statutes that employ the terms willful and wanton without defining them. See
comment to M Civ JI 14.10. M Civ JI 14.20, Emergency Medical Services Act—
Explanation, and M Civ JI 14.21, Emergency Medical Services Act—Burden of Proof,
provide a model for instructions combining one or more of the definitions in M Civ JI
14.10, 14.11, and 14.12.
The committee takes no position on the application of this instruction in a context other than
the statutes discussed in this comment and the comment to M Civ JI 14.10.
Comment
In Burnett, the Michigan Supreme Court defined willful and wanton: “[ W ]illful and
wanton misconduct is made out only if the conduct alleged shows an intent to harm or, if
not that, such indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a
willingness that it does.” Burnett, at 455. In Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 521
NW2d 230 (1994), which construed willful as used in the Emergency Medical Services
Act, the court approved the Burnett definition with a refinement. The court said that willful
and wanton are distinct and logically inconsistent, so “willful and wanton” is to be read as
“willful or wanton.” Willful, as Burnett said, requires intent to harm while wanton means
the equivalent, reckless conduct without intent to harm but with indifference as to the result.
History
M Civ JI 14.11 was added September 1995.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 14-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 14.12 Willful Misconduct—Definition
Willful misconduct means conduct or a failure to act that was intended to harm the plaintiff.
Note on Use
This instruction may be used in combination with M Civ JI 14.10 and 14.11 in cases arising
under the recreational use statute, Burnett v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448; 326 NW2d 810
(1982); and the good samaritan act, Higgins v Detroit Osteopathic Hospital Corp, 154
Mich App 752; 398 NW2d 520 (1986). It should also be applicable to most other limited
tort liability statutes that employ the terms willful and wanton without defining them. See
comment to M Civ JI 14.10. M Civ JI 14.20, Emergency Medical Services Act—
Explanation, and M Civ JI 14.21, Emergency Medical Services Act—Burden of Proof,
provide a model for instructions combining one or more of the definitions in M Civ JI
14.10, 14.11, and 14.12.
The committee takes no position on the application of this instruction in a context other than
the statutes discussed in this comment and the comment to M Civ JI 14.10.
Comment
In Burnett, the Michigan Supreme Court defined willful and wanton: “[ W ]illful and
wanton misconduct is made out only if the conduct alleged shows an intent to harm or, if
not that, such indifference to whether harm will result as to be the equivalent of a
willingness that it does.” Burnett, at 455. In Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 521
NW2d 230 (1994), which construed willful as used in the Emergency Medical Services
Act, the court approved the Burnett definition with a refinement. The court said that willful
and wanton are distinct and logically inconsistent, so “willful and wanton” is to be read as
“willful or wanton.” Willful, as Burnett said, requires intent to harm while wanton means
the equivalent, reckless conduct without intent to harm but with indifference as to the result.
History
M Civ JI 14.12 was added September 1995.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 14-9
Chapter 14: Subsequent Negligence—Intentional Misconduct
M Civ JI 14.20 Emergency Medical Services Act—Explanation
An emergency medical services worker acting in an emergency situation is liable for
injuries to a patient caused by the worker’s conduct or failure to act only if the conduct or
failure to act constitutes gross negligence or willful misconduct.
[ Insert M Civ JI 14.10 Gross Negligence—Definition ]
[ Insert M Civ JI 14.12 Willful Misconduct—Definition ]
Note on Use
The Emergency Medical Services Act applies only to emergencies. Knight v Limbert, 170
Mich App 410; 427 NW2d 637 (1988); Pavlov v Community Emergency Medical Services,
Inc, 195 Mich App 711; 491 NW2d 874 (1992).
On the question of whether the Emergency Medical Services Act applies to governmental
units and their employees, see Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 141 fn 9; 468 NW2d
479 (1991), and subsection (2) of MCL 333.20965.
Comment
MCL 333.20965. Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 521 NW2d 230 (1994).
History
M Civ JI 14.20 was added January 1996.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 14-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 14.21 Emergency Medical Services Act—Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following:
that [ he / she ] was injured
that defendant’s conduct or failure to act constituted gross negligence or
willful misconduct
that the gross negligence or willful misconduct of the defendant was a
proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.
*(Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if you find that all of these have been proved.)
*(Your verdict will be for the defendant if you find that any one of these has not been
proved.)
Note on Use
The Emergency Medical Services Act applies only to emergencies. Knight v Limbert, 170
Mich App 410; 427 NW2d 637 (1988); Pavlov v Community Emergency Medical Services,
Inc, 195 Mich App 711; 491 NW2d 874 (1992). If there are fact issues, such as the
existence of an emergency or whether defendant is one of the persons enumerated in the
statute, additional instructions on the alternative of ordinary negligence will have to be
given.
*These paragraphs are not necessary if a special verdict form is used. These paragraphs
should not be used if comparative negligence is an issue in the case. If comparative
negligence is an issue, the court should use M Civ JI 11.01, Comparative Negligence—
Definition, and should incorporate the comparative negligence issue in this burden of proof
instruction. For guidance, see M Civ JI 16.02A Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases.
Comment
MCL 333.20965. Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125; 521 NW2d 230 (1994).
History
M Civ JI 14.21 was added January 1996.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 15-1
CHAPTER 15
Proximate Cause (Negligence)
M Civ JI 15.01 Definition of Proximate Cause .............................................................. 15-2
M Civ JI 15.01A Definition of The Proximate Cause ..................................................... 15-3
M Civ JI 15.02 Definition of Proximately Contributed [ Instruction Deleted ] ............. 15-4
M Civ JI 15.03 More Than One Proximate Cause ......................................................... 15-5
M Civ JI 15.04 Causation by Multiple Defendants........................................................ 15-7
M Civ JI 15.05 Intervening Negligence or Conduct of Person Not a Party [ Instruction
deleted ] ....................................................................................................................... 15-8
M Civ JI 15.06 Intervening Outside Force (Other Than Person)................................... 15-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 15-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 15.01 Definition of Proximate Cause
When I use the words “proximate causeI mean first, that the negligent conduct must have
been a cause of plaintiff’s injury, and second, that the plaintiff’s injury must have been of
a type that is a natural and probable result of the negligent conduct.
Note on Use
This definition should accompany instructions which use the term “proximate cause.”
When a defendant presents evidence that the conduct of a person other than the plaintiff or
force was a proximate cause, M Civ JI 15.03 and the appropriate instruction from M Civ JI
15.04, 15.05 and 15.06 should be given in addition to this instruction.
Comment
Proximate cause, at the minimum, means a cause in fact relationship. Glinski v Szylling, 358
Mich 182; 99 NW2d 637 (1959). In addition, the causal connection between the
defendant’s conduct and the occurrence which produced the injury must have some
practical limitation, variously expressed in terms such as “natural,” “probable,” “direct,” or
“reasonably anticipated.” See Van Keulen & Winchester Lumber Co v Manistee & N R Co,
222 Mich 682; 193 NW 289 (1923); Woodyard v Barnett, 335 Mich 352; 56 NW2d 214
(1953); and Fisk v Powell, 349 Mich 604; 84 NW2d 736 (1957), all approved in Sutter v
Biggs, 377 Mich 80; 139 NW2d 684 (1966). The exact damages need not have been
foreseen so long as the results are a natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s
conduct. It is sufficient that the ordinary prudent person ought to have foreseen or
anticipated that damage might possibly occur. Luck v Gregory, 257 Mich 562; 241 NW 862
(1932); Clumfoot v St Clair Tunnel Co, 221 Mich 113; 190 NW 759 (1922). Proximate
cause “normally involves examining the foreseeability of consequences, and whether a
defendant should be held legally responsible for such consequences.” Skinner v Square D
Co, 445 Mich 153, 163 (1994).
History
M Civ JI 15.01 is a revision of SJI 15.01. Amended September 1980, October 1988, June
2010.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 15-3
Chapter 15: Proximate Cause (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 15.01A Definition of The Proximate Cause
When I use the words “the proximate cause” I mean first, that the negligence must have
been a cause of plaintiff’s injury, and second, that it was reasonably foreseeable that the
negligence could result in harm or injury to plaintiff, and third, that if there was more than
one negligent actor, the defendant’s negligence was the one most immediate, efficient, and
direct cause of the plaintiff’s injury. There is no special definition of what it means to be
the one most immediate, efficient, and direct proximate cause and its application is for your
judgment. However, to be the one most immediate, efficient, and direct proximate cause,
the defendant’s negligent act or omission does not need to be the last in time before the
plaintiff’s injury.
Proximate cause refers to negligent human conduct. Non-human and natural causes cannot
be considered to be a proximate cause of injury, although they can be considered in
determining whether the damages were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Only
negligent human acts or omissions can be the proximate cause of the injury.
Note on Use
Use only in determining a defendant’s entitlement to governmental immunity pursuant to
the Government Tort Liability Act (GTLA) or as otherwise required by statute.
History
M Civ JI 15.01A was added April 2019.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 15-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 15.02 Definition of Proximately Contributed [ Instruction
Deleted ]
History
Deleted September 1988.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 15-5
Chapter 15: Proximate Cause (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 15.03 More Than One Proximate Cause
There may be more than one proximate cause. To be a proximate cause, the claimed
negligence need not be the only cause nor the last cause. A cause may be proximate
although it and another cause act at the same time or in combination to produce the
occurrence.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given as an introduction to M Civ JI 15.04, 15.05, or 15.06. The
instruction may also be given where the only possible additional proximate cause is the
conduct of the plaintiff.
The use note to the predecessor version of this instruction included the admonition that it
was not to be used if the only possible additional proximate cause was the conduct of the
plaintiff. The reason for that admonition was that there was a separate instruction on the
plaintiff’s conduct as a “proximate contributing cause,” M Civ JI 15.02 Definition of
Proximately Contributed. Several cases repeated this admonition. E.g., Stephens v Spiwak,
61 Mich App 647; 233 NW2d 124 (1975). In 1988, the Committee deleted M Civ JI 15.02
and made the instruction that defines proximate cause, M Civ JI 15.01, party-neutral by
eliminating the reference to the defendant’s negligent conduct. These changes make the
Stephens case obsolete and make the current version of M Civ JI 15.03 applicable even if
the only other possible additional proximate cause is the plaintiff’s conduct.
This instruction should not be given in a case against a government employee under the
employee exception to the governmental immunity act. Robinson v City of Detroit, 462
Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000) (overruling Dedes v Asch, 446 Mich 99; 521 NW2d 488
(1994)). See the Comment below.
Comment
There may be more than one proximate cause contributing to an injury; the defendant’s
negligence need not be the sole cause. Brisboy v Fibreboard Corp, 429 Mich 540; 418
NW2d 650 (1988); Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594; 101 NW2d 365 (1960); Gleason v
Hanafin, 308 Mich 31; 13 NW2d 196 (1944). It is prejudicially erroneous for instructions
on proximate cause to refer to “the proximate cause” instead of “a proximate cause” in
cases in which it is an issue whether there was more than one proximate cause. Kirby v
Larson, 400 Mich 585, 600–607; 256 NW2d 400, 408–411 (1977).
Governmental employees are not individually liable under the motor vehicle exception
(MCL 691.1405) to the governmental immunity act unless their conduct constitutes the
proximate cause, that is, the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the
plaintiff’s injury. Robinson (construing the employee provision of the act, MCL
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 15-6 Michigan Supreme Court
691.1407(2)).
History
Amended December 1988.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 15-7
Chapter 15: Proximate Cause (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 15.04 Causation by Multiple Defendants
You may decide that the conduct of [ neither / none ], one or [ both / more ] of the
defendants was a proximate cause. If you decide that [ one / one or more ] of the defendants
was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not a
defense that the conduct of [ the / any ] other [ defendant / defendants ] also may have been
a cause of the occurrence. Each defendant is entitled to separate consideration as to whether
[ his / or / her ] conduct was a proximate cause of the occurrence.
Note on Use
This instruction should be preceded by M Civ JI 15.03 and should be given when there is
an issue whether the conduct of each defendant was a proximate cause. The bracketed
alternatives should be selected according to whether there are two or more than two
defendants.
Comment
See Banzhof v Roche, 228 Mich 36; 199 NW 607 (1924); Camp v Wilson, 258 Mich 38; 241
NW 844 (1932).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 15-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 15.05 Intervening Negligence or Conduct of Person Not a
Party [ Instruction deleted ]
Note on Use
This instruction was deleted by the Committee June 1, 2003. The instruction was deleted
because the effect of nonparty fault is addressed in MCivJI 15.03 More Than One
Proximate Cause and 42.05 Allocation of Fault of Parties and Identified Nonparties.
History
M Civ JI 15.05 is a revision of SJI2d 15.05. Amended September 1980. Deleted June 1,
2003.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 15-9
Chapter 15: Proximate Cause (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 15.06 Intervening Outside Force (Other Than Person)
If you decide that [ the defendant / one or more of the defendants ] [ was / were ] negligent
and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not a defense that
[ description of force ] also was a cause of this occurrence.
*(However, if you decide that the only proximate cause of the occurrence was [ description
of force ], then your verdict should be for the [ defendant / defendants ].)
Note on Use
M Civ JI 15.03 is the proper preface to this instruction.
*The paragraph in parentheses should be given only if there is evidence that the outside
force may have been the sole proximate cause.
In the blanks, insert a description of the force, as for example flood, fire or wind.
Comment
As to the possibility of more than one proximate cause and the liability of a single defendant
when more than one such cause existed, see authorities in Comments to M Civ JI 15.03 and
15.04. Defendant is relieved from liability if the outside force was the sole proximate cause
of the injury. See Tobin v Lake Shore & M S R Co, 192 Mich 549; 159 NW 389 (1916).
However, defendant is not relieved from liability where the outside force aggravates the
damage resulting from defendant’s negligent conduct. Lillibridge v McCann, 117 Mich 84;
75 NW 288 (1898).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 15-10 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 16-1
CHAPTER 16
Burden of Proof (Negligence)
M Civ JI 16.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof [ Renumbered to M Civ JI 8.01 ].............. 16-2
M Civ JI 16.02 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases on the Issues and Legal Effect Thereof
[INSTRUCTION DELETED].............................................................................................. 16-3
M Civ JI 16.02A Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases.................................................. 16-4
M Civ JI 16.03 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases on the Issues and Legal Effect Thereof,
Including the Issues of Contributory Negligence and Subsequent Negligence (Last Clear
Chance) or Intentional Misconduct [ Instruction Deleted ] ......................................... 16-6
M Civ JI 16.04 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases on Affirmative Defenses Other Than
Contributory Negligence .............................................................................................. 16-7
M Civ JI 16.05 Burden of Proof and Legal Effect Thereof in Negligence Cases—Complaint
and Counterclaim......................................................................................................... 16-8
M Civ JI 16.06 Burden of Proof and Legal Effect Thereof in Negligence Cases—Third-Party
Complaint—Contribution Only .................................................................................. 16-11
M Civ JI 16.07 Evenly Balanced Evidence [ Recommend No Instruction ] ................. 16-13
M Civ JI 16.08 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or After
March 28, 1996) ......................................................................................................... 16-14
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 16-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 16.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof [ Renumbered to M Civ JI
8.01 ]
History
M Civ JI 16.01 was SJI 21.01. Amended October 1984. Renumbered to M Civ JI 8.01
November 1998.
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Chapter 16: Burden of Proof (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 16.02 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases on the Issues and
Legal Effect Thereof [INSTRUCTION DELETED]
Comment
This instruction was deleted because it applied solely to lawsuits filed on or before March
28, 1996, when the 1996 Tort Reform legislation took effect.
History
M Civ JI 16.02 is a revision of SJI 21.02. Amended September 1980. Deleted January
2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
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M Civ JI 16.02A Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that the defendant was negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the
plaintiff *(as stated to you in these instructions)
(b) that the plaintiff [ was injured / sustained damage ]
(c) that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the [ injuries
/ damages ] to the plaintiff.
** Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if you decide that all of these have been proved.
** Your verdict will be for the defendant if you decide that any one of these has not been
proved.
† (The defendant has the burden of proof on [ his / her ] claim that the plaintiff was
negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the defendant *(as stated to you in these
instructions), and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the [ injuries / damages ]
to the plaintiff.)
(The defendant has the burden of proof on [ his / her ] claim that [ name of nonparty ] was
negligent, and that the negligence of [ name of nonparty ] was a proximate cause of the [
injuries / damages ] to the plaintiff.)
† (If your verdict is for the plaintiff, then you must determine the percentage of fault for
each party or nonparty whose negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s [ injuries /
damages ]. In determining the percentage of fault, you should consider the nature of the
conduct, and the extent to which each person’s conduct caused or contributed to plaintiff’s
[ injuries / damages ].
(The Court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers
to the questions in the Special Verdict Form will provide the basis on which this case will
be resolved.)
Note on Use
*If the parties waive the court’s reading of the theories of the parties (see M Civ JI 7.01,
Theories of the Parties), the court should delete the phrase in parentheses.
**The two paragraphs beginning with the words “Your verdict” are not necessary if a
Special Verdict Form is used.
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Chapter 16: Burden of Proof (NEGLIGENCE)
†These three paragraphs should not be read to the jury if comparative negligence is not an
issue in the case.
‡This paragraph should only be used if defendant has identified a nonparty pursuant to
MCL 600.2957.
This instruction may have to be modified or other instructions given if fault, such as
intentional conduct, is an issue in the case. By statutory definition, “fault” includes an act,
an omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a
legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a
proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.” MCL 600.6304(8).
Comment
Comparative negligence should be applied in all common-law tort actions sounding in
negligence where defendant’s misconduct falls short of being intentional. Vining v Detroit,
162 Mich App 720; 413 NW2d 486 (1987), lv den, 430 Mich 892 (1988).
When allocating fault in an action based on tort or another legal theory, the jury must
consider evidence of intentional conduct. MCL 600.6304.
M Civ JI 16.08 was renumbered to M Civ JI 16.02A and replaces M Civ JI 16.02, which
was deleted in January 2020 because it only applied to cases filed on or before March 28,
1996.
History
M Civ JI 16.08 was added June 1997. Amended March 1999. Amended January 2020
(renumbered to be this instruction).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 16-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 16.03 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases on the Issues and
Legal Effect Thereof, Including the Issues of Contributory
Negligence and Subsequent Negligence (Last Clear Chance) or
Intentional Misconduct [ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
The doctrine of last clear chance as a separate defense to contributory negligence has been
superseded by the adoption of pure comparative negligence. Petrove v Grand Trunk W R
Co (On Remand), 437 Mich 31; 464 NW2d 711 (1991). The remainder of the instruction is
no longer necessary.
History
M Civ JI 16.03 was a revision of SJI 21.02(A). Amended October 1988. Deleted August
1991.
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Chapter 16: Burden of Proof (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 16.04 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases on Affirmative
Defenses Other Than Contributory Negligence
In this case the defendant has asserted [ the affirmative defense that / certain affirmative
defenses that ] [ concisely state affirmative defense(s) ].
The defendant has the burden of proving [ this defense / these defenses ].
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the defendant has proved [ that / any one of those
] affirmative defense(s).
Note on Use
This instruction is to be given if accord and satisfaction, release, or statute of limitations
that act as a complete bar to recovery are at issue. It may be used in conjunction with M
Civ JI 16.08 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or after
March 28, 1996) or, if applicable, M Civ JI 16.02A Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases.
History
M Civ JI 16.04 replaced SJI 21.03. Added September 1980. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 16-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 16.05 Burden of Proof and Legal Effect Thereof in
Negligence Cases—Complaint and Counterclaim
In this action there is not only the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant, but also a
claim by the defendant against the plaintiff. This is known as a counterclaim.
Because there is a counterclaim in this case, you may reach one of four results:
First, your verdict may be for the plaintiff on [ his / her ] claim and against the defendant
on [ his / her ] counterclaim.
Second, your verdict may be for the defendant on [ his / her ] counterclaim and against the
plaintiff on [ his / her ] claim.
Third, your verdict may be against both the plaintiff on [ his / her ] claim and the defendant
on [ his / her ] counterclaim.
Fourth, your verdict may be for the plaintiff on [ his / her ] claim and for the defendant on
[ his / her ] counterclaim.
As to plaintiff’s claim, [ he / she ] has the burden of proving:
(a) that the defendant was negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the
plaintiff as stated to you in these instructions
(b) that the plaintiff [ was injured / sustained damages ]
(c) that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the [ injuries
/ damages ] to the plaintiff
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff on [ his / her ] claim, if the plaintiff has proved all of
those elements. Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove
any one of those elements.
† (The defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff was negligent in one or more
of the ways claimed by the defendant *(as stated to you in these instructions), and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of the [ injuries / damages ] to the plaintiff.)
‡ (The defendant has the burden of proving that [ name of nonparty ] was negligent, and
that the negligence of [ name of nonparty ] was a proximate cause of the [ injuries / damages
] to the plaintiff.)
† (If your verdict is for the plaintiff, then you must determine the percentage of fault for
Michigan Supreme Court Page 16-9
Chapter 16: Burden of Proof (NEGLIGENCE)
each party or nonparty whose negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s [ injuries /
damages ]. In determining the percentage of fault, you should consider the nature of the
conduct, and the extent to which each person’s conduct caused or contributed to plaintiff’s
[ injuries / damages ].
As to the defendant’s counterclaim, [ he / she ] has the burden of proving:
(a) that the plaintiff was negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the
defendant as stated to you in these instructions
(b) that the defendant [ was injured / sustained damages ]
(c) that the negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of the [ injuries /
damages ] to the defendant
Your verdict will be for the defendant on [ his / her ] counterclaim if the defendant has
proved all of those elements. Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the defendant has failed
to prove any one of those elements.
† (The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent in one or more
of the ways claimed by the plaintiff *(as stated to you in these instructions), and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of the [ injuries / damages ] to the defendant.)
(The plaintiff has the burden of proving that [ name of nonparty ] was negligent, and that
the negligence of [ name of nonparty ] was a proximate cause of the [ injuries / damages ]
to the defendant.)
† (If your verdict is for the defendant, then you must determine the percentage of fault for
each party or nonparty whose negligence was a proximate cause of defendant’s [ injuries /
damages ]. In determining the percentage of fault, you should consider the nature of the
conduct, and the extent to which each person’s conduct caused or contributed to
defendant’s [ injuries / damages ].)
Note on Use
This instruction is for the negligence case in which either the plaintiff or the defendant or
both may recover.
It should be given with M Civ JI 8.01, which defines burden of proof.
If the case involves an affirmative defense, or a third-party complaint, use M Civ JI 16.04
or 16.06 together with this instruction.
To make this instruction more understandable, the Court may refer to the parties by name.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 16-10 Michigan Supreme Court
† (The defendant has the burden of proof on [ his / her ] claim that the plaintiff was
negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the defendant *(as stated to you in these
instructions), and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the [ injuries / damages ]
to the plaintiff.)
(The defendant has the burden of proof on [ his / her ] claim that [ name of nonparty ] was
negligent, and that the negligence of [ name of nonparty ] was a proximate cause of the [
injuries / damages ] to the plaintiff.)
† (If your verdict is for the plaintiff, then you must determine the percentage of fault for
each party or nonparty whose negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s [ injuries /
damages ]. In determining the percentage of fault, you should consider the nature of the
conduct, and the extent to which each person’s conduct caused or contributed to plaintiff’s
[ injuries / damages ].
Comment
The 2013 amendment changed “proximate contributing cause” to “proximate cause” in two
places. The new paragraphs addressing the defendant’s burden of proof are taken from M
Civ JI 16.08, now M Civ JI 16.02A.
History
M Civ JI 16.05 is a revision of SJI 21.04. Amended September 1980. Amended May 2013.
Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 16-11
Chapter 16: Burden of Proof (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 16.06 Burden of Proof and Legal Effect Thereof in
Negligence Cases—Third-Party Complaint—Contribution Only
In addition to the claim of the plaintiff, [ name of plaintiff ], there is also a claim by the
defendant, [ name of defendant ]. This is called a third-party complaint and the defendant,
[ name of defendant ], is called the third-party plaintiff and [ name ] is called the third-party
defendant.
[ Name of third-party plaintiff ] has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ name of third-party defendant ] was negligent in one or more of the
ways claimed by [ name of third-party plaintiff ] as stated to you in these
instructions
(b) that the negligence of [ name of third-party defendant ] was a proximate
cause of the [ injuries / damages ] to the plaintiff, [ name of plaintiff ]
[ Name of third-party defendant ] has the burden of proving that the plaintiff, [ name of
plaintiff ], was negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by [ name of third-party
defendant ] as stated to you in these instructions; and that such negligence was a proximate
contributing cause of the [ injuries / damages ] to the plaintiff, [ name of plaintiff ].
If your verdict is for the plaintiff, [ name of plaintiff ], against the defendant, [ name of
defendant ], then your verdict will be for [ name of third-party plaintiff ] if [ name of third-
party defendant ] was negligent, and such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff [
name of plaintiff ]’s [ injuries / damages ].
If your verdict is for the defendant, [ name of defendant ], then your verdict must also be
for [ name of third-party defendant ].
Even if your verdict is against the defendant, [ name of defendant ], your verdict will be for
[ name of third-party defendant ] if [ he / she ] was not negligent, or, if negligent, such
negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff [ name of plaintiff ]’s [ injuries / damages
].
Comment
For rights to contribution among persons jointly liable in tort, see MCL 600.2925a–.2925d.
In late 1995, the Michigan legislature abrogated joint liability in most cases and thereby
eliminated most actions for contribution among tortfeasors:
Except as provided in section 6304, in an action based on tort or another legal
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 16-12 Michigan Supreme Court
theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful
death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and is not
joint. However, this section does not abolish an employer’s vicarious liability
for an act or omission of the employer’s employee. MCL 600.2956.
Section 6304 created two exceptions to the abolishment of joint liability. MCL
600.6304(4). The first exception applies to medical malpractice actions. In
medical malpractice actions in which the plaintiff is determined to be without
fault, liability of defendants is joint and several. MCL 600.6304(6)(a). In
medical malpractice actions in which the plaintiff is determined to have fault,
a mechanism for allocating uncollectable amounts to certain defendants is
provided. MCL 600.6304(6)(b), 6304(7). The second exception to the
abrogation of joint liability is for defendants who have been found liable for an
act or omission that also constitutes one of the enumerated crimes for which
the defendant was convicted. MCL 600.6312.
History
M Civ JI 16.06 was SJI 21.05. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 16-13
Chapter 16: Burden of Proof (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 16.07 Evenly Balanced Evidence [ Recommend No
Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instruction on “evenly balanced evidence” be given.
An “evenly balanced evidence” instruction is unnecessary, since the jury will be instructed
on the burden of proof. See M Civ JI 8.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof. Not only is such an
instruction unnecessary, but it may be prejudicial error in certain circumstances. See
Krisher v Duff, 331 Mich 699; 50 NW2d 332 (1951); cf. Hale v Knapp, 134 Mich 622; 96
NW 1060 (1903).
History
M Civ JI 16.07 was SJI 21.06.
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M Civ JI 16.08 Burden of Proof in Negligence Cases (To Be Used in
Cases Filed on or After March 28, 1996)
This instruction was renamed and renumbered to be M Civ JI 16.02A.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 17-1
CHAPTER 17
Admitted Liability (Negligence)
M Civ JI 17.01 Admitted Liability.................................................................................. 17-2
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Page 17-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 17.01 Admitted Liability
The defendant has admitted that [ he / she ] is liable to the plaintiff for any [ injury /
damages ] which [ he / she ] caused. You are to decide only *(what [ injuries / damages ]
were caused by defendant and) the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff for such [ injury /
damages ].
Note on Use
*The phrase in parentheses should be used only if there is an issue whether some or all of
the damages were caused by the defendant. The wording of the instruction should be
modified when defendant’s liability is vicarious.
Comment
The jury should not be permitted to consider the question of liability where it has been
admitted. It is reversible error to submit any issue to the jury which has not been questioned
or has been admitted. Richardson v Coddington, 45 Mich 338; 7 NW 903 (1881); Holbert
v Staniak, 359 Mich 283; 102 NW2d 186 (1960).
History
M Civ JI 17.01 was SJI 23.01.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 19-1
CHAPTER 19
Premises Liability (Negligence)
M Civ JI 19.01 Invitee, Licensee, Trespasser—Definitions (Relationship Disputed)..... 19-2
M Civ JI 19.02 Possessor of Land—Definition .............................................................. 19-4
M Civ JI 19.03 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Invitee... 19-5
M Civ JI 19.04 Duty of Plaintiff to Use Ordinary Care in Self-Service Store or Store
Displaying Goods [ Instruction Deleted ]...................................................................... 19-6
M Civ JI 19.05 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to a Business
Invitee Regarding the Natural Accumulation of Ice and Snow .................................... 19-7
M Civ JI 19.06 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Licensee 19-8
M Civ JI 19.07 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to
Trespasser .................................................................................................................. 19-10
M Civ JI 19.07A Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Child
Trespasser for Artificial Conditions ............................................................................ 19-12
M Civ JI 19.08 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Trespasser
Whose Presence Is Known or Should Have Been Known to Possessor [ Instruction
Deleted ]..................................................................................................................... 19-13
M Civ JI 19.09 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of Business to Persons
Traveling along Adjacent Street or Way..................................................................... 19-14
M Civ JI 19.10 Nondelegable Duty of Possessor or Occupier of Land, Premises, or Place of
Business...................................................................................................................... 19-15
M Civ JI 19.11 Landlord’s Nondelegable Duty for Negligent Repairs Made by an
Independent Contractor ............................................................................................ 19-16
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M Civ JI 19.01 Invitee, Licensee, Trespasser—Definitions
(Relationship Disputed)
To determine the duty owed to plaintiff, you must first determine whether plaintiff was an
[ invitee / or / licensee / or / trespasser ].
*(An invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on [ land / premises / a place of
business ] for a commercial benefit to the possessor of the [ land / premises / place of
business ] or for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the
possessor. An invitation may be either express or implied.)
*(A licensee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on [ land / premises / a place of
business ] for any purpose other than a business or commercial one with the express or
implied permission of the owner or person in control of the [ land / premises / place of
business ]. A social guest is a licensee, not an invitee.)
*(A trespasser is a person who goes upon the [ land / premises / place of business ] of
another without an express or implied invitation, for his or her own purposes, and not in the
performance of any duty to the owner. It is not necessary that in making such an entry the
trespasser have an unlawful intent.)
Note on Use
*These definitions should be given only if there is a factual issue as to the legal status of
the plaintiff as invitee, licensee, or trespasser. If the factual issue pertains to two, but not all
three, of the categories, only the applicable two paragraphs of this instruction should be
given. The jury should then be instructed that once it decides on the legal status of the
plaintiff, according to this instruction, it should apply the corresponding instruction on
duty.
This instruction and the other instructions in this chapter are not intended for use in cases
in which liability is limited by statute. See MCL 324.73301, which provides that an owner,
tenant or lessee of land is liable only for gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct
that causes injuries to a person who is on the land for outdoor recreational purposes without
having paid a valuable consideration. The predecessor statute, MCL 300.201, was held to
apply to large tracts of undeveloped land suitable for outdoor recreational uses, but not to
urban, suburban, and subdivided lands. Wymer v Holmes, 429 Mich 66; 412 NW2d 213
(1987).
Comment
See Wymer; Preston v Sleziak, 383 Mich 442; 175 NW2d 759 (1970); Perl v Cohodas,
Peterson, Paoli, Nast Co, 295 Mich 325; 294 NW 697 (1940); Cox v Hayes, 34 Mich App
Michigan Supreme Court Page 19-3
Chapter 19: Premises Liability (NEGLIGENCE)
527; 192 NW2d 68 (1971). Social guests are licensees. Preston.
Persons who are on church premises for religious activities and not a commercial purpose
are licensees. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591; 614 NW2d 88
(2000). Stitt overruled Preston insofar as Preston might be read as adopting the public
invitee portion of the definition of “invitee” in Restatement (Second) of Torts §332, at 176.
History
M Civ JI 19.01 was added January 1982. Amended September 1982, October 2001.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 19-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 19.02 Possessor of Land—Definition
A “possessor” is defined as—
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it; or
(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if no other
person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it; or
(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no other person is
in possession as I have just explained.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given if there is a dispute as to who had possession of the land.
Orel v Uni-Rak Sales Co, 454 Mich 564; 563 NW2d 241 (1997). If it is not an issue, this
instruction should not be given. Orel.
Comment
See Merritt v Nickelson, 407 Mich 544; 287 NW2d 178 (1980).
A mortgagee not in actual possession and control of the premises during the mortgage
foreclosure redemption period is not considered a possessor. Kubczak v Chemical Bank &
Trust Co, 456 Mich 653; 575 NW2d 745 (1998).
History
M Civ JI 19.02 was added January 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 19-5
Chapter 19: Premises Liability (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 19.03 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of
Business to Invitee
(a)A possessor of land has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect an invitee from an
unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition of the land that was known to
the possessor or that should have been known to the possessor in the exercise of ordinary
care.
*(In determining whether the possessor should know of the condition, you should consider
the character of the condition and whether the condition existed for a sufficient length of
time that a possessor exercising ordinary care would discover the condition.)
Notes on Use
*This paragraph should be used only if there is an issue of constructive notice or inspection.
This paragraph should not be used where the possessor has created the condition.
Berryman v Kmart Corp, 193 Mich App 88, 93 (1992).
Comments
See Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95 (2023).
On the subject of constructive notice, see Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 419 (2001)
and Banks v Exxon Mobil Corporation, 477 Mich 983, 983-984 (2007); on the subject of
inspection, James v Alberts, 464 Mich 12, 19-20 (2001).
On the subject of liability to invitees injured by the criminal acts of third parties, see
MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322 (2001).
History
M Civ JI 19.03 was added January 1982. Amended January 1994, June 2003, March 2005,
December 2005, January 2024.
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M Civ JI 19.04 Duty of Plaintiff to Use Ordinary Care in Self-Service
Store or Store Displaying Goods [ Instruction Deleted ]
History
M Civ JI 19.04 was added January 1982.
This instruction was deleted by the Committee April 1, 2004. The instruction was deleted
because the Committee believes it did not accurately state the law.
M
Michigan Supreme Court Page 19-7
Chapter 19: Premises Liability (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 19.05 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of
Business to a Business Invitee Regarding the Natural Accumulation
of Ice and Snow
A possessor owes an invitee the duty to use reasonable care to protect against hazards
arising from a natural accumulation of ice and snow on the property. The duty requires the
possessor to take reasonable measures within a reasonable time after an accumulation of ice
and snow to diminish the hazard of the injury to the invitee.
Comments
This instruction was deleted in 2004 because it was found to be inaccurate by the Michigan
Supreme Court in Mann v Shusteric Enterprises, Inc, 470 Mich 320 (2004). The instruction
was revised and added in 2024 in response to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kandil-
Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 149-150 (2023) (citing Quinlivan v Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co, Inc, 395 Mich 244, 248, 261 (1975)).
History
M Civ JI 1M Civ JI 19.05 was added January 1982, deleted September 2004, and added
January 2024.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 19-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 19.06 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of
Business to Licensee
A possessor of [ land / premises / a place of business ] is liable for physical harm caused to
a licensee by a condition on the [ land / premises / place of business ] if, but only if —
(a) the possessor knew or should have known of the condition and should have
realized that it involved an unreasonable risk of harm to the licensee, and
should have expected that [ he / she ] would not discover or realize the danger;
and
(b) the possessor failed to warn the licensee of the danger; and
(c) the licensee did not know or have reason to know of the danger.
Note on Use
If there is no dispute as to the legal status of the plaintiff as a licensee, the plaintiff’s name
should be substituted for the term “licensee” in this instruction.
If there is a factual question as to the legal status of the plaintiff as invitee, licensee, or
trespasser, M Civ JI 19.01 should be given.
Comment
See Preston v Sleziak, 383 Mich 442; 175 NW2d 759 (1970). Stitt v Holland Abundant Life
Fellowship, 462 Mich 591; 614 NW2d 88 (2000), overruled Preston only insofar as
Preston might be read as adopting the public invitee portion of the definition of “invitee”
in the Restatement Torts, 2d, § 332, p 176.
While a possessor owes no duty to pedestrians regarding the natural accumulations of ice
and snow on public sidewalks abutting the possessor’s land, this rule does not change the
duty owed by a possessor to a licensee on the possessor’s private premises. Altairi v Alhaj,
235 Mich App 626; 599 NW2d 537 (1999), lv den, 461 Mich 1021; 611 NW2d 797 (2000).
In Burnett v Bruner, 247 Mich App 365 (2001), the Court of Appeals held that it was
reversible error for the trial court to give an instruction to the jury modeled after an earlier
version of M Civ JI 19.06. The Court held that a landowner only owes his or her licensees
a duty to warn and does not owe a duty to inspect or repair the premises. The amendment
deletes the offending provision from subpart (b). Therefore, it is not necessary to include
the supplemental instruction sought by the defendant in Burnett.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 19-9
Chapter 19: Premises Liability (NEGLIGENCE)
History
M Civ JI 19.06 was added January 1982. Amended June 2006.
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Page 19-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 19.07 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of
Business to Trespasser
[ Because plaintiff was a trespasser on defendant’s ( land / premises / place of business ) ]
/ If you find that plaintiff was a trespasser on defendant’s [ land / premises / place of
business ], then defendant had a duty to plaintiff only if you find that one or more of the
following circumstances existed:
(1) Defendant injured the plaintiff by willful and wanton misconduct, or
(2) Defendant was aware or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, of
plaintiff’s presence on the [ land / premises / place of business ], but [ he / she / it ] failed
to use ordinary care to prevent injury to plaintiff arising from defendant’s active
negligence, or
(3) Defendant knew, or should have known from facts within [ his / her / its ] knowledge,
that trespassers constantly intrude on a limited area of [ his / her / its ] [ land / premises /
place of business ] and plaintiff was harmed because:
(a) Defendant carried on an activity in that limited area,
(b) that involved a risk of death or serious bodily harm, and
(c) [ he / she / it ] failed to use reasonable care for the trespasser’s safety.
If you find that one or more of these circumstances existed, then defendant had a duty to
exercise reasonable care to put the land in a condition reasonably safe for plaintiff or to
carry on activities on the land so as not to endanger trespassers.
Note on Use
If there is a factual question as to the legal status of the plaintiff as invitee, licensee, or
trespasser, M Civ JI 19.01 should be given.
M Civ JI 19.01 defines “trespasser”; M Civ JI 14.11 defines “wanton misconduct”; 14.12
defines “willful misconduct.”
“Active negligence” is not yet defined in MCL 554.583(2)(b) and since this statute has not
yet been subject to judicial interpretation, the committee is not providing a definition.
This instruction may apply to a child trespasser who claims injury due to a non-artificial
condition. See M Civ JI 19.07A.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 19-11
Chapter 19: Premises Liability (NEGLIGENCE)
This instruction does not affect the applicability of any instructions for immunities or
defenses to which the defendant-possessor is otherwise entitled under statute or common
law. See MCL 554.583(3).
Comment
See Blakeley v White Star Line, 154 Mich 635; 118 NW 482 (1908); MCL 554.583
History
M Civ JI 19.07 was added January 1982. Amended November 2015.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 19-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 19.07A Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of
Business to Child Trespasser for Artificial Conditions
[ Because plaintiff was a child trespasser / If you find that plaintiff was a child
trespasser ], defendant had a duty to plaintiff only if you find that all of the following
circumstances exist:
(1) Plaintiff
was injured by an artificial condition on defendant’s [ land / premises /
place of business ],
(2) Defendant knew or had reason to know that a child would be likely to trespass on the
place where the condition existed,
(3) Defendant knew or had reason to know about the condition and realized or should
have realized that it would involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm
to a child,
(4) Plaintiff, because of [ his / her ] youth, did not discover the condition or realize the
risk involved in meddling with it or coming within the area made dangerous by it,
(5) The usefulness to defendant of maintaining the condition and the burden of
eliminating the danger were slight as compared with the risk to the child, and
(6) Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise
protect the child.
If you find that all of these circumstances existed, then defendant had a duty to exercise
reasonable care to put the land in a condition reasonably safe for plaintiff or to carry on
activities on the land so as not to endanger child trespassers.
Note on Use
If a child trespasser does not claim injury due to an artificial condition, then M Civ JI
19.07A is inapplicable. In such a case, M Civ JI 19.07 may be given.
This instruction does not affect the applicability of any instructions for immunities or
defenses to which the defendant-possessor is otherwise entitled under statute or common
law. See MCL 554.583(3).
M Civ JI 19.01 defines “trespasser.”
History
Added November 2015.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 19-13
Chapter 19: Premises Liability (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 19.08 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of
Business to Trespasser Whose Presence Is Known or Should Have
Been Known to Possessor [ Instruction Deleted ]
This instruction was deleted because it was subsumed in the amended M Civ JI 19.07.
History
M Civ JI 19.08 was added January 1982. Deleted November 2015.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 19-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 19.09 Duty of Possessor of Land, Premises, or Place of
Business to Persons Traveling along Adjacent Street or Way
A possessor of [ land / premises / a place of business ] has a duty to exercise ordinary care
in maintaining [ his / her ] premises in a reasonably safe condition in order to prevent injury
to persons traveling along an adjacent [ street / or / sidewalk / or other / public way ].
Comment
See Parsons v E I Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co, 198 Mich 409; 164 NW 413 (1917);
Grimes v King, 311 Mich 399; 18 NW2d 870 (1945).
Generally, the law imposes no duty on a possessor of land to maintain or improve the
condition of an adjacent street, sidewalk, or other public way. Mendyk v Michigan
Employment Security Commission, 94 Mich App 425; 288 NW2d 643 (1979). This
instruction pertains only to the duty of the possessor to maintain his or her own land so as
not to injure users of the abutting street, sidewalk, or public way.
History
M Civ JI 19.09 was added January 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 19-15
Chapter 19: Premises Liability (NEGLIGENCE)
M Civ JI 19.10 Nondelegable Duty of Possessor or Occupier of Land,
Premises, or Place of Business
A possessor or occupier of [ land / premises / a place of business ] who owes a duty to
[ name of plaintiff ] may not delegate that responsibility to another and thus avoid liability.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given if an issue is raised at the trial that the occupier or
possessor of property has attempted to delegate the duty regarding the premises by either a
lease arrangement, a contract, or the employment of an independent contractor.
Comment
See McCord v United States Gypsum Co, 5 Mich App 126; 145 NW2d 841 (1966), lv den,
379 Mich 759 (1967), citing with approval Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (2d ed),
§ 61, p 404, and Bradley v Burdick Hotel Co, 306 Mich 600; 11 NW2d 257 (1943). See also
Quinlivan v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 395 Mich 244; 235 NW2d 732 (1975);
Misiulis v Milbrand Maintenance Corp, 52 Mich App 494; 218 NW2d 68 (1974).
History
M Civ JI 19.10 was added January 1982.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 19-16 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 19.11 Landlord’s Nondelegable Duty for Negligent Repairs
Made by an Independent Contractor
A landlord, [ name of landlord ], undertaking to make repairs on the leased premises may
not delegate his or her duty to another and avoid liability for injuries occurring on the leased
premises, but remains responsible to the [ tenant / tenant’s invitees ], [ name of tenant /
names of tenant’s invitees ], for negligence of the independent contractor in undertaking or
making the repairs.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given if a dangerous condition is brought about as the result of a
negligent act of an independent contractor making repairs on the premises. It does not
matter whether the repairs are being undertaken pursuant to a lease or other agreement, or
gratuitously.
Comment
This instruction is supported by Misiulis v Milbrand Maintenance Corp, 52 Mich App 494;
218 NW2d 68 (1974).
History
M Civ JI 19.11 was added January 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-1
CHAPTER 25
Products Liability
M Civ JI 25.01 Definition of Proximate Cause—Warranty ........................................... 25-2
M Civ JI 25.02 More Than One Proximate Cause—Warranty ...................................... 25-3
M Civ JI 25.03 Causation—Multiple Defendants with Warranty and Negligence
Counts .......................................................................................................................... 25-4
M Civ JI 25.04 Causation—Multiple Defendants with Warranty Counts Only............. 25-5
M Civ JI 25.11 Express Warranty—Definition .............................................................. 25-6
M Civ JI 25.12 Express Warranty—Burden of Proof..................................................... 25-8
M Civ JI 25.21 Implied Warranty—Definition ............................................................ 25-10
M Civ JI 25.22 Implied Warranty—Burden of Proof................................................... 25-12
M Civ JI 25.31 Negligent Production—Definition....................................................... 25-14
M Civ JI 25.32 Negligent Production—Burden of Proof............................................. 25-15
M Civ JI 25.41 Comparative Negligence—Burden of Proof [ Instruction Deleted ] ... 25-18
M Civ JI 25.45 Breach of Warranty: Comparative Fault—Burden of Proof (To Be Used in
Cases Filed on or After March 28, 1996).................................................................... 25-19
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 25.01 Definition of Proximate Cause—Warranty
When I use the words “proximate cause” I mean first, that the failure of the product to
conform to the warranty must have been a cause of plaintiff’s injury, and second, that the
occurrence which is claimed to have produced plaintiff’s injury must have been of a type
that is a natural and probable result of the failure of the product to conform to the warranty.
Note on Use
This definition should accompany the warranty instruction(s) concerning burden of proof
(M Civ JI 25.12 for express warranty and M Civ JI 25.22 for implied warranty).
In a products liability case where a negligence count is also included, the negligence
instruction should be given separately as explained in the Introduction to this Section.
When a defendant presents evidence that the conduct of another person (other than the
plaintiff) or another force was a proximate cause, M Civ JI 25.02 and the appropriate
instruction from M Civ JI 25.03 and M Civ JI 25.04 should be given in addition to this
instruction.
Comment
See Comment under M Civ JI 15.01.
There must be a causal connection between the breach of warranty and the injury or
damages. In order to describe the required causal relationship (and to state the outer limits
of liability based on simple causation), it is proper to use the term and concept of proximate
cause. See Heckel v American Coupling Corp, 384 Mich 19; 179 NW2d 381 (1970).
The October 2011 amendment made the instruction consistent with MCJI 15.01.
History
Amended December 1988, October 2011.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-3
Chapter 25: Products Liability
M Civ JI 25.02 More Than One Proximate Cause—Warranty
There may be more than one proximate cause. A cause may be proximate although it and
another cause act at the same time or in combination to produce the occurrence. To be a
proximate cause, the claimed [ failure / failures ] of the [ product / products ] to meet the
warranty need not be the only cause nor the last cause.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given as an introduction to M Civ JI 25.03 or M Civ JI 25.04, as
appropriate, when there is an issue whether the breach of warranty by each defendant was
a proximate cause or where there is evidence that acts of a person not a party or an outside
force constituted a proximate cause of the injury or damages suffered by plaintiff.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 25.03 Causation—Multiple Defendants with Warranty and
Negligence Counts
Each defendant is entitled to separate consideration as to whether [ [ his / her ] conduct / or
/ the failure of [ his / her ] product to meet the warranty ] was a proximate cause of the
occurrence. If you decide that a defendant [ was negligent / or / failed to meet the warranty ]
and that such [ negligence / or / failure ] was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not
a defense that another [ defendant / or / defendant’s product ] also may have been a cause
of the occurrence.
Note on Use
M Civ JI 25.03 or M Civ JI 25.04, as appropriate, should be given when there is an issue
whether each defendant’s breach of warranty or conduct was a proximate cause. The
appropriate bracketed alternatives must be selected.
This instruction should be preceded by M Civ JI 25.02.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-5
Chapter 25: Products Liability
M Civ JI 25.04 Causation—Multiple Defendants with Warranty
Counts Only
If you decide that [ one / one or more ] of the products failed to meet the warranty and that
such failure was a proximate cause of the occurrence, it is not a defense that [ the other /
another ] defendant’s product also may have been a cause of the occurrence.
Note on Use
See Note on Use to M Civ JI 25.03.
History
M Civ JI 25.04 is a revision of SJI 25.03(A).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 25.11 Express Warranty—Definition
An express warranty is a representation or statement, made in writing, orally or by any other
means, by a [ manufacturer / seller ], that his or her product has certain characteristics or
will meet certain standards.
*(An expression of opinion which cannot reasonably be believed or relied upon is sales talk
or trade puffing and is not a representation or statement of an express warranty.)
Note on Use
The description of the warrantor can be adapted to describe him or her accurately under the
facts of the case; e.g., “contractor” or “lessor” may be more appropriate than
“manufacturer” or “seller.”
*The paragraph in parentheses should be used only when there is a dispute whether a
statement is an express warranty or mere sales talk.
Comment
Some Michigan decisions involving express warranties are Bahlman v Hudson Motor Car
Co, 290 Mich 683; 288 NW 309 (1939); Curby v Mastenbrook, 288 Mich 676; 286 NW
123 (1939); Dvoracek v Goldstein, 311 Mich 680; 19 NW2d 333 (1945); Worden v Peck,
245 Mich 237; 222 NW 101 (1928); and Hansen v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 276 F2d
254 (CA 6, 1960). The Uniform Commercial Code definition of an express warranty is
found in MCL 440.2313.
The distinction between an express warranty and trade puffing has not been articulated
clearly by Michigan courts. It has been said, however, that statements which are not
reasonable to believe are trade puffing and sales talk. Hayes Construction Co v Silverthorn,
343 Mich 421; 72 NW2d 190 (1955). If there is a dispute on this point, the existence of an
express warranty normally will be a jury issue. Nevertheless, the Court in some cases may
be required to decide that question as a matter of law. See Worth v McConnell, 42 Mich
473; 4 NW 198 (1880); Goodspeed v MacNaughton, Greenawalt & Co, 288 Mich 1; 284
NW 621 (1939).
A question about reliance also may arise in defining an express warranty. Several cases
suggest that Michigan follows the traditional rule and requires reliance by the injured party
for recovery on an express warranty. See Kepling v Schleuter Manufacturing Co, 378 F2d
5 (CA 6, 1967); Curby v Mastenbrook, 288 Mich 676; 286 NW 123 (1939); May v Otto,
236 Mich 540; 211 NW 64 (1926); Barron v Probert, 230 Mich 313; 202 NW 941 (1925).
Although the Uniform Sales Act, in effect at the time of these decisions, has been repealed,
not all of these cases fell under that act. The Uniform Commercial Code, MCL 440.2318,
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-7
Chapter 25: Products Liability
indicates that an express warranty extends to any natural person in the family or household
or to a guest of the purchaser under certain circumstances. The extent to which reliance is
still required in cases under and outside of the Uniform Commercial Code is not known.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 25.12 Express Warranty—Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that the defendant expressly warranted the product in one or more of the
ways claimed by the plaintiff
(b) that the [ plaintiff / plaintiff’s decedent ] [ relied upon / or / was protected
by ] the warranty
(c) that the product [ description of alleged failure to meet express warranty ]
(d) that the product [ description of alleged failure to meet express warranty ]
at the time it left defendant’s control
(e) that the [ plaintiff / plaintiff’s decedent ] [ was injured / sustained
damage ]
(f) that the [ description of alleged failure to meet express warranty ] was a
proximate cause of the [ injuries / damages ] to [ plaintiff / plaintiff’s
decedent ].
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
In choosing between the alternatives of b, the Court shall be guided by MCL 440.2318.
For cases filed on or after March 28, 1996, if comparative fault or comparative negligence
are at issue, M Civ JI 25.45 should be used. MCL 600.6304.
Comment
Under prior law, there was an issue as to the applicability of comparative negligence in
cases involving breach of express warranty. See In re Certified Questions (Karl v Bryant
Air Conditioning Co), 416 Mich 558; 331 NW2d 456 (1982). 1995 PA 249 makes
comparative fault the standard for all cases based on tort or another legal theory filed on or
after March 28, 1996, which would include cases involving breach of express warranty.
MCL 600.2957.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-9
Chapter 25: Products Liability
History
M Civ JI 25.12 was SJI 25.13. Amended October 1993. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 25.21 Implied Warranty—Definition
When I use the words “implied warranty,” I mean a duty imposed by law which requires
that the manufacturer’s product be reasonably fit for the [ purpose / purposes ] and [ use /
uses ] intended or reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer.
Note on Use
This instruction should not be used in an action against a manufacturer for an alleged defect
in the design of its product. Prentis v Yale Manufacturing Co, 421 Mich 670; 365 NW2d
176 (1984). Additionally, because breach of implied warranty is not a separate theory upon
which to bring a products liability action against a non-manufacturing seller, a separate
negligence or express warranty instruction will be needed to address such a claim. Curry v
Meijer, Inc., 286 Mich App 586 (2009).
Another term may be substituted for “manufacturer” when more appropriate to the facts of
the case. In addition, the term “product” may be replaced by a more descriptive word.
Since an implied warranty is a duty imposed by law, the Court, not the jury, determines
whether a warranty is implied under the circumstances. Nevertheless, if there is a dispute
over one of the factual requirements for imposing an implied warranty, that issue must be
given to the jury with appropriate instructions.
Cases involving the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose
arising out of a commercial transaction may dictate modification of this instruction to
accurately reflect the statutory description of those warranties.
Comment
Michigan cases defining an implied warranty and discussing its existence are Piercefield v
Remington Arms Co, 375 Mich 85; 133 NW2d 129 (1965); Spence v Three Rivers Builders
& Masonry Supply Inc, 353 Mich 120; 90 NW2d 873 (1958); Manzoni v Detroit Coca-Cola
Bottling Co, 363 Mich 235; 109 NW2d 918 (1961); and Hill v Harbor Steel & Supply Corp,
374 Mich 194; 132 NW2d 54 (1965).
There are statutory implied warranties. See, e.g., MCL 440.2314. A warranty also may be
implied under the common law. The dimensions of the common law implied warranty and
the circumstances under which it exists are not necessarily the same as statutory implied
warranties.
Whether the sale of secondhand goods carries an implied warranty is not clear in Michigan.
See Hysko v Morawski, 230 Mich 221; 202 NW 923 (1925); Bayer v Winton Motor Car Co,
194 Mich 222; 160 NW 642 (1916); Kaufman v Katz, 356 Mich 354; 97 NW2d 56 (1959).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-11
Chapter 25: Products Liability
Comment 3 to MCL 440.2314 (by the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) states that “the sale of second-hand goods,
however, involves only such obligation as is appropriate to such goods….”
The parties to a transaction may negate an implied warranty with proper language showing
that intention. See Richardson v Messina, 361 Mich 364; 105 NW2d 153 (1960); and
Parsonson v Construction Equipment Co, 18 Mich App 87; 170 NW2d 479 (1969), the
latter case being a sale of equipment in an “as is” condition. See also MCL 440.2316 for
exclusion or modification of warranties in commercial transactions.
History
Amended June 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 25.22 Implied Warranty—Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that the [ name of product ] was not reasonably fit for the [ use / uses ] or
[ purpose / purposes ] anticipated or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant,
in one or more of the ways claimed by the plaintiff
(b) that the [ name of product ] was not reasonably fit for the [ use / uses ] or
[ purpose / purposes ] anticipated or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant
at the time it left the defendant’s control
(c) that [ plaintiff / plaintiff’s decedent ] [ was injured / sustained damage ]
(d) that the [ description of claimed defect ] was a proximate cause of the
[ injuries / damages ] to [ plaintiff / plaintiff’s decedent ].
*(Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.)
*(Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.)
Note on Use
This instruction should not be used in an action against a manufacturer for an alleged defect
in the design of its product. Prentis v Yale Manufacturing Co, 421 Mich 670; 365 NW2d
176 (1984). Additionally, this instruction should not be used in an action against a non-
manufacturing seller because breach of implied warranty is not a separate theory upon
which to bring such an action. Curry v Meijer, Inc., 286 Mich App 586 (2009).
*These paragraphs are not necessary if a Special Verdict Form is used.
For cases filed on or after March 28, 1996, if comparative fault or comparative negligence
are at issue, M Civ JI 25.45 should be used. MCL 600.6304.
Comment
For the quantum of proof required to demonstrate a defect see Bronson v J L Hudson Co,
376 Mich 98; 135 NW2d 388 (1966); Hertzler v Manshum, 228 Mich 416; 200 NW 155
(1924); Accetola v Hood, 7 Mich App 83; 151 NW2d 210 (1967); Martel v Duffy-Mott
Corp, 15 Mich App 67; 166 NW2d 541 (1968); and Shirley v Drackett Products Co, 26
Mich App 644; 182 NW2d 726 (1970).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-13
Chapter 25: Products Liability
History
M Civ JI 25.22 was SJI 25.23. Amended November 1983, October 1984, June 2011,
January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 25.31 Negligent Production—Definition
The defendant had a duty to use reasonable care at the time of [ production* ] of the
[ product / [ name of product ] ] so as to eliminate unreasonable risks of harm or injury that
were reasonably foreseeable.
Reasonable care means that degree of care that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would
exercise under the circumstances that you find existed in this case. It is for you to decide,
based on the evidence, what a reasonably prudent manufacturer would do or would not do
under those circumstances.
A failure to fulfill the duty to use reasonable care is negligence.
However, the defendant had no duty to _______________* a [ product / [ name of
product ] ] to eliminate reasonable risks of harm or injury or risks that were not reasonably
foreseeable.
Note on Use
*Select the appropriate word or words from the statutory definition of production, which
is: “‘Production’ means manufacture, construction, design, formulation, development of
standards, preparation, processing, assembly, inspection, testing, listing, certifying,
warning, instructing, marketing, selling, advertising, packaging, or labeling.” MCL
600.2945(i).
M Civ JI 10.02 should not be used with this instruction.
Comment
MCL 600.2947.
See Owens v Allis-Chambers Corp, 414 Mich 413; 326 NW2d 372 (1982).
The test for assessing a manufacturer’s liability to persons injured by its product is whether
the risk to the plaintiff is unreasonable and foreseeable by the manufacturer, not whether
the risk is patent or obvious to the plaintiff. Owens. For this reason, the instruction does not
refer to obviousness.
History
M Civ JI 25.31 was added February 1981. Amended January 1990, March 2001.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-15
Chapter 25: Products Liability
M Civ JI 25.32 Negligent Production—Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that the defendant was negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the
plaintiff *(as stated to you in these instructions);
(b) that the plaintiff [ was injured / sustained damage ];
(c) that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the [ injuries
/ damages ] to the plaintiff;
(d) that the product was not reasonably safe at the time it left the defendant’s
control;
**(e) that, according to generally accepted production practices at the time the
specific unit of the product left the control of the defendant, a practical and
technically feasible alternative production practice was available that would
have prevented the harm without significantly impairing the usefulness or
desirability of the product to users and without creating equal or greater risk of
harm to others. An alternative production practice is practical and feasible
only if the technical, medical, or scientific knowledge relating to production of
the product, at the time the specific unit of the product left the control of the
defendant, was developed, available, and capable of use in the production of
the product and was economically feasible for use by the manufacturer.
Technical, medical, or scientific knowledge is not economically feasible for
use by the manufacturer if use of that knowledge in production of the product
would significantly compromise the product’s usefulness or desirability.
***Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
***Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
†(The defendant has the burden of proof on [ his / her ] claim that the plaintiff was negligent
in one or more of the ways claimed by the defendant *(as stated to you in these
instructions), and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the [ injuries / damages ]
to the plaintiff.)
‡(The defendant has the burden of proof on [ his / her ] claim that [ name of nonparty ] was
negligent and that the negligence of [ name of nonparty ] was a proximate cause of the
[ injuries / damages ] to the plaintiff.)
†(If your verdict is for the plaintiff, then you must determine the percentage of fault for each
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-16 Michigan Supreme Court
party or nonparty whose negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s [ injuries /
damages ]. In determining the percentage of fault, you should consider the nature of the
conduct and the extent to which each person’s conduct caused or contributed to the
plaintiff’s [ injuries / damages ].)
†(The Court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers
to the questions in the Special Verdict Form will provide the basis on which this case will
be resolved.)
Note on Use
*If the parties waive the court’s reading of the theories of the parties (see M Civ JI 7.01
Theories of the Parties), the court should delete the phrase in parentheses.
**In certain cases, there may be an issue as to whether the language in paragraph (e)
applies.
***The two paragraphs beginning with the words “Your verdict” are not necessary if a
Special Verdict Form is used.
†These three paragraphs should not be read to the jury if comparative negligence is not an
issue in the case.
‡This paragraph should be used only if the defendant has identified a nonparty pursuant to
MCL 600.2957.
This instruction may have to be modified or other instructions given if fault, such as
intentional conduct, is an issue in the case. By statutory definition, “fault” “includes an act,
an omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a
legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is
proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.” MCL 600.6304(8).
Comment
MCL 600.2946, .2947.
See Owens v Allis-Chalmers Corp, 414 Mich 413; 326 NW2d 372 (1982).
The test for assessing a manufacturer’s liability to persons injured by its product is whether
the risk to the plaintiff is unreasonable and foreseeable by the manufacturer, not whether
the risk is patent or obvious to the plaintiff. Owens. For this reason, the instruction does
not refer to obviousness.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-17
Chapter 25: Products Liability
History
Current M Civ JI 25.32 was added March 2001. Former M Civ JI 25.32 was deleted
October 1989. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-18 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 25.41 Comparative Negligence—Burden of Proof
[ Instruction Deleted ]
History
This instruction was deleted by the Committee March 13, 2009. The instruction was deleted
because its provisions were combined with MCJI 25.45. Previously the jury was given
separate instructions about its responsibility to allocate comparative negligence of the
plaintiff and its responsibility to allocate comparative fault of nonparties. Because the jury
is performing one allocation task, the Committee believed it would be less confusing to
have only one instruction.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 25-19
Chapter 25: Products Liability
M Civ JI 25.45 Breach of Warranty: Comparative Fault—Burden of
Proof (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or After March 28, 1996)
The defendant has the burden of proof on [ his / her / its ] claim that the plaintiff was
negligent, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the [ injuries / damages ] to
the plaintiff.
*Likewise, the defendant has the burden of proof on [ his / her / its ] claim that [ name of
nonparty ] was negligent, and that the negligence of [ name of nonparty ] was a proximate
cause of the [ injuries / damages ] to the plaintiff.
Negligence on the part of the plaintiff or a nonparty does not bar recovery by the plaintiff
against the defendant. However, the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff or
the nonparty will be used by the Court to reduce the amount of recoverable damages.
If your verdict is for the plaintiff, then using 100 percent as the total fault of all persons that
contributed to the plaintiff’s [ injuries / damages ], you must determine the percentage of
fault for each party or nonparty whose fault was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s [ injuries
/ damages ], including the plaintiff.
The Court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers to
the questions in the Special Verdict Form will provide the basis on which this case will be
resolved.
Note on Use
This instruction should not be used in an action against a manufacturer for an alleged defect
in the design of its product. Prentis v Yale Manufacturing Co, 421 Mich 670; 365 NW2d
176 (1984).
This instruction should only be used in products liability cases that involve issues of
negligence on the part of plaintiff or a nonparty.
*This paragraph should be used only if defendant has identified a nonparty pursuant to
MCL 600.2957.
Comment
MCL 600.6304. Fault is defined in MCL 600.6304(8): “As used in this section, ‘fault’
includes an act, an omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty,
or a breach of a legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict
liability, that is a proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.”
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 25-20 Michigan Supreme Court
The provisions of MCJI 25.41 and MCJI 25.45 were combined. Previously the jury was
given separate instructions about its responsibility to allocate comparative negligence of
the plaintiff and its responsibility to allocate comparative fault of nonparties. Because the
jury is performing one allocation task, it is less confusing to have only one instruction.
History
M Civ JI 25.45 was added June 1997. Amended March 2009.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 30-1
CHAPTER 30
Malpractice
M Civ JI 30.01 Professional Negligence/Malpractice ................................................... 30-2
M Civ JI 30.02 Informed Consent ................................................................................. 30-3
M Civ JI 30.03 Burden of Proof..................................................................................... 30-4
M Civ JI 30.04 Medical Malpractice: Cautionary Instruction on Medical
Uncertainties................................................................................................................ 30-5
M Civ JI 30.05 Medical Malpractice: Permissible Inference of Malpractice from
Circumstantial Evidence (Res Ipsa Loquitur) ................................................................ 30-6
M Civ JI 30.10 Medical Malpractice: Exceptions to Cap............................................... 30-7
M Civ JI 30.20 Medical Malpractice: Loss of Opportunity to Survive or Achieve a
Better Result [ Instruction Deleted ] ............................................................................ 30-8
M Civ JI 30.30 Medical Malpractice: Vicarious Tort Liability Based on Ostensible
Agency........................................................................................................................ 30-10
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 30-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 30.01 Professional Negligence/Malpractice
A “breach of the standard of care or practice,” “professional negligence” and “malpractice”
are the same. They mean the failure to do something that a [ name profession ] of ordinary
learning, judgment and skill in [ this community or a similar one / [ name particular
specialty ] ] would do, or the doing of something that such a [name profession] would not
do, under the same or similar circumstances as in this case.
It is for you to decide, based upon the evidence, what the [ name profession / name
particular specialty ] of ordinary learning, judgment and skill would do or would not do
under the same or similar circumstances.
Note on Use
There is case law support for the applicability of the malpractice instructions to the
professionals noted: Siirila v Barrios, 398 Mich 576; 248 NW2d 171 (1976) (doctor);
Roberts v Young, 369 Mich 133; 119 NW2d 627 (1963) (doctor); Babbitt v Bumpus, 73
Mich 331; 41 NW 417 (1889) (attorney); Eggleston v Boardman, 37 Mich 14 (1877)
(attorney); Tasse v Kaufman, 54 Mich App 595; 221 NW2d 470 (1974) (dentist);
Ambassador Baptist Church v Seabreeze Heating & Cooling Co, 28 Mich App 424; 184
NW2d 568 (1970) (architect); Tschirhart v Pethtel, 61 Mich App 581; 233 NW2d 93 (1975)
(chiropractor).
Standards for liability of a certified public accountant are set forth in MCL 600.2962, added
by 1995 PA 249.
If the defendant is a specialist, the name of that specialty should be stated where that option
is given instead of the name of the defendant’s profession.
Comment
The language in the instruction is supported by numerous cases, including Roberts;
Johnson v Borland, 317 Mich 225; 26 NW2d 755 (1947); Siirila; Fortner v Koch, 272 Mich
273; 261 NW 762 (1935); Tasse. MCL 600.2912a.
History
M Civ JI 30.01 was added February 1, 1981. Amended May 2013, July 2017, April 2018,
October 2023.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 30-3
Chapter 30: Malpractice
M Civ JI 30.02 Informed Consent
Negligence may consist of the failure on the part of the [ name profession ] to reasonably
inform [ name of plaintiff ] of risks or hazards which may follow the [ treatment / services ]
contemplated by the [ name profession ]. By “reasonably inform” I mean that the
information must have been given timely and in accordance with the accepted standard of
practice among members of the profession with similar training and experience in [ this
community or a similar one / [ name particular specialty ] ].
Comment
This instruction is supported by Roberts v Young, 369 Mich 133; 119 NW2d 627 (1963).
History
M Civ JI 30.02 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 30-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 30.03 Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that the defendant was professionally negligent in one or more of the ways
claimed by the plaintiff *(as stated in these instructions)
(b) that the plaintiff sustained injury and damages
(c) that the professional negligence or malpractice of the defendant was a
proximate cause of the injury and damages to the plaintiff
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
History
M Civ JI 30.03 was added February 1, 1981. Amended January 2020, October 2023.
Notes on Use
*If the parties waive the court’s reading of the theories of the parties (see M Civ JI 7.01,
Theories of the Parties), the court should delete the phrase in parentheses.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 30-5
Chapter 30: Malpractice
M Civ JI 30.04 Medical Malpractice: Cautionary Instruction on
Medical Uncertainties
There are risks inherent in medical treatment that are not within a doctor’s control. A doctor
is not liable merely because of an adverse result. However, a doctor is liable if the doctor
is negligent and that negligence is a proximate cause of an adverse result.
Note on Use
For guidance on cases in which this is an appropriate instruction, see Jones v Porretta, 428
Mich 132; 405 NW2d 863 (1987).
History
M Civ JI 30.04 was added December 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 30-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 30.05 Medical Malpractice: Permissible Inference of
Malpractice from Circumstantial Evidence (Res Ipsa Loquitur)
If you find that the defendant had control over the [ body of the plaintiff / instrumentality
which caused the plaintiff’s injury ], and that the plaintiff’s injury is of a kind which does
not ordinarily occur without someone’s negligence, then you may infer that the defendant
was negligent.
However, you should weigh all of the evidence in this case in determining whether the
defendant was negligent and whether that negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s
injury.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given only if there is expert testimony that the injury does not
ordinarily occur without negligence, or if the court finds that such a determination could be
made by the jury as a matter of common knowledge.
This instruction should be followed by M Civ JI 30.03 Burden of Proof.
As to whether this instruction is appropriate in a case involving an issue of contributory
negligence, see Jones v Porretta, 428 Mich 132, 151, fn 5; 405 NW2d 863 (1987).
History
M Civ JI 30.05 was added December 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 30-7
Chapter 30: Malpractice
M Civ JI 30.10 Medical Malpractice: Exceptions to Cap
On the special verdict form that will be furnished to you by the court, you will be asked to
answer certain questions, such as whether:
(a)*(there has been a [ specify intentional tort, e.g., battery ])
(b)(a foreign object was left in the body of the plaintiff)
(c)(the injury involves the reproductive system of the plaintiff)
(d)(the discovery of the existence of this claim was prevented by the fraudulent
conduct of [ name of health care provider ])
(e)(a limb or organ of the plaintiff was wrongfully removed)
(f)(the plaintiff has lost a vital body function).
Your answer to [ this question / these questions ] will assist the court in entering a judgment
after you have returned your verdict.
Note on Use
*The court must instruct on the elements of the intentional tort and defenses.
This instruction should be used only if the cause of action arose before April 1, 1994. 1993
PA 78.
The limitations on noneconomic loss damages and criteria for recovering noneconomic loss
damages have been established by 1993 PA 78, §1483. Neither the trial judge nor counsel
of either party shall advise the jury of any provision set forth in §1483. 1993 PA 78, §6306.
Comment
MCL 600.1483(1).
History
M Civ JI 30.10 was added June 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 30-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 30.20 Medical Malpractice: Loss of Opportunity to Survive or
Achieve a Better Result [ Instruction Deleted ]
The Committee deleted MCJI 30.20 based on the decisions in Stone v Williamson, 482
Mich 144 (2008) and O’Neal v St. John Hospital, 487 Mich 485 (2010). While the
Committee believed the former instruction accurately reflected the decision in Fulton v
William Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70 (2002), a majority of justices have stated, albeit
in dicta, that Fulton was wrongly decided. Given the uncertainty of Fulton’s status and
because there is a lack of consensus among the courts on how to apply the second sentence
of MCL 600.2912a, the Committee believed that it should no longer offer the instruction.
Plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to [ survive / achieve a better result ]
unless the plaintiff proves that the [ decedent’s chance of survival / chance of receiving a
better result ] fell more than 50 percentage points as a result of the professional negligence.
Note on Use
Use this instruction only if there is a claim involving a loss of opportunity to survive or
achieve a better result and limit its application to those defendants against whom plaintiff has such
a claim.
Comment
Prior to the enactment of 1993 PA 78, recovery was allowed for loss of a substantial
opportunity for a decedent to survive, with damages being allowed in proportion to the lost
chances of survival. See Falcon v Memorial Hosp, 436 Mich 443; 462 NW2d 44 (1990). M Civ JI
30.20 prior to revision was based on Falcon.
By recognizing loss of a substantial opportunity to survive as an injury, Falcon solved the
problem that a plaintiff (if plaintiff’s decedent had a 50 percent or less chance of survival) would
be unable to show that defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the death, applying the
“more probable than not” proximate cause standard which was equated with a more than 50
percent chance.
In 1993, the Michigan legislature rejected Falcon, adding a new subsection (2) to MCL
600.2912a:
In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or
she suffered an injury that more probably than not was proximately caused by the negligence of
the defendant or defendants. In an action alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover
for loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the
opportunity was greater than 50%.
MCL 600.2912a(2) was construed to preclude a medical malpractice action for a reduced
chance of survival of a living plaintiff. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53; 631
NW2d 686 (2001).
The 1993 amendment of MCL 600.2912a precludes recovery for an opportunity to
Michigan Supreme Court Page 30-9
Chapter 30: Malpractice
achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50 percent. In a case involving
alleged medical malpractice occurring in 1990 and not covered by the 1993 amendment, the
Michigan Supreme Court refused to extend Falcon to a cause of action for loss of a 50 percent or
less opportunity to avoid physical harm less than death. Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639; 563
NW2d 647 (1997).
In Fulton v William Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70 (2002), the Court of Appeals held
that “MCL 600.2912a(2) requires a plaintiff to show that the loss of opportunity to survive or
achieve a better result exceeds fifty percent.” Leave to appeal was granted in Fulton but that order
was subsequently vacated and leave to appeal was denied. This occurred after legislation was
introduced that would have substantially altered MCL 600.2912a. The proposed legislation was
not enacted and the Supreme Court has since denied leave to appeal in two cases raising the issue
first raised in Fulton. Ensink v Mecosta County Gen Hosp, 262 Mich App 518 (2004) and Klein v
Kik, 264 Mich App 682 (2005).
History
M Civ JI 30.20 was added October 1991. Amended September 2006. Deleted June 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 30-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 30.30 Medical Malpractice: Vicarious Tort Liability Based on
Ostensible Agency
A hospital is not generally responsible for the professional negligence of a [ physician /
health care provider ] who has staff privileges at the hospital but is not an agent or employee
of the hospital. However, a hospital may be liable for the professional negligence of a [
physician / health care provider ] if the hospital through its words, conduct, or omissions
caused the plaintiff to reasonably believe that the [ physician / health care provider ] was
an employee or agent of the hospital.
In order to establish the liability of the hospital under this theory, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving:
(a) that [ name of physician or health care provider ] committed professional
negligence in one or more of the ways claimed by the plaintiff;
(b) that the plaintiff sustained injury and damages;
(c) that the professional negligence of [ name of physician or health care
provider ] was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries and damages;
(d) that the plaintiff reasonably believed that the [ physician / health care
provider ] was acting as an agent or employee of the hospital;
(e) that the plaintiff’s belief that the [ physician / health care provider ] was an
agent or employee of the hospital was created by words, conduct, or omissions
of the hospital.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
If there is an issue about whether the plaintiff “looked to the hospital to provide him with
medical treatment” (Grewe v Mt Clemens General Hospital, 404 Mich 240, 250; 273
NW2d 429, 433 (1978)), then this instruction may need to be modified.
Comment
Grewe v Mt Clemens General Hospital, 404 Mich 240, 250; 273 NW2d 429, 433 (1978).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 30-11
Chapter 30: Malpractice
See also Howard v Park, 37 Mich App 496; 195 NW2d 39 (1972), lv den, 387 Mich 782
(1972); Revitzer v Trenton Medical Center, Inc, 118 Mich App 169; 324 NW2d 561 (1982),
lv den, 417 Mich 995 (1983); Saseen v Community Hospital Foundation, 159 Mich App
231; 406 NW2d 193 (1986); Strach v St John Hospital Corp, 160 Mich App 251; 408
NW2d 441 (1987), lv den, 429 Mich 886 (1987), recon den, 430 Mich 866 (1988);
Brackens v Detroit Osteopathic Hospital, 174 Mich App 290; 435 NW2d 471 (1989), lv
den, 433 Mich 857 (1989); Chapa v St Mary’s Hospital of Saginaw, 192 Mich App 29; 480
NW2d 590 (1991); Setterington v Pontiac General Hospital, 223 Mich App 594; 568
NW2d 93 (1997).
History
M Civ JI 30.30 was added August 2000. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 30-12 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-1
CHAPTER 35
First-Party Benefits Action
Introductory Directions to the Court ........................................................................... 35-2
M Civ JI 35.01 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Explanation of Statute................ 35-5
M Civ JI 35.02 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Burden of Proof........................ 35-10
M Civ JI 35.03 No-Fault: Benefits from First-Party Actions ........................................ 35-13
M Civ JI 35.04 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Statutory Interest..................... 35-17
M Civ JI 35.05 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Damages—Setoff for Governmental
Benefits [ Instruction Deleted ] .................................................................................. 35-19
M Civ JI 35.06 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Damages—Setoff; Coordinated
Benefits [ Instruction Deleted ] .................................................................................. 35-20
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introductory Directions to the Court
The following instructions are designed for the average no-fault case involving an alleged
breach of contract for failure to pay first-party benefits. Obviously, it is impossible to
reflect on all current appellate cases or to anticipate future decisions. The ever-changing
law in this area mandates vigilance for additions or deletions which aptly reflect the current
status of appellate decisions.
Many facets of a no-fault benefits case are not in dispute. For instance, the applicable wage
rate, if readily ascertainable, should be stipulated to and inserted into the various formulas
for computation of benefits. It is recommended that the Court eliminate from jury
consideration any stipulation as to fact or amount. It would certainly behoove the Court
and parties to closely scrutinize all areas of potential agreement before commencing jury
selection, so as to avoid unwieldy and prolonged trials.
The Court and parties should note that 2019 PA 22 amended the Michigan No-Fault
Insurance Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq) and introduced, among other reforms, new PIP
choice options that apply to allowable expense benefits payable pursuant to MCL
500.3107(1)(a). By way of example, the reforms made by 2019 PA 22 include potential
caps on allowable expense coverage, allowable expense fee schedules, the potential for
managed care polices and limitations on certain attendant care benefits. Many of these
issues will be matters of law for the Court to decide, absent stipulation by the parties. It is
strongly recommended that the Court and parties consider the ramifications of 2019 PA 22
on certain aspects of cases when fashioning jury instructions and verdict forms and
endeavor to resolve any legal issues that are not stipulated to by the parties prior to jury
selection.
Chapter 35 contains no instructions on setoffs from first-party benefits. In most cases, these
issues will be resolved as questions of law. Jarosz v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance
Exchange, 418 Mich 565; 345 NW2d 563 (1984); Perez v State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co, 418 Mich 634; 344 NW2d 773 (1984); Thompson v Detroit Automobile
Inter-Insurance Exchange, 418 Mich 610; 344 NW2d 764 (1984). The statutes authorizing
setoffs from first party benefits are MCL 500.3109 (governmental benefits setoffs), and
MCL 500.3109a (coordinated benefit setoffs).
Governmental benefits may only be set off against no-fault benefits if they “1) Serve the
same purpose as the no-fault benefits, and 2) Are provided or required to be provided as a
result of the same accident.” Jarosz, 418 Mich at 565; 345 NW2d at 563.
Social Security disability benefits and Social Security survivors’ benefits have been held to
be proper setoffs, regardless of whether the insured elected or was offered coordinated
benefits coverage. See O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co, 404 Mich 524;
273 NW2d 829, appeal dismissed, 444 US 803; 100 S Ct 22; 62 L Ed 2d 16 (1979), and
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-3
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
Profit v Citizens Insurance Co of America, 444 Mich 281; 506 NW2d 514 (1993). See also
Wolford v Travelers Insurance Co, 92 Mich App 600; 285 NW2d 383 (1979). Also, Social
Security disability payments to dependents of the injured worker are proper setoffs against
work loss benefits. Thompson. (This may change if the injured wage earner and spouse are
divorced. Thompson, 418 Mich at 617, fn 8; 344 NW2d at 766, fn 8).
Social Security old age benefits are not proper setoffs. Jarosz. Also, Social Security
survivors’ benefits cannot be set off against that particular component of no-fault survivors’
loss benefits which represents replacement service expenses. Swanson v Citizens Insurance
Co, 99 Mich App 52; 298 NW2d 119 (1980), vacated on other grounds 411 Mich 945; 308
NW2d 99 (1981), Cole v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 137 Mich App
603; 357 NW2d 898 (1984).
Worker’s compensation benefits have been held a proper setoff. See Mathis v Interstate
Motor Freight System, 408 Mich 164; 289 NW2d 708 (1980). But federal worker’s
compensation benefits which the insured was required to repay out of tort recovery could
not be set off. Sibley v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 431 Mich 164; 427
NW2d 528 (1988). Also, if worker’s compensation will not be paid because the employer
failed to obtain insurance coverage, there is no setoff. Perez. (In Perez, the Court in a three-
Justice opinion construed the phrase “required to be provided” in MCL 500.3109 (1) to
mean that an injured worker must use “reasonable efforts” to obtain governmental benefits
that are available.) See also Joiner v Michigan Mutual Insurance Co, 137 Mich App 464;
357 NW2d 875 (1984), appeal after remand, 161 Mich App 285; 409 NW2d 807 (1987).
See also Thacker v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 114 Mich App 374; 319
NW2d 349 (1982) (amount of setoff where employee voluntarily redeems worker’s
compensation claim); Gregory v Transamerica Insurance Co, 425 Mich 625; 391 NW2d
312 (1986) (no-fault insurer can set off the amount of a plaintiff’s workers’ compensation
redemption of medical expenses against its obligation to pay wage loss benefits); Luth v
Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 113 Mich App 289; 317 NW2d 867 (1982)
(no setoff where federal employee elected accumulated vacation and sick leave rather than
federal worker’s compensation). But see Krygel v City of Detroit, 135 Mich App 187; 353
NW2d 116 (1984) (setoff permitted where city of Detroit employee elected to receive City
Charter benefits instead of worker’s compensation benefits.)
Medical and disability benefits received from the Army and Veteran’s Administration are
proper setoffs. Bagley v State Farm Mutual Insurance Co, 101 Mich App 733; 300 NW2d
322 (1980). Amounts paid by the United States government for medical care for a member
of the armed services may also be set off against medical no-fault benefits otherwise
payable where neither the injured serviceman, his spouse, nor a relative domiciled in the
same household owned an automobile insured under the no-fault act. Crowley v Detroit
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 428 Mich 270; 407 NW2d 372 (1987). However,
if the insurer does not offer the option of purchasing a coordinated benefits policy under
MCL 500.3109a, then governmental medical care benefits paid to members of the armed
services may not be offset under section 3109a. Tatum v Government Employees Insurance
Co, 431 Mich 663; 431 NW2d 391 (1988).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Medical benefits provided under an out-of-state no-fault automobile insurance plan in
compliance with the laws of that state may be set off as benefits under MCL 500.3109.
DeMeglio v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 449 Mich 33; 534 NW2d 665 (1995).
Medicare benefits are not proper setoffs under MCL 500.3109 but may be set off as a
coordinated benefit under section 3109a. LeBlanc v State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co, 410 Mich 173; 301 NW2d 775 (1981).
The Michigan no-fault law authorizes the use of an insurance policy endorsement which
coordinates benefits provided by the act with other health and accident insurance benefits
available through Blue Cross/Blue Shield, other medical insurance, other disability
insurance, or sickness and accident benefits. Coordinated benefit endorsements apply only
to duplicate claims for allowable expenses and work loss. LeBlanc; Nyquist v Aetna
Insurance Co, 84 Mich App 589; 269 NW2d 687 (1978), aff’d, 404 Mich 817; 280 NW2d
792 (1979); Orr v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 90 Mich App 687; 282
NW2d 177, lv den, 407 Mich 865 (1979); Thomas v State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co, 159 Mich App 372; 406 NW2d 300 (1987); Dean v Auto Club Insurance
Ass’n, 139 Mich App 266; 362 NW2d 247 (1984); Sheeks v Farmers Insurance Exchange,
146 Mich App 361; 379 NW2d 493 (1985).
For cases resolving priority disputes between no-fault insurers and health insurance
companies where both insurers have coordinated benefits provisions in their policies,
making that policy secondary to the other, see Federal Kemper Insurance Co v Health
Insurance Administration, Inc, 424 Mich 537; 383 NW2d 590 (1986); Michigan Mutual
Insurance Co v American Community Mutual Insurance Co, 165 Mich App 269; 418
NW2d 455 (1987); Northern Group Services, Inc v Auto Owners Insurance Co, 833 F2d 85
(6th Cir 1987), cert denied, 486 US 1017; 108 S Ct 1754; 100 L Ed 2d 216 (1988); Benike
v Scarborough Insurance Trust, 150 Mich App 710; 389 NW2d 156 (1986), lv denied, 425
Mich 882 (1986); West Michigan Heath Care Network v Transamerica Insurance Corp of
America, 167 Mich App 218; 421 NW2d 638 (1988); US Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Group
Health Plan of Southeast Michigan, 131 Mich App 268; 345 NW2d 683 (1983); Auto-
Owners Insurance Co v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 132 Mich App 800; 349
NW2d 238 (1984). However, where the health insurer is an employee health benefit plan
established under ERISA, a coordinated benefits provision in the plan making it secondary
to no-fault policies is enforceable, thus making the no-fault insurer primary. Auto Club
Insurance Ass’n v Frederick & Herrud, Inc, 443 Mich 358; 505 NW2d 820 (1993).
History
Amended January 1985, January 1988, February 1989, June 1989, February 1994,
February 1999, October 2022.2.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-5
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
M Civ JI 35.01 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Explanation of
Statute
We have a state law known as the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act which provides that
if a person sustains accidental bodily injury or death arising out of the [ ownership / or /
operation / or / maintenance / or / use ] of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, by [ himself
or herself / or / someone else ], an insurance company may be responsible to pay the
following types of benefits:
(a) *(The first type of benefit is known as “allowable expenses” and consists
of reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and
accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery or rehabilitation.
Allowable expenses include, but are not limited to, medical expenses.)
(b) *(The second type of benefit is known as “work loss benefit” and consists
of †(85 percent) of an injured person’s loss of income from work the injured
person would have performed during the first three years after the date of the
accident if the person had not been injured. The total work loss benefit for any
thirty-day period may not exceed $[ applicable maximum ]).
(c) *(The third type of benefit is known as “replacement service expenses”
and consists of expenses not exceeding $20 per day reasonably incurred in
obtaining ordinary and necessary services in place of those the injured person
would have performed during the first three years after the date of the accident,
not for income but for the benefit of [ himself / herself ] or of [ his / her ]
dependents.)
(d) *(The fourth type of benefit is known as “survivors’ loss benefits” and
consists of two separate types of benefits:
1. A loss, after the date on which the decedent died, of contributions of
tangible things of economic value, not including services, that dependents
of the decedent, at the time of [ his / her ] death, would have received from
the decedent for support during their dependency if [ he / she ] had not
suffered the accidental bodily injury causing death; and
2. Replacement service expenses, not exceeding $20 per day, reasonably
incurred by these dependents, during their dependency and after the date
on which the decedent died, in obtaining ordinary and necessary services
in place of those services that the decedent would have performed for their
benefit if [ he / she ] had not suffered the injury causing death.
It should be noted, however, that the total survivors’ loss benefits for any
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-6 Michigan Supreme Court
thirty-day period, that is, the combination of loss of support and
replacement services, may not exceed $ [ applicable maximum ] and are
not payable beyond three years from the date of the accident.)
(e) *(The last type of benefit is funeral and burial expenses. These may not
exceed **$ [ policy maximum ].)
Note on Use
*The words and subparagraphs should be selected to fit the facts in the particular case.
**See MCL 500.3107(1)(a) for the statutory minimum and maximum for funeral and burial
expenses.
Maximum work loss benefits have been increased each year by the Insurance Commission,
according to increased cost of living. (See the table below for maximum work loss benefit
amounts.) Annual adjustments for survivors’ loss benefits commenced on October 1, 1978,
with an amendment to MCL 500.3108. Prior to that date, the maximum survivors’ loss per
thirty-day period was $1,000. Since October 1, 1978, survivors’ loss maximums have been
the same as work loss maximums under MCL 500.3107(1)(b).
It should also be noted that no-fault insurance can be purchased which provides benefits in
excess of the minimum. For those benefits in excess of the no-fault law, the Court may
supply the appropriate amount in the blank captioned “applicable maximum.”
†This standard statutory percentage must be modified if plaintiff’s income tax
consequences are less than 15 percent. See MCL 500.3107(1)(b).
October 1, 1973 through September 30, 1974—$1000 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1974 through September 30, 1975—$1111 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1975 through September 30, 1976—$1213 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1976 through September 30, 1977—$1285 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1977 through September 30, 1978—$1373 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1978 through September 30, 1979—$1475 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1979 through September 30, 1980—$1636 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1980 through September 30, 1981—$1870 per single 30-day period.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-7
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
October 1, 1981 through September 30, 1982—$2049 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1982 through September 30, 1983—$2195 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1983 through September 30, 1984—$2252 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1984 through September 30, 1985—$2347 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1985 through September 30, 1986—$2434 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1986 through September 30, 1987—$2477 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1987 through September 30, 1988—$2569 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1988 through September 30, 1989—$2670 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1989 through September 30, 1990—$2808 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1990 through September 30, 1991—$2939 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1991 through September 30, 1992—$3077 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1992 through September 30, 1993—$3172 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1993 through September 30, 1994—$3267 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1994 through September 30, 1995—$3349 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1995 through September 30, 1996—$3450 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1996 through September 30, 1997—$3545 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1997 through September 30, 1998—$3627 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1998 through September 30, 1999—$3688 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2000—$3760 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2000 through September 30, 2001—$3898 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2001 through September 30, 2002—$4027 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2002 through September 30, 2003—$4070 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2003 through September 30, 2004—$4156 per single 30-day period.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-8 Michigan Supreme Court
October 1, 2004 through September 30, 2005—$4293 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2005 through September 30, 2006—$4400 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2006 through September 30, 2007—$4589 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2008—$4713 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2008 through September 30, 2009—$4948 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2009 through September 30, 2010—$4878 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2010 through September 30, 2011—$4929 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2011 through September 30, 2012—$5104 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2013—$5189 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2013 through September 30, 2014—$5282 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2014 through September 30, 2015—$5392 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2016—$5398 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017—$5452 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2017 through September 30, 2018—$5541 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2018 through September 30, 2019—$5700 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2019 through September 30, 2020—$5718 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2020 through September 30, 2021—$5755 per single 30-day period.
October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022—$6065 per single 30-day period.
Comment
2019 PA 22 amended the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq) and
introduced, among other reforms, new PIP choice options that apply to allowable expense
benefits payable pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a). By way of example, the reforms made
by 2019 PA 22 include potential caps on allowable expense coverage, allowable expense
fee schedules, the potential for managed care polices and limitations on certain attendant
care benefits. Many of these issues will be matters of law for the Court to decide, absent
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-9
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
stipulation by the parties. It is strongly recommended that the Court and parties consider
the ramifications of 2019 PA 22 on certain aspects of cases when fashioning jury
instructions and verdict forms and endeavor to resolve any legal issues that are not
stipulated to by the parties prior to jury selection.
History
M Civ JI 35.01 was added November 1980. Amended May 1998, April 2019, October
2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 35.02 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) *(that at the time of the accident there existed a valid contract of no-fault insurance
between [ name of insured ] and defendant)
(b) †(that plaintiff’s injuries arose out of the [ ownership / or / operation / or / maintenance
/ or / use ] of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle)
(c) †(that plaintiff incurred allowable expenses which consist of reasonable charges for
reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for the plaintiff’s care,
recovery or rehabilitation)
(d) †(that plaintiff suffered a work loss which consists of a loss of income from work the
plaintiff would have performed during the first three years after the accident had [ he / she ]
not been injured)
(e) †(that plaintiff reasonably incurred replacement service expenses which consist of
expenses during the first three years after the accident to obtain ordinary and necessary
services in place of those that plaintiff would have performed for [ his / her ] benefit and
the benefit of [ his / her ] dependents)
(f) †(that the death of plaintiff’s decedent arose out of the [ ownership / or / operation / or
/ maintenance / or / use ] of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle)
(g) †(that following the death of [ name of decedent ], dependents of [ name of decedent ],
during the first three years after the date of the accident, sustained a loss of contribution of
tangible things of economic value, not including services, that the dependents would have
received for their support during their dependency, if [ name of decedent ] had not died)
(h) †(that following the death of [ name of decedent ], dependents of [ name of decedent ],
during the first three years after the date of the accident, reasonably incurred expenses
during their dependency and after the date [ name of decedent ] died, in obtaining ordinary
and necessary services in place of those that the decedent would have performed for the
benefit of the dependents)
(i) †(that plaintiff incurred funeral and burial expenses)
(j) hat the detfendant failed to pay any or all of said benefits.
To the extent that plaintiff has met or has not met [ his / her ] burden of proof, you may
grant, diminish or deny the claimed benefits according to the methods of computation
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-11
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
which I will describe next.
Note on Use
*Delete where not an issue. If an issue, the Court should determine what contractual
relationship must be proved under MCL 500.3114, .3115.
†Delete any of the subsections which are not at issue in the lawsuit.
Where the facts are not in dispute, the question whether the injury “arose out of” use of a
vehicle as a motor vehicle is a legal issue for the court to decide and not for the
jury. Putkamer v Transamerica Insurance Corp of America, 454 Mich 626; 563 NW2d 683
(1997). In such a case, subsection (b) should be deleted.
Comment
The term “arose out of” in subsection (b) has been the subject of litigation. See, e.g.,
Putkamer; Morosini v Citizens Insurance Co of America, 461 Mich 303; 602 NW2d 828
(1999); McKenzie v Auto Club Insurance Ass’n, 458 Mich 214; 580 NW2d 424 (1998);
Thornton v Allstate Insurance Co, 425 Mich 643; 391 NW2d 320 (1986); Williams v
Citizens Mutual Insurance Co of America, 94 Mich App 762; 290 NW2d 76 (1980); O’Key
v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 89 Mich App 526; 280 NW2d 583 (1979);
Kangas v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1; 235 NW2d 42 (1975); Shinabarger
v Citizens Mutual Insurance Co, 90 Mich App 307; 282 NW2d 301 (1979); Detroit
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v Higginbotham, 95 Mich App 213; 290 NW2d 414,
lv den, 409 Mich 919 (1980); Hamka v Automobile Club of Michigan, 89 Mich App 644;
280 NW2d 512 (1979); Ciaramitaro v State Farm Insurance Co, 107 Mich App 68; 308
NW2d 661 (1981), lv den, 413 Mich 861 (1982); McClees v Kowalski, No 44711 (Mich
App, Dec 28, 1979) (unreported); Buckeye Union Insurance Co v Johnson, 108 Mich App
46; 310 NW2d 268 (1981); Smith v Community Service Insurance Co, 114 Mich App 431;
319 NW2d 358 (1982); Mann v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 111 Mich
App 637; 314 NW2d 719 (1981); Gajewski v Auto-Owners Insurance Co, 112 Mich App
59; 314 NW2d 799 (1981), rev’d, 414 Mich 968; 326 NW2d 825 (1982); Bromley v
Citizens Insurance Co of America, 113 Mich App 131; 317 NW2d 318 (1982).
These cases hold in essence that there must be causal connection between the injury and the
operation, use, ownership or maintenance of a motor vehicle, which connection must be
more than incidental, fortuitous or but for. The injury must be foreseeably identifiable with
the normal use of the motor vehicle. The injury must be closely related to the
transportational function of motor vehicles. (McKenzie; Morosini.) Proximate cause is not
required; however, it is generally not sufficient that the motor vehicle is merely the site of
the accident. If the motor vehicle is one of the causes, a sufficient causal connection exists
even though there are other independent causes.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-12 Michigan Supreme Court
Plaintiff’s injuries may arise out of maintenance (repairing) of a motor vehicle without
regard to whether the vehicle may be considered “parked” at the time of the injury. Miller
v Auto-Owners Insurance Co, 411 Mich 633, 309 NW2d 544 (1981); but see MCL
500.3106(2), which denies first-party benefits under certain circumstances to employees
covered by worker’s compensation who are injured loading, unloading, or repairing a
vehicle, or entering into or alighting from a vehicle.
The motor vehicle from which the injuries arose need not be a registered or covered motor
vehicle. Lee v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 412 Mich 505; 315 NW2d
413 (1982).
While MCL 500.3135(2) has been construed to retain tort liability of nonmotorist
tortfeasors, the no-fault insurer is still obliged to pay first-party benefits. Citizens Insurance
Co of America v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536; 309 NW2d 174 (1981).
2019 PA 22 amended the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq) and
introduced, among other reforms, new PIP choice options that apply to allowable expense
benefits payable pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a). By way of example, the reforms made
by 2019 PA 22 include potential caps on allowable expense coverage, allowable expense
fee schedules, the potential for managed care polices and limitations on certain attendant
care benefits. Many of these issues will be matters of law for the Court to decide, absent
stipulation by the parties. It is strongly recommended that the Court and parties consider
the ramifications of 2019 PA 22 on certain aspects of cases when fashioning jury
instructions and verdict forms and endeavor to resolve any legal issues that are not
stipulated to by the parties prior to jury selection.
History
M Civ JI 35.02 was added November 1980. Amended January 2020, October 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-13
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
M Civ JI 35.03 No-Fault: Benefits from First-Party Actions
If you decide no-fault benefits are owed to the plaintiff, you are instructed to award benefits
*(that have not already been paid by the defendant) as follows:
(a) **†† (allowable expenses consisting of reasonable charges incurred for reasonably
necessary products, services and accommodations for the plaintiff’s care, recovery or
rehabilitation arising out of the accident in question)
(b) **(work loss benefits consisting of †(85 percent) of the loss of income from work that
the plaintiff would have performed during the first three years after the date of the accident
if [ he / she ] had not been injured. Total work loss benefits for any thirty-day period cannot
exceed $ [ applicable monthly maximum ])
(c) **(replacement service expenses not exceeding $20 per day reasonably incurred by
plaintiff in obtaining ordinary and necessary services in place of those that, if the plaintiff
had not been injured, [ he / she ] would have performed during the first three years after the
date of the accident, not for income but for the benefit of [ himself / herself ] or of [ his /
her ] dependents)
(d) **(survivors’ loss benefits consisting of tangible things of economic value, not
including services, that dependents of [ name of decedent ] at the time of [ his / her ] death
would have received for support during their dependency from [ name of decedent ] if [ he
/ she ] had not suffered the accidental bodily injury causing death)
(e) **(replacement service expenses consisting of expenses not exceeding $20 per day
reasonably incurred by these dependents during their dependency and after the date on
which [ name of decedent ] died in obtaining ordinary and necessary services in place of
those that [ name of decedent ] would have performed for their benefit if [ he / she ] had not
suffered the injury causing death) **(You are reminded, however, that the total survivors’
loss benefits for any thirty-day period, that is, the combination of loss of support and
replacement services, may not exceed $ [ applicable monthly maximum ] and are not
payable beyond three years from the date of the accident.)
(f) **(funeral and burial expenses not exceeding *** $ [ policy maximum ])
Note on Use
*The phrase in parentheses should be used if some benefits have already been paid by the
defendant.
**Delete if not an issue.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-14 Michigan Supreme Court
***See MCL 500.3107(1)(a) for the statutory minimum and maximum for funeral and
burial expenses.
For applicable monthly maximum, see Note on Use to M Civ JI 35.01.
†This standard statutory percentage must be modified if plaintiff’s income tax
consequences are less than 15 percent. See MCL 500.3107(1)(b).
†† The Court and parties should consider the amendments in 2019 PA 22, including those
to MCL 500.3157(10), which include limitations on certain attendant care benefits, when
crafting an appropriate instruction for each specific case.
The Court may wish to give additional instruction on the meaning of work loss where
plaintiff’s disability ceases but plaintiff claims a loss of income from work as a
consequence of the injury. See Comment below.
Comment
“An attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee for advising and representing a claimant in an
action for personal or property protection insurance benefits which are overdue. The
attorney’s fee shall be a charge against the insurer in addition to the benefits recovered, if
the court finds the insurer unreasonably refused to pay the claim or unreasonably delayed
in making proper payment.” MCL 500.3148(1). The attorney fee thus is a question not for
the jury but for the Court. 2019 PA 22 amended MCL 500.3148 to include additional
conditions on the awarding of an attorney fee.
Factors to be considered in determining reasonableness of attorney fees are discussed in
Wood v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 413 Mich 573; 321 NW2d 653
(1982).
Note that work loss and survivors’ loss damages are given in the alternative. There are
cases, however, where both will be applicable, such as where an injured party dies
sometime subsequent to the accident.
Work loss benefits are available only for actual lost income and not for loss of earning
capacity. See, e.g., Nawrocki v Hawkeye Security Insurance Co, 83 Mich App 135; 268
NW2d 317 (1978). If the disability ends but the income is lost as a direct consequence of
the injury, plaintiff may still recover. Id. (Plaintiff was replaced during his disability and
therefore could not return to his job after the disability ended.)
Similarly, where plaintiff’s disability ceases and he is able to return to work with pain
medication, but the employer’s rules prohibit it, plaintiff’s work loss is a consequence of
the injury and work loss benefits are recoverable. Lenart v Detroit Automobile Inter-
Insurance Exchange, 156 Mich App 669; 401 NW2d 900 (1986); lv denied, 428 Mich 917
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-15
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
(1987); reconsideration denied, 430 Mich 860 (1988).
While fringe benefits are not ordinarily recoverable work loss, where profit-sharing
payments were considered part of an employee’s wages, they are recoverable as a work loss
benefit. Krawczyk v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 418 Mich 231; 341
NW2d 110 (1983).
A person receiving work loss benefits is not entitled to continue to receive those benefits
after suffering a subsequent unrelated disability which independently renders him or her
physically unable to work. MacDonald v State Farm Mutual Insurance Co, 419 Mich 146;
350 NW2d 233 (1984).
Work loss benefits can be recovered by those temporarily unemployed at the time of the
accident or during the period of disability. For factors determining “temporarily
unemployed” and the computation of wage loss for such periods, see Oikarinen v Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co of Michigan, 101 Mich App 436; 300 NW2d 589 (1980);
Lewis v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 90 Mich App 251; 282 NW2d 794
(1979); Lowman v Reliance Insurance Co, 413 Mich 945 (1982); Kennedy v Auto-Owners
Insurance Co, 87 Mich App 93; 273 NW2d 599 (1978); Szabo v Detroit Automobile Inter-
Insurance Exchange, 136 Mich App 9; 355 NW2d 619 (1983).
Tangible things of economic value that dependents of a decedent would have received are
not limited to wages; they include “hospital and medical insurance benefits, disability
coverage, pensions, investment income, annuity income and other benefits.” Miller v State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 410 Mich 538, 557; 302 NW2d 537, 541 (1981).
The computation of things of economic value requires an adjustment for income taxes that
decedent would have paid on the portion that was taxable, but does not require an
adjustment for personal consumption. Miller. If one of the survivors ceases to be a
dependent, an adjustment to benefits due to the remaining survivor or survivors may be
required. Miller.
Surviving dependents of a decedent who was unemployed at the time of death are entitled
to survivors’ loss benefits if they can show that the decedent would have been employed
had he survived the accident. Gobler v Auto-Owners Insurance Co, 428 Mich 51; 404
NW2d 199 (1987).
2019 PA 22 amended the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq) and
introduced, among other reforms, new PIP choice options that apply to allowable expense
benefits payable pursuant to MCL 500.3107(1)(a). By way of example, the reforms made
by 2019 PA 22 include potential caps on allowable expense coverage, allowable expense
fee schedules, the potential for managed care polices and limitations on certain attendant
care benefits. Many of these issues will be matters of law for the Court to decide, absent
stipulation by the parties. It is strongly recommended that the Court and parties consider
the ramifications of 2019 PA 22 on certain aspects of cases when fashioning jury
instructions and verdict forms and endeavor to resolve any legal issues that are not
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-16 Michigan Supreme Court
stipulated to by the parties prior to jury selection.
History
M Civ JI 35.03 was added November 1980. Amended May 1998, October 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-17
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
M Civ JI 35.04 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Statutory
Interest
Plaintiff is entitled to 12 percent interest on any benefit you find overdue. Benefits are
overdue if not paid within thirty days after reasonable proof of the fact and amount of the
loss has been provided to the insurance company.* Plaintiff has the burden of proving that
[ he / she ] provided reasonable proof of loss and that the defendant failed to pay the claim
within thirty days. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, you shall award
interest as to all benefits for which reasonable proof was supplied. Your verdict will be for
plaintiff as to interest on those benefits for which [ he / she ] has met [ his / her ] burden of
proof. Your verdict will be for the defendant as to interest on those benefits for which
plaintiff failed to meet [ his / her ] burden of proof.
Note on Use
* MCL 500.3142(3) was added by 2019 PA 22. It provides that if a bill for the product,
service, accommodations, or training was not provided to the insured within 90 days after
the product, service, accommodations, or training is provided, the insurer has an additional
60 days to pay before the bill is considered overdue. In that situation, the instruction will
need to be modified accordingly.
Comment
MCL 500.3142.
An award of interest on the judgment under MCL 600.6013 and 12 percent interest on
overdue benefits is proper. Wood v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 413
Mich 573; 321 NW2d 653 (1982). An award of interest does not require proof of
unreasonable conduct or bad faith on the part of the insurer. E.g., Cook v Detroit
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 114 Mich App 53; 318 NW2d 476 (1981); Bach v
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 137 Mich App 128; 357 NW2d 325 (1984),
lv den, 421 Mich 862 (1985); Nash v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 120
Mich App 568; 327 NW2d 521 (1982), lv den, 417 Mich 1088 (1983).
Exemplary damages or damages for mental or emotional distress are not recoverable from
a no-fault insurer if the claim is based solely on breach of contract for nonpayment of
benefits. Liddell v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 102 Mich App 636; 302
NW2d 260 (1981); Jerome v Michigan Mutual Auto Insurance Co, 100 Mich App 685; 300
NW2d 371 (1980). See also Kewin v Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co, 409 Mich
401; 295 NW2d 50 (1980).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-18 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 35.04 was added November 1980. Amended January 2020, October 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-19
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
M Civ JI 35.05 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Damages—Setoff
for Governmental Benefits [ Instruction Deleted ]
Instruction deleted.
History
M Civ JI 35.05 was added November 1980. Deleted January 1985.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-20 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 35.06 No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action: Damages—Setoff;
Coordinated Benefits [ Instruction Deleted ]
Instruction deleted.
History
M Civ JI 35.06 was added November 1980. Deleted January 1985.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-1
CHAPTER 36
Third-Party Tort Action
Introductory Directions to the Court ........................................................................... 36-2
M Civ JI 36.01 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Serious Impairment of Body Function—
Definition (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995 PA 222 Applies) ................................. 36-4
M Civ JI 36.01A No-Fault Auto Negligence: Serious Impairment of Body Function—
Definition (To Be Used in Cases in Which 2019 PA 22 Applies) ................................... 36-7
M Civ JI 36.01B No-Fault Auto Negligence: Noneconomic Loss Damages for Non-
Continuing Serious Impairment Threshold Injury ........................................................ 36-8
M Civ JI 36.02 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Mental or Emotional Injury........................ 36-9
M Civ JI 36.03 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Permanent Serious Disfigurement........... 36-10
M Civ JI 36.04 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Elements of Proof—Explanation of
Noneconomic-Economic Distinction for Michigan Resident Plaintiff ........................ 36-11
M Civ JI 36.04A No-Fault Auto Negligence: Elements of Proof—Explanation of
Noneconomic-Economic Distinction for Out-of-State Resident Plaintiff ................... 36-13
M Civ JI 36.05 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Noneconomic
Loss (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995 PA 222 Does Not Apply) ........................... 36-14
M Civ JI 36.06 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Economic and/or
Noneconomic Loss for Michigan Resident Plaintiff.................................................... 36-15
M Civ JI 36.06A No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Economic and
Non-Economic Loss of Out-of-State Resident Plaintiff............................................... 36-19
M Civ JI 36.11 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Serious Impairment of Body Function—
Definition (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995 PA 222 Applies) ............................... 36-22
M Civ JI 36.15 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Economic and/or
Noneconomic Loss ..................................................................................................... 36-23
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introductory Directions to the Court
The instructions in Chapter 36 should be used with applicable instructions in the
Negligence section (Section 2), e.g., M Civ JI 10.02 Negligence of Adult—Definition and
15.01 Definition of Proximate Cause, and with M Civ JI 8.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof
in the General Instructions section (Section 1).
The Court and parties should note that 2019 PA 21 and 22 amended the Michigan No-Fault
Insurance Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq) and introduced, among other reforms, different legal
standards applicable to Michigan residents and out-of-state residents. It is strongly
recommended that the Court and parties consider the ramifications of 2019 PA 22 on
certain aspects of cases when fashioning jury instructions and verdict forms and endeavor
to resolve any legal issues that are not stipulated to by the parties prior to jury selection.
The tort liability limited by the no-fault law is only such liability as arises out of the
defendant’s ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, not liability that
arises out of other conduct. Citizens Insurance Co of America v Tuttle, 411 Mich 536; 309
NW2d 174 (1981) (negligent keeping of cow). See also Schwark v Lilly, 91 Mich App 189;
283 NW2d 684 (1979) (dram shop action); Auto-Owners Insurance Co v Employers
Insurance of Wausau, 103 Mich App 682; 303 NW2d 867 (1981) (products liability
action); Pustay v Gentelia, 104 Mich App 250; 304 NW2d 539 (1981) (negligent
maintenance of parking lot); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co v Soo Line R Co,
106 Mich App 138; 307 NW2d 434 (1981) (railroad accident). In such cases, the
instructions in Chapter 36 are not applicable to a nonmotorist tortfeasor defendant.
Where a tortfeasor’s liability is not limited by the no-fault act, the common-law collateral-
source rule has full application. Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350; 343 NW2d 181 (1984). But
see the modifications to the collateral-source rule in 1986 PA 178.
A question currently exists as to whether certain portions of 1986 PA 178 are applicable to
third-party tort cases filed under the no-fault statute after October 1, 1986. Because of that
uncertainty, the Committee has not drafted any changes to the no-fault instructions dealing
with third-party tort cases. The Committee did change the no-fault verdict form to enable
the jury to allocate fault among parties, but the Committee has taken no position as to the
ramifications of that allocation. One Michigan Court of Appeals panel has agreed there
seems to be some question about the applicability of certain provisions of 1986 PA 178 to
no-fault third-party tort cases. However, because the panel saw no prejudice to the plaintiff
in the verdict form and judgment containing the specific breakdown of past and future
damages pursuant to MCL 600.6305, .6306, as amended by 1986 PA 178, the panel
declined to consider the question. Miller v Ochampaugh, 191 Mich App 48; 477 NW2d 105
(1991).
A question also currently exists whether certain portions of 1995 PA 161 and 249 are
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-3
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
applicable to third-party tort cases filed under the no-fault statute. Public Acts 161 and 249
were enacted during the same session the legislature enacted 1995 PA 222, which redefines
the no-fault threshold. Neither 1995 PA 161 nor 1995 PA 249 makes any reference to 1995
PA 222 or to the no-fault statute, and, similarly, 1995 PA 222 makes no reference to the
other two public acts. Moreover, in enacting MCL 500.3135(3), amended by 1995 PA 222,
the legislature retained in the tort abrogation portion of that section prefatory language
identical to that in the original no-fault statute that makes limitations on tort recovery stated
in the no-fault statute applicable [ n ]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” For these
reasons, the Committee has not drafted any changes to the no-fault instructions or verdict
forms in response to 1995 PA 161 or 249.
Effective June 11, 2019, a tortfeasor is liable for damages up to $3,000 to motor vehicles
to the extent the damages are not covered by insurance. MCL 500.3135(3)(e). (Before June
11, 2019, the limitation was $1,000.) The tortfeasor is also liable for intentionally caused
harm to persons or property. MCL 500.3135(3)(a).
1995 PA 222 introduced two limitations on the recovery of damages for noneconomic loss.
First, a plaintiff who is more than 50 percent at fault may not recover noneconomic loss
damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b). Second, a plaintiff operating his or her own vehicle at the
time of injury who does not have in effect for that vehicle no-fault insurance required by
statute is precluded from recovering noneconomic loss damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(c).
Neither of these provisions bar a Michigan resident plaintiff’s claim for excess economic
loss damages. However, all damages of out-of-state residents will be barred if they are
proven to be more than 50% at fault or fail to prove a threshold injury. See MCL
500.3135(2); MCL 500.3135(3)(d). In other words, in order to recover any damages,
whether economic or noneconomic in nature, the out-of-state resident must be 50% or less
at fault, and his/her injuries must constitute death, serious impairment of body function or
permanent serious disfigurement.
The no-fault threshold of serious impairment is applicable in a suit against a governmental
agency pursuant to the motor vehicle exception to the governmental immunity act. Hardy
v County of Oakland, 461 Mich 561; 607 NW2d 718 (2000).
Based on the needs and issues of a particular case, the Court and parties may consider re-
ordering the instructions in this Chapter for additional clarity or consistency.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 36.01 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Serious Impairment of
Body Function—Definition (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995 PA
222 Applies)
One of the elements plaintiff must prove in order to recover noneconomic loss damages in
this case is that [ he / she ] sustained a serious impairment of body function.
Serious impairment of body function means an objectively manifested impairment of an
important body function that affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead [ his / her ] normal
life. An impairment does not have to be permanent in order to be a serious impairment of
body function.
Note on Use
1995 PA 222 amended the no-fault statute to provide that the issue of serious impairment
of body function is a question of law if the trial judge finds either that (1) there is no factual
dispute concerning the nature and extent of the person’s injuries, or (2) there is a factual
dispute concerning the nature and extent of the person’s injuries, but the dispute is not
material to the determination of whether the person suffered serious impairment of body
function. MCL 500.3135(2)(a). In cases which do not fall into either of these categories,
serious impairment of body function is a jury question and this instruction should be given.
The amended statute specifically provides that for a closed-head injury, a question of fact
is created if a licensed allopathic or osteopathic physician who regularly diagnoses or treats
closed-head injuries testifies under oath that there may be a serious neurological injury.
MCL 500.3135(2).
The definition of serious impairment in 1995 PA 222 applies to cases filed on or after July
26, 1996. MCL 500.3135(2).
If the claim involves economic and noneconomic damages, M Civ JI 36.04 No-Fault Auto
Negligence: Elements of Proof—Explanation of Noneconomic-Economic Distinction
should be given before this instruction.
If the trial court makes any preliminary rulings as a matter of law in the plaintiff’s favor,
e.g., that a body function is “important,” this instruction must be modified accordingly.
If mental or emotional injury is an issue, M Civ JI 36.02 should be given in addition to this
instruction.
Comment
Prior to the enactment of 1995 PA 222, the statutory threshold requirement of “serious
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-5
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
impairment of body function” had not been defined by the Michigan Legislature. However,
it had been the subject of frequent appellate court decisions. In two Supreme Court
decisions, Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483 (1982), and DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich
32 (1986), the Michigan Supreme Court defined “serious impairment of body function” in
substantially different ways. Presumably 1995 PA 222 was a legislative response to those
conflicting opinions, which, among other things, adopted the first legislative definition of
“serious impairment of body function.” MCL 500.3135(7) formerly stated: “As used in this
section, ‘serious impairment of body function’ means an objectively manifested
impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead
his or her normal life.”
Following the enactment of 1995 PA 222, the Supreme Court decided Kreiner v Fischer,
471 Mich 109 (2004), and numerous Court of Appeals’ decisions were issued
implementing that decision.
In McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010), the Supreme Court overruled Kreiner. Both
Kreiner and McCormick are summary disposition cases that address when and under what
circumstances a trial judge can decide the issue of serious impairment of body function as
a matter of law. Neither addressed the issue of jury instructions. Therefore, caution should
be exercised in extracting language from McCormick and converting it to jury instructions.
In McCormick, the Supreme Court held that the statutory definition of serious impairment
of body function sets forth three requirements: first, there must be an objectively
manifested impairment; second, the impairment must be of an important body function; and
third, the impairment must be one that affects the injured person’s general ability to lead
his or her normal life.
The Committee determined it was necessary to delete the last paragraph of the instruction,
which formerly stated, In order for an impairment to be objectively manifested, there must
be a medically identifiable injury or condition that has a physical basis.” This definitional
language came from DiFranco, supra, which predated 1995 PA 222. It was also affirmed
in Jackson v Nelson, 252 Mich App 643 (2002), which was decided after 1995 PA 222.
However, there is language in McCormick suggesting that this definition, although
arguably still relevant, does not present a complete definition of the objectively manifested
element of the threshold. In this regard, McCormick stated, “The common meaning of
‘objectively manifested’ in MCL 500.3135(5) is an impairment that is evidenced by actual
symptoms or conditions that someone other than the injured person would observe or
perceive as impairing a body function. In other words, an ‘objectively manifested’
impairment is commonly understood as one observable or perceivable from actual
symptoms or conditions.” However, the Court goes on to cite Cassidy and DiFranco,
supra and states, “Further, the preexisting judicial interpretation of ‘objectively
manifested’ is consistent with the plain language of the later adopted statute.” The
Committee determined that the most appropriate course was to delete any definitional
language of the objectively manifested element from this instruction. In doing so, however,
the Committee did not mean to imply that a court cannot give an appropriate special
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-6 Michigan Supreme Court
instruction on this issue or on the other two threshold elements dealing with important body
function and general ability to lead plaintiff’s normal life.
It is error to instruct the jury that “serious impairment means impairment of more than
ordinary severity.” Karas v White, 101 Mich App 208; 300 NW2d 320 (1980); Smith v
Sutherland, 93 Mich App 24; 285 NW2d 784 (1979).
It is also error to instruct the jury regarding death and permanent serious disfigurement if
the only issue is whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment. Karas; Argenta v
Shahan, 135 Mich App 477; 354 NW2d 796 (1984), rev’d on other grounds, 424 Mich 83;
378 NW2d 470 (1985).
The Michigan Supreme Court has made it clear that the threshold of serious impairment is
not a limitation that precludes recovery of damages for noneconomic loss where a plaintiff
ceases to suffer from a serious impairment. Incarnati v Savage (and Byer v Smith), 419
Mich 541; 357 NW2d 644 (1984). See M Civ JI 36.01A.
History
M Civ JI 36.01 was deleted October 2022. M Civ JI 36.11 was originally added June 1997;
it was amended in December 1999, February 2001, and June 2011; it was renumbered as
M Civ JI 36.01 in October 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-7
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
M Civ JI 36.01A No-Fault Auto Negligence: Serious Impairment of
Body Function—Definition (To Be Used in Cases in Which 2019 PA
22 Applies)
One of the elements plaintiff must prove in order to recover noneconomic loss damages in
this case is that [ he / she ] sustained a serious impairment of body function.
Serious impairment of body function means an objectively manifested impairment of an
important body function that affects the plaintiff’s general ability to lead [ his / her ] normal
life. An impairment does not have to be permanent in order to be a serious impairment of
body function.
An objectively manifested impairment is one that is observable or perceivable from actual
symptoms or conditions by someone other than the injured person.
An important body function is a body function of great value, significance, or consequence
to the injured person.
An impairment affects a person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life where it has
had an influence on some of the person’s capacity to live in his or her normal manner of
living. Although how long an impairment lasts may be relevant, there is no set amount of
time for how long an impairment must last. This examination is inherently fact and
circumstance specific to each injured person, must be conducted on a case-by-case basis,
and requires comparison of the injured person’s life before and after the incident.
Note on Use
2019 PA 22 in essence codified the holding of McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010).
See MCL 500.3135(5).
History
M Civ JI 36.01A renumbered to M Civ JI 36.01B October 2022. New M Civ JI 36.01A
added October 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 36.01B No-Fault Auto Negligence: Noneconomic Loss
Damages for Non-Continuing Serious Impairment Threshold
Injury
If you find plaintiff suffered serious impairment of body function, but [ his / her ] injury has
ceased, or may in the future cease to be a serious impairment of body function, that fact will
not relieve defendant from liability for any of the noneconomic loss damages suffered by
plaintiff as a proximate result of defendant’s negligence.
Note on Use
Comment
Incarnati v Savage (and Byer v Smith), 419 Mich 541; 357 NW2d 644 (1984); DiFranco v
Pickard, 427 Mich 32, 42 n6; 398 NW2d 896, 902 n6 (1986).
History
M Civ JI 36.01A was added September 1988. Amended February 2001. Amended and
renumbered to M Civ JI 36.01B October 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-9
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
M Civ JI 36.02 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Mental or Emotional Injury
The operation of the mind and of the nervous system are body functions. Mental or
emotional injury which is caused by physical injury or mental or emotional injury not
caused by physical injury but which results in physical symptoms may be a serious
impairment of body function.
Comment
See Luce v Gerow, 89 Mich App 546; 280 NW2d 592 (1979).
History
M Civ JI 36.02 was added November 1980. Amended February 2001, October 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 36.03 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Permanent Serious
Disfigurement
The law in Michigan provides that plaintiff may recover [insert ‘noneconomic loss” if the
plaintiff is a Michigan resident; insert “economic and noneconomic loss” if the plaintiff is
not a Michigan resident] damages in this case if [ he / she ] suffered permanent serious
disfigurement. The term “permanent serious disfigurement” should be considered to have
its ordinary meaning as those words are commonly used. Based upon the evidence in this
case, you must decide whether plaintiff suffered disfigurement and, if so, whether that
disfigurement is both serious and permanent.
Note on Use
2019 PA 21 and 22 amended the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act to differentiate between
Michigan residents and out-of-state residents for purposes of tort liability for economic
damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b) & (3)(d).
The parenthetical phrase “noneconomic loss” should be included in the instruction if the
Michigan resident plaintiff claims economic loss in addition to noneconomic loss. Under
MCL 500.3135(3)(c) (formerly MCL 500.3135(2)(c)), the Michigan resident plaintiff need
not prove permanent serious disfigurement to recover economic loss damages in excess of
no-fault benefits. However, the out-of-state resident Plaintiff must prove permanent
serious disfigurement to recover economic and noneconomic loss damages.
The issue of permanent serious disfigurement is a question of law if the trial judge finds
either that (1) there is no factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the person’s
injuries, or (2) there is a factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the person’s
injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination of whether the person has
suffered permanent serious disfigurement. MCL 500.3135(2)(a).
History
M Civ JI 36.03 was added November 1980. Amended October 2022
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-11
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
M Civ JI 36.04 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Elements of Proof—
Explanation of Noneconomic-Economic Distinction for Michigan
Resident Plaintiff
The plaintiff claims two different types or classes of damages in this case. The elements
which the plaintiff has the burden of proving with respect to each type of damages are
somewhat different. The first type or class of damages is generally referred to as
“noneconomic” loss damages and consists of such things as [ insert those applicable
noneconomic loss damages for which the plaintiff seeks recovery in this case ].
The second type or class of damages sought by plaintiff is generally referred to as
“economic” loss damages and consists of [ for insured defendants, insert those applicable
economic loss damages suffered by the plaintiff in excess of compensable no-fault benefits
for which plaintiff seeks recovery: for the first three years, amounts in excess of no-fault
benefits for work loss and survivors’ loss, and, for the period after three years, all work loss
and survivors’ loss. For uninsured defendants, insert any economic loss damages. With
regard to allowable expenses, they consist of all allowable expenses, including all future
allowable expenses, if plaintiff is excluded from, or has opted out of, allowable expense
coverage. If plaintiff is not excluded from, or has not opted out of, allowable expense
coverage, then allowable expenses will consist of those allowable expenses, including all
future allowable expenses, in excess of no-fault benefits payable under the no-fault
coverage available to the plaintiff.].
As I indicated, what the plaintiff must prove differs somewhat depending on which type of
damages claim is being considered—economic or noneconomic loss damages. I will now
instruct you regarding the elements which the plaintiff must prove.
Note on Use
2019 PA 21 and 22 amended the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act to differentiate between
Michigan residents and out-of-state residents for purposes of tort liability for economic
damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b) & (3)(d).
Both insured and uninsured motorist tortfeasors have immunity from tort liability for
noneconomic loss damages, except where the injured person has suffered death, serious
impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. Auto Club Insurance
Ass’n v Hill, 431 Mich 449; 430 NW2d 636 (1988). However, the uninsured motorist
tortfeasor (unlike the insured motorist tortfeasor) has no tort immunity for economic loss
damages. Hill.
Under MCL 500.3135(3)(c) (formerly MCL 500.3135(2)(c)), serious impairment need not
be proven to recover economic loss damages in excess of no-fault benefits. Cassidy v
McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982); Cochran v Myers, 146 Mich App 729;
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-12 Michigan Supreme Court
381 NW2d 800 (1985); lv denied, 425 Mich 867; 387 NW2d 387 (1986). Damages for loss
of earning capacity are not recoverable in tort under the no-fault act. Loss of earnings,
however, is an economic loss damage, and as such is recoverable in tort if it is in excess of
no-fault benefits received for “work loss” as that term is defined in MCL 500.3107–.3110.
“Work loss” as defined in those sections does not include loss of earning capacity. Argenta
v Shahan (and Ouellette v Kenealy), 424 Mich 83; 378 NW2d 470 (1985).
MCL 500.3135(3)(c) provides that the defendant remains liable for “Damages for
allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor's loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110,
including all future allowable expenses and work loss, in excess of any applicable limit
under section 3107c or the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in those
sections, or without limit for allowable expenses if an election to not maintain that coverage
was made under section 3107d or if an exclusion under section 3109a(2) applies. The party
liable for damages is entitled to an exemption reducing his or her liability by the amount of
taxes that would have been payable on account of income the injured person would have
received if he or she had not been injured.”
MCL 500.3135(3) abolishes tort liability of drivers and owners of insured vehicles with
exceptions listed in that subsection. MCL 500.3135(3)(c) identifies recoverable economic
damages but does not include replacement services. Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 821
NW2d 520 (2012).
This instruction should be given in those cases where the plaintiff is seeking to recover for
both economic and noneconomic losses. It should be read immediately before the burden
of proof instructions with regard to noneconomic and economic loss damages.
History
M Civ JI 36.04 was added November 1980. Amended September 1989, October 2013,
October 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-13
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
M Civ JI 36.04A No-Fault Auto Negligence: Elements of Proof—
Explanation of Noneconomic-Economic Distinction for Out-of-State
Resident Plaintiff
The plaintiff claims two different types or classes of damages in this case. The first type or
class of damages is generally referred to as “noneconomic” loss damages and consists of
such things as [ insert those applicable noneconomic loss damages for which the plaintiff
seeks recovery in this case ].
The second type or class of damages sought by plaintiff is generally referred to as
“economic” loss damages and consists of [ insert those economic loss damages for which
the plaintiff seeks recovery in this case]
I will now instruct you regarding the elements which the plaintiff must prove.
Note on Use
2019 PA 21 and 22 amended the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act to differentiate between
Michigan residents and out-of-state residents for purposes of tort liability for economic
damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b) & (3)(d).
MCL 500.3135(3) abolishes tort liability of drivers and owners of insured vehicles with
exceptions listed in that subsection.
This instruction is based on MCL 500.3135(3)(d) which sets forth the rights of non-resident
plaintiffs in automobile negligence cases following the amendments of 2019 PA 21-22.
If the injury resulted in death, the words, “plaintiff’s decedent” should be substituted where
appropriate.
Both insured and uninsured motorist tortfeasors have immunity from tort liability for
noneconomic loss damages, except where the injured person has suffered death, serious
impairment of a body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. Auto Club Insurance
Ass’n v Hill, 431 Mich 449; 430 NW2d 636 (1988). However, the uninsured motorist
tortfeasor (unlike the insured motorist tortfeasor) has no tort immunity for economic loss
damages.
History
M Civ JI 36.04A was added October 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 36.05 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—
Noneconomic Loss (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995 PA 222 Does
Not Apply)
[Instruction Deleted]
History
M Civ JI 36.05 was added November 1980. Amended January 1984, November 1995,
January 2020. Deleted October 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-15
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
M Civ JI 36.06 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Economic
and/or Noneconomic Loss for Michigan Resident Plaintiff
In order to recover damages for either economic or noneconomic loss, plaintiff has the
burden of proving:
(a) that the defendant was negligent;
(b) that the plaintiff was injured;
(c) that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.
ECONOMIC LOSS
If the plaintiff has proved all of those elements, then (subject to the rule of comparative
negligence, which I will explain) the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for economic
loss resulting from that injury, including: [ for insured defendants, insert those applicable
economic loss damages suffered by the plaintiff in excess of compensable no-fault benefits
for which plaintiff seeks recovery: for the first three years, amounts in excess of no-fault
benefits for work loss and survivors’ loss, and, for the period after three years, all work loss
and survivors’ loss. With regard to allowable expenses, they consist of all allowable
expenses, including all future allowable expenses, if plaintiff is excluded from, or has opted
out of, allowable expense coverage. If plaintiff is not excluded from, or has not opted out
of, allowable expense coverage, then allowable expenses will consist of those allowable
expenses, including all future allowable expenses, in excess of no-fault benefits payable
under the no-fault coverage available to the plaintiff. For uninsured defendants, insert any
economic loss damages. ], that you determine the plaintiff has incurred or will incur in the
future.
[ Read only if applicable ] If you find that plaintiff is entitled to recover for work loss
beyond what is recoverable in no-fault benefits, you must reduce that by the taxes that
would have been payable on account of income plaintiff would have received if he or she
had not been injured.
NONECONOMIC LOSS
As to plaintiff’s claim for damages for noneconomic loss, plaintiff has the burden of
proving a fourth element:
(d) that plaintiff’s injury resulted in [ death / serious impairment of body function / or /
permanent serious disfigurement ].
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-16 Michigan Supreme Court
If the plaintiff has proved all of those elements, then (subject to the rule of comparative
negligence, which I will explain) plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for noneconomic
loss that you determine the plaintiff has sustained or will sustain in the future as a result of
that [ death / injury ].
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff was negligent and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s [ injury / death ].
If your verdict is for the plaintiff and you find that the negligence of both parties was a
proximate cause of plaintiff’s [ injury / death ], then you must determine the degree of such
negligence, expressed as a percentage, attributable to each party.
Negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not bar recovery by plaintiff against the
defendant for damages for economic loss. However, the percentage of negligence
attributable to the plaintiff will be used by the court to reduce the amount of damages for
economic loss that you find were sustained by plaintiff.
Negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not bar recovery by plaintiff against the
defendant for damages for noneconomic loss unless plaintiff’s negligence is more than 50
percent. If the plaintiff’s negligence is more than 50 percent, your verdict will be for the
defendant as to plaintiff’s claim for damages for noneconomic loss. Where the plaintiff’s
negligence is 50 percent or less, the percentage of negligence attributable to plaintiff will
be used by the court to reduce the amount of damages for noneconomic loss that you find
were sustained by the plaintiff.
The Court will furnish a Verdict Form that will list the questions you must answer. Your
answers to the questions in the verdict form will constitute your verdict.
Note on Use
1995 PA 222 contains a definition of “serious impairment of body function” that applies to
all cases filed on or after March 28, 1996. See May v Sommerfield, 239 Mich App 197; 607
NW2d 422 (1999). 1995 PA 222 also bars recovery of damages for noneconomic loss if
(1) a plaintiff is more than 50 percent at fault or (2) a plaintiff is uninsured and is operating
his or her own vehicle at the time of the injury. MCL 500.3135(2)(b),(c). These two
provisions are effective for cases filed on or after July 26, 1996, but they do not affect a
plaintiff’s right to recover excess economic loss damages.
This instruction applies to a case that includes claims for damages for both economic and
noneconomic loss. If the case involves only one of these types of damages, this instruction
must be modified. For example, if only noneconomic loss damages are claimed, the trial
judge should read the four elements (a)–(d) together; delete the section titled “Economic
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-17
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
Loss”; and delete the third-from-last paragraph of this instruction. This instruction should
also be modified by deleting the first four paragraphs under the section titled “Comparative
Negligence” if plaintiff’s negligence is not an issue in the case.
An uninsured plaintiff operating his or her own vehicle at the time of the injury is not
entitled to noneconomic loss damages, but may recover excess economic loss damages. See
MCL 500.3135(2)(c), added by 1995 PA 222.
Both insured and uninsured motorist tortfeasors have immunity from tort liability for
noneconomic loss damages, except where the injured person has suffered death, serious
impairment of a body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. Auto Club Insurance
Ass’n v Hill, 431 Mich 449; 430 NW2d 636 (1988). However, the uninsured motorist
tortfeasor (unlike the insured motorist tortfeasor) has no tort immunity for economic loss
damages. Hill.
See MCL 500.3135(3)(c) (formerly MCL 500.3135(2)(c)) for allowable economic loss
damages. MCL 500.3135(3) abolishes tort liability of drivers and owners of insured
vehicles with exceptions listed in that subsection. MCL 500.3135(3)(c) identifies
recoverable economic damages but does not include replacement services. Johnson v
Recca, 492 Mich 169, 821 NW2d 520 (2012).
In suits against an insured defendant, MCL 500.3135(3)(c) requires a reduction for the tax
liability the injured person would have otherwise incurred. The tax reductioninstruction
should only be included if there is evidence to support it.
2019 PA 22 amended the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act (MCL 500.3101 et seq.) and in
essence codified the holding of McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010). In addition,
MCL 500.3135(3)(c) provides that tort liability remains for damages for allowable
expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss, including all future allowable expenses and wage
loss, in excess of any applicable limit under MCL 500.3107c and MCL 500.3107d. MCL
500.3107c is the provision permitting insureds to select lesser amounts of first-party
benefits, and MCL 500.3107d permits qualified persons to opt out of allowable expense
benefits, and MCL 500.3109a(2) permits qualified persons to exclude coverage for
allowable expense benefits.
Comment
The no-fault law has not abolished the common law action for loss of consortium by the
spouse of a person who receives above-threshold injuries. Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder &
Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502; 309 NW2d 163 (1981).
A plaintiff who is more than 50 percent at fault is not entitled to noneconomic loss damages.
MCL 500.3135(2)(b), added by 1995 PA 222.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-18 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 36.06 was added November 1980. Amended September 1989, November 1995,
October 2013, January 2020, October 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-19
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
M Civ JI 36.06A No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—
Economic and Non-Economic Loss of Out-of-State Resident Plaintiff
In order to recover damages for either economic or noneconomic loss, plaintiff has the
burden of proving:
(a) that the defendant was negligent;
(b) that the plaintiff was injured;
(c) that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.
(d) that plaintiff’s injury resulted in [ death / serious impairment of body function / or /
permanent serious disfigurement ].
ECONOMIC LOSS
If the plaintiff has proved all of those elements, then (subject to the rule of comparative
negligence, which I will explain) the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for economic
loss resulting from that injury, including: [ insert those economic loss damages for which
the plaintiff seeks recovery in this case ], that you determine the plaintiff has incurred or
will incur in the future.
[ Read only if applicable ] If you find that plaintiff is entitled to recover for work loss
beyond what is recoverable in no-fault benefits, you must reduce that by the taxes that
would have been payable on account of income plaintiff would have received if he or she
had not been injured.
NONECONOMIC LOSS
If the plaintiff has proved all of those elements, then (subject to the rule of comparative
negligence, which I will explain) plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for noneconomic
loss that you determine the plaintiff has sustained or will sustain in the future as a result of
that [ death / injury ].
†COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff was negligent and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s [ injury / death ].
If your verdict is for the plaintiff and you find that the negligence of both parties was a
proximate cause of plaintiff’s [ injury / death ], then you must determine the degree of such
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-20 Michigan Supreme Court
negligence, expressed as a percentage, attributable to each party.
Negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not bar recovery by plaintiff against the
defendant for damages for economic and noneconomic loss unless plaintiff’s negligence is
more than 50 percent. If the plaintiff’s negligence is more than 50 percent, your verdict will
be for the defendant as to plaintiff’s claim for damages for economic and noneconomic loss.
Where the plaintiff’s negligence is 50 percent or less, the percentage of negligence
attributable to plaintiff will be used by the court to reduce the amount of damages for
economic and noneconomic loss that you find were sustained by the plaintiff.
The Court will furnish you with a Verdict Form that will list the questions you must answer.
Your answers to the questions will constitute your verdict.
Note on Use
2019 PA 21-22 amended the Michigan No-Fault Insurance Act to differentiate between
Michigan residents and out-of-state residents for purposes of tort liability for economic
damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b) & (3)(d).
MCL 500.3135(3) abolishes tort liability of drivers and owners of insured vehicles with
exceptions listed in that subsection.
This instruction is based on MCL 500.3135(3)(d) which sets forth the rights of non-resident
plaintiffs in automobile negligence cases following the amendments of 2019 PA 21-22.
If the injury resulted in death, the words, “plaintiff’s decedent” should be substituted where
appropriate.
Both insured and uninsured motorist tortfeasors have immunity from tort liability for
noneconomic loss damages, except where the injured person has suffered death, serious
impairment of a body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. Auto Club Insurance
Ass’n v Hill, 431 Mich 449; 430 NW2d 636 (1988). However, the uninsured motorist
tortfeasor (unlike the insured motorist tortfeasor) has no tort immunity for economic loss
damages.
†If comparative negligence is not an issue in the case, this section should not be read to the
jury.
This instruction applies to a case that includes claims for damages for both economic and
noneconomic loss. If the case involves only one of these types of damages, this instruction
must be modified.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-21
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
History
M Civ JI 36.06A was added October 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-22 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 36.11 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Serious Impairment of
Body Function—Definition (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995 PA
222 Applies)
[Renumbered to M Civ JI 36.01]
History
M Civ JI 36.11 was added June 1997. Amended in December 1999, February 2001, June
2011, and October 2022. Renumbered to M Civ JI 36.01 October 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 36-23
Chapter 36: Third-Party Tort Action
M Civ JI 36.15 No-Fault Auto Negligence: Burden of Proof—Economic
and/or Noneconomic Loss
[Instruction Deleted]
History
M Civ JI 36.15 was added June 1997. Amended December 1999, October 2013, July 2017,
January 2020. Deleted October 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 36-24 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 38-1
CHAPTER 38
Agency
M Civ JI 38.01 Agency Relationship: Definitions of Agent and Principal...................... 38-2
M Civ JI 38.10 Agency: Apparent Agency Relationship ................................................ 38-3
M Civ JI 38.20 Vicarious Tort Liability Based on Ostensible Agency (For Cases
Other Than Medical Malpractice) ................................................................................ 38-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 38-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 38.01 Agency Relationship: Definitions of Agent and
Principal
An “agent” is a person who is authorized by another to act on [ his / her / its ] behalf. The
[ person / entity ] who has given the authority and has the right to control the agent is called
the “principal.”
*(The agent’s authority may be expressed or implied.)
Note on Use
*The sentence in parentheses should be used only if applicable.
Comment
Burton v Burton, 332 Mich 326; 51 NW2d 297 (1952).
History
M Civ JI 38.01 was added May 1999.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 38-3
Chapter 38: Agency
M Civ JI 38.10 Agency: Apparent Agency Relationship
The plaintiff claims that [ name of person ] was acting as the defendant’s agent. The
defendant is bound by the acts of [ name of person ] as [ his / her ] agent if
(a) the defendant put [ name of person ] in such a situation that an ordinary
person familiar with the particular type of business involved in this matter
would be justified in assuming that [ name of person ] had the authority to act
on behalf of the defendant,
(b) the plaintiff assumed that [ name of person ] had the authority to act on
behalf of the defendant, and
(c) the plaintiff was justified in assuming that [ name of person ] had the
authority to act on behalf of the defendant.
Note on Use
This instruction does not apply in tort cases. See Grewe v Mount Clemens General
Hospital, 404 Mich 240; 273 NW2d 429 (1978); Johnston v American Oil Co, 51 Mich App
646; 215 NW2d 719 (1974).
Comment
Central Wholesale Co v Sefa, 351 Mich 17; 87 NW2d 94 (1957); Faber v Eastman, Dillon
& Co, 271 Mich 142; 259 NW 880 (1935).
History
M Civ JI 38.10 was added January 1999.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 38-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 38.20 Vicarious Tort Liability Based on Ostensible Agency
(For Cases Other Than Medical Malpractice)
Under certain circumstances, a defendant may be liable for the actions or omissions of a
person who is not actually [ his / her / its ] agent or employee. In this case, plaintiff claims
that defendant is liable based on negligence of [ name of ostensible agent or employee ].
In order to establish the liability of defendant under this theory, plaintiff has the burden of
proving:
(a) Defendant intentionally or negligently made representations that [ name
of ostensible agent ] was [ his / her / its ] employee or agent;
(b) On the basis of those representations, plaintiff reasonably believed that
[ name of ostensible agent ] was acting as an employee or agent of the
defendant;
(c) Plaintiff [ was injured / sustained damage ];
(d) Plaintiff [ was injured / sustained damage ] because [ he / she ] relied on
[ name of defendant ] to provide employees or agents who would exercise
reasonable skill or care;
(e) [ Name of ostensible agent ] was negligent;
(f) The negligence of [ name of ostensible agent ] was a proximate cause of
plaintiff’s [ injury / damage ].
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
Johnston v American Oil Co, 51 Mich App 646; 215 NW2d 719 (1974); Thomas v Checker
Cab Co, 66 Mich App 152; 238 NW2d 558 (1975); Little v Howard Johnson Co, 183 Mich
App 675; 455 NW2d 390 (1990).
History
M Civ JI 38.20 was added May 2000. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 40-1
CHAPTER 40
Multiple Plaintiffs
M Civ JI 40.01 Two or More Plaintiffs—Separate Consideration—Repeating
Instructions .................................................................................................................. 40-2
M Civ JI 40.02 Assessment of Damages ....................................................................... 40-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 40-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 40.01 Two or More Plaintiffs—Separate Consideration—
Repeating Instructions
There are [ number ] plaintiffs in this trial. Each plaintiff is entitled to separate
consideration of [ his / or / her ] own case. I shall not repeat my instructions for each
plaintiff. Unless I tell you otherwise, all instructions apply to each plaintiff.
Note on Use
The use of this instruction will tend to eliminate repeating instructions on behalf of two or
more plaintiffs on issues and questions of law applicable to more than one plaintiff. It is
recommended that this instruction be given either before or after M Civ JI 7.01 Issues for
the Jury and Theories of the Parties, in the discretion of the judge. It will apply in cases
consolidated for trial as well as a single suit involving multiple plaintiffs.
Comment
An instruction of this type has not been passed on by the Michigan Supreme Court.
Instructions somewhat similar have been approved in California in Fresno City Lines v
Herman, 97 Cal App 2d 366; 217 P2d 987 (1950), and McCallum v Howe, 110 Cal App 2d
792; 243 P2d 894 (1952).
History
M Civ JI 40.01 was SJI 41.01.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 40-3
Chapter 40: Multiple Plaintiffs
M Civ JI 40.02 Assessment of Damages
If your verdict is for one of the plaintiffs, you shall determine [ his / or / her ] damages and
return a verdict in that amount. If your verdict is for more than one of the plaintiffs, you
shall determine the amount of their damages separately, and return a verdict in that separate
amount for each plaintiff.
Comment
See Forms of Verdicts under M Civ JI 65.01–65.04.
History
M Civ JI 40.02 was SJI 41.02.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 40-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-1
CHAPTER 41
Multiple Defendants
M Civ JI 41.01 Two or More Defendants—Separate Consideration—Repeating
Instructions .................................................................................................................. 41-2
M Civ JI 41.02 Damages Where There Is No Allocation of Fault Between Defendants 41-3
M Civ JI 41.03 Multiple Parties and Pleadings Where Jury May Not Be Able to Apportion
Damages [ Instruction Deleted ] .................................................................................. 41-4
M Civ JI 41.04 Damages Not to Be Allocated Among Joint Tort-Feasors [ Instruction
Deleted ]....................................................................................................................... 41-5
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 41.01 Two or More Defendants—Separate Consideration—
Repeating Instructions
There are [ number ] defendants in this trial. Each defendant is entitled to separate
consideration of [ his / or / her ] own defense. I shall not repeat my instructions for each
defendant. Unless I tell you otherwise, all instructions apply to each defendant.
Note on Use
The use of this instruction will tend to eliminate repeating instructions on behalf of two or
more defendants on issues and questions of law applicable to more than one defendant. It
is recommended that this be given either before or after M Civ JI 7.01 Issues for the Jury
and Theories of the Parties, in the discretion of the judge.
Exception: In cases of claimed vicarious liability in which the relationship of the defendants
is admitted or exists as a matter of law, this instruction should not be given.
Comment
The Michigan Supreme Court has not considered the specific question of repetition of
instructions due to more than one party’s being present in the case. But see Hayes v
Coleman, 338 Mich 371; 61 NW2d 634 (1953); Mack v Precast Industries, 369 Mich 439;
120 NW2d 225 (1963).
History
M Civ JI 41.01 was SJI 41.03.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-3
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
M Civ JI 41.02 Damages Where There Is No Allocation of Fault
Between Defendants
If you find one of the defendants to be liable, you shall determine the amount of damages
[ he / or / she ] caused and return a verdict in that amount. If you find more than one of the
defendants to be liable, you shall return a separate verdict for the amount of damages you
determine each defendant caused.
Note on Use
This instruction should be used only if defendants caused factually separable injuries.
Defendants who cause factually separable injuries are liable only for the injuries they cause
and the jury should determine separate damages. Rodgers v Canfield, 272 Mich 562; 262
NW 409 (1935). This instruction does not apply in cases of vicarious liability or joint
liability. (For discussion of the abrogation of joint liability in most cases see comment to
now-deleted M Civ JI 43.01A Contribution among Tort-feasors by Relative Fault.)
Even if defendants have caused factually separable injuries, the jury may be required to
allocate fault between one of the defendants and the plaintiff or a named nonparty. MCL
600.2957, .6304. If an allocation of fault is required, the jury’s verdict will not be for the
damages caused by that defendant, as this instruction states. Instead, the court will
determine that defendant’s damages based on the allocation of fault. MCL 600.6306. In
such cases involving both factually separable injuries and allocation of fault, modifications
of both this instruction and M Civ JI 42.01 Allocation of Fault of Parties may be given.
Where there is an issue about whether defendants caused factually separable injuries,
modifications of both this instruction and M Civ JI 42.01 may be given.
History
M Civ JI 41.02 was SJI 41.04.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 41.03 Multiple Parties and Pleadings Where Jury May Not Be
Able to Apportion Damages [ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
This instruction was deleted because allocation of fault between defendants and others in a
lawsuit based on tort or other legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property
damage, or wrongful death is required by MCL 600.6304, and the trial judge then assesses
damages against defendants based on the allocation of fault (MCL 600.6306). (Prior to its
amendment by 1995 PA 249, the section requiring an allocation of fault applied only to
“personal injury actions.”)
History
M Civ JI 41.03 was SJI 41.05. Deleted November 2000.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 41-5
Chapter 41: Multiple Defendants
M Civ JI 41.04 Damages Not to Be Allocated Among Joint Tort-Feasors
[ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
This instruction was deleted because even in cases in which joint liability has not been
abolished, allocation of fault between defendants and others in a lawsuit based on tort or
other legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death
is required by MCL 600.6304. (Prior to its amendment by 1995 PA 249, the allocation of
fault section applied only to “personal injury actions.”) Joint liability was not abolished in
medical malpractice actions in which the plaintiff is determined to be without fault (MCL
600.6304(6)(a)), and cases in which the defendant is found liable for an act or omission that
constitutes one of enumerated crimes (MCL 600.6312).
Also, this instruction was deleted because even in joint liability cases, it is the judge, not
the jury, that is given the role of assessing damages against defendants in accordance with
MCL 600.6306.
History
M Civ JI 41.04 was SJI 41.06. Deleted November 2000.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 41-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 42-1
CHAPTER 42
Allocation of Fault (Personal
Injury Action)
M Civ JI 42.01 Allocation of Fault of Parties................................................................. 42-2
M Civ JI 42.05 Allocation of Fault of Parties and Identified Nonparties....................... 42-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 42-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 42.01 Allocation of Fault of Parties
If you find that multiple parties are at fault, then you must allocate the total fault among
those parties.
In determining the percentage of fault of each party, you must consider the nature of the
conduct of each party and the extent to which each party’s conduct caused or contributed
to the plaintiff’s injury. The total must add up to 100 percent.
Note on Use
This instruction should be used only for personal injury actions filed on or after October 1,
1986, relating to causes of action arising on or after October 1, 1986. See 1986 PA 178, §§2
and 3. “‘Personal injury’ means bodily harm, sickness, disease, death, or emotional harm
resulting from bodily harm.” MCL 600.6301.
This instruction may also be used for actions filed on or after March 28, 1996, that are based
on tort or other legal theory and seek damages for property damage only. MCL 600.6304,
as amended by 1995 PA 161 and 249. See §3 of each act for the effective date.
However, this instruction should not be used in any action filed on or after March 28, 1996,
that involves fault of an identified nonparty. Instead, M Civ JI 42.05 Allocation of Fault of
Parties and Identified Nonparties should be used.
If the defendants caused factually separable injuries, M Civ JI 41.02 Damages Where There
Is No Allocation of Fault Between Defendants should be used.
In cases of vicarious liability, this instruction may need to be modified or omitted. Fault
may not be allocated between two parties, one of whom is vicariously liable for the fault of
the other.
Comment
MCL 600.6304. The requirement that the jury allocate fault may be waived by agreement
of all the parties. MCL 600.6304(1).
History
M Civ JI 42.01 was added February 1987. Amended August 2014.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 42-3
Chapter 42: Allocation of Fault (Personal Injury Action)
M Civ JI 42.05 Allocation of Fault of Parties and Identified
Nonparties
If you find that *(at least one) defendant and an identified nonparty are at fault, then you
must allocate the total fault among all the parties and identified nonparties who are at fault.
In determining the percentage of fault of each person, you must consider the nature of the
conduct of each person and the extent to which each person’s conduct caused or contributed
to the plaintiff’s injury. The total must add up to 100 percent.
Note on Use
*This phrase should be used if there is more than one defendant in the case.
This instruction should be used only for actions filed on or after March 28, 1996, that are
based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage,
and wrongful death and that involve fault of more than one person including an identified
nonparty. See MCL 600.2957, .6304, as amended by 1995 PA 161 and 249. For the
effective date of the 1995 amendments, see 1995 PA 161, §3; and 1995 PA 249, §3.
A party who wishes to have fault of a nonparty assessed under MCL 600.6304 must file
notice designating the nonparty within 91 days after filing its first responsive pleading; any
filing after that date must be made by motion with a showing that facts underlying the
notice could not, with reasonable diligence, have been known earlier. MCR 2.112(K)(3)(c).
The parties may not stipulate to forgo the notice provision of this rule. Staff v Marder, 242
Mich App 521; 619 NW2d 57 (2000). (The rule of procedure stated in MCR 2.112(K) takes
precedence over the conflicting statutory provision, MCL 600.2957(2).)
If the defendants caused factually separable injuries, M Civ JI 41.02 Damages Where There
Is No Allocation of Fault Between Defendants should be used.
In cases of vicarious liability, this instruction may need to be modified or omitted. Fault
may not be allocated between two parties, one of whom is vicariously liable for the fault of
the other.
Comment
MCL 600.2957, .6304. The requirement that the jury allocate fault may be waived by
agreement of all the parties. MCL 600.6304(1).
The definition of “fault” is: “As used in this section, ‘fault’ includes an act, an omission,
conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a legal duty, or
any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a proximate cause
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 42-4 Michigan Supreme Court
of damage sustained by a party.” MCL 600.6304(8). The definition of “fault” was added by
1995 PA 249.
History
M Civ JI 42.05 was added October 2001.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 43-1
CHAPTER 43
Contribution Among Tort-Feasors
M Civ JI 43.01A Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault [ Instruction
Deleted ]....................................................................................................................... 43-2
M Civ JI 43.01B Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault (Bifurcation)
[ Instruction Deleted ] .................................................................................................. 43-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 43-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 43.01A Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault
[ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
For rights to contribution among persons jointly liable in tort, see MCL 600.2925a–.2925d.
In late 1995, the Michigan legislature abrogated joint liability in most cases and thereby
eliminated most actions for contribution among tort-feasors:
Except as provided in section 6304, in an action based on tort or another legal
theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death,
the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and is not joint.
However, this section does not abolish an employer’s vicarious liability for an act
or omission of the employer’s employee.
MCL 600.2956.
The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that the 1995 tort legislation (1995 PA 161 and
249) eliminated most claims for contribution. Kokx v Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655; 617
NW2d 368 (2000). According to Kokx, the allocation of fault section (MCL 600.6304),
which limits a party’s liability for damages to his or her own percentage of fault, eliminates
the possibility that a party will pay more than his or her pro rata share of common liability,
which is a prerequisite to a contribution claim under MCL 600.2925a.
Section 6304 created two exceptions to the abolishment of joint liability. MCL
600.6304(4). The first exception applies to medical malpractice actions. In medical
malpractice actions in which the plaintiff is determined to be without fault, liability of
defendants is joint and several. MCL 600.6304(6)(a). In medical malpractice actions in
which the plaintiff is determined to have fault, a mechanism for allocating uncollectable
amounts to certain defendants is provided. MCL 600.6304(6)(b), (7). The second exception
to the abrogation of joint liability is for defendants who have been found liable for an act
or omission that also constitutes one of the enumerated crimes for which the defendant was
convicted. MCL 600.6312.
In cases in which joint tort-feasor liability remains, this instruction is unnecessary because
in actions based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury,
property damage, or wrongful death that involve fault of more than one person including
third-party defendants and nonparties (unless otherwise agreed by all parties), the jury is
required to determine the percentage of the total fault of each person that contributed to the
death or injury. MCL 600.6304(1)(b).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 43-3
Chapter 43: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors
History
M Civ JI 43.01A was added February 1983. Deleted May 1998.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 43-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 43.01B Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault
(Bifurcation) [ Instruction Deleted ]
Comment
For rights to contribution among persons jointly liable in tort, see MCL 600.2925a–.2925d.
In late 1995, the Michigan legislature abrogated joint liability in most cases and thereby
eliminated most actions for contribution among tort-feasors:
Except as provided in section 6304, in an action based on tort or another legal
theory seeking damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death,
the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and is not joint.
However, this section does not abolish an employer’s vicarious liability for an act
or omission of the employer’s employee.
MCL 600.2956.
The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that the 1995 tort legislation (1995 PA 161 and
249) eliminated most claims for contribution. Kokx v Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655; 617
NW2d 368 (2000). According to Kokx, the allocation of fault section (MCL 600.6304),
which limits a party’s liability for damages to his or her own percentage of fault, eliminates
the possibility that a party will pay more than his or her pro rata share of common liability,
which is a prerequisite to a contribution claim under MCL 600.2925a.
Section 6304 created two exceptions to the abolishment of joint liability. MCL
600.6304(4). The first exception applies to medical malpractice actions. In medical
malpractice actions in which the plaintiff is determined to be without fault, liability of
defendants is joint and several. MCL 600.6304(6)(a). In medical malpractice actions in
which the plaintiff is determined to have fault, a mechanism for allocating uncollectable
amounts to certain defendants is provided. MCL 600.6304(6)(b), (7). The second exception
to the abrogation of joint liability is for defendants who have been found liable for an act
or omission that also constitutes one of the enumerated crimes for which the defendant was
convicted. MCL 600.6312.
In cases in which joint tort-feasor liability remains, this instruction is unnecessary because
in actions based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury,
property damage, or wrongful death that involve fault of more than one person including
third-party defendants and nonparties (unless otherwise agreed by all parties), the jury is
required to determine the percentage of the total fault of each person that contributed to the
death or injury. MCL 600.6304(1)(b).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 43-5
Chapter 43: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors
History
M Civ JI 43.01B was added February 1983. Deleted May 1998.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 43-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 45-1
CHAPTER 45
Wrongful Death
M Civ JI 45.01 Wrongful Death—Explanation of Statute ............................................. 45-2
M Civ JI 45.02 Wrongful Death—Damages .................................................................. 45-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 45-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 45.01 Wrongful Death—Explanation of Statute
We have a law known as the Wrongful Death Act. This law permits the personal
representative of the estate of a deceased person to bring an action whenever the death of a
person or injuries resulting in the death of a person have been caused by the [ wrongful act
/ negligence ] of another. In this case, [ name of plaintiff ], the personal representative of
the estate of [ name of decedent ], the deceased, is suing [ name of defendant ], the
defendant. [ Name of plaintiff ] is representing the [ estate / surviving spouse / next of kin ]
of the deceased, [ namely [ name of surviving spouse ] / namely [ name of next of kin ] ].
They are the real parties in interest in this lawsuit and in that sense are the real plaintiffs,
whose damages you are to determine if you decide for the personal representative of the
estate of [ name of decedent ].
Note on Use
In In re Ellen Combs, ___ Mich App ___ (July 24, 2003), the Court of Appeals held the
phrase “children of the deceased’s spouse,” in MCL 600.2922(3)(b) does not include
children of a spouse who predeceases the plaintiff’s decedent. Leave to appeal to the
Michigan Supreme Court has been sought.
Comment
The instruction is based on MCL 600.2922.
This statute, together with MCL 600.2921, combines into one cause of action damages
suffered by a decedent prior to his death and damages suffered by others as a result of such
death.
Under this statute an action may be brought for the death of a viable fetus. O’Neill v Morse,
385 Mich 130; 188 NW2d 785 (1971). An action may be maintained for an interspousal tort
resulting in death. Mosier v Carney, 376 Mich 532; 138 NW2d 343 (1965). Action will also
lie if the tort-feasor is dead. In re Olney’s Estate, 309 Mich 65; 14 NW2d 574 (1944).
History
M Civ JI 45.01 was SJI 32.01.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 45-3
Chapter 45: Wrongful Death
M Civ JI 45.02 Wrongful Death—Damages
If you decide the plaintiff is entitled to damages, you shall give such amount as you decide
to be fair and just, under all the circumstances, to those persons represented in this case.
Such damages may include the following items, to the extent you find they have been
proved by the evidence:
(1)*(reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses)
(2)*(reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering undergone by [ name
of decedent ] while [ he / she ] was conscious during the time between [ his /
her ] injury and [ his / her ] death)
(3)*(losses suffered by [ name of surviving spouse / name of next of kin ] as a
result of [ name of decedent ]’s death, including:
(a) loss of financial support
(b) loss of service
(c) loss of gifts or other valuable gratuities
(d) loss of parental training and guidance
(e) loss of society and companionship
(f) [ other ]
(g) [ other ])
Which, if any, of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to decide, based upon
evidence and not upon speculation, guess, or conjecture. The amount of money to be
awarded for certain of these elements of damage cannot be proved in a precise dollar
amount. The law leaves such amount to your sound judgment. Your verdict must be solely
to compensate for the damages and not to punish the defendant.
Note on Use
*Include only such of the listed elements of damage as are properly claimed and supported
by evidence. If there is proof of additional elements of damage which are appropriate under
the statute, they should be added to this instruction. If any item of damage is admitted or
established by undisputed evidence, the jury should be so instructed when such item is
mentioned in this instruction.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 45-4 Michigan Supreme Court
In child death cases, when there is a basis for finding the amount expended by the parent
on the child’s support, maintenance and education, add the following language after
element 3b: “which shall be at least as great as the amount spent by the parent on the child’s
support, maintenance and education.” See Rohm v Stroud, 386 Mich 693; 194 NW2d 307
(1972).
If a surviving widow has remarried but continues to regularly use her prior married name,
she is entitled to a protective order requiring that she not be referred to or addressed by the
name of her present husband. Wood v Detroit Edison Co, 409 Mich 279; 294 NW2d 571
(1980). Under such circumstances, her prior married name should be used in this
instruction and in M Civ JI 45.01.
In In re Ellen Combs, ___ Mich App ___ (July 24, 2003), the Court of Appeals held the
phrase “children of the deceased’s spouse,” in MCL 600.2922(3)(b) does not include
children of a spouse who predeceases the plaintiff’s decedent. Leave to appeal to the
Michigan Supreme Court has been sought.
Comment
Damages for medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses are expressly authorized by the
wrongful death statute. MCL 600.2922(6). See Rufner v Traverse City, 296 Mich 204; 295
NW 620 (1941), as to recovery for such expenses when the estate is not liable.
Clause 2 of the instruction covers the “survival” element of the statute. Prior to 1939, in
cases where death was not instantaneous, remedy was under the “survival act,” which gave
to the estate the right of action which the decedent had at the time of his death, including
damages for pain and suffering and for loss of past and future earnings. See Olivier v
Houghton County Street R Co, 134 Mich 367; 96 NW 434 (1903). 1939 PA 297 changed
the law so as to require all claims for injuries resulting in death to be brought under the
Wrongful Death Act. Damage for conscious pain and suffering was added to the wrongful
death claim, and damage for loss of earnings after death was superseded by the claim for
“pecuniary injury” suffered by the surviving spouse or next of kin. See Baker v Slack, 319
Mich 703; 30 NW2d 403 (1948).
This leaves a possible ambiguity as to damage for loss of earnings between the time of
injury and time of death. It is doubtful that the 1939 amendment was intended to eliminate
such a clear-cut element of economic loss, and the “fair and just” clause of the present
statute is doubtless broad enough to encompass it. But since the matter is unsettled, and
since the item will be relatively unimportant in most cases, this element of damage has not
been included in the above instruction.
Clause 3 of the instruction covers the “wrongful death” element of the statute, for losses
inflicted upon the surviving spouse or next of kin as a result of the decedent’s death. Until
1971, the statute limited this element of damage to “pecuniary injury.” Historically,
Michigan Supreme Court Page 45-5
Chapter 45: Wrongful Death
“pecuniary injury” was interpreted to include only injuries resulting in an actual loss of
money to the surviving spouse and next of kin. For example, a surviving husband could
recover for the future cost of maid service required by the death of his wife. Strong v
Kittenger, 300 Mich 126; 1 NW2d 479 (1942). Also, parents could recover for the loss of
wages which would have been earned by a deceased child, minor or adult. Thompson v
Ogemaw County Board of Road Commissioners, 357 Mich 482; 98 NW2d 620 (1959). This
includes voluntary contributions for support from a child. Mooney v Hill, 367 Mich 138;
116 NW2d 231 (1962).
In Wycko v Gnodtke, 361 Mich 331; 105 NW2d 118 (1960), a case involving the death of
a fourteen-year-old child, the court upheld the jury award to his surviving parents as not
being excessive. The opinion declared that the traditional child labor formula (probable
wages less cost of keep) did not adequately measure the pecuniary injury to the child’s
parents and went on to say that loss of companionship is an element of damages for the
wrongful death. However, Breckon v Franklin Fuel Co, 383 Mich 251, 174 NW2d 836
(1970), limited Wycko to its holding that the award of damages was not excessive in the
particular case and repudiated Wycko and later cases regarding loss of companionship as an
element of pecuniary injury. (Breckon was later overruled by Smith v Detroit, 388 Mich
637; 202 NW2d 300 (1972), as to cases commenced prior to the effective date of 1971 PA
65.)
The legislature responded to Breckon with the enactment of 1971 PA 65, which amended
the statute by deleting the phrase “pecuniary injury,” and by directing the jury to give such
damages as it “shall deem fair and just, under all of the circumstances, … [ including ]
recovery for the loss of the society and companionship of the deceased.” In context it seems
clear enough that this was not intended to eliminate any of the elements of “pecuniary
injury” previously allowed, but rather to settle the troublesome question as to inclusion of
damages for loss of society and companionship. Therefore, clause 3 of this instruction
includes both kinds of elements.
It should be noted that the Wrongful Death Act permits a child to recover for the loss of
society and companionship of a deceased parent. Berger v Weber, 411 Mich 1; 303 NW2d
424 (1981).
Where appropriate, elements of damages such as those listed in M Civ JI 50.02 may be
inserted into this instruction. See Taylor v Michigan Power Co, 45 Mich App 453, 457; 206
NW2d 815, 818 (1973).
History
M Civ JI 45.02 was SJI 32.02.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 45-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 50-1
CHAPTER 50
Basic InstructionsPerson and
Property
Damages Introduction.................................................................................................. 50-2
M Civ JI 50.01 Measure of Damages—Personal and Property..................................... 50-3
M Civ JI 50.02 Elements of Damage — Pain and Suffering, Etc.................................... 50-5
M Civ JI 50.03 Elements of Damage—Disability and Disfigurement ............................ 50-7
M Civ JI 50.04 Element of Damage—Aggravation of Preexisting Ailment or
Condition...................................................................................................................... 50-8
M Civ JI 50.05 Element of Damage—Medical Expenses .............................................. 50-9
M Civ JI 50.06 Element of Damage—Loss of Earning Capacity—Past and Future—Adult
Plaintiff, Emancipated Minor ..................................................................................... 50-10
M Civ JI 50.07 Element of Damage—Loss of Future Earning Capacity—Unemancipated
Minor Plaintiff ............................................................................................................ 50-11
M Civ JI 50.08 Element of Damage—Miscellaneous Expense.................................... 50-12
M Civ JI 50.09 Element of Damage—Personal Property ............................................ 50-13
M Civ JI 50.10 Defendant Takes the Plaintiff As He/She Finds Him/Her.................... 50-14
M Civ JI 50.11 Inability to Determine Extent of Aggravation of Injuries .................... 50-15
M Civ JI 50.21 Personal Injury Action: Definition of Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss
Damages; Separation of Future Damages by Year..................................................... 50-16
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 50-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Damages Introduction
M Civ JI 50.01–50.09 and M Civ JI 51.01–51.07 relate to damages or injury to person or
property. Each series consists of a basic instruction stating that if the defendant is found
liable the jury is to award damages as proved by the evidence. Following the basic
instruction are a number of phrases setting out various elements of damages. These
elements are to be inserted in the basic instruction. If there are elements which are not
covered by these specific instructions but are equally appropriate, they should be inserted
in the same way. By this method the instruction can be built up to include all the elements
of damages which the evidence tends to prove in any given case. This building block
system greatly simplifies the drafting of damage instructions.
M Civ JI 52.01 pertains to an injury to a spouse.
These instructions contemplate a case involving a single plaintiff and defendant.
Adaptations may be required for multiple parties. See M Civ JI 40.01, 40.02, and 41.01.
The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the different elements of damage in a
personal injury case. Jageriskey v Detroit United R Co, 163 Mich 631, 634; 128 NW 726,
727 (1910). However, the instruction on damages must not permit the jury to speculate or
expand on the injuries beyond the scope of the evidence. Sabo v New York Central R Co,
365 Mich 231, 235; 112 NW2d 453, 455 (1961).
Chapter 53 deals with particular factors in computing damages.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 50-3
Chapter 50: Basic Instructions—Person and Property
M Civ JI 50.01 Measure of Damages—Personal and Property
If you decide that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, it is your duty to determine the amount
of money which reasonably, fairly and adequately compensates [ him / her ] for each of the
elements of damage which you decide has resulted from the [ negligence / professional
negligence or malpractice ] of the defendant, taking into account the nature and extent of
the injury.
You should include each of the following elements of damage which you decide has been
sustained by the plaintiff to the present time:
[ Here insert the appropriate elements of damage, such as: M Civ JI 50.02 Pain and
Suffering, Etc.; M Civ JI 50.03 Disability and Disfigurement; M Civ JI 50.04 Aggravation
of Preexisting Ailment or Condition ]
You should also include each of the following elements of damage which you decide
plaintiff is reasonably certain to sustain in the future:
[ Reinsert applicable elements of damages as specified above ].
If any element of damage is of a continuing nature, you shall decide how long it may
continue. *(If an element of damage is permanent in nature, then you shall decide how long
the plaintiff is likely to live.)
Which, if any, of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to decide based upon
evidence and not upon speculation, guess or conjecture. The amount of money to be
awarded for certain of these elements of damage cannot be proved in a precise dollar
amount. The law leaves such amount to your sound judgment. Your verdict must be solely
to compensate plaintiff for [ his / her ] damages, and not to punish the defendant.
Note on Use
If any item of damage is admitted or established by undisputed evidence, the jury should
be so instructed when such item is mentioned in the instruction.
This instruction cannot be given in the form shown. Complete the instruction by inserting
the appropriate elements of damage from M Civ JI 50.02–50.09. If there are elements which
are not covered by these instructions, but are equally appropriate, they should be inserted
in the same way.
*The sentence in parentheses should be used if appropriate.
If evidence concerning plaintiff’s susceptibility to injury has been introduced, M Civ JI
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 50-4 Michigan Supreme Court
50.10 Defendant Takes the Plaintiff As He/She Finds Him/Her may be given.
Comment
The object of damages is to compensate the aggrieved party for the injury sustained.
Allison v Chandler, 11 Mich 542 (1863), approved in Muskegon Agency, Inc v General
Telephone Co, 350 Mich 41; 85 NW2d 170 (1957). The instructions should not lead the jury
to believe that an award of damages is to punish the defendant. Stillson v Gibbs, 53 Mich
280; 18 NW 815 (1884).
The extent, nature and permanency of injuries suffered are elements “peculiarly appropriate
for the estimation and determination of the jury according as they find the fact to be.”
Griggs v Saginaw & F R Co, 196 Mich 258, 267–268; 162 NW 960, 963 (1917), approved
in A’Enoy v Lowry, 367 Mich 657; 116 NW2d 930 (1962); Greinke v Yellow Cab Co, 368
Mich 611; 118 NW2d 835 (1962).
Plaintiff is entitled to an instruction covering past, present and future injuries as covered by
the proofs. See MCR 2.118(C), 2.601, and Wilton v Flint, 128 Mich 156; 87 NW 86 (1901).
The jury should be instructed that future and permanent injuries must be “reasonably
certain” to occur for damages to be so awarded. Finkelstein v Michigan R Co, 197 Mich
157; 163 NW 973 (1917); Bishop v Gaudio, 266 Mich 267; 253 NW 292 (1934); see also
Motts v Michigan Cab Co, 274 Mich 437; 264 NW 855 (1936); but see Routsaw v McClain,
365 Mich 167; 112 NW2d 123 (1961), as to whether the “reasonably certain” rule has been
relaxed.
History
M Civ JI 50.01 was SJI 30.01.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 50-5
Chapter 50: Basic Instructions—Person and Property
M Civ JI 50.02 Elements of Damage — Pain and Suffering, Etc.
… the [ insert applicable element(s) ].
(a)*(physical pain and suffering)
(b)*(mental anguish)
(c)*(fright and shock)
(d)*(denial of social pleasure and enjoyments)
(e)*(embarrassment, humiliation or mortification)
Note on Use
*Insert the applicable element or elements of pain and suffering a–e in the blank provided.
Other possible elements of pain and suffering may be inserted as appropriate.
The element or elements are then to be inserted in M Civ JI 50.01 when the evidence
justifies their use. In order for material which relates to future pain and suffering to be
included, there must be evidence from which it can be inferred that such pain and suffering
is reasonably certain to be experienced in the future.
Comment
Pain and suffering are compensable elements of damage. Samuelson v Olson
Transportation Co, 324 Mich 278; 36 NW2d 917 (1949); Beattie v Detroit, 137 Mich 319;
100 NW 574 (1904); Draper v Switous, 370 Mich 468; 122 NW2d 698 (1963); Brown v
Arnold, 303 Mich 616; 6 NW2d 914 (1942).
Compensation may be allowed for future pain and suffering if reasonable certainty of such
future pain and suffering is established. McDuffie v Root, 300 Mich 286; 1 NW2d 544
(1942); Motts v Michigan Cab Co, 274 Mich 437; 264 NW 855 (1936); Prince v Lott, 369
Mich 606; 120 NW2d 780 (1963).
If pain persists, the jury may be charged on the issue of future pain and suffering although
there is no proof of permanent physical injury, Toman v Checker Cab Co, 306 Mich 87, 92;
10 NW2d 318, 320 (1943), and if pain persists, it is not error to charge the jury on future
pain and suffering merely because there is no medical testimony that such would occur.
Shinabarger v Phillips, 370 Mich 135, 142; 121 NW2d 693, 696 (1963).
If the facts justify it, the jury may be instructed to consider shame and mortification, mental
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 50-6 Michigan Supreme Court
pain, and anxiety which plaintiff suffered by reason of the injuries sustained. Beath v Rapid
R Co, 119 Mich 512; 78 NW 537 (1899). Annoyance, discomfiture and humiliation related
to the physical injury are also proper damage elements for the jury. Grenawalt v Nyphuis,
335 Mich 76; 55 NW2d 736 (1952); see also Decorte v New York Central R Co, 377 Mich
317, 330–331; 140 NW2d 479, 484 (1966); Manie v Matson Oldsmobile-Cadillac Co, 378
Mich 650; 148 NW2d 779 (1967); Ross v Leggett, 61 Mich 445; 28 NW 695 (1886). Denial
of social pleasure and enjoyments are also proper damage elements if properly pleaded. See
Beath.
Fright and shock are also proper damage elements for the jury to consider. Geveke v Grand
Rapids & I R Co, 57 Mich 589; 24 NW 675 (1885); Sherwood v Chicago & W M R Co, 82
Mich 374; 46 NW 773 (1890).
History
M Civ JI 50.02 was SJI 30.02.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 50-7
Chapter 50: Basic Instructions—Person and Property
M Civ JI 50.03 Elements of Damage—Disability and Disfigurement
… the *(disability including the loss or impairment of [ describe ]).
*(and the)
*(disfigurement of [ describe ]).
Note on Use
*The appropriate element or elements are to be inserted in M Civ JI 50.01 where the
evidence justifies their use. A brief description of the disability or disfigurement or both
must be inserted to tailor the instruction to the facts of the case.
Comment
Disability and disfigurement are recognized as separate elements of compensable damages
in Michigan. Where relevant, they may both be properly inserted in M Civ JI 50.01.
Disfigurement and disability were both held compensable elements of damage in Shaw v
Chicago & G T R Co, 123 Mich 629; 82 NW 618 (1900), and Power v Harlow, 57 Mich
107; 23 NW 606 (1885). Instructions including disfigurement as an element of
compensable damage were approved in Sherwood v Chicago & W M R Co, 82 Mich 374;
46 NW 773 (1890), and Gilson v Bronkhorst, 353 Mich 148; 90 NW2d 701 (1958).
Disabilities were held compensable in Brininstool v Michigan United R Co, 157 Mich 172;
121 NW 728 (1909); Ott v Wilson, 216 Mich 499; 185 NW 860 (1921); McDuffie v Root,
300 Mich 286; 1 NW2d 544 (1942); Prince v Lott, 369 Mich 606; 120 NW2d 780 (1963);
and Magda v Johns, 374 Mich 14; 130 NW2d 902 (1964).
History
M Civ JI 50.03 was SJI 30.03.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 50-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 50.04 Element of Damage—Aggravation of Preexisting
Ailment or Condition
… the *(increase in [ describe ] arising from aggravation of a preexisting ailment or
condition)
Note on Use
*Insert this element in M Civ JI 50.01 Measure of Damages—Personal and Property if the
proof justifies submitting the issue of aggravation of a preexisting ailment or condition.
Insert language describing the particular aggravation, such as increased “pain in his left
leg,” or “disability from loss of sight.”
If it appears from the evidence that the jury may have difficulty determining the damages
caused by defendant as compared to those resulting from a preexisting ailment or condition,
M Civ JI 50.11 Inability to Determine Extent of Aggravation of Injuries should be given.
Comment
Reasonable compensation may be awarded for the increase of pain and suffering, increased
disability, and related expenses arising from aggravation of a preexisting ailment or
condition. Schwingschlegl v City of Monroe, 113 Mich 683; 72 NW 7 (1897); Mosley v
Dati, 363 Mich 690; 110 NW2d 637 (1961); Rypstra v Western Union Telegraph Co, 374
Mich 166; 132 NW 140 (1965).
History
M Civ JI 50.04 was SJI 30.04.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 50-9
Chapter 50: Basic Instructions—Person and Property
M Civ JI 50.05 Element of Damage—Medical Expenses
… the *(reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment and services)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 50.01 when the evidence justifies its use.
Comment
Reasonable expenses of necessary medical care are compensable elements of damage.
Foley v Detroit & M R Co, 193 Mich 233; 159 NW 506 (1916). These include past and
prospective expenses. Sherwood v Chicago & W M R Co, 82 Mich 374; 46 NW 773 (1890).
The reasonable value of the medical care must be established. Herter v Detroit, 245 Mich
425; 222 NW 774 (1929).
History
M Civ JI 50.05 was SJI 30.05.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 50-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 50.06 Element of Damage—Loss of Earning Capacity—Past
and Future—Adult Plaintiff, Emancipated Minor
… the *(loss of earning capacity)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 50.01 when the evidence justifies its use.
Comment
It is the loss of earning capacity for which damages are awarded as a result of a personal
injury. Canning v Hannaford, 373 Mich 41; 127 NW2d 851 (1964); Prince v Lott, 369
Mich 606; 120 NW2d 780 (1963); Harris v Wiener, 362 Mich 656; 107 NW2d 789 (1961).
The injured party may recover for loss of earning capacity although he or she may have
received salary, wages or other compensation during the time he or she was incapacitated.
Motts v Michigan Cab Co, 274 Mich 437; 264 NW 855 (1936); Canning.
History
M Civ JI 50.06 was SJI 30.06.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 50-11
Chapter 50: Basic Instructions—Person and Property
M Civ JI 50.07 Element of Damage—Loss of Future Earning
Capacity—Unemancipated Minor Plaintiff
… the *(loss of earning capacity after the plaintiff has reached the age of eighteen)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 50.01 when the evidence justifies its use and the
plaintiff is an unemancipated minor.
Comment
As to use of the term “earning capacity,” see Comment to M Civ JI 50.06.
In actions for damages arising out of an injury to an unemancipated minor, the loss of
earning capacity during the child’s minority is recoverable by the parents. Vink v House,
336 Mich 292; 57 NW2d 887 (1953); Gumienny v Hess, 285 Mich 411; 280 NW 809
(1938); Mulder v Achterhof, 258 Mich 190; 242 NW 215 (1932). The child’s recovery,
therefore, is limited to the loss of his earning capacity after he or she reaches the age of
eighteen (the age of majority, as provided by 1971 PA 79, MCL 722.52 et seq), unless the
parents waive their rights. See Gumienny, 285 Mich at 414–415; 280 NW at 810.
History
M Civ JI 50.07 is a revision of SJI 30.07. Amended February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 50-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 50.08 Element of Damage—Miscellaneous Expense
… the *(reasonable expense for [ insert applicable items ], which has been required as a
result of the injury)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 50.01 when there is evidence of miscellaneous
compensable expenses, such as for caretaking, substitute transportation and baby-sitting.
Comment
Michigan has long followed the general rule that a plaintiff may recover for the necessary
and reasonable expenses incurred as a consequence of the injury. See, e.g., Andries v
Everitt-Metzger-Flanders Co, 177 Mich 110; 142 NW 1067 (1913); Foley v Detroit & M
R Co, 193 Mich 233; 159 NW 506 (1916); Sherwood v Chicago & W M R Co, 82 Mich 374;
46 NW 773 (1890); Allison v Chandler, 11 Mich 542 (1863).
History
M Civ JI 50.08 was SJI 30.08.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 50-13
Chapter 50: Basic Instructions—Person and Property
M Civ JI 50.09 Element of Damage—Personal Property
… *(property damage, to be measured according to the [ instruction / instructions ] which
I shall give you later)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 50.01 when the evidence justifies its use. It must
then be followed by instructions taken from M Civ JI 51.01–51.07, as applicable in the
particular case.
History
M Civ JI 50.09 was SJI 30.09.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 50-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 50.10 Defendant Takes the Plaintiff As He/She Finds Him/
Her
You are instructed that the defendant takes the plaintiff as [ he / she ] finds [ him / her ]. If
you find that the plaintiff was unusually susceptible to injury, that fact will not relieve the
defendant from liability for any and all damages resulting to plaintiff as a proximate result
of defendant’s negligence.
Note on Use
This instruction should not be used in negligence cases in which the action is based on
emotional distress, fright, or mental shock without a contemporaneous physical impact.
While recovery may be permitted in such cases, it is subject to the limitation that “Absent
specific knowledge of plaintiff’s unusual sensitivity, there should be no recovery for
hypersensitive mental disturbance where a normal individual would not be affected under
the circumstances.” Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 13; 179 NW2d 390, 395 (1970)
(citations omitted).
Comment
See Wilkinson v Lee, 463 Mich 388; 617 NW2d 305 (2000); Richman v City of Berkley, 84
Mich App 258; 269 NW2d 555 (1978).
History
M Civ JI 50.10 was added January 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 50-15
Chapter 50: Basic Instructions—Person and Property
M Civ JI 50.11 Inability to Determine Extent of Aggravation of
Injuries
If an injury suffered by plaintiff is a combined product of both a preexisting [ disease /
injury / state of health ] and the effects of defendant’s negligent conduct, it is your duty to
determine and award damages caused by defendant’s conduct alone. You must separate the
damages caused by defendant’s conduct from the condition which was preexisting if it is
possible to do so.
However, if after careful consideration, you are unable to separate the damages caused by
defendant’s conduct from those which were preexisting, then the entire amount of
plaintiff’s damages must be assessed against the defendant.
Comment
See Schwingschlegl v City of Monroe, 113 Mich 683; 72 NW 7 (1897); Mason v
Chesapeake & O R Co, 110 Mich App 76; 312 NW2d 167 (1981); Richman v City of
Berkley, 84 Mich App 258; 269 NW2d 555 (1978); McNabb v Green Real Estate Co, 62
Mich App 500; 233 NW2d 811 (1975). See also Belue v Uniroyal Inc, 114 Mich App 589;
319 NW2d 369 (1982).
History
M Civ JI 50.11 was added October 1982.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 50-16 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 50.21 Personal Injury Action: Definition of Economic Loss
and Noneconomic Loss Damages; Separation of Future Damages by
Year
In this case, you must determine a separate amount for each year in the future for which
plaintiff will sustain damages.
You will also be required to separate the two types of damages available in this case. The
first type, “economic loss” damages, consists of such things as medical expenses, loss of
wages or lost earning potential, and miscellaneous expenses. The second type,
“noneconomic loss” damages, means damages or loss due to pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, physical disfigurement, and [ other noneconomic
loss; i.e., see M Civ JI 50.02 (b)–(e) ].
Comment
MCL 600.6305.
History
M Civ JI 50.21 was added June 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 51-1
CHAPTER 51
Property Damage
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 51-2
M Civ JI 51.01 Measure of Damages—Personal Property............................................ 51-3
M Civ JI 51.02 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Cost of Repair Less
Than Difference in Value.............................................................................................. 51-4
M Civ JI 51.03 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Irreparable Damage
with Salvage ................................................................................................................. 51-5
M Civ JI 51.04 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Irreparable Damage
and No Salvage............................................................................................................. 51-6
M Civ JI 51.05 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Dispute Whether
Cost of Repair Is Less Than Difference in Value ........................................................... 51-7
M Civ JI 51.06 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Cost of Repair with
Loss in Value after Repair............................................................................................. 51-8
M Civ JI 51.07 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal Property—Dispute Whether
Cost of Repair plus Loss in Value after Repair Is Less Than Difference in Value .......... 51-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 51-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introduction
The following set of instructions, M Civ JI 51.01–51.07, relates to damages for injury to
personal property. These instructions follow the same building block system used for other
damage elements, as described in the Introduction to this Section.
If there are claims of damage to personal property, the property element, M Civ JI 50.09,
should be inserted in the basic damage instruction, M Civ JI 50.01. After M Civ JI 50.01
has been completed, M Civ JI 51.01 should follow, with the applicable elements from M
Civ JI 51.02–51.07 inserted to explain the appropriate method of measuring property
damages. If there are elements of property damage which are not covered by M Civ JI
51.02–51.07, but are equally appropriate, they should be inserted in the same way.
History
This Introduction was SJI 31.00.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 51-3
Chapter 51: Property Damage
M Civ JI 51.01 Measure of Damages—Personal Property
In this case, plaintiff claims damages to his [ description of personal property ]. If you
decide that plaintiff is entitled to such damages, the amount should be measured by:
[ Here insert the appropriate elements for determining the amount of damages, such as: M
Civ JI 51.02 Cost of Repair Less Than Difference in Value; M Civ JI 51.03 Irreparable
Damage with Salvage ].
Note on Use
If any element of personal property damage and the amount of loss is admitted or
established by undisputed evidence, the jury should be so instructed when such item is
mentioned in the instruction.
This instruction cannot be given in the form shown. Complete the instruction by inserting
the appropriate phrases for determining the amounts of damage from M Civ JI 51.02–51.07.
If there are elements which are not covered by these instructions, but are equally
appropriate, they should be inserted in the same way.
These instructions would not be appropriate to a claim for damages to a unique chattel,
which should be covered by an appropriate specific instruction.
History
M Civ JI 51.01 was SJI 31.01.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 51-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 51.02 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal
Property—Cost of Repair Less Than Difference in Value
… the *(reasonable expense of necessary repairs to the property which was damaged)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 51.01 when the evidence justifies its use.
Comment
This instruction is applicable if only the reasonable expense of necessary repairs is claimed
and that is less than the difference in value of the property before and after the damage.
If the difference in the value of property before and after it was damaged is less than the
reasonable cost of repairs, use M Civ JI 51.03.
If the property was damaged beyond repair and has no salvage value, or if it is doubtful that
the property has salvage value, use M Civ JI 51.04.
If there is no claim that the repaired property has depreciated in value and there is an issue
whether the cost of repairs or the difference in value of the property before and after it was
damaged is the lesser amount, use M Civ JI 51.05.
If the cost of repairs plus depreciation will be less than the difference in value between the
damaged and undamaged property, use M Civ JI 51.06.
If there is an issue whether the cost of repairs plus depreciation or the difference in value
between the damaged and undamaged property is the lesser amount of loss, use M Civ JI
51.07.
See also Comment to M Civ JI 51.07.
History
M Civ JI 51.02 was SJI 31.02.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 51-5
Chapter 51: Property Damage
M Civ JI 51.03 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal
Property—Irreparable Damage with Salvage
… the *(difference between the fair market value immediately before the occurrence and
its fair market value after the occurrence)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 51.01 when the evidence justifies its use.
This instruction is appropriate only where the property, though destroyed or damaged
beyond repair, is still in existence and has salvage value. If the property is not in existence
or if it lacks salvage value, M Civ JI 51.04 is appropriate.
Comment
See Comments to M Civ JI 51.02 and 51.07.
History
M Civ JI 51.03 was SJI 31.03.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 51-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 51.04 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal
Property—Irreparable Damage and No Salvage
… *(the fair market value of the property immediately before the occurrence)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 51.01 when the evidence justifies its use.
This phrase may be used where the property is damaged beyond repair and has no salvage
value and, possibly, where it is doubtful that the property has salvage value.
Comment
See Comments to M Civ JI 51.02 and 51.07.
History
M Civ JI 51.04 was SJI 31.04.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 51-7
Chapter 51: Property Damage
M Civ JI 51.05 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal
Property—Dispute Whether Cost of Repair Is Less Than Difference
in Value
… the *(lesser of the reasonable expense of necessary repairs to the property which was
damaged, or the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately
before the occurrence and its fair market value immediately after the occurrence)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 51.01 when the evidence justifies its use.
This element is to be used when there is an issue whether the cost of repairs or the difference
in value of the property before and after it is damaged is the lesser amount. When the cost
of repairs is admittedly the lesser amount, use M Civ JI 51.02; when the converse is true,
use M Civ JI 51.03.
Comment
See Comments to M Civ JI 51.02 and 51.07.
History
M Civ JI 51.05 was SJI 31.05.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 51-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 51.06 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal
Property—Cost of Repair with Loss in Value after Repair
… the *(reasonable expense of necessary repairs to the property which was damaged plus
the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before the
occurrence and its fair market value after it is repaired)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 51.01 when the evidence justifies its use.
Comment
See Comments to M Civ JI 51.02 and 51.07.
History
M Civ JI 51.06 was SJI 31.06.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 51-9
Chapter 51: Property Damage
M Civ JI 51.07 Measure of Damages—Damage to Personal
Property—Dispute Whether Cost of Repair plus Loss in Value after
Repair Is Less Than Difference in Value
… the *(following instructions:
First, there is evidence that the [ description of personal property ] was worth less after it
was repaired than it was before it was damaged. You should determine whether this is true
and, if so, by how much, and then add the expense of reasonably necessary repairs to that
figure.
Second, you should determine the difference between the value of the [ description of
personal property ] before it was damaged and its value immediately after it was damaged.
You should then measure plaintiff’s property damage as being the lower figure computed
by your use of these two methods.)
Note on Use
*This element is to be inserted in M Civ JI 51.01 when the evidence justifies its use.
See Comment to M Civ JI 51.02 as to the property damage issues applicable to M Civ JI
51.02–51.07.
Comment
When the evidence justifies it, the jury may be instructed that damages may include the
amount expended for necessary reasonable repairs and the reduced value of the chattel after
the repairs. Moore v Kenockee Twp, 75 Mich 332; 42 NW 944 (1889). If the damage is
irreparable, the measure is the difference between the market value before and after the
injury. If the damage is not irreparable, the measure of damages is the reasonable costs of
such repairs, if such were less than the value of the property. See O’Donnell v Oliver Iron
Mining Co, 262 Mich 470; 247 NW 720 (1933); 273 Mich 27; 262 NW 728 (1935); Tillson
v Consumers Power Co, 269 Mich 53; 256 NW 801 (1934); Jackson County Road
Commissioners v O’Leary, 326 Mich 570; 40 NW2d 729 (1950). No Michigan case has
applied both elements of this instruction as part of one instruction. However, the rationale
of the cited cases taken together supports the measure of damages as covered by this
instruction.
History
M Civ JI 51.07 was SJI 31.07.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 51-10 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 52-1
CHAPTER 52
Injury to Spouse or Parent
M Civ JI 52.01 Measure of Damages—Injury to Spouse .............................................. 52-2
M Civ JI 52.02 Measure of Damages for Child of Injured Parent ................................. 52-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 52-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 52.01 Measure of Damages—Injury to Spouse
In this case [ name of derivative plaintiff ] is claiming that [ he / she ] sustained damages as
a result of injury to [ his / her ] spouse. If you find that [ name of principal plaintiff ] [ is /
would ] be entitled to damages, then it is your duty to determine the amount of money
which will reasonably, fairly and adequately compensate [ name of derivative plaintiff ] for
any of the following elements of damage [ he / she ] has sustained to the present time as a
result of injury to [ his / her ] spouse.
(a)*(the reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment and services
received by [ his / her ] spouse
(b)*(the reasonable value of the services of [ his / her ] spouse of which [ he /
she ] has been deprived)
(c)*(the reasonable value of the society, companionship and sexual
relationship with [ his / her ] spouse of which [ he / she ] has been deprived)
You should also include the amount of money that will compensate [ name of derivative
plaintiff ] for such of these elements of damage as you decide are reasonably certain to be
sustained in the future. If any element is of a continuing nature, you shall decide how long
it may continue. †(If an element of damage is permanent in nature, then you shall decide
how long [ name of derivative plaintiff ] and [ his / her ] spouse are each likely to live and
how long the plaintiff is likely to sustain that element of damage.)
Which, if any, of these elements of damage have been proved is for you to decide based
upon evidence and not upon speculation, guess or conjecture. The amount of money to be
awarded for certain of these elements of damage cannot be proved in a precise dollar
amount. The law leaves such amount to your sound judgment. Your verdict must be solely
to compensate [ name of derivative plaintiff ] and not to punish the defendant.
Note on Use
*Complete this instruction by selecting the appropriate element or elements of damages, as
shown by the evidence, from the three clauses in parentheses. The appropriate phrases in
brackets should also be given as part of the instruction.
†The sentence in parentheses should be given if appropriate.
This instruction must be modified if there has been a divorce or other event which would
end the right to consortium damages.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 52-3
Chapter 52: Injury to Spouse or Parent
Comment
A husband may recover for necessary medical expense incurred as a result of injury to his
wife. Burns v Van Buren Twp, 218 Mich 44; 187 NW 278 (1922); Laskowski v People’s Ice
Co, 203 Mich 186; 168 NW 940 (1918). He may also recover the reasonable value of the
loss of his wife’s ability to carry on her services and housework. Leeds v Masha, 328 Mich
137; 43 NW2d 92 (1950); Burns.
Both the husband and wife have a right to recover for the loss of consortium. See
Montgomery v Stephan, 359 Mich 33; 101 NW2d 227 (1960).
The no-fault law has not abolished the common-law action for loss of consortium by the
spouse of a person who receives above threshold injuries, Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder &
Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502; 309 NW2d 163 (1981); nor is a consortium action
precluded by the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; Eide v Kelsey-Hayes
Co, 431 Mich 26; 427 NW2d 488 (1988).
See Morse v Deschaine, 13 Mich App 101, 107; 163 NW2d 693, 696 (1968), for a
discussion of situations in which a wife may sue in her own right for her medical expenses.
History
M Civ JI 52.01 was SJI 33.00. Amended May 2016.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 52-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 52.02 Measure of Damages for Child of Injured Parent
In this case [ name of child ] is claiming that [ he / she ] sustained damages as a result of
injury to [ his / her ] [ father / mother ]. If you find that [ name of parent ] [ is / would be ]
entitled to damages, then it is your duty to determine the amount of money which will
reasonably, fairly and adequately compensate [ name of child ] for any of the following
elements of damage [ he / she ] has sustained to the present time as a result of injury to [ his
/ her ] [ father / mother ].
(a)*(the reasonable value of the services of [ his / her ] [ father / mother ] of
which [ he / she ] has been deprived)
(b)*(the reasonable value of the society and companionship with [ his / her ]
[ father / mother ] of which [ he / she ] has been deprived)
You should also include the amount of money that will compensate [ him / her ] for such
of these elements of damage as you decide are reasonably certain to be sustained in the
future. If any element is of a continuing nature, you shall decide how long it may continue.
**(If an element of damage is permanent in nature, then you shall decide how long [ name
of child ] and [ his / her ] [ father / mother ] are each likely to live and how long [ name of
child ] is likely to sustain that element of damage.)
Which, if any, of these elements of damage have been proved is for you to decide based
upon evidence and not upon speculation, guess or conjecture. The amount of money to be
awarded for certain of these elements of damage cannot be proved in a precise dollar
amount. The law leaves such amount to your sound judgment. Your verdict must be solely
to compensate [ name of child ] and not to punish the defendant.
Note on Use
*Complete this instruction by selecting the appropriate element or elements of damages, as
shown by the evidence, from the clauses in parentheses. The appropriate phrases in
brackets should also be given as part of the instruction.
**The sentence in parentheses should be given if appropriate.
Subsection a. is not intended for use in no-fault cases without modification.
Comment
A child has a cause of action for loss of parental consortium caused by tortious injury to the
parent. Berger v Weber, 411 Mich 1; 303 NW2d 424 (1981). Consortium includes love,
Michigan Supreme Court Page 52-5
Chapter 52: Injury to Spouse or Parent
companionship, affection, society, comfort and solace as well as services. Id. at 17.
Special note on parent’s cause of action
A parent has no cause of action for loss of consortium when a child is negligently injured.
Sizemore v Smock, 430 Mich 283; 422 NW2d 666 (1988); but the parent may sue for loss
of services and medical expenses, Jakubiec v Hasty, 337 Mich 205; 59 NW2d 385 (1953).
See also Sizemore, 430 Mich at 288.
History
M Civ JI 52.02 was added September 1989.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 52-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 53-1
CHAPTER 53
Particular Factors in Computing
Damages
M Civ JI 53.01 Statutory Mortality Table—Injury Case [ Instruction Deleted ] ............ 53-2
M Civ JI 53.02 Statutory Mortality Table—Death Case [ Instruction Deleted ]............ 53-3
M Civ JI 53.03 Future Damages (Non-personal Injury Action)—Reduction to Present Cash
Value ............................................................................................................................ 53-4
M Civ JI 53.03A Future Damages (Personal Injury Action)—Reduction to Present Cash
Value ............................................................................................................................ 53-5
M Civ JI 53.04 Interest—As Part of Damages............................................................... 53-6
M Civ JI 53.05 Mitigation of Damages—Failure to Exercise Ordinary Care ................. 53-8
M Civ JI 53.06 Effect of Inflation on Future Damages .................................................. 53-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 53-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 53.01 Statutory Mortality Table—Injury Case [ Instruction
Deleted ]
Comment
The mortality table that was part of MCL 500.834 was deleted by 1994 PA 226.
In the absence of a stipulation as to the mortality table to be used, testimony may be
necessary.
Tables of life expectancy for Michigan residents are available from the Michigan
Department of Community Health, Division for Vital Records and Health Statistics. The
tables may be accessed electronically at http://www.michigan.gov/mdch
.
Life expectancy tables for the United States and individual states are available from the
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. The tables may be accessed electronically
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
. The United States Department of Health and Human Services
also publishes U.S. Decennial Life Tables containing information for the various states.
Life expectancy tables can also be found in the Statistical Abstract of the United States
published by the United States Department of Commerce.
There may be other sources of mortality tables.
History
M Civ JI 53.01 was SJI 34.01. Amended January 1992. Deleted October 1999.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 53-3
Chapter 53: Particular Factors in Computing Damages
M Civ JI 53.02 Statutory Mortality Table—Death Case [ Instruction
Deleted ]
Comment
The mortality table that was part of MCL 500.834 was deleted by 1994 PA 226.
In the absence of a stipulation as to the mortality table to be used, testimony may be
necessary.
Tables of life expectancy for Michigan residents are available from the Michigan
Department of Community Health, Division for Vital Records and Health Statistics. The
tables may be accessed electronically at http://www.michigan.gov/mdch
.
Life expectancy tables for the United States and individual states are available from the
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, National Center for Health Statistics. The tables may be accessed electronically
at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
. The United States Department of Health and Human Services
also publishes U.S. Decennial Life Tables containing information for the various states.
Life expectancy tables can also be found in the Statistical Abstract of the United States
published by the United States Department of Commerce.
There may be other sources of mortality tables.
History
M Civ JI 53.02 was SJI 34.02. Amended March 1991, January 1992. Deleted October 1999.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 53-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 53.03 Future Damages (Non-personal Injury Action)—
Reduction to Present Cash Value
If you decide plaintiff will sustain damages in the future, you must reduce that amount to
its present cash value. The amount of damages you determine [ he / she ] will sustain the
first year is to be divided by 1.05. The amount of damages you determine [ he / she ] will
sustain the second year is to be divided by 1.10. The amount [ he / she ] will sustain the third
year is to be divided by 1.15. You then continue to use a similar procedure for each
additional year you determine [ he / she ] will sustain damages. The total of your yearly
computations is the present cash value of plaintiff’s future damages.
Note on Use
This instruction is not for use in personal injury actions filed on or after October 1, 1986.
MCL 600.6306; 1986 PA 178, §3. In personal injury actions, MCivJI 53.03A should be
given.
The jury should be instructed to reduce future damages to present cash value in cases other
than personal injury actions. Nation v WDE Electric Co, 454 Mich 489; 563 NW2d 233
(1997). In the absence of a stipulation to the contrary, the trial court is required to instruct
the jury to reduce future damages to present cash value. Freeman v Lanning Corp, 61 Mich
App 527 (1975); Goins v Ford Motor Co, 131 Mich App 185; 347 NW2d 184 (1983);
Lagalo v Allied Corporation (On Remand), 233 Mich App 514; 592 NW2d 786 (1999).
The reduction to present value called for by this instruction is based on a 5 percent simple
interest calculation. This rate has been approved in numerous cases. See cases collected in
Pontiac School District v Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, 221 Mich App 602; 563
NW2d 693 (1997). In cases in which the court determines that a 5 percent simple interest
rate is not appropriate, this instruction should be revised. See Pontiac School District.
Comment
The obligation to reduce future damages to present cash value in cases other than personal
injury actions filed on or after October 1, 1986 remains with the jury. Nation. Non-personal
injury action cases have approved the 5 percent rate in this instruction. See, e.g., Goins;
Foehr v Republic Automotive Parts, 212 Mich App 663; 538 NW2d 420 (1995). But see,
Pontiac School District.
History
M Civ JI 53.03 was SJI 34.03. Amended April 1, 2004.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 53-5
Chapter 53: Particular Factors in Computing Damages
M Civ JI 53.03A Future Damages (Personal Injury Action)—
Reduction to Present Cash Value
If you decide that plaintiff is entitled to an award of future damages, you should award the
full value of future damages as you determine them. You should not reduce any award of
future damages to present cash value.
Note on Use
This instruction is for use in personal injury actions. MCL 600.6306; 1986 PA 178, § 3. In
personal injury actions, the trial judge, rather than the jury, is required to calculate the
reduction of future damages to present cash value using the statutory rate of 5 percent per
year, compounded annually, for each year in which those damages accrue. MCL
600.6306(2). Pursuant to MCL 600.6311, future damages awarded to a plaintiff who is 60
years of age or older at the time of judgment are not reduced to present value. Pursuant to
2012 PA 608, MCL 600.6306 does not apply to medical malpractice actions where the
cause of action arose after March 28, 2013. Those actions are governed by MCL 600.6306a.
History
This instruction was added April 1, 2004. Amended September 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 53-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 53.04 Interest—As Part of Damages
If you decide plaintiff has suffered damages, you should determine when those damages
began, and add interest from then to [ date complaint filed ] [ at a rate of [ insert rate ]
percent per year/ at a rate per year that you decide is appropriate ].
Note on Use
This instruction does not include a rate of interest, which may differ depending on the type
of action. If an issue about rate of interest is raised, the judge will have to decide whether
the law requires the judge to give the jury a stated interest rate, or whether it should be left
to the jury to determine a reasonable interest rate. See the comment below.
In non-personal injury actions, plaintiffs’ attorneys commonly agree that the trial judge not
give this instruction in exchange for defense attorneys’ agreement that the judge not give
MCivJI 53.03 Future Damages-Reduction to Present Cash Value, sometimes with the
further agreement that the judge will make these computations after the jury returns its
verdict. If the trial judge is to make these computations, the jury will still have to determine
when the pre-complaint damages accrued and when the future damages will be sustained.
(Note that in personal injury actions, MCivJI 53.03 is not given to the jury because the trial
judge reduces future damages to present cash value. See comment to MCivJI 53.03.)
Comment
In Currie v Fiting, 375 Mich 440, 454-455; 134 NW2d 611, 616 (1965) (a wrongful death
action), the Michigan Supreme Court held that in tort actions where a claim accrues as of a
certain date and can be ascertained or computed as of that date, interest is properly awarded
as a part of damages from that date to the date of verdict. While the Currie case was not
tried to a jury, the Court went on to comment that in a jury trial, the jury should be instructed
to ascertain the date damages accrued and add interest from that date to the date of its
verdict. When Currie was decided, the judgment interest statute (MCL 600.6013) made a
defendant liable for interest from the date of judgment forward-to the date judgment is
satisfied. Shortly after Currie was decided, the statute was amended to prescribe interest
from the date of filing of the complaint. Cases decided subsequent to the statutory
amendment allow interest as part of damages only to the date the complaint is filed. Vannoy
v City of Warren, 26 Mich App 283, 288-289; 182 NW2d 65, 68-69 (1970), aff’d on other
grounds, 386 Mich 686; 194 NW2d 304 (1972).
The common law rule that interest may be awarded as an element of damages to
compensate for lost use of funds has early origins in Michigan jurisprudence. Snow v
Nowlin, 43 Mich 383; 5 NW 443 (1880). While MCivJI 53.04 was adopted with personal
injury/wrongful death cases in mind, juries have been instructed to include pre-complaint
(formerly pre-judgment) interest in other tort cases. Snow (misrepresentation); Capital
Michigan Supreme Court Page 53-7
Chapter 53: Particular Factors in Computing Damages
Mortgage Corp v Coopers & Lybrand, 142 Mich App 531; 369 NW2d 922 (1985)
(accountant negligence; but plaintiff failed to show when the loss accrued); Coan v
Brownstown Township, 126 Mich 626; 86 NW130 (1901) (negligence-property damage).
In Vannoy (a wrongful death action), the court instructed the jury to add interest as part of
damages at the rate of 5 percent per year from the date each type of damages was incurred.
The 5 percent rate was not in dispute, but the appellate court did comment that the judgment
interest statute, MCL 600.6013 (statutory rate was then 5% for judgments not on written
instruments), and interest as part of damages serve the same function to compensate for loss
of use of funds. Vannoy, 26 Mich App 283, 288. (Interest rates in the present version of
MCL 600.6013 vary depending on the nature of the action and the date the complaint was
filed, and are affected by offers of settlement.) An analogy to the reduction of future
damages to present worth was noted in Currie, but there was no indication of the rate of
interest used by the trial court in awarding interest as part of damages and the Supreme
Court did not discuss rate of interest. As the comment to MCivJI 53.03 Future Damages—
Reduction to Present Cash Value indicates, many decisions have approved a rate of 5
percent in reducing future damages to present worth. (Under present law, in personal injury
actions, the judge, not the jury reduces future damages to present worth using a 5 percent
rate (compounded annually for causes of action arising after March 28, 2013). MCL
600.6306(2). In Baxter v Woodward, 191 Mich 379; 158 NW 137 (1916) (a conversion
case), the Court approved the trial court’s instruction to the jury to award the market value
of the item at the date of conversion plus interest at 5 percent, but did not specifically
discuss the rate used.
Pre-complaint interest in certain contract cases is covered by statute (MCL 438.7) but that
does not preclude common law interest as part of damages in cases in which MCL 438.7 is
not applicable. Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Brothers, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 499 n 9; 475
NW2d 704 (1991). The 5 percent legal rate under MCL 438.31 must be used when
awarding interest under MCL 438.7. Gordon, 438 Mich 488, 505. But there is no indication
that the 5 percent rate is mandatory in contract cases in which common law interest as part
of damages is awarded. See the discussion of pre-complaint statutory and common law
interest including rates in Manley, Bennett, McDonald & Co v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins
Co, 821 F Supp 1225 (ED Mich 1993), aff’d 33 F3d 55 (6th Cir 1994). If the trial judge
neglects to instruct a jury on pre-complaint interest, interest may be added after the jury
returns its verdict. Gottesman v Fay-Bea Construction Co, 355 Mich 6; 94 NW2d 81
(1959).
For an extensive discussion of Michigan cases and statutes relating to pre-judgment
interest, see Michigan Law of Damages and Other Remedies, Ch 28 (Barbara A. Patek et
al, eds) (ICLE, 3rd ed 2002). “
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 53-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 53.05 Mitigation of Damages—Failure to Exercise Ordinary
Care
A person has a duty to use ordinary care to minimize his or her damages after [ he or she /
his or her property ] has been [ injured / damaged ]. It is for you to decide whether plaintiff
failed to use such ordinary care and, if so, whether any damage resulted from such failure.
You must not compensate the plaintiff for any portion of [ his / her ] damages which
resulted from [ his / her ] failure to use such care.
Note on Use
This instruction should not be given unless there is evidence creating an issue as to whether
plaintiff failed to use ordinary care to minimize his or her injury or damage.
Comment
Michigan law recognizes there is a duty of ordinary care to mitigate either personal or
property damage. See Zibbell v Grand Rapids, 129 Mich 659, 661; 89 NW 563, 564 (1902)
(personal injury); Sullivan v Pittsburgh Steamship Co, 230 Mich 414, 422; 203 NW 126,
128 (1925) (property damage).
The duty to minimize damages may include a duty to seek and follow medical treatment,
including surgery, which does not involve danger to life or extraordinary suffering.
Poikanen v Thomas Furnace Co, 226 Mich 614; 198 NW 252 (1924); Beauerle v Michigan
Central R Co, 152 Mich 345; 116 NW 424 (1908); Kolbas v American Boston Mining Co,
275 Mich 616; 267 NW 751 (1936); Anno: Duty of injured person to minimize tort
damages by medical or surgical treatment, 48 ALR2d 346.
History
M Civ JI 53.05 was SJI 35.01.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 53-9
Chapter 53: Particular Factors in Computing Damages
M Civ JI 53.06 Effect of Inflation on Future Damages
If you decide that the plaintiff will sustain damages in the future, you may consider the
effect of inflation in determining the damages to be awarded for future losses.
Comment
Kovacs v Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co, 426 Mich 647; 397 NW2d 169 (1986). The
plaintiff is not required to introduce evidence regarding inflation, because there is no expert
consensus on the rate of inflation and it would unnecessarily and unduly prolong trials.
Kovacs.
In Bosak v Hutchinson, 422 Mich 712; 375 NW2d 333 (1985), the Michigan Supreme
Court upheld the trial court’s refusal to give an instruction stating a 13 percent rate of
inflation based on a rise in the Consumer Price Index.
History
M Civ JI 53.06 was added October 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 53-10 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 60-1
CHAPTER 60
Jury Deliberations
M Civ JI 60.01 Jury Deliberations ................................................................................. 60-2
M Civ JI 60.01A Cameras in the Courtroom .................................................................. 60-5
M Civ JI 60.02 Deadlocked Jury ..................................................................................... 60-6
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 60-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 60.01 Jury Deliberations
You will be given a written copy of the final jury instructions for your use in the jury room
for deliberation. [ I will also provide you with an electronically recorded copy of these
instructions. ]
When you go to the jury room, your deliberations should be conducted in a serious and
respectful manner. You should first select a foreperson. She or he should see to it that the
discussion goes forward in an orderly fashion and that each juror has full opportunity to
discuss the issues.
When at least five of you agree upon a verdict, it will be received as your verdict. In your
deliberations, you should weigh the evidence with an open mind and consideration for each
other’s opinions.
In this jury trial your group decision-making process is important. A jury that works
together to deliberate fairly and respectfully as a group is more likely to come to a fair and
just result.
As a jury you have heard and seen the evidence admitted in this trial, but some jurors may
not have heard or seen all the evidence. You are encouraged to share with your fellow jurors
the evidence you heard and saw that others may have missed.
Because you will be deliberating as a group, here are a few simple practices to follow
during deliberation to ensure this process runs fairly and respectfully. I will have a printed
copy of these recommended practices for the jury’s reference during deliberation because
I want you to understand how this process should work so each of you can do your job as
jurors.
First, before you vote on any verdict question, you are encouraged to discuss the strengths
and weaknesses of the evidence.
Second, you are encouraged to discuss the evidence that you think supports your decision.
Third, as your fellow jurors speak about the evidence they found important, please listen to
one another. In order for this process to work best, I want each of you to have the benefit
of your fellow jurors’ insights and ideas. Those insights and ideas may impact your
thinking—or they may not—but unless you listen and allow them to speak, you will not
have the chance to have your own thinking challenged.
Fourth, as in any group, some of you will be more comfortable than others in sharing your
thoughts. The group will lose out if they do not listen to each other and have the benefit of
everyone’s input. It is important that all ideas are heard. Therefore, I encourage everyone
Michigan Supreme Court Page 60-3
Chapter 60: Jury Deliberations
to speak out. The jury should make sure each juror’s ideas are voiced and considered during
the deliberations.
If differences of opinion arise, you should discuss them in a spirit of fairness and frankness.
You should express not only your opinion but also the facts and reasons upon which you
base it.
In the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and change
your opinion if you are convinced that it is wrong. However, none of you should surrender
your honest conviction as to the weight and effect of the evidence or lack of evidence solely
because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
During your deliberations, and before you reach a verdict, you must not disclose anything
about your discussions to others outside the jury room, not even how your voting stands.
Therefore, until you reach a verdict, do not disclose that information, even in the
courtroom.
During your deliberations you may not communicate with persons outside the jury room
(other than the judge), or seek information by any means, including cellular telephones or
other electronic devices. In other words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone,
correspond with anyone, or electronically communicate with anyone about this case. You
can only discuss the case in the jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations. You
may not use these electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case because
it is important that you decide the case based solely on the evidence presented in the
courtroom and my instructions on the law. Information from the Internet or available
through social media might be wrong, incomplete, or inaccurate.
If you discover a juror has violated my instructions, you should report it to me right away.
That concludes my instructions on the law. If you have any questions about these
instructions at this point, please write them down and give them to the bailiff. The bailiff
will then give them to me, and after consulting with counsel, I will address your questions.
[ Having addressed the questions / No questions having been asked, ] I have approved a
verdict form for your use in the jury room. The verdict form reads as follows: [ review
verdict form ]
If you wish to communicate with me or examine the exhibits while you are deliberating,
please have your foreperson write a note and give it to the bailiff. If you have any questions
about my instructions on the law, please place those particular questions in a sealed
envelope. Any questions or communications with me must be given to the bailiff, who will
then pass them to me, and I will address the questions or communications with counsel and
respond as appropriate.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 60-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Note on Use
If, after reasonable deliberation, the jury reports an inability to agree or fails to return a
verdict, then the court may also give M Civ JI 60.02. The court may give the jurors copies of
the instructions before the instructions are read to the jury.
Comment
MCL 600.1352 and MCR 2.514(A) now provide for trial by a jury of six in civil cases, with
a verdict to be received when five jurors agree. An exception is made for civil actions for
commitment of a person to a mental, correctional or training institution, which require a
unanimous verdict. MCR 5.740(C); MCL 600.1352.
The 2011 amendment reflects the amendment to MCR 2.513(N) ordered by the Michigan
Supreme Court on June 29, 2011, which became effective September 1, 2011. This
amendment requires that certain procedures be followed with respect to questions raised by
the jurors and that the jurors be given a written copy of the instructions.
The May 2023 amendment was drawn from amended instructions suggested by the
American College of Trial Lawyers and was “designed to counter cognitive flaws and focus
jurors’ attention, increase their use of deliberative thought, mitigate “confirmation bias,”
and broaden participation during jury deliberation.” Improving Jury Deliberations through
Jury Instructions Based on Cognitive Science, American College of Trial Lawyers,
February 2019.
History
M Civ JI 60.01 was SJI 1.05. Amended January 1982, April 1986, October 1993, March
2006, October 2011, January 2014, October 2017, May 2023.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 60-5
Chapter 60: Jury Deliberations
M Civ JI 60.01A Cameras in the Courtroom
In this case, the news media was permitted to film and photograph the proceedings pursuant
to the rules of the Michigan Supreme Court.
In your deliberation, you should not draw any inferences or conclusions from the fact that
cameras were present during trial. Nor should you concern yourself with why certain
witnesses were filmed and photographed and others were not. Whether a particular witness
was filmed or photographed is not any indication as to the value of, or weight to be given
to, that witness’s testimony.
Note on Use
This instruction would only be given if the trial judge allowed cameras in the courtroom as
permitted by Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 1989-1.
History
M Civ JI 60.01A was added October 2013.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 60-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 60.02 Deadlocked Jury
The Court has previously instructed you that it is your duty to determine the facts from
evidence received in open court and to apply the law to the facts and in this way decide the
case. I am now asking you to return to the jury room for further deliberations. In your
deliberations you should reexamine the questions submitted with a proper regard and
consideration for each other’s opinions. You should listen to each other’s arguments with
open minds and make every reasonable effort to reach a verdict.
[ Because it appears you are (at an impasse / in need of assistance), I invite you to list the
issues that (divide / confuse) you so that I can see if I can be of some assistance by clarifying
or amplifying the final instructions. ]
Note on Use
This instruction should be used only if the jury has reported a deadlock or the Court has
determined that further deliberations are warranted, after considering such factors as the
length of time the jury has been out, the hour of the day, the nature and complexity of the
issues, the expense of retrial and the possibility of agreement. The following procedure is
suggested:
If a message is received that the jury is deadlocked, or if the Court proposes to ascertain
whether the jury is deadlocked, all counsel should be notified and given a reasonable
opportunity to be present. At that time, the Court should state on the record the facts
concerning any communication from the jury, or, if there has been no communication, the
length of time the jury has been deliberating. Counsel should be informed that the Court
proposes to give the instruction and give them an opportunity to object.
The jury should then be returned to the box and cautioned not to reveal the numerical
division in the voting. The Court may then make inquiry of the foreperson regarding the
jury’s ability to reach a verdict and, if further deliberations appear warranted, may give the
instruction and return the jury to the jury room.
The bracketed language should be used as permitted by MCR 2.513(N)(4).
Comment
See MCR 2.513(N)(1) for authority to give additional instructions. Instructions which
importune the jurors to reconcile their differences and reach a verdict have been approved
in Michigan. Kelley v Emery, 75 Mich 147; 42 NW 795 (1889); Vinton v Plainfield Twp,
208 Mich 179; 175 NW 403 (1919); Pierce v Rehfuss, 35 Mich 53 (1876); Richardson v
Detroit & M R Co, 182 Mich 206; 148 NW 397 (1914).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 60-7
Chapter 60: Jury Deliberations
However, any instruction which tends to censure jurors for not yielding to the majority is
erroneous. Stoudt v Shepard, 73 Mich 588; 41 NW 696 (1889). Any instructions which tend
to be coercive, even though unintentionally so, may be reversible error. Yinger v Secord,
369 Mich 364; 119 NW2d 577 (1963). The same is true of such conduct as repeatedly
sending the jury back for further deliberations late at night after already lengthy
deliberations produced a deadlock. Id.
Instructions of this type have been approved by the federal courts in both civil and criminal
cases. See, e.g., Allen v United States, 164 US 492 (1896); Hoagland v Chestnut Farms
Dairy, Inc, 72 F2d 729 (CA DC, 1934).
The question of the propriety of inquiring as to the numerical division of the jury in civil
cases has not been directly passed upon in Michigan. In Yinger such an inquiry by the trial
judge was noted in the opinion, but not discussed. However, both federal and Michigan
criminal cases have held that inquiry into the numerical division of the jury is coercive.
Brasfield v United States, 272 US 448; 47 S Ct 135; 71 L Ed 345 (1926); People v Wilson,
390 Mich 689; 213 NW2d 193 (1973).
See generally Comment: On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 Yale LJ 100 (1968).
The 2011 amendment reflects the amendment to MCR 2.513(N) ordered by the Michigan
Supreme Court on June 29, 2011, which became effective September 1, 2011. This
amendment permits the court in certain situations to invite the jurors to list the issues that
divide or confuse them in the event the court can be of assistance in clarifying or amplifying
the final instructions.
History
M Civ JI 60.02 was SJI 1.06. Amended October 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 60-8 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 65-1
CHAPTER 65
Forms of Verdicts: General
M Civ JI 65.01 Forms of Verdicts: Single Defendant without Counterclaim [ Form of Verdict
Deleted ]....................................................................................................................... 65-2
M Civ JI 65.02 Forms of Verdicts: Single Defendant with Counterclaim [ Form of Verdict
Deleted ]....................................................................................................................... 65-3
M Civ JI 65.03 Forms of Verdicts: Multiple Defendants with No Counterclaims [ Form of
Verdict Deleted ] .......................................................................................................... 65-4
M Civ JI 65.04 Forms of Verdicts: Multiple Defendants with One or More Counterclaims
[ Form of Verdict Deleted ] .......................................................................................... 65-5
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 65-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 65.01 Forms of Verdicts: Single Defendant without
Counterclaim [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
These forms of verdict, which were intended for tort cases, were deleted because they did
not comply with the current statute on jury verdicts in personal injury actions that requires
a division of past and future damages, of economic and noneconomic damages, and of
certain future damages by year. MCL 600.6305.
Also, these verdict forms were deleted because they were not suitable in cases in which
comparative negligence is an issue or in which fault of a named nonparty is an issue. MCL
600.6304.
History
M Civ JI 65.01 was SJI 45.01. Deleted November 2000.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 65-3
Chapter 65: Forms of Verdicts: General
M Civ JI 65.02 Forms of Verdicts: Single Defendant with Counterclaim
[ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
These forms of verdict, which were intended for tort cases, were deleted because they did
not comply with the current statute on jury verdicts in personal injury actions that requires
a division of past and future damages, of economic and noneconomic damages, and of
certain future damages by year. MCL 600.6305.
Also, these verdict forms were deleted because they were not suitable in cases in which
comparative negligence is an issue or in which fault of a named nonparty is an issue. MCL
600.6304.
History
M Civ JI 65.02 was SJI 45.02. Deleted November 2000.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 65-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 65.03 Forms of Verdicts: Multiple Defendants with No
Counterclaims [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
These verdict forms were deleted because they did not comply with current statutes
concerning jury verdicts (MCL 600.6304–.6306), because they did not incorporate
principles of comparative negligence or recognize the abolishment of joint liability in most
cases. See the Notes on Use to M Civ JI 41.04 Damages Not to Be Allocated among Joint
Tort-Feasors and M Civ JI 65.01 Forms of Verdicts: Single Defendant without
Counterclaim.
History
M Civ JI 65.03 was SJI 45.03. Deleted November 2000.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 65-5
Chapter 65: Forms of Verdicts: General
M Civ JI 65.04 Forms of Verdicts: Multiple Defendants with One or
More Counterclaims [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
These verdict forms were deleted because they did not comply with current statutes
concerning jury verdicts (MCL 600.6304–.6306), because they did not incorporate
principles of comparative negligence or recognize the abolishment of joint liability in most
cases. See the Notes on Use to M Civ JI 41.04 Damages Not to Be Allocated among Joint
Tort-Feasors and M Civ JI 65.01 Forms of Verdicts: Single Defendant without
Counterclaim.
History
M Civ JI 65.04 was SJI 45.04. Deleted November 2000.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 65-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-1
CHAPTER 66
Forms of Verdicts: Comparative
Negligence
M Civ JI 66.01 Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence............................................ 66-2
M Civ JI 66.01A Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence (Personal Injury Action)... 66-4
M Civ JI 66.02 Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence—Property Damage (To Be Used
in Cases Filed on or after March 28, 1996) ................................................................ 66-10
M Civ JI 66.03 Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence—Personal Injury Action (To Be
Used in Cases Filed on or after March 28, 1996) ....................................................... 66-13
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 66.01 Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury or damage to
the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s damages?
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the plaintiff negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 5: Was the plaintiff’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury or damage to the
plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 6: Using 100 percent as the total combined negligence which proximately caused
the injury or damage to the plaintiff, what percentage of such negligence is attributable to the
plaintiff?
Answer: ____ percent
Please note that the Court will reduce the total amount of plaintiff’s damages entered in QUESTION
NO. 3 by the percentage of negligence attributable to plaintiff, if any, entered in QUESTION NO.
6. The remainder will be the amount which plaintiff is entitled to recover.
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-3
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
Note on Use
Where there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the appropriate questions should be asked
separately as to each one.
A separate Special Verdict sheet should be furnished to the jury for each plaintiff and each
defendant.
History
M Civ JI 66.01 was added September 1980.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 66.01A Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence (Personal
Injury Action)
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the plaintiff sustain injury or damage?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 3.
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury or damage to
the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 4.
DAMAGES TO THE PRESENT DATE
QUESTION NO. 4: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s damages to the present date for [ describe
past economic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as lost wages, medical expenses, etc. ]?
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 5: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s damages to the present date for [ describe
past noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as M Civ JI 50.02 Pain and Suffering, Etc.,
M Civ JI 50.03 Disability and Disfigurement, and M Civ JI 50.04 Aggravation of Preexisting
Ailment or Condition ]?
Answer: $________.____
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-5
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
FUTURE DAMAGES
QUESTION NO. 6: If you find that the plaintiff will incur costs for medical or other health care in
the future, give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will incur costs.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-6 Michigan Supreme Court
QUESTION NO. 7: If you find that the plaintiff will sustain damages for [ lost wages or earnings /
or / lost earning capacity / and / [ describe other economic loss claimed by plaintiff ] ] in the future,
give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-7
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
QUESTION NO. 8: If you find that the plaintiff will sustain damages for [ describe future
noneconomic damages claimed by plaintiff ] in the future, give the total amount for each year in
which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-8 Michigan Supreme Court
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE/ALLOCATION OF FAULT
QUESTION NO. 9: Was the plaintiff negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 10.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 12.
QUESTION NO. 10: Was the plaintiff’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury or damage to
plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 11.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 12.
QUESTION NO. 11: Using 100 percent as the total, and considering the nature of the conduct and
the extent to which each party’s conduct caused or contributed to plaintiff’s injury, enter the
percentage of fault attributable to:
Answer:
Defendant [ name of defendant ]____ percent
Defendant [ name of defendant ]____ percent
Plaintiff [ name of plaintiff ]____ percent
QUESTION NO. 12: Using 100 percent as the total, and considering the nature of the conduct and
the extent to which each party’s conduct caused or contributed to plaintiff’s injury, enter the
percentage of fault attributable to:
Answer:
Defendant [ name of defendant ]____ percent
Defendant [ name of defendant ]____ percent
Please note that the judge will reduce the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages entered in
Questions No. 4 through 8 by the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff, if any, entered in
QUESTION NO. 11.
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-9
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
Note on Use
For cases filed before October 1, 1986, use M Civ JI 66.01. For cases filed on or after
October 1, 1986, relating to causes of action arising before October 1, 1986, use Questions
No. 1 through 10 from M Civ JI 66.01A followed by QUESTION NO. 6 from M Civ JI
66.01. For cases filed on or after October 1, 1986, relating to causes of action arising after
October 1, 1986, use M Civ JI 66.01A. See 1986 PA 178, §3.
Where there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the appropriate questions should be asked
separately as to each one.
A separate Special Verdict sheet should be furnished to the jury for each plaintiff and each
defendant.
Omit any questions that are not an issue, such as the question on contributory negligence
or those on future damages.
This verdict form should not be used if the plaintiff is over 60 years of age.
This form of verdict is appropriate in a case in which the evidence would allow an award
of damages for a 20-year period in the future. The form must be modified by the court to
add or delete lines in Questions No. 6, 7, and 8 in cases where the evidence supports an
award of damages for a period longer or shorter than 20 years.
Comment
See MCL 600.6304, .6305. The jury is not to determine the fault of settling tortfeasors.
Department of Transp v Thrasher, 446 Mich 61; 521 NW2d 214 (1994).
History
M Civ JI 66.01A was added February 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 66.02 Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence—Property
Damage (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or after March 28, 1996)
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 2.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the plaintiff sustain damage in one or more of the ways claimed?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 3.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the damage claimed by
the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 4.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 4: Was [ name of nonparty ] negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 5.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 6.
QUESTION NO. 5: Was [ name of nonparty ]’s negligence a proximate cause of the damage
claimed by the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 6.
QUESTION NO. 6: Was the plaintiff negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 7.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
QUESTION NO. 7: Was the plaintiff’s negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damage?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-11
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
QUESTION NO. 8:
A. Using 100 percent as the total, enter the percentage of negligence attributable to the defendant:
____ percent
B. If you answered “yes” to QUESTION NO. 5, then using 100 percent as the total, enter the
percentage of negligence attributable to [ name of nonparty ]:
____ percent
C. If you answered “yes” to QUESTION NO. 7, then using 100 percent as the total, enter the
percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff:
____ percent
The total of these must equal 100 percent:
TOTAL 100 percent
QUESTION NO. 9: If you find that plaintiff has sustained damage for [ describe damages to
property claimed by the plaintiff ], give the total amount of damages.
Answer: $________.____
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
This form of verdict should be used for cases involving only property damages that are filed
on or after March 28, 1996. 1995 PA 161, §3; 1995 PA 249, §3. See MCL 600.6304.
Where there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the appropriate questions should be asked
separately to each one.
A separate special verdict sheet should be furnished to the jury for each plaintiff and each
defendant.
Omit any questions that are not an issue.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-12 Michigan Supreme Court
If this verdict form is used in a property damage case in which future damages are
appropriate, the damages awarded in the answer to QUESTION NO. 9 should reflect
(unless the parties stipulate otherwise) an adjustment for inflation and a reduction of future
damages to present worth as directed by M Civ JI 53.06 Effect of Inflation on Future
Damages and M Civ JI 53.03 Future Damages—Reduction to Present Cash Value. The
Michigan statute MCL 600.6305 that requires jury verdicts to separate past from future
damages and to separate future damages by year applies to personal injury actions, not to
actions for damage to property only.
This form of verdict may have to be modified if fault, such as intentional conduct, is an
issue in the case. The statutory definition of fault is: “‘fault’ includes an act, an omission,
conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a legal duty, or
any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a proximate cause
of damage sustained by a party.” MCL 600.6304(8).
Comment
See MCL 600.6304, .6306.
Before the enactment of 1995 PA 161, the jury was not to determine the fault of settling
tortfeasors. Department of Transp v Thrasher, 446 Mich 61; 521 NW2d 214 (1994).
History
M Civ JI 66.02 was added June 1997. Amended December 2001.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-13
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
M Civ JI 66.03 Form of Verdict: Comparative Negligence—Personal
Injury Action (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or after March 28, 1996)
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 2.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the plaintiff injured?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 3.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury claimed by
the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 4.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 4: Was [ name of nonparty ] negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 5.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 6.
QUESTION NO. 5: Was [ name of nonparty ]’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury
claimed by the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 6.
QUESTION NO. 6: Was the plaintiff negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 7.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-14 Michigan Supreme Court
QUESTION NO. 7: Was the plaintiff’s negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
QUESTION NO. 8:
The total of these must equal 100 percent:TOTAL 100
percent
QUESTION NO. 9: If you find that plaintiff has sustained damages for [ describe past economic
damages claimed by the plaintiff such as lost wages, medical expenses, etc. ] to the present date,
give the total amount of damages to the present date.
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 10: If you find that the plaintiff will incur costs for medical or other health care
in the future, give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will incur costs.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
A. Using 100 percent as the total, enter the percentage
of negligence attributable to the defendant: ____ percent
B. If you answered “yes” to QUESTION NO. 5, then
using 100 percent as the total, enter the percentage of
negligence attributable to [ name of nonparty ]: ____ percent
C. If you answered “yes” to QUESTION NO. 7, then
using 100 percent as the total, enter the percentage of
negligence attributable to the plaintiff: ____ percent
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-15
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
QUESTION NO. 11: If you find that plaintiff will sustain damages for [ lost wages or earnings / or
/ lost earning capacity / and / [ describe other economic loss claimed by plaintiff ] ] in the future,
give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-16 Michigan Supreme Court
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
NOTE: If you determined in QUESTION NO. 8 that plaintiff was more than 50 percent at fault,
then do not answer any further questions. If you determined in QUESTION NO. 8 that plaintiff was
50 percent or less at fault, then go on to QUESTION NO. 12.
QUESTION NO. 12: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s damages to the present date for
[ describe past noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as M Civ JI 50.02 Pain and
Suffering, Etc., M Civ JI 50.03 Disability and Disfigurement, and M Civ JI 50.04 Aggravation of
Preexisting Ailment or Condition ]?
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 13: If you find that plaintiff will sustain damages for [ describe future
noneconomic damages claimed by plaintiff ] in the future, give the total amount for each year in
which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-17
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
This form of verdict should only be used for cases that are filed on or after March 28, 1996.
1995 PA 161, §3; 1995 PA 249, §3.
If the plaintiff is not the person upon whose injury or death the damages are based, this form
of verdict must be modified.
Where there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the appropriate questions should be asked
separately to each one.
A separate special verdict sheet should be furnished to the jury for each plaintiff and
defendant.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-18 Michigan Supreme Court
Omit any questions that are not an issue.
This verdict form should not be used if the plaintiff is over 60 years of age.
This form of verdict is appropriate in a case in which the evidence would allow an award
of damages for a twenty-year period in the future. This form must be modified by the trial
judge to add or delete lines in Questions No. 10, 11, and 13 in cases where the evidence
supports an award of damages for a period longer or shorter than twenty years.
This form of verdict may have to be modified if fault, such as intentional conduct, is an
issue in the case. The statutory definition of fault is: “ ‘fault’ includes an act, an omission,
conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a legal duty, or
any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a proximate cause
of damage sustained by a party.” MCL 600.6304(8).
Comment
See MCL 600.6304, .6305, .6306 .
Before the enactment of 1995 PA 161, the jury was not to determine the fault of settling tort
feasors. Department of Transp v Thrasher, 446 Mich 61 (1994).
In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury or
wrongful death, noneconomic damages will not be awarded if the person whose injury or
death the damages are based on is more than 50 percent at fault. MCL 600.2959 .
The 2007 amendment deleted the phrase “in one or more of the ways claimed” from
Question 2.
History
M Civ JI 66.03 was added June 1997. Amended September 2007.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-1
CHAPTER 67
Forms of Verdicts: Michigan No-
Fault Automobile Insurance Law
M Civ JI 67.01 Form of Verdict: No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action ............................... 2
M Civ JI 67.02 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Noneconomic Loss [ Form of
Verdict Deleted ] ................................................................................................................ 6
M Civ JI 67.02A Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Noneconomic Loss (and
Allocation of Fault) [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] ................................................................. 7
M Civ JI 67.03 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic Loss [ Form of Verdict
Deleted ]............................................................................................................................. 8
M Civ JI 67.03A Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic Loss (and Allocation
of Fault) [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] .................................................................................. 9
M Civ JI 67.04 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic Loss and
Noneconomic Loss [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] ............................................................... 10
M Civ JI 67.04A Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic Loss and
Noneconomic Loss (and Allocation of Fault) [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]........................ 11
M Civ JI 67.15 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: Economic Loss and
Noneconomic Loss—Comparative Negligence Not an Issue [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] 12
M Civ JI 67.16 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: Economic Loss and
Noneconomic Loss—and Comparative Negligence/Multiple Defendants/Allocation of
Fault (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995 PA 222 Applies) [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] . 13
M Civ JI 67.17 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: (As Applicable) Economic Loss
and Noneconomic Loss—and Comparative Negligence/Single or Multiple Defendants/
Allocation of Fault ............................................................................................................ 14
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 67.01 Form of Verdict: No-Fault First-Party Benefits Action
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Did the plaintiff sustain an accidental bodily injury?
A. Answer: ____(yes or no)
B. If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the plaintiff’s accidental bodily injury arise out of the ownership,
operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle [ on [ date ] / during the period
of [ specify dates ]? ]
A. Answer: ____(yes or no)
B. If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
ALLOWABLE EXPENSES
QUESTION NO. 3: Were allowable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the plaintiff arising out
of the accidental bodily injury referred to in QUESTION NO. 2?
(Allowable expenses consist of all reasonable charges for reasonably necessary products, services,
and accommodations for the plaintiff’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation.)
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” what is the amount of allowable expenses owed to the plaintiff (include
only expenses not already paid by the defendant)?
$____________
WORK LOSS
QUESTION NO. 4: Did the plaintiff sustain work loss arising out of the accidental bodily injury
referred to in QUESTION NO. 2?
(Work loss consists of loss of income from work the plaintiff would have performed during the first
three years after the date of the accident if the plaintiff had not been injured. *[ Work loss for an
injured person who is temporarily unemployed at the time of the accident or during the period of
disability shall be based on earned income for the last month employed full time preceding the
accident. ] Work-loss benefits are computed at 85 percent of the plaintiff’s loss of gross income, but
they may not exceed the sum of [ applicable monthly maximum ] per 30-day period nor may they
be payable beyond three years after the date of the accidental bodily injury.)
A. Answer: ____ (yes or no)
B. If your answer is “yes,” what is the amount of work loss owed to the plaintiff
(include only work loss not already paid by the defendant)?
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-3
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
$____________
REPLACEMENT SERVICE EXPENSES
QUESTION NO. 5: Were replacement service expenses incurred by or on behalf of the plaintiff
arising out of the accidental bodily injury referred to in QUESTION NO. 2?
(Replacement service expenses consist of expenses not exceeding $20 per day reasonably incurred
in obtaining ordinary and necessary services in place of those that, if the plaintiff had not been
injured, the plaintiff would have performed during the first three years after the date of the accident,
not for income, but for the benefit of the plaintiff or [ his / her ] dependent(s). Benefits for
replacement service expenses may not exceed $20 per day nor may they be payable beyond three
years after the date of the accidental bodily injury.)
A. Answer: ____ (yes or no)
B. If your answer is yes,” what is the amount of replacement service expenses
owed to the plaintiff (include only replacement service expenses not already paid by the
defendant)?
$____________
SURVIVOR’S LOSS; FUNERAL AND BURIAL EXPENSES
QUESTION NO. 6: Did [ name of decedent ]’s death result from the accidental bodily injury
referred to in QUESTION NO. 2?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer QUESTION NO. 7 or QUESTION NO. 8. Answer
QUESTION NO. 9.
If your answer is “yes,” answer QUESTION NO. 7.
QUESTION NO. 7: Did the dependents of [ name of decedent ] incur survivor’s loss?
(Survivor’s loss consists of two categories of loss: (1) a loss of tangible things of economic value
that the dependents would have received for their support during their dependency if [ name of
decedent ] had not died. This includes the after-tax income of [ name of decedent ] plus the value of
[ his / her ] lost fringe benefits, and (2) replacement service expenses not exceeding $20 per day
reasonably incurred by the dependents during their dependency and after the death of [ name of
decedent ] in obtaining ordinary and necessary services in place of those that [ name of decedent ]
would have performed for their benefit if [ he / she ] had not died. The benefits payable for both
categories of survivor’s loss may not exceed the sum total of [ applicable monthly maximum ] per
30-day period nor may they be payable beyond three years after the date of the accidental bodily
injury.)
A. Answer: ____ (yes or no)
B. If your answer is “yes,” what is the total amount of survivor’s loss owed to the
plaintiff (include only the loss not already paid by the defendant)?
$____________
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-4 Michigan Supreme Court
QUESTION NO. 8: Were funeral and burial expenses incurred as a result of the death of [ name of
decedent ]?
(Funeral and burial expenses may not exceed the lesser of the amount incurred or [ insert policy
maximum ].)
A. Answer: ____ (yes or no)
B. If your answer is “yes,” what is the amount of funeral and burial expenses
owed to the plaintiff (include only those expenses not already paid by the defendant)?
$____________
INTEREST
QUESTION NO. 9: Was payment for any of the expenses or losses to which the plaintiff was
entitled overdue?
(Payment for an expense or loss is overdue if it is not paid within 30 days after the defendant
receives reasonable proof of the fact and the amount of the claim. An overdue claim bears interest
at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the date the expense or loss became overdue.)
A. Answer: ____ (yes or no)
B. If your answer is yes,” what is the amount of interest owed to the
plaintiff on overdue benefits (include only interest not already paid by the defendant)?
$____________
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
*The bracketed sentence in QUESTION NO. 4 should be used if the injured person is
temporarily unemployed.
If the plaintiff is not the injured person, substitute the name of the injured person for the
word “plaintiff” where necessary.
See MCL 500.3107(1)(a) for the statutory minimum and maximum for funeral and burial
expenses.
Omit any questions that are not at issue, such as whether the injuries arose out of the
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-5
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, and any benefits that are not
claimed by the plaintiff.
This Special Verdict Form may have to be modified where there are questions involving
coordination of benefits, governmental setoffs, or other issues arising under the no-fault
statutes that are not specifically addressed by the format set forth.
For applicable monthly maximum, see Note on Use to M Civ JI 35.01.
History
M Civ JI 67.01 was added February 1981. Amended May 1999.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 67.02 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence;
Noneconomic Loss [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
This form of verdict, deleted by the Committee May 1998, was used for causes of action
that arose before October 1, 1986. See 1986 PA 178, §3.
History
M Civ JI 67.02 was added November 1980. Amended January 1984, January 1988,
November 1995. Deleted May 1998.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-7
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
M Civ JI 67.02A Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence;
Noneconomic Loss (and Allocation of Fault) [ Form of Verdict
Deleted ]
Note on Use
See M Civ JI 67.17 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: (As Applicable)
Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss—and Comparative Negligence/Single or Multiple
Defendants/Allocation of Fault.
History
M Civ JI 67.02A was added October 1987. Amended November 1995. Deleted December
1999.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 67.03 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic
Loss [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
This form of verdict, deleted by the Committee May 1998, was used for causes of action
that arose before October 1, 1986. See 1986 PA 178, §3.
History
M Civ JI 67.03 was added November 1980. Amended September 1989. Deleted May 1998.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-9
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
M Civ JI 67.03A Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic
Loss (and Allocation of Fault) [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
See M Civ JI 67.17 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: (As Applicable)
Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss—and Comparative Negligence/Single or Multiple
Defendants/Allocation of Fault.
History
M Civ JI 67.03A was added October 1987. Amended September 1989. Deleted December
1999.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 67.04 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic
Loss and Noneconomic Loss [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
This form of verdict, deleted by the Committee May 1998, was used for causes of action
that arose before October 1, 1986. See 1986 PA 178, §3.
History
M Civ JI 67.04 was added November 1980. Amended January 1984, January 1988,
September 1989. Deleted May 1998.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-11
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
M Civ JI 67.04A Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence; Economic
Loss and Noneconomic Loss (and Allocation of Fault) [ Form of
Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
See M Civ JI 67.17 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: (As Applicable)
Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss—and Comparative Negligence/Single or Multiple
Defendants/Allocation of Fault.
History
M Civ JI 67.04A was added October 1987. Amended September 1989. Deleted December
1999.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 67.15 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: Economic
Loss and Noneconomic Loss—Comparative Negligence Not an Issue
[ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
See M Civ JI 67.17 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: (As Applicable)
Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss—and Comparative Negligence/Single or Multiple
Defendants/Allocation of Fault.
History
M Civ JI 67.15 was added June 1997. Deleted December 1999.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-13
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
M Civ JI 67.16 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: Economic
Loss and Noneconomic Loss—and Comparative Negligence/Multiple
Defendants/Allocation of Fault (To Be Used in Cases in Which 1995
PA 222 Applies) [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
See M Civ JI 67.17 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: (As Applicable)
Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss—and Comparative Negligence/Single or Multiple
Defendants/Allocation of Fault.
History
M Civ JI 67.16 was added June 1997. Deleted December 1999.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 67.17 Form of Verdict: No-Fault Auto Negligence: (As
Applicable) Economic Loss and Noneconomic Loss—and
Comparative Negligence/Single or Multiple Defendants/Allocation
of Fault
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was [ name of defendant A ] negligent?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 2.
*QUESTION NO. 2: Was [ name of defendant B ] negligent?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go to QUESTION NO. 3.
If your answer is “no” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 1 is “yes,” go to QUESTION NO. 3.
If your answer is “no” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 1 is “no,” do not answer any further
questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the plaintiff injured?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 1 is “yes,” go to QUESTION NO. 4.
If your answer is “yes,” your answer to QUESTION NO. 1 is “no,” and your answer to
QUESTION NO. 2 is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 5.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 4: Was [ name of defendant A ] ‘s negligence a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
[ injury / injuries ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 2 is “yes,” go to QUESTION NO. 5.
If your answer is “no” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 2 is “yes,” go to QUESTION NO. 5.
If your answer is “yes” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 2 is “no,” go to QUESTION NO. 6.
If your answer is “no” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 2 is “no,” do not answer any further
questions.
*QUESTION NO. 5: Was [ name of defendant B ] ‘s negligence a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
[ injury / injuries ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on QUESTION NO. 6.
If your answer is “no” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 4 is “yes,” go to QUESTION NO. 6.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-15
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
If your answer is “no” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 4 is “no,” do not answer any further
questions.
PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE
QUESTION NO. 6: Was the plaintiff negligent?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 7.
If your answer is “no” and your answers to both Questions No. 4 and 5 are “yes,” do not answer
QUESTION NO. 7; go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
If your answer is “no” and you answered “no” to either QUESTION NO. 4 or QUESTION NO. 5,
do not answer QUESTION NO. 7 or QUESTION NO. 8; go on to QUESTION NO. 9.
QUESTION NO. 7: Was the plaintiff’s negligence a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s [ injury /
injuries ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
If your answer is “no” and your answers to Questions No. 4 and 5 are “yes,” go on to QUESTION
NO. 8.
If your answer is “no” and you answered “no” to either QUESTION NO. 4 or QUESTION NO. 5,
do not answer QUESTION NO. 8; go on to QUESTION NO. 9.
QUESTION NO. 8:
The total of these must equal 100 percent:TOTAL 100
percent
ECONOMIC LOSS CLAIM
A. If you answered “yes” to QUESTION NO. 4, then
using 100 percent as the total, enter the percentage of
negligence attributable to [ name of defendant A ]: ____ percent
*B. If you answered “yes” to QUESTION NO. 5,
then using 100 percent as the total, enter the percent-
age of negligence attributable to [ name of defendant
B ]:
____ percent
C. If you answered “yes” to QUESTION NO. 7, then
using 100 percent as the total, enter the percentage of
negligence attributable to the plaintiff: ____ percent
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-16 Michigan Supreme Court
QUESTION NO. 9: Did the plaintiff’s injury result in damages for economic loss for [ for insured
defendants, insert those applicable economic loss damages suffered by the plaintiff in excess of
compensable no-fault benefits for which plaintiff seeks recovery: for the first three years, amounts
in excess of no-fault benefits for work loss, allowable expenses, and survivors’ loss, and, for the
period after three years, all work loss, allowable expenses, and survivors’ loss. For uninsured
defendants, insert any economic loss damages ] to the present date?
Answer: _____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes”, go on to QUESTION NO. 10.
If your answer is “no”, do not answer QUESTION NO. 10; go on to QUESTION NO. 12.
QUESTION NO. 10: What is the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages for economic loss to the
present date?
Answer: $________.____
[ Please note that the judge will reduce the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages for economic
loss by the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff, if any, entered in QUESTION
NO. 8. ]
QUESTION NO. 11: Will plaintiff sustain economic damages in the future for [ for insured
defendants, insert those applicable economic loss damages suffered by the plaintiff in excess of
compensable no-fault benefits for which plaintiff seeks recovery: for the first three years, amounts
in excess of no-fault benefits for work loss, allowable expenses, and survivors’ loss, and, for the
period after three years, all work loss, allowable expenses, and survivors’ loss. For uninsured
defendants, insert any economic loss damages ]?
Answer: _____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes”, go on to QUESTION NO. 12.
If your answer is “no”, do not answer QUESTION NO. 12; go on to QUESTION NO. 13.
QUESTION NO. 12: Give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will incur economic
damages in the future.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-17
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
NONECONOMIC LOSS CLAIM
**[ NOTE: If you determined in QUESTION NO. 8 that the plaintiff was more than 50 percent at
fault, then do not answer any further questions. If you determined in QUESTION NO. 8 that the
plaintiff was 50 percent or less at fault, then go on to QUESTION NO. 13. ]
QUESTION NO. 13: Did the plaintiff’s injury result in [ death / serious impairment of ***[ a body
function ]
1
[ body function ]
2
/ or / permanent serious disfigurement ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 14.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 14: What is the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages for noneconomic loss for
[ describe noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as M Civ JI 50.02 Pain and
Suffering, Etc., M Civ JI 50.03 Disability and Disfigurement, and M Civ JI 50.04 Aggravation of
Preexisting Ailment or Condition ] to the present date?
Answer: $________.____
[ Please note that the judge will reduce the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages for noneconomic
loss by the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff, if any, entered in QUESTION NO.
8. ]
QUESTION NO. 15: Will plaintiff sustain damages for noneconomic loss in the future for
[ describe noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as M Civ JI 50.02 Pain and
Suffering, Etc., M Civ JI 50.03 Disability and Disfigurement, and M Civ JI 50.04 Aggravation of
Preexisting Ailment or Condition ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 16.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 16: Give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will incur
noneconomic damages in the future.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-18 Michigan Supreme Court
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
[ Please note that the judge will reduce the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages for
noneconomic loss by the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff, if any, entered in
QUESTION NO. 8. ]
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
*Delete Questions No. 2 and 5 and subpart B of QUESTION NO. 8 if there is only one
defendant.
This verdict form may also be adapted by deleting questions under headings such as
Michigan Supreme Court Page 66-19
Chapter 66: Forms of Verdicts: Comparative Negligence
“Plaintiff’s Negligence,” “Economic Loss Claim,” and Noneconomic Loss Claim” if they
are not issues in the case.
Deleting questions will require renumbering remaining questions and the references to the
deleted questions.
See MCL 500.3135 for economic and noneconomic losses. MCL 500.3135(3) abolishes
tort liability of drivers and owners of insured vehicles with exceptions listed in that
subsection. MCL 500.3135(3)(c) identifies recoverable economic losses for amounts or
periods beyond first-party no-fault benefits: “allowable expenses, work loss, and survivors’
loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 [ MCL 500.3107-.3110 ]. Excess “replacement
services” beyond those recoverable under MCL 500.3107 are not recoverable under MCL
500.3135(3). Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169 (2012).
**Include the bracketed instructional note for those cases that are controlled by 1995 PA
222. For cases not controlled by this statute, omit the bracketed note.
***In QUESTION NO. 13, use bracketed phrase number 2 for cases that are controlled by
1995 PA 222 and bracketed phrase number 1 for cases not controlled by this statute.
This form of verdict is appropriate in a case in which the evidence would allow an award
of damages for a 20-year period in the future. The form must be modified by the court to
add or delete lines in Questions No. 12 and 16 in cases where the evidence supports an
award of damages for a period longer or shorter than 20 years.
Comment
Both insured and uninsured motorist tortfeasors have immunity from tort liability for
noneconomic loss damages, except where the injured person has suffered death, serious
impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement. Auto Club Insurance
Ass’n v Hill, 431 Mich 449; 430 NW2d 636 (1988). However, the uninsured motorist
tortfeasor (unlike the insured motorist tortfeasor) has no tort immunity for economic loss
damages. Hill.
In cases in which 1995 PA 222 applies, an uninsured plaintiff (who was operating his or her
own vehicle at the time the injury occurred) is not entitled to noneconomic loss damages.
MCL 500.3135(2)(c), added by 1995 PA 222. This restriction on uninsured plaintiffs does
not apply in cases not controlled by 1995 PA 222.
In cases in which 1995 PA 222 applies, a plaintiff who is more than 50 percent at fault is
not entitled to noneconomic loss damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b), added by 1995 PA 222.
This restriction does not apply in cases not controlled by 1995 PA 222.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 66-20 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 67.17 was added December 1999. Amended September 2008, October
Michigan Supreme Court Page 68-1
CHAPTER 68
Forms of Verdicts: Product
Liability
M Civ JI 68.01 Form of Verdict: Products Liability........................................................ 68-2
M Civ JI 68.01A Form of Verdict: Products Liability (Personal Injury Action)............... 68-4
M Civ JI 68.03 Form of Verdict: Products Liability—Personal Injury Action (To Be Used in
Cases Filed on or After March 28, 1996)...................................................................... 68-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 68-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 68.01 Form of Verdict: Products Liability
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the court:
QUESTION NO. 1A: Was the defendant negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the
plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 1B: Did the defendant breach an implied warranty in one or more of the ways
claimed by the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no” to both QUESTION NO. 1A and QUESTION NO. 1B, do not answer any
further questions.
If you answered QUESTION NO. 1A “no,” then do not answer QUESTION NO. 2A:
QUESTION NO. 2A: Was the defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of [ injuries / damages ]
to the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If you answered QUESTION NO. 1B “no,” do not answer QUESTION NO. 2B:
QUESTION NO. 2B: Was the defendant’s breach of implied warranty a proximate cause of
[ injuries / damages ] to the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer to QUESTION NO. 2A and QUESTION NO. 2B is “no,” do not answer any further
questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: What is the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages?
Answer: $________
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the plaintiff negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 5: Was the plaintiff’s negligence a proximate cause of the damages to the
plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 68-3
Chapter 68: Forms of Verdicts: Product Liability
QUESTION NO. 6: Using 100 percent as the total combined negligence and/or breach of warranty
which proximately caused the plaintiff’s damages, what percentage was due to the plaintiff’s
negligence?
Answer: ____ percent
Please note that the Court will reduce the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages answered in
QUESTION NO. 3 by the percentage of plaintiff’s negligence, if any, entered in the answer to
QUESTION NO. 6. The remainder will be the amount which the plaintiff is entitled to recover.
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
This form of verdict should not be used in an action against a manufacturer for an alleged
defect in the design of its product. Prentis v Yale Manufacturing Co, 421 Mich 670; 365
NW2d 176 (1984).
History
M Civ JI 68.01 was added October 1984.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 68-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 68.01A Form of Verdict: Products Liability (Personal Injury
Action)
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1A: Was the defendant negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the
plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 1B: Did the defendant breach an implied warranty in one or more of the ways
claimed by the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no” to both QUESTION NO. 1A and QUESTION NO. 1B, do not answer any
further questions.
If your answer to QUESTION NO. 1A is “yes,” then answer QUESTION NO. 2A.
If your answer to QUESTION NO. 1B is “yes,” then answer QUESTION NO. 2B.
QUESTION NO. 2A: Was the defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of [ injuries / damages ]
to the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 2B: Was the defendant’s breach of implied warranty a proximate cause of
[ injuries / damages ] to the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer to either QUESTION NO. 2A or QUESTION NO. 2B is ‘yes,” go on to
QUESTION NO. 3.
DAMAGES TO THE PRESENT DATE
QUESTION NO. 3: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s damages to the present date for [ describe
past economic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as lost wages, medical expenses, etc. ]?
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 4: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s damages to the present date for [ describe
past noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as M Civ JI 50.02 Pain and Suffering, Etc.,
M Civ JI 50.03 Disability and Disfigurement, and M Civ JI 50.04 Aggravation of Preexisting
Ailment or Condition ]?
Answer: $________.____
Michigan Supreme Court Page 68-5
Chapter 68: Forms of Verdicts: Product Liability
FUTURE DAMAGES
QUESTION NO. 5: If you find that the plaintiff will incur costs for medical or other health care in
the future, give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will incur costs.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
QUESTION NO. 6: If you find that the plaintiff will sustain damages for [ lost wages or earnings /
or / lost earning capacity / and / [ describe other economic loss claimed by plaintiff ] ] in the future,
give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 68-6 Michigan Supreme Court
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
QUESTION NO. 7: If you find that the plaintiff will sustain damages for [ describe future
noneconomic damages claimed by plaintiff ] in the future, give the total amount for each year in
which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Supreme Court Page 68-7
Chapter 68: Forms of Verdicts: Product Liability
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE/ALLOCATION OF FAULT
QUESTION NO. 8: Was the plaintiff negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 9.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 11.
QUESTION NO. 9: Was the plaintiff’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury or damage to the
plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 10.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 11.
QUESTION NO. 10: Using 100 percent as the total, and considering the nature of the conduct and
the extent to which each party’s conduct caused or contributed to plaintiff’s injury, enter the
percentage of fault attributable:
Answer:
Defendant [ name of defendant ]____ percent
Defendant [ name of defendant ]____ percent
Plaintiff [ name of plaintiff ]____ percent
QUESTION NO. 11: Using 100 percent as the total, and considering the nature of the conduct and
the extent to which each party’s conduct caused or contributed to plaintiff’s injury, enter the
percentage of fault attributable:
Answer:
Defendant [ name of defendant ]____ percent
Defendant [ name of defendant ]____ percent
Please note that the judge will reduce the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages answered in
Questions No. 3 through 7 by the percentage of plaintiff’s fault, if any, entered in the answer to
QUESTION NO. 10.
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 68-8 Michigan Supreme Court
Note on Use
For cases filed before October 1, 1986, use M Civ JI 68.01. For cases filed on or after
October 1, 1986, relating to causes of action arising before October 1, 1986, use Questions
No. 1 through 9 from M Civ JI 68.01A followed by QUESTION NO. 6 from M Civ JI
68.01. For cases filed on or after October 1, 1986, relating to causes of action arising after
October 1, 1986, use M Civ JI 68.01A. See 1986 PA 178, §3.
This form of verdict must be modified by deleting Questions No. 1B and 2B in an action
against a manufacturer for an alleged defect in the design of its product. Prentis v Yale
Manufacturing Co, 421 Mich 670; 365 NW2d 176 (1984).
Where there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the appropriate questions should be asked
separately as to each one.
A separate Special Verdict sheet should be furnished to the jury for each plaintiff and each
defendant.
Omit any questions that are not an issue, such as the question on contributory negligence
or those on future damages.
This verdict form should not be used if the plaintiff is over 60 years of age.
This form of verdict is appropriate in a case in which the evidence would allow an award
of damages for a 20-year period in the future. The form must be modified by the court to
add or delete lines in Questions No. 5, 6, and 7 in cases where the evidence supports an
award of damages for a period longer or shorter than 20 years.
Comment
MCL 600.6305; MCL 600.6304.
History
M Civ JI 68.01A was added February 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 68-9
Chapter 68: Forms of Verdicts: Product Liability
M Civ JI 68.03 Form of Verdict: Products Liability—Personal Injury
Action (To Be Used in Cases Filed on or After March 28, 1996)
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the plaintiff injured or damaged in one or more of the ways claimed?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 1 is “yes,” go to QUESTION NO. 3.
If your answer is “yes” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 1 is “no,” go to QUESTION NO. 4.
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury or damage
claimed by the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 4.
QUESTION NO. 4: Did the defendant breach an express warranty?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 5.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 6.
QUESTION NO. 5: Was the defendant’s breach of express warranty a proximate cause of the injury
or damage claimed by the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 6.
*QUESTION NO. 6: Did the defendant breach an implied warranty?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 7.
If your answer is “no,” but your answer to either QUESTION NO. 3 or 5 is “yes,” go on to
QUESTION NO. 8.
If your answer is “no,” and your answer to either QUESTION NO. 1 or 3 is “no,” and your answer
to either QUESTION NO. 4 or 5 is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 68-10 Michigan Supreme Court
*QUESTION NO. 7: Was the defendant’s breach of implied warranty a proximate cause of the
injury or damage claimed by the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
If your answer is “no,” but your answer to either QUESTION NO. 3 or QUESTION NO. 5 is
“yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
If your answer is “no,” and your answer to either QUESTION NO. 1 or 3 is “no,” and your answer
to either QUESTION NO. 4 or 5 is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 8: Was [ name of nonparty ] negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 9.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 10.
QUESTION NO. 9: Was [ name of nonparty ]’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury or
damage claimed by the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 10.
QUESTION NO. 10: Was the plaintiff negligent?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 11.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 12.
QUESTION NO. 11: Was the plaintiff’s negligence a proximate cause of the injury or damage to
the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 12.
QUESTION NO. 12:
A. Using 100 percent as the total, enter the percentage
of fault attributable to the defendant: ____ percent
B. If you answered “yes” to QUESTION NO. 9, then
using 100 percent as the total, enter the percentage of
fault attributable to [ name of nonparty ]: ___ percent
C. If you answered “yes” to QUESTION NO. 11,
then using 100 percent as the total, enter the percent-
age of fault attributable to the plaintiff: ____ percent
Michigan Supreme Court Page 68-11
Chapter 68: Forms of Verdicts: Product Liability
The total of these must equal 100 percent:TOTAL 100 percent
QUESTION NO. 13: If you find that plaintiff has sustained damages for [ describe past economic
damages claimed by the plaintiff such as lost wages, medical expenses, etc. ] to the present date,
give the total amount of damages to the present date.
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 14: If you find that the plaintiff will incur costs for medical or other health care
in the future, give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will incur costs.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
QUESTION NO. 15: If you find that plaintiff will sustain damages for [ lost wages or earnings / or
/ lost earning capacity / and / [ describe other economic loss claimed by plaintiff ] ] in the future,
give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 68-12 Michigan Supreme Court
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
NOTE: If you determined in QUESTION NO. 12 that plaintiff was more than 50 percent at fault,
then do not answer any further questions. If you determined in QUESTION NO. 12 that plaintiff
was 50 percent or less at fault, then go on to QUESTION NO. 16.
QUESTION NO. 16: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s damages to the present date for
[ describe past noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as M Civ JI 50.02 Pain and
Suffering, Etc., M Civ JI 50.03 Disability and Disfigurement, and M Civ JI 50.04 Aggravation of
Preexisting Ailment or Condition ]?
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 17: If you find that plaintiff will sustain damages for [ describe future
noneconomic damages claimed by plaintiff ] in the future, give the total amount for each year in
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Supreme Court Page 68-13
Chapter 68: Forms of Verdicts: Product Liability
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
This form of verdict should only be used for cases that are filed on or after March 28, 1996.
1995 PA 161, §3; 1995 PA 249, §3.
This verdict form should not be used if the plaintiff is over 60 years of age.
This form of verdict is appropriate in a case in which the evidence would allow an award
of damages for a twenty-year period in the future. This form must be modified by the trial
judge to add or delete lines in Questions No. 14, 15, and 17 in cases in which the evidence
supports an award of damages for a period longer or shorter than twenty years.
*This form of verdict must be modified by deleting Questions No. 6 and 7 in an action
against a manufacturer for an alleged defect in the design of its product. Prentis v Yale
Manufacturing Co, 421 Mich 670; 365 NW2d 176 (1984).
The trial judge should omit any questions that are not an issue in the case.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 68-14 Michigan Supreme Court
If there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the appropriate questions should be asked
separately to each one.
A separate special verdict sheet should be furnished to the jury for each plaintiff and
defendant.
For guidance in preparing a form of verdict for a products liability action that involves only
a claim for property damage, see M Civ JI 66.02.
Comment
MCL 600.6304, .6305, .6306.
Before the enactment of 1995 PA 161, the jury was not to determine the fault of settling
tortfeasors. Department of Transp v Thrasher, 446 Mich 61; 521 NW2d214 (1994).
In an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking damages for personal injury or
wrongful death, noneconomic damages must not be awarded if the person upon whose
injury or death the damages are based is more than 50 percent at fault. MCL 600.2959.
Fault is defined in MCL 600.6304(8): “As used in this section, ‘fault’ includes an act, an
omission, conduct, including intentional conduct, a breach of warranty, or a breach of a
legal duty, or any conduct that could give rise to the imposition of strict liability, that is a
proximate cause of damage sustained by a party.”
History
M Civ JI 68.03 was added June 1997.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 70-1
CHAPTER 70
Forms of Verdicts: Medical
Malpractice
M Civ JI 70.01 Form of Verdict: Special Questions in Medical Malpractice Cases (Limitation
on Noneconomic Damages) ......................................................................................... 70-2
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 70-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 70.01 Form of Verdict: Special Questions in Medical
Malpractice Cases (Limitation on Noneconomic Damages)
QUESTION NO. 1: Did the professional negligence or malpractice of the defendant cause or
contribute to the plaintiff’s death?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the defendant wrongfully leave a foreign object in plaintiff’s body?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 3: Did the injury proximately caused by defendant’s professional negligence or
malpractice involve the reproductive system of the plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 4: Did the defendant wrongfully remove plaintiff’s [ limb / organ ]?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 5: Did the professional negligence or malpractice of the defendant cause or
contribute to the loss of a vital bodily function of plaintiff?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 6: Did the fraudulent conduct of [ name of health care provider ] prevent the
discovery of the existence of plaintiff’s claim?
Answer: ____(yes or no).
QUESTION NO. 7: Did the conduct of the defendant amount to a [ specify intentional tort, e.g.,
battery, etc. ]?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
This form of verdict should only be used if the cause of action arose before April 1, 1994.
1993 PA 78.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 70-3
Chapter 70: Forms of Verdicts: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors
The court should use only the question or questions that are applicable. These questions
may be added to the applicable questions in M Civ JI 66.01A, the form of verdict for
negligence actions, but the questions relating to defendant’s negligence should be revised
to refer to defendant’s “professional negligence or malpractice.”
History
M Civ JI 70.01 was added June 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 70-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 72-1
CHAPTER 72
Forms of Verdicts: Contribution
Among Tort-Feasors
M Civ JI 72.01A Form of Verdict: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault
[ Form of Verdict Deleted ] .......................................................................................... 72-2
M Civ JI 72.01B Form of Verdict: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors by Relative Fault
(Bifurcation) [ Form of Verdict Deleted ] ..................................................................... 72-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 72-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 72.01A Form of Verdict: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors
by Relative Fault [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
This verdict form was deleted because allocation of fault among defendants and others in a
lawsuit is incorporated as a question in the comparative negligence, no-fault, and products
liability verdict forms (chapters 66–68).
Comment
See MCL 600.2925a–.2925d for rights to contribution among joint tort-feasors.
In late 1995, the Michigan legislature abrogated joint liability in most cases and thereby
eliminated most actions for contribution. See Comment to M Civ JI 43.01A Contribution
among Tortfeasors by Relative Fault.
History
M Civ JI 72.01A was added February 1983. Deleted May 1998.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 72-3
Chapter 72: Forms of Verdicts: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors
M Civ JI 72.01B Form of Verdict: Contribution Among Tort-Feasors
by Relative Fault (Bifurcation) [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Note on Use
This verdict form was deleted because allocation of fault among defendants and others in a
lawsuit is incorporated as a question in the comparative negligence, no-fault, and products
liability verdict forms (chapters 66–68).
Comment
See MCL 600.2925a–.2925d for rights to contribution among joint tort-feasors.
In late 1995, the Michigan legislature abrogated joint liability in most cases and thereby
eliminated most actions for contribution. See Comment to M Civ JI 43.01B Contribution
among Tortfeasors by Relative Fault (Bifurcation).
History
M Civ JI 72.01B was added February 1983. Deleted May 1998.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 72-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 73-1
CHAPTER 73
Forms of Verdicts: Damages of
Spouse of Injured Plaintiff
M Civ JI 73.01 Form of Verdict: Damages of Spouse of Injured Plaintiff...................... 73-2
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 73-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 73.01 Form of Verdict: Damages of Spouse of Injured
Plaintiff
NOTE: If you find that [ name of injured spouse ] is not entitled to damages, do not complete this
verdict form.
If you find that [ name of injured spouse ] is entitled to damages, you should complete this verdict
form.
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Did [ name of spouse ] sustain damages for [ expense of necessary medical
care, treatment or services received by [ name of injured spouse ] / the services of [ name of injured
spouse ] of which [ name of spouse ] has been deprived / society, companionship and sexual
relationship with [ name of injured spouse ] of which [ name of spouse ] has been deprived ]?
Answer: ____(yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to Questions No. 2 through 6.
DAMAGES TO THE PRESENT DATE
QUESTION NO. 2: What is the total amount of [ name of spouse ]’s damages to the present date
for [ expense of necessary medical care, treatment, or services received by [ name of injured
spouse ] / the services of [ name of injured spouse ] of which [ name of spouse ] has been
deprived ]?
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 3: What is the total amount of [ name of spouse ]’s damages to the present date
for society, companionship and sexual relationship with [ name of injured spouse ] of which [ name
of spouse ] has been deprived?
Answer: $________.____
FUTURE DAMAGES
QUESTION NO. 4: If you find that in the future [ name of spouse ] will incur costs for the expense
of necessary medical care, treatment, or services received by [ name of injured spouse ], give the
total amount for each year in which [ name of spouse ] will incur costs.
Answer:
Michigan Supreme Court Page 73-3
Chapter 73: Forms of Verdicts: Damages to Spouse of Injured Plaintiff
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
QUESTION NO. 5: If you find that in the future [ name of spouse ] will sustain damages for the
services of [ name of injured spouse ] of which [ name of spouse ] has been deprived, give the total
amount for each year in which [ name of spouse ] will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 73-4 Michigan Supreme Court
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
QUESTION NO. 6: If you find that in the future [ name of spouse ] will sustain damages for society,
companionship and sexual relationship with [ name of injured spouse ] of which [ name of spouse ]
has been deprived, give the total amount for each year in which [ name of spouse ] will sustain
damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Please note that the judge will reduce the total amount of [ name of spouse ]’s damages entered in
Questions No. 2 through 6 by the percentage of [ name of injured spouse ]’s fault, if any, in causing
Michigan Supreme Court Page 73-5
Chapter 73: Forms of Verdicts: Damages to Spouse of Injured Plaintiff
[ name of injured spouse ]’s own injury.
Signed,
_________________________________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
This verdict form is designed for a lawsuit in which the action for damages to the spouse is
combined with the action for the injured spouse’s damages. The verdict form assumes that
the spouse’s action is a personal injury action and subject to MCL 600.6305, .6304.
Personal injury action is defined at MCL 600.6301. This verdict form may be used for cases
filed on or after October 1, 1986, relating to causes of action arising after October 1, 1986.
See 1986 PA 178, § 3.
This verdict form should not be used in no-fault cases.
Where there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the appropriate questions should be asked
separately as to each one.
A separate Special Verdict sheet should be furnished to the jury for each plaintiff and each
defendant.
Omit any questions that are not an issue.
This verdict form should not be used if the plaintiff is over 60 years of age.
This form of verdict is appropriate in a case in which the evidence would allow an award
of damages for a 20-year period in the future. The form must be modified by the court to
add or delete lines in Questions No. 4, 5, and 6 in cases where the evidence supports an
award of damages for a period longer or shorter than 20 years.
Comment
Where a derivative action by a spouse for loss of consortium or other damages is tried
jointly with an action by the other spouse for his or her own injury, recovery in the
derivative action is dependent on whether the injured spouse is entitled to recover. Bias v
Ausbury, 369 Mich 378, 120 NW2d 233 (1963); Morrison v Grass, 314 Mich 87, 22 NW2d
82 (1946).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 73-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Recovery of damages for loss of consortium in the suit by one spouse is to be reduced by
the other spouse’s negligence in causing his or her own injury. Danaher v Partridge Creek
Country Club, 116 Mich App 305, 323 NW2d 376 (1982).
A husband may recover for necessary medical expense incurred as a result of injury to his
wife. Burns v Van Buren Twp, 218 Mich 44; 187 NW 278 (1922); Laskowski v People’s Ice
Co, 203 Mich 186; 168 NW 940 (1918). But see Morse v Deschaine, 13 Mich App 101,
107; 163 NW2d 693, 696 (1968), for a discussion of situations in which a wife may sue in
her own right for her medical expenses. A husband may also recover the reasonable value
of the loss of his wife’s ability to carry on her services and housework. Leeds v Masha, 328
Mich 137; 43 NW2d 92 (1950); Burns.
Both husband and wife have a right to recover for the loss of consortium. See Montgomery
v Stephan, 359 Mich 33; 101 NW2d 227 (1960).
The no-fault law has not abolished the common-law action for loss of consortium by the
spouse of a person who receives above threshold injuries, Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder &
Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502; 309 NW2d 163 (1981); nor is a consortium action
precluded by the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. Eide v Kelsey-Hayes
Co., 431 Mich 26; 427 NW2d 488 (1988).
History
M Civ JI 73.01 was added June 1989.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 75-1
CHAPTER 75
Dram Shop Actions
Dram Shop Actions—Introduction ............................................................................... 75-2
M Civ JI 75.01 Dram Shop—Explanation of Statute ................................................... 75-10
M Civ JI 75.02 Dram Shop—Definitions ..................................................................... 75-11
M Civ JI 75.11 Dram Shop—Sale to Minor: Burden of Proof...................................... 75-13
M Civ JI 75.12 Dram Shop—Sale to Visibly Intoxicated Person: Burden of Proof ...... 75-15
M Civ JI 75.13 Dram Shop—Contributing to Occurrence Not a Defense ................... 75-16
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 75-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Dram Shop Actions—Introduction
In 1986 (1986 PA 176), the legislature made substantial modifications to the Dram Shop
Act. The act was renumbered in 1998 as part of the repeal and recodification of the
Michigan Liquor Control Code. Subsection (2) of MCL 436.1801, sets forth the cause of
action as follows:
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, an individual who suffers
damage or who is personally injured by a minor or visibly intoxicated person
by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor to
the minor or visibly intoxicated person, if the unlawful sale is proven to be a
proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death, or the spouse, child, parent,
or guardian of that individual, shall have a right of action in his or her name
against the person who by selling, giving, or furnishing the alcoholic liquor has
caused or contributed to the intoxication of the person or who has caused or
contributed to the damage, injury, or death. In an action pursuant to this
section, the plaintiff shall have the right to recover actual damages in a sum of
not less than $50.00 in each case in which the court or jury determines that
intoxication was a proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death.
I. Elements of a Cause of Action
A. Unlawful Selling, Giving, or Furnishing of Alcoholic Liquor
The transaction giving rise to liability under the Dram Shop Act is an “unlawful selling,
giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor to the minor or visibly intoxicated person.”
Although most of the cases have involved an actual “sale,” the statute makes clear that
“giving, or furnishing” will also suffice. In King v Partridge, 9 Mich App 540; 157 NW2d
417 (1968), the court of appeals decided that a bar employee’s serving herself intoxicating
liquor constitutes an unlawful “giving or furnishing” where there was no indication that the
taking of the liquor was in violation of the employer’s orders.
A sale of liquor that is illegal due to its time or day (i.e., a Sunday sale) is not the type of
illegal sale that gives rise to liability under the Dram Shop Act. Pesola v Pawlowski, 45
Mich App 516; 206 NW2d 780 (1973).
The requirements of the statute vary depending on which of the two types of unlawful sales
is involved: an unlawful sale to a minor, or an unlawful sale to a visibly intoxicated person.
(The term “minor” is defined in the act to mean a person under 21 years of age. MCL
436.1109(6).)
Michigan Supreme Court Page 75-3
Chapter 75: Dram Shop Actions
Direct and Indirect Sales
“Unlawful” sale to a minor may be interpreted with reference to subsection (1) of MCL
436.1801, which says that a retail licensee shall not directly sell (give or furnish) to a minor.
(The pre-1986 statute prohibited indirect as well as direct sales to minors.) If indirect sale
means a situation where a licensee sells to a buyer who then furnishes the liquor to a minor,
the licensee may not be liable under the present statute if the minor became intoxicated and
injured someone. This may represent a departure from case law that recognizes the
potential liability of a licensee who knew or had reason to know that the purchase of liquor
was being made for the minor who ultimately caused the injury. Maldonado v Claud’s, Inc,
347 Mich 395; 79 NW2d 847 (1956); Meyer v State Line Super Mart, Inc, 1 Mich App 562;
137 NW2d 299 (1965); Verdusco v Miller, 138 Mich App 702; 360 NW2d 281 (1984).
Where a dram shop action is based on an unlawful sale to a visibly intoxicated person, if
“unlawful” is to be construed with reference to subsection (1) of MCL 436.1801, that
subsection prohibits both indirect and direct sales, giving, or furnishing to visibly
intoxicated persons.
State of Intoxication at the Time of Sale
In an action based on a sale to a minor, it is not necessary to show that the minor was
intoxicated at the time of the sale. Maldonado.
Where the cause of action is based on a sale to one other than a minor, it is necessary to
show that the person is “visibly intoxicated” at the time of the sale. MCL 436.1801(2). See
also MCL 436.1801(1). The requirement of “visibly” intoxicated dates back to a 1972
amendment to the act. See Hollis v Abraham, 67 Mich App 426; 241 NW2d 231 (1975);
McKnight v Carter, 144 Mich App 623; 376 NW2d 170 (1985).
B. Causal Relationship Issues
Two issues of causal relationship may arise under the act: (1) whether the injury or damage
was caused by the minor or visibly intoxicated person, and (2) whether the unlawful sale
was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury or damages.
(1) Injury Caused by a Minor or Visibly Intoxicated Person
The statute requires that the plaintiff suffers damage or is personally injured by a minor
or visibly intoxicated person.” The issue suggested by this language is whether the visibly
intoxicated person or minor caused the injury or damage. In some cases, it is contended that
the injury was caused by someone or something else. Duma v Janni, 26 Mich App 445; 182
NW2d 596 (1970). Where the injury was not caused by the intoxicated person, the
conclusion must also be that the sale was not a proximate cause of the injury. See discussion
under 1(B)(2) Sale as a Proximate Cause of the Injury, infra.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 75-4 Michigan Supreme Court
(2) Sale as a Proximate Cause of the Injury
Before the 1972 amendment to the Dram Shop Act, which added the proximate cause
requirement, the statute provided for an action against a licensee who “caused or
contributed to the intoxication of said person or persons or who shall have caused or
contributed to any such injury.”
Although this language remains a part of the statute, the question of the sale’s contributing
to the intoxication is seldom an issue and is obscured by the current express requirement of
a proximate cause relationship between the unlawful sale and the injury or damage.
Before the 1972 amendment, it apparently was not necessary to show that the unlawful sale
was a proximate cause of the injury or damages. In Heikkala v Isaacson, 178 Mich 176,
182; 144 NW 508, 510 (1913), the court said: “[ T]here was no question before the jury
whether the intoxication of Lund was or was not the natural cause of the act which caused
the injury. The act itself by a person intoxicated, to whom liquor has been sold unlawfully,
fixes the liability for the damage upon the person furnishing the liquor which caused or
contributed to the intoxication.” See also Brockway v Patterson, 72 Mich 122, 128; 40 NW
192, 195 (1888). (It should be noted, however, that several Michigan cases construed the
pre-1972 version of the Dram Shop Act to require a causal connection between the
unlawful sale and the injury. Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363, 370 n 4; 207 NW2d 316,
319 n 4 (1973); Durbin v K-K-M Corp, 54 Mich App 38, 58; 220 NW2d 110, 121 (1974).
The present version of the statute continues the express requirement that “the unlawful sale
is proven to be a proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death.” The effect of the
proximate cause requirement is that in addition to proving that the intoxicated person
caused the injuries or damages, the plaintiff must prove that the conduct, act, or omission
that caused the injury or damages was the natural and probable result of the selling, giving,
or furnishing of alcoholic liquor. Since the probable effect of the alcoholic liquor on the
person’s behavior may be difficult to establish by objective evidence, this element of the
case will have to be supplied by an inference to be drawn by the trier of fact from the
circumstances as shown by the evidence. Cases have considered the proximate cause
requirement where there is no indication that the person continued to be intoxicated or
sobered up before the injury occurred. Bryant v Athans, 362 Mich 17; 106 NW2d 389
(1960).
This added requirement of proximate cause has potential for denying recovery in some of
the factual situations described in early cases. See Dice v Sherberneau, 152 Mich 601; 116
NW 416 (1908), where the court said it was not necessary for the plaintiff widow to show
that the intoxication was the cause of her husband’s suicide.
C. What Types of Injuries Are Covered by the Act?
See discussion under III Who Has a Cause of Action Under the Act?, infra.
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Chapter 75: Dram Shop Actions
D. “Visibly Intoxicated”
See Comment to M Civ JI 75.02 Dram Shop—Definitions
II. Who Can Be Held Liable Under the Act?
Only retail licensees can be held liable under the Dram Shop Act. Tennille v Action
Distributing Company, Inc, 225 Mich App 66; 570 NW2d 130 (1997) (act not applicable
to wholesale licensees). MCL 436.1801(1), (2). This class also includes those who fail to
obtain or maintain the required licensing. Guitar v Bieniek, 402 Mich 152; 262 NW2d 9
(1978).
Suit may be maintained against each of several bars that sold liquor to an intoxicated
person. Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363; 207 NW2d 316 (1973). However, the statute
provides that: “There is a rebuttable presumption that a retail licensee, other than the retail
licensee who last sold, gave, or furnished alcoholic liquor to the minor or the visibly
intoxicated person, has not committed any act giving rise to a cause of action under
subsection (2).” MCL 436.1801(7).
An owner of an establishment is liable for unlawful sales made by employees even if the
sale was not authorized or was contrary to instructions. Dice v Sherberneau, 152 Mich 601;
116 NW 416 (1908).
Under prior law, a surety could be sued under the Dram Shop Act. Browder v International
Fidelity Insurance Co, 413 Mich 603; 321 NW2d 668 (1982). While the 1986 amendments
(MCL 436.22a(6)) prohibit naming a surety or insurer as a defendant, a new section was
added permitting suit, including recovery of punitive damages, where an insurer fails to pay
a judgment against the insured within 90 days. MCL 436.22e. (See now MCL 436.1809.)
One with only a security interest in assets of a bar who becomes a co-receiver after an
unlawful sale cannot be sued under the Dram Shop Act. Ray v Taft, 125 Mich App 314; 336
NW2d 469 (1983).
A plaintiff must name and retain in the action the alleged intoxicated person or minor who
caused the injury. MCL 436.1801(4). (The name-and-retain provision is excused under
certain circumstances. Green v Martin, 455 Mich 342; 565 NW2d 813 (1997).) Settlements
or agreements to limit recovery preclude a suit against the dram shop defendant. Putney v
Haskins, 414 Mich 181; 324 NW2d 729 (1982), reh denied, 414 Mich 1111 (1982); Riley
v Richards, 428 Mich 198; 404 NW2d 618 (1987).
Private individuals who supply alcoholic liquor to social guests are not liable under the
Dram Shop Act, but are subject to common-law negligence liability based on violation of
section 33 (now section 701, MCL 436.1701) of the Michigan Liquor Control Act, MCL
436.1101 et seq., if they serve liquor to a minor. Longstreth v Gensel, 423 Mich 675; 377
NW2d 804 (1985). However, a common-law negligence action based on violation of
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section 26c(2) of the Michigan Liquor Control Act (now section 913(2) of the Michigan
Liquor Control Code of 1998) may not be maintained against an unlicensed banquet facility
operator who allows liquor consumption on the premises. Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290;
414 NW2d 706 (1987).
III. Who Has a Cause of Action Under the Act?
An individual (or the spouse, child, parent, or guardian of an individual) who sustains injury
or damage as a result of the conduct of a minor or visibly intoxicated person to whom liquor
has been unlawfully sold has a cause of action under the act. However, 1986 PA 176 made
a substantial departure from prior law regarding claims for damages by relatives of a visibly
intoxicated person who has injured himself or herself.
Prior law allowed a suit by a relative of an adult intoxicated person for damages such as
loss of support, loss of society and companionship, etc. caused by the intoxicated person
injuring himself or herself. O’Dowd v General Motors Corp, 419 Mich 597; 358 NW2d 553
(1984); Eddy v Courtright, 91 Mich 264, 51 NW 887 (1892). The amended Dram Shop Act
expressly excludes actions by relatives for these kinds of damages:
… and a person does not have a cause of action under this section for the loss of
financial support, services, gifts, parental training, guidance, love, society, or
companionship of the alleged visibly intoxicated person.
MCL 436.1801(8). (The constitutionality of this limitation on the types of damages that
relatives may recover has been upheld. Roy v Rau Tavern, Inc, 167 Mich App 664; 423
NW2d 54 (1988).) The amendment, however, does not preclude an action by a relative of
the alleged visibly intoxicated person for other kinds of damages, or for personal injury to
the relative that was caused by the intoxicated person. See Podbielski v Argyle Bowl, Inc,
392 Mich 380; 220 NW2d 397 (1974).
Cases construing the prior statute permitted actions by relatives of minors for damages,
including loss of support, caused by the minor injuring himself or herself. La Blue v
Specker, 358 Mich 558; 100 NW2d 445 (1960). However, the present statute has been
construed to preclude such actions by relatives of an intoxicated minor. LaGuire v Kain,
440 Mich 367; 487 NW2d 389 (1992).
Visibly Intoxicated Person and Minor
The 1986 amendments to the Dram Shop Act (recodified in 1998) explicitly exclude the
alleged visibly intoxicated person from those who have a cause of action against a licensee.
MCL 436.1801(8). This codifies prior case law. Malone v Lambrecht, 305 Mich 58; 8
NW2d 910 (1943) (intoxicated person injured himself falling down flight of stairs in bar);
Brooks v Cook, 44 Mich 617; 7 NW 216 (1880) (opinion by Justice Cooley; plaintiff who
had pockets picked while drunk was denied recovery under dram shop statute). But see
Heikkala v Isaacson, 178 Mich 176, 144 NW 508 (1913) (recovery possible where innocent
Michigan Supreme Court Page 75-7
Chapter 75: Dram Shop Actions
intoxicated person injured by another intoxicated person).
Subsection (2) of MCL 436.1801, which provides a cause of action to “an individual who
suffers damage or who is personally injured by a minor,” has been construed to preclude an
action by the imbibing minor or the minor’s estate. LaGuire. However, the minor does have
a common-law negligence action against a social host. Longstreth v Gensel, 423 Mich 675,
696; 377 NW2d 804 (1985).
IV. Defenses to a Cause of Action Under the Act
All Defenses of the Visibly Intoxicated Person or Minor Available to Licensee
A 1972 amendment to the Dram Shop Act, 1972 PA 196, allowed the licensee to raise all
factual defenses open to the alleged intoxicated person or minor.” Comparative negligence
is a factual defense based on causation; where plaintiff sues a licensee in a dram shop action
and sues an intoxicated person on a negligence theory, the intoxicated person’s defense that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent is equally available to the licensee. Lyman v Bavar
Co, 136 Mich App 407; 356 NW2d 28 (1984). (Thus, the licensee is entitled to have the
judgment against it reduced by the percentage of plaintiff’s negligence.) A licensee is also
entitled to have a judgment against it reduced by the percentage of the plaintiff’s fault in an
altercation with the defendant to whom the illegal sale was made. Brown v Swartz Creek
Memorial Post 3720—Veterans of Foreign Wars, Inc, 214 Mich App 15; 542 NW2d 588
(1995).
1986 PA 176 (recodified in 1998) broadened defenses available to licensees by deleting the
word “factual”: “All defenses of the alleged visibly intoxicated person or the minor are
available to the licensee.” MCL 436.1801(6). The most probable and significant impact of
this change is to allow the licensee to assert the no-fault threshold defenses.
The 1986 amendment giving the licensee “all” defenses available to the alleged visibly
intoxicated person or minor also eliminates the potential, which existed under prior law, for
the licensee to be liable to a plaintiff injured in an affray even though the intoxicated person
would escape liability because he or she acted in self-defense. See Archer v Burton, 91
Mich App 57, 61; 282 NW2d 833 (1979); see also Doty v Postal, 87 Mich 143; 49 NW 534
(1891); Morgan v Backseat Saloon Country Cousin, Inc, 114 Mich App 89; 318 NW2d 617
(1982). Under the statute, a successful defense of self-defense by an alleged intoxicated
person will eliminate any liability of the licensee.
Noninnocent Person—Actively Contributing to Intoxication
One who actively contributes to the intoxication of a person and is subsequently injured by
that person is precluded from recovery. Kangas v Suchorski, 372 Mich 396; 126 NW2d 803
(1964); Morton v Roth, 189 Mich 198; 155 NW 459 (1915). These noninnocent person
cases have usually involved purchasing liquor for or supplying liquor to the intoxicated
person, but in Larrow v Miller, 216 Mich App 317; 548 NW2d 704 (1996), the court
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determined that plaintiff’s decedent who supplied defendant with an illegal drug (marijuana
cigarettes) actively contributed to defendant’s intoxication. The mere act of buying drinks
for an adult before he or she becomes visibly intoxicated does not as a matter of law make
that person a noninnocent party. Arciero v Wicks, 150 Mich App 522; 389 NW2d 116
(1986). (The court distinguished the case of minors for whom supplying alcohol at any time
is illegal.) Where the plaintiff merely drinks liquor with the intoxicated person, that is not
the active participation in the actor’s intoxication that would preclude recovery. Dahn v
Sheets, 104 Mich App 584; 305 NW2d 547 (1981), lv denied, 412 Mich 928 (1982).
The Michigan Supreme Court has rejected the argument that in light of the adoption of
comparative negligence, contributing to the intoxication should no longer be a bar but
rather should be a partial defense to a dram shop action. Craig v Larson, 432 Mich 346; 439
NW2d 899 (1989). This noninnocent party rule applies equally to minors as to adults who
actively participate in the intoxication of the tortfeasor. Id.
Identification Card As Defense to Sale to Minor
Under subsection (6) of the statute (MCL 436.1801(7)), it is a defense to an action based
on unlawful sale to a minor that the defendant retail licensee (agent or employee) demanded
and was shown a Michigan driver’s license or official state personal identification card,
appearing to be genuine and showing that the minor was at least 21 years of age. In a case
where this defense is proved but where the minor also happened to be visibly intoxicated at
the time of the sale, the plaintiff would presumably have the option of showing an unlawful
sale based on the fact of visible intoxication (as well as the other elements of the action)
and succeed despite the defense.
V. Damages and Allocation of Fault
Dramshop actions against retail licensees are subject to the provisions of the Revised
Judicature Act. MCL 436.1801(10). The sections of the Revised Judicature Act that require
specific findings of past and future damages and types of damages (MCL 600.6305) and
postverdict adjustments by the trial judge (MCL 600.6306) apply to dramshop actions.
Weiss v Hodge, 223 Mich App 620; 567 NW2d 468 (1997), lv den, 457 Mich 886; 586
NW2d 231 (1998). If there are multiple defendants, including a dramshop defendant, the
allocation of fault provisions of MCL 600.6304 apply. Brown; see also Weiss, in which the
court of appeals upheld the jury’s allocation of a greater percentage of fault to the licensee
and lesser fault to the intoxicated defendant.
Prior to 1972, the Dram Shop Act allowed for recovery of damages actual and exemplary.”
The word “exemplary” was deleted and the current version of the statute provides for
“actual damages in a sum of not less than $50.00.” MCL 436.1801(2). For a discussion of
actual and exemplary damages as they pertain to mental distress and other injury to
feelings, see Hink v Sherman, 164 Mich 352; 129 NW 732 (1911); Veselenak v Smith, 414
Mich 567; 327 NW2d 261 (1982).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 75-9
Chapter 75: Dram Shop Actions
VI. Dram Shop Action As Exclusive Remedy for Unlawful Sale
The 1986 amendments to the Dram Shop Act (recodified in 1998) expressly provide that it
is the “exclusive remedy for money damages against a licensee arising out of the selling,
giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor.” MCL 436.1801(9). This was previously well
recognized in case law but not embodied in the statute. See, e.g., Brownier v International
Fidelity Insurance Co, 413 Mich 603; 321 NW2d 668 (1982); Verdusco v Miller, 138 Mich
App 702; 360 NW2d 281 (1984); Rowan v Southland Corp, 90 Mich App 61; 282 NW2d
243 (1979).
The exclusive remedy provision precludes an injured intoxicated person from bringing a
common-law action for gross negligence, willful and wanton, or intentional misconduct
against a liquor licensee, notwithstanding the fact that the licensee knew that the person was
an alcoholic or intoxicated to the point of helplessness. Jackson v PKM Corp, 430 Mich
262; 422 NW2d 657 (1988).
The Dram Shop Act is also the exclusive remedy where a licensee furnishes alcoholic
beverages to an employee and the common law does not recognize a separate claim for
negligent supervision of the employee to whom alcohol has been served. Millross v Plum
Hollow Golf Club, 429 Mich 178; 413 NW2d 17 (1987).
But the exclusive remedy provision does not preclude common-law actions against the
dram shop defendant for unlawful or negligent conduct other than the selling, giving, or
furnishing of alcoholic liquor. Manuel v Weitzman, 386 Mich 157; 191 NW2d 474 (1971)
(count in negligence against bar owner for failure to keep premises safe for business invitee
may be maintained in addition to dram shop count).
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M Civ JI 75.01 Dram Shop—Explanation of Statute
We have a state law known as the Dram Shop Act which provides that persons who are
injured or damaged by a minor or a visibly intoxicated person may, under certain
circumstances, receive damages from the person who sold, gave or furnished the alcoholic
liquor.
Note on Use
The instructions in this chapter should be given only where there is some evidence of a
Dram Shop Act violation and that the injured party is within the class intended to be
protected by the statute.
History
M Civ JI 75.01 was SJI 27.01. Amended May 1982, May 1988.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 75-11
Chapter 75: Dram Shop Actions
M Civ JI 75.02 Dram Shop—Definitions
“Intoxicated”
A person is intoxicated” when, as a result of drinking alcoholic liquor, his or
her mental or physical senses are impaired.
“Visibly Intoxicated”
A person is “visibly intoxicated” when his or her intoxication would be
apparent to an ordinary observer.
“Alcoholic Liquor”
“Alcoholic liquor” includes beer and wine as well as other alcoholic
beverages.
Note on Use
The court may wish to precede this instruction with M Civ JI 10.01 Definitions Introduced.
Comment
In Lafler v Fisher, 121 Mich 60, 62–63; 79 NW 934, 935 (1899), the Michigan Supreme
Court approved the following definition of “intoxication,” which had been given by the trial
court:
When it is apparent that a person is under the influence of liquor, or when his manner is
unusual or abnormal, and his inebriated condition is reflected in his walk or conversation,
when his ordinary judgment and common sense are disturbed, or his usual will power is
temporarily suspended, when these or similar symptoms result from the use of liquors, and
are manifest, then, within the meaning of the statute, the person is intoxicated, and anyone
who makes a sale of liquor to such person violates the law of the State. It is not necessary
that the person be so-called “dead drunk”, or hopelessly intoxicated; it is enough that his
senses are obviously destroyed or distracted by the use of intoxicating liquors.
See also Groth v DeGrandchamp, 71 Mich App 439; 248 NW2d 576 (1976), where the
Court of Appeals approved the trial court’s use of the Lafler instruction.
The thrust of the instruction in Lafler is that a person is intoxicated when, as a result of
drinking liquor, there is an impairment of his or her mental or physical senses.
Other than actions involving sales to minors, the Dram Shop Act requires injury or damage
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by an intoxicated person by reason of an unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of alcoholic
liquor to the “visibly” intoxicated person. A person is visibly intoxicated when his or her
intoxication would be apparent to an ordinary observer. Miller v Ochampaugh, 191 Mich
App 48; 477 NW2d 105 (1991); Heyler v Dixon, 160 Mich App 130; 408 NW2d 121
(1987).
The definition of alcoholic liquor is found in the statute. MCL 436.1105(2).
History
M Civ JI 75.02 was SJI 27.02. Amended May 1988.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 75-13
Chapter 75: Dram Shop Actions
M Civ JI 75.11 Dram Shop—Sale to Minor: Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ name of plaintiff ] was [ injured / damaged ] by [ name of minor ];
(b) that [ name of defendant / name of agent / name of employee ] *(directly)
[ sold / gave / furnished ] alcoholic liquor to [ name of minor ];
(c) that [ name of minor ] was under the lawful drinking age of 21 years at the
time [ he / she ] was [ sold / given / furnished ] alcoholic liquor by [ name of
defendant / name of agent / name of employee ];
(d) that the [ selling / giving / furnishing ] of the alcoholic liquor was a
proximate cause of [ name of plaintiff ]’s [ injury / damage ].
The defendant has the burden of proving the defense(s) that:
(e) plaintiff purchased for or gave or furnished alcoholic liquor to [ name of
minor ];
(f) †[ name of defendant / name of agent / name of employee ] demanded and
was shown [ a Michigan driver’s license / an official state personal
identification card ] that appeared to be genuine and showed that [ name of
minor ] was 21 years of age or older.
If [ name of minor ] was visibly intoxicated at the time of the [ selling / giving / furnishing ]
of alcoholic liquor, then it is not a defense that [ name of defendant / name of agent / name
of employee ] demanded and was shown [ a Michigan driver’s license / an official state
personal identification card ] that appeared to be genuine and showed that [ name of minor ]
was 21 years of age or older.
The court will provide you with a Special Verdict Form. Your answers to the questions on
the Special Verdict Form will provide the basis on which this case will be resolved.
Note on Use
*If there is an issue whether the retail licensee directly sold, gave, or furnished alcoholic
liquor to the minor, the word “directly” should be read to the jury and the trial judge may
give an additional instruction on the meaning of “directly.” See the Comment below.
†The statute (MCL 436.1801(6)) does not define “official state personal identification
card,” e.g., other state or foreign driver’s license, etc.
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All defenses of the minor or alleged visibly intoxicated person are available to the licensee.
MCL 436.1801(6). See Introduction to this chapter, part IV.
Comment
“Unlawful sale” to a minor may be interpreted with reference to subsection (2) of MCL
436.1801, which says that a retail licensee shall not directly sell, give, or furnish alcoholic
liquor to a minor. (The pre-1986 statute prohibited indirect as well as direct sales to
minors.) If indirect sale means a situation where a licensee sells to a buyer who then
furnishes the liquor to a minor, the licensee may not be liable under the present statute if
the minor became intoxicated and injured someone. This may represent a departure from
case law that recognizes the potential liability of a licensee who knew or had reason to
know that the purchase of liquor was being made for the minor who ultimately caused the
injury. Maldonado v Claud’s, Inc, 347 Mich 395; 79 NW2d 847 (1956); Meyer v State Line
Super Mart, Inc, 1 Mich App 562; 137 NW2d 299 (1965); Verdusco v Miller, 138 Mich
App 702; 360 NW2d 281 (1984).
History
M Civ JI 75.11 was added May 1988 to replace M Civ JI 75.03 and 75.04. Amended
November 1989, January 2001, January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 75-15
Chapter 75: Dram Shop Actions
M Civ JI 75.12 Dram Shop—Sale to Visibly Intoxicated Person:
Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ name of plaintiff ] was [ injured / damaged ] by [ name of alleged
intoxicated person ];
(b) that [ name of alleged intoxicated person ] was visibly intoxicated at the
time [ he / she ] was [ sold / given / furnished ] alcoholic liquor by [ name of
defendant / name of agent / name of employee ];
(c) that the [ selling / giving / furnishing ] of the alcoholic liquor was a
proximate cause of [ name of plaintiff ]’s [ injury / damage ].
The defendant has the burden of proving the defense that plaintiff actively contributed to
the intoxication of [ name of alleged intoxicated person ].
The court will provide you with a Special Verdict Form. Your answers to the questions on
the Special Verdict Form will provide the basis on which this case will be resolved.
Note on Use
All defenses of the minor or alleged visibly intoxicated person are available to the licensee.
MCL 436.1801(6). See Introduction to this chapter, part IV.
Subsection (1) of the statute (MCL 436.1801) prohibits both direct and indirect sales
(giving or furnishing) to visibly intoxicated persons. This instruction and the corresponding
form of verdict, M Civ JI 190.02 Form of Verdict: Dram Shop—Sale to Visibly Intoxicated
Person, may have to be modified if there is an issue whether the sale, giving, or furnishing
was indirect.
History
M Civ JI 75.12 was added May 1988 to replace M Civ JI 75.03 and 75.04. Amended
November 1989, January 2001, January 2020.
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M Civ JI 75.13 Dram Shop—Contributing to Occurrence Not a
Defense
There has been evidence that [ plaintiff / plaintiff’s spouse / [ other ] ] was [ description of
conduct ]. I instruct you that such conduct is not a defense to a claim under the Dram Shop
Act.
Note on Use
This instruction should not be used to describe conduct that is a defense to a dram shop
action. See Comment in Section IV of Introduction, Defenses to a Cause of Action Under
the Act.
In cases where there is evidence of conduct by the plaintiff, plaintiff’s spouse, or other
person that would not be a defense, this instruction should be used to distinguish such
conduct. See the Comment below.
Comment
Prior case law held that the licensee cannot raise a defense that the intoxicated person was
contributorily negligent in actions that are brought by a relative of the intoxicated person
for damages (i.e., loss of support, consortium) caused by the intoxicated person injuring
himself or herself. Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co v Bourrie, 375 Mich 383; 134
NW2d 713 (1965); James v Dixon, 95 Mich App 527; 291 NW2d 106 (1980). Other
wrongdoing by the alleged intoxicated person has also been held not to be a defense.
Weatherbee v Byam, 160 Mich 600; 125 NW 686 (1910) (plaintiff’s husband unlawfully
fishing when he drowned).
Under the 1986 amendments to the Dram Shop Act, claims for these types of damages have
been eliminated for relatives of the alleged intoxicated person. But insofar as relatives of
intoxicated minors may still sue for such damages, the licensee does not have a defense that
the minor was contributorily negligent.
History
M Civ JI 75.13 was added May 1988 to replace M Civ JI 75.05.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 80-1
CHAPTER 80
Dog Bite Actions
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 80-2
M Civ JI 80.01 Dog Bite Statute—Explanation ............................................................. 80-3
M Civ JI 80.02 Dog Bite Statute—Burden of Proof....................................................... 80-4
M Civ JI 80.03 Dog Bite Statute—Definition of Provocation ........................................ 80-5
M Civ JI 80.04 Dog Bite Statute—Lawfully on Property ............................................... 80-6
M Civ JI 80.05 Dog Bite Statute—Lawfully on Property of Dog Owner........................ 80-7
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 80-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introduction
There are three alternative theories of liability for dog bites recognized in Michigan:
1.Common law, based upon negligence. See MCL 287.288; Grummel v
Decker, 294 Mich 71 (1940); Knowles v Mulder, 74 Mich 202 (1889).
2.Common law, based on strict liability. Trager v Thor, 445 Mich 95 (1994);
Hiner v Mojica, 271 Mich App ___ (2006).
3.Statutory, imposing strict liability upon the owner. See MCL 287.351;
Nicholes v Lorenz, 396 Mich 53 (1976); Cox v Hayes, 34 Mich App 527
(1971); Hill v Sacka, 256 Mich App 443 (2003).
Provocation is the only defense to an action maintained under the dog bite statute.
Comparative negligence principles and MCL 600.2959 are not applicable. MCL 600.2957
and MCL 600.6304, concerning allocation of fault, also do not apply. Hill, supra.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 80-3
Chapter 80: Dog Bite Actions
M Civ JI 80.01 Dog Bite Statute—Explanation
We have a state statute that provides that the owner of a dog that without provocation bites
a person while that person is [ on public property / lawfully on private property ] is liable
for any damages suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the previous viciousness of the
dog or whether the owner knew of that viciousness.
Note on Use
As stated above, principles of comparative negligence and allocation of fault do not apply.
History
Added February 1981. Amended September 2006.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
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M Civ JI 80.02 Dog Bite Statute—Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that the plaintiff [ was injured by / sustained damage from ] a dog bite,
(b) that the plaintiff was [ on public property / lawfully on private property ],
(c) that the biting was without provocation, and
(d) that the defendant was the owner of the dog.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
History
Added February 1981. Amended September 2006, January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 80-5
Chapter 80: Dog Bite Actions
M Civ JI 80.03 Dog Bite Statute—Definition of Provocation
When I say “provocation,” I mean any action or activity, whether intentional or
unintentional, which would reasonably be expected to cause a dog in similar circumstances
to react in a manner similar to that shown by the evidence.
Comment
In Brans v Extrom, 266 Mich App 216 (2005), the Court of Appeals held a person can
commit unintentional acts that are sufficiently provocative to relieve a dog owner of
liability under MCL 287.351. The Court held the trial court did not err in giving essentially
the above instruction.
History
Added September 2006.
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M Civ JI 80.04 Dog Bite Statute—Lawfully on Property
A person is lawfully on the property unless the person has gained lawful entry upon the
premises for the purpose of an unlawful or criminal act or is a trespasser.
Comment
If there is a dispute as to the plaintiff’s status, the Court would then review the definitions
of licensee, invitee, or trespasser as defined in MCJI 19.01 and draft a specific instruction
for the fact pattern in dispute.
History
Added September 2006.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 80-7
Chapter 80: Dog Bite Actions
M Civ JI 80.05 Dog Bite Statute—Lawfully on Property of Dog Owner
A person is lawfully on the property of the owner of the dog if the person is on the owner’s
property in the performance of any duty imposed upon [ him/her ] by the laws of this state
or by the laws or postal regulations of the United States.
Note on Use
This instruction should be used only if the incident occurred on the property of the dog’s
owner.
History
Added September 2006.
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Michigan Supreme Court Page 85-1
CHAPTER 85
Emergency Vehicles
M Civ JI 85.01 Exemption of Emergency Vehicles from Certain Statutory
Regulations................................................................................................................... 85-2
M Civ JI 85.02 Requirement of Due Care by Operator of an Emergency Vehicle ........ 85-3
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M Civ JI 85.01 Exemption of Emergency Vehicles from Certain
Statutory Regulations
It is claimed that [ plaintiff / defendant ] was *(contributorily) negligent in that [ he / she ]
[ nature of violation ]. We have a state statute which provides that [ Quote or paraphrase
the applicable part of the statute as construed by the courts ].
Note on Use
This instruction should be given when one party claims an exemption from a statutory
requirement as an emergency vehicle, or vehicle at work on a highway, under Section 603,
632, or 653 of the Michigan Vehicle Code, or MCL 333.20938. M Civ JI 85.02 must also
be given.
*Add the word “contributorily” if appropriate.
Comment
Sections 603, 632 and 653 of the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.603, .632, .653, and
MCL 333.20938 exempt authorized emergency vehicles from statutory requirements
concerning parking, standing, stoplights, stop signs, prima facie speed limits, direction of
movement, turning in specified directions, and right-of-way, under certain circumstances
and upon displaying or sounding certain warning devices. Vehicles at work on a highway
are also exempted from certain of the foregoing statutes.
History
M Civ JI 85.01 was SJI 71.01.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 85-3
Chapter 85: Emergency Vehicles
M Civ JI 85.02 Requirement of Due Care by Operator of an
Emergency Vehicle
This statute excuses the claimed [ nature of violation ] by [ plaintiff / defendant ] if
[ plaintiff / defendant ] complied with the provisions of the statute which I have just read to
you.
However, the [ plaintiff / defendant ] must always use that care which a reasonably careful
[ description of operator ] would use under the circumstances which you find existed in this
case.
Note on Use
This instruction must be given whenever M Civ JI 85.01 is given. If there is a question of
fact as to whether the vehicle is “authorized,” or whether it is “responding to an emergency
call,” etc., such issue must be covered by an additional instruction to be drafted for the
particular case.
Comment
Such an instruction has been approved in conjunction with the reading of the statute by the
Court to the jury in McKay v Hargis, 351 Mich 409; 88 NW2d 456 (1958). Other Michigan
Supreme Court opinions have used similar language. See Holser v City of Midland, 330
Mich 581; 48 NW2d 208 (1951); Kalamazoo v Priest, 331 Mich 43; 49 NW2d 52 (1951).
History
M Civ JI 85.02 was SJI 71.02.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 85-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-1
CHAPTER 90
Condemnation
Introductory Directions to the Court ........................................................................... 90-3
M Civ JI 90.01 Pretrial Instruction: Nature of Condemnation Action........................... 90-5
M Civ JI 90.02 Power of Eminent Domain .................................................................... 90-7
M Civ JI 90.03 Burden of Proof [ Recommend No Instruction ] ................................... 90-8
M Civ JI 90.04 Absence of Fault.................................................................................... 90-9
M Civ JI 90.05 Just Compensation—Definition .......................................................... 90-10
M Civ JI 90.06 Market Value—Definition ................................................................... 90-11
M Civ JI 90.07 Special Purpose Property .................................................................... 90-12
M Civ JI 90.08 Assessed Value.................................................................................... 90-13
M Civ JI 90.09 Highest and Best Use .......................................................................... 90-14
M Civ JI 90.10 Possibility of Rezoning ........................................................................ 90-15
M Civ JI 90.11 Refusal to Rezone................................................................................ 90-16
M Civ JI 90.12 Partial Taking....................................................................................... 90-17
M Civ JI 90.13 Date of Valuation ................................................................................ 90-19
M Civ JI 90.14 Date of Valuation: Early Date of Taking .............................................. 90-20
M Civ JI 90.15 Effect of Proposed Public Improvement ............................................. 90-21
M Civ JI 90.16 Comparable Market Transactions....................................................... 90-22
M Civ JI 90.17 Easements........................................................................................... 90-24
M Civ JI 90.18 Total Taking......................................................................................... 90-25
M Civ JI 90.19 Benefits ............................................................................................... 90-26
M Civ JI 90.20 Compensation for Fixtures; Definition................................................ 90-27
M Civ JI 90.21 Fixtures: Election to Remove—Compensation ................................... 90-28
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.22 Effect of View ...................................................................................... 90-29
M Civ JI 90.22A Valuation Witnesses [DELETED]........................................................ 90-30
M Civ JI 90.23 Range of Testimony ............................................................................ 90-31
M Civ JI 90.24 Mechanics of Verdict .......................................................................... 90-32
M Civ JI 90.30 Going Concern..................................................................................... 90-33
M Civ JI 90.31 Business Interruption.......................................................................... 90-34
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-3
Chapter 90: Condemnation
Introductory Directions to the Court
The following are standard jury instructions for cases involving the taking of private
property by government agencies or utility companies. The taking can occur either (1)
through formal action instituted by the condemning authority (de jure) or (2) by
extrajudicial conduct on the part of the condemning authority which is inimical to an
owner’s property interests to such an extreme degree as to constitute a constitutional de
facto taking giving rise to an inverse condemnation action. It should be noted at the outset
that all eminent domain cases, except inverse condemnation cases, are commenced
pursuant to a particular enabling statute which may have some bearing on the jury
instructions to be given.
These standard instructions and any supplementary instructions should be preceded by the
applicable standard instructions dealing with credibility (M Civ JI 4.01–4.12) and the usual
cautionary instructions (M Civ JI 3.01–3.15).
These jury instructions do not purport to cover all situations which may occur in an eminent
domain case. There are many issues which do not arise with sufficient frequency to warrant
inclusion in a set of standard jury instructions, yet are important or even crucial in those few
cases in which they do arise. In addition, eminent domain is a rapidly changing area in
which new issues may arise which are not covered by these jury instructions. In either case
it is appropriate for additional jury instructions to be given by the trial judge. Some of the
issues which arise infrequently and are therefore not covered by these jury instructions are
listed below with some important cases. This list does not purport to be exhaustive.
Cost to Cure:
In re Widening of Bagley Avenue, 248 Mich 1; 226 NW 688 (1929)
Detroit v Loula, 227 Mich 189; 198 NW 837 (1924)
Necessity:
Grand Rapids Board of Education v Baczewski, 340 Mich 265; 65 NW2d 810 (1954)
In re Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority’s Petition, 306 Mich 373; 10 NW2d 920 (1943)
Lansing v Jury Rowe Realty Co, 59 Mich App 316; 229 NW2d 432 (1975)
Leasehold Interest:
Pierson v H R Leonard Furniture Co, 268 Mich 507; 256 NW 529 (1934)
Frustration of Plans for Business Expansion—Loss of Potential Use:
State Highway Commission v Great Lakes Express Co, 50 Mich App 170; 213 NW2d 239 (1973)
Scope of the Parcel in Partial Taking Cases:
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-4 Michigan Supreme Court
State Highway Commissioner v Snell, 8 Mich App 299; 154 NW2d 631 (1967)
Port Huron & S W R Co v Voorheis, 50 Mich 506; 15 NW 882 (1883)
In re Slum Clearance, 331 Mich 714; 50 NW2d 340 (1951)
Denial of Access:
Pearsall v Board of Supervisors, 74 Mich 558; 42 NW 77 (1889)
Violation of Restrictive Covenants:
Bales v State Highway Commission, 72 Mich App 50; 249 NW2d 158 (1976)
Johnstone v Detroit, GH & M R Co, 245 Mich 65; 22 NW 325 (1928)
Allen v Detroit, 167 Mich 464; 133 NW 317 (1911)
Vacation of an Alley:
Forster v Pontiac, 56 Mich App 415; 224 NW2d 325 (1974)
Diversion of Traffic:
State Highway Commissioner v Watt, 374 Mich 300; 132 NW2d 113 (1965)
State Highway Commissioner v Gulf Oil Corp, 377 Mich 309; 140 NW2d 500 (1966)
Special Adaptability of Property to Use for Which It Is Being Taken:
Allegan v Vonasek, 261 Mich 16; 245 NW 557 (1932)
Loss of Light, Air and View:
Gerson v Lansing, 250 Mich 587; 231 NW 125 (1930)
Noise:
Boyne City, G & A R Co v Anderson, 146 Mich 328; 109 NW 429 (1906)
Lost Rentals:
Muskegon v DeVries, 59 Mich App 415; 229 NW2d 479 (1975)
See 2 Michigan Municipal Law (ICLE 1980), ch 13, for further discussion and sources.
History
Amended September 1998.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-5
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.01 Pretrial Instruction: Nature of Condemnation Action
This is a case in eminent domain, which means the power of the government to take private
property for a public purpose upon payment of just compensation to the owner of the
property taken. Under the constitution and laws of this state, all private property is held
subject to this right of eminent domain.
The right of eminent domain is exercised through proceedings commonly called a
condemnation action. This is such an action.
By your verdict, you will decide the disputed [ issue / issues ] of fact, which in this case
[ concerns / concern ] *(the necessity for the project and) the just compensation to be paid
to the [ owner / owners ] for the property taken.
There are three matters that make this case different from most trials:
†(First, this trial involves several parcels of property owned by several landowners named
in the action. All of these parcels are being tried together, but each is separate from the other
and each constitutes a separate trial as to each individual parcel and owner. The trials are
consolidated for convenience and to save time and expense.)
†(Second, you, as jurors in this case, may make a personal inspection of the property
involved in this action. The purpose of the view is to enable you, the jurors, to better
understand the evidence and testimony concerning the property. You must not visit or view
the property unless and until the Court directs you to do so.)
†(Third, because you will hear witnesses who will testify concerning values of property
involving numerous mathematical computations, you will be permitted to take notes as the
various witnesses testify. Pads and pencils will be provided for you.)
Note on Use
*The phrase in parentheses should be read to the jury only if necessity for the taking is an
issue in the case.
The name of the appropriate condemning authority may be substituted for the term
“government.”
†Each of the paragraphs in parentheses should be included in the instruction only if
applicable.
This is a pretrial instruction which should be read after the jurors are sworn.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Comment
See US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 10, § 2.
History
M Civ JI 90.01 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-7
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.02 Power of Eminent Domain
This case is one in eminent domain, which means the power of the government to take
private property for a public purpose upon payment of just compensation to the owner of
the property taken. Under the constitution and laws of this state, all private property, real
and personal, and any interest therein, is held subject to this right of eminent domain.
The right of eminent domain is exercised through proceedings commonly called a
condemnation action. This is such an action.
Note on Use
The name of the appropriate condemning authority may be substituted for the word
“government.”
History
M Civ JI 90.02 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.03 Burden of Proof [ Recommend No Instruction ]
Comment
The committee recommends that no instruction on general burden of proof be given in
condemnation cases. There is strictly speaking no general burden of proof applicable to all
issues in all condemnation proceedings.
Neither party has the burden of proof on the issue of damages, except where benefits to the
remainder are claimed by the government.
If the government claims an offset for benefits under express statutory authority, it has the
burden of proving the existence of such benefits. MCL 213.73(4).
There may be other special issues where there is an express burden of proof, by statute or
otherwise.
History
M Civ JI 90.03 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-9
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.04 Absence of Fault
The property owners in this case are not in any way at fault, but are in the position of
owning property which the [ name of condemning authority ] has determined to take for
public use.
History
M Civ JI 90.04 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.05 Just Compensation—Definition
Whenever private property is taken for a public purpose, the Constitution commands that
the owner shall be paid just compensation.
Just compensation is the amount of money which will put the person whose property has
been taken in as good a position as the person would have been in had the taking not
occurred. The owner must not be forced to sacrifice or suffer by receiving less than full and
fair value for the property. Just compensation should enrich neither the individual at the
expense of the public nor the public at the expense of the individual.
The determination of value and just compensation in a condemnation case is not a matter
of formula or artificial rules, but of sound judgment and discretion based upon a
consideration of all of the evidence you have heard and seen in this case.
*(In determining just compensation, you should not consider what the [ name of
condemning authority ] has gained. The value of the property taken to the [ name of
condemning authority ] and to its customers is not to be considered in any way.)
Note on Use
*The paragraph in parentheses should be used in public utility condemnation cases.
Comment
See State Highway Commissioner v Eilender, 362 Mich 697; 108 NW2d 755 (1961); In re
Grand Haven Highway, 357 Mich 20; 97 NW2d 748 (1959); Fitzsimons & Galvin, Inc v
Rogers, 243 Mich 649; 220 NW 881 (1928); Consumers Power Co v Allegan State Bank,
20 Mich App 720; 174 NW2d 578 (1969).
History
M Civ JI 90.05 was added February 1, 1981. Amended October 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-11
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.06 Market Value—Definition
Your award must be based upon the market value of the property as of the date of taking.
By “market value” we mean:
(a)the highest price estimated in terms of money that the property will bring if
exposed for sale in the open market with a reasonable time allowed to find a
purchaser buying with knowledge of all of the uses and purposes to which it is
adapted and for which it is capable of being used
(b)the amount which the property would bring if it were offered for sale by one
who desired, but was not obliged, to sell, and was bought by one who was
willing, but not obliged, to buy
(c)what the property would bring in the hands of a prudent seller, at liberty to
fix the time and conditions of sale
(d)what the property would sell for on negotiations resulting in sale between
an owner willing, but not obliged, to sell and a willing buyer not obliged to buy
(e)what the property would be reasonably worth on the market for a cash price,
allowing a reasonable time within which to effect a sale.
Note on Use
If there is evidence that the property is a special purpose property, M Civ JI 90.07 should
be used in addition to this instruction.
Comment
See Consumers Power Co v Allegan State Bank, 20 Mich App 720, 744–745; 174 NW2d
578, 591 (1969).
History
M Civ JI 90.06 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.07 Special Purpose Property
There are certain kinds of properties for which the market value standard is, for one reason
or another, inappropriate. These properties are referred to as “special purpose” properties.
The adaptability of the property sought to be taken in eminent domain for a special purpose
or use may be considered as an element of value. If the property possesses a special value
to the owner which can be measured in money, the owner has a right to have that value
considered in the estimate of compensation and damages.
While market value is always the ultimate test, it occasionally happens that the property
taken is of a class not commonly bought and sold, such as a church or a college or a
cemetery or the fee of a public street, or some other piece of property which may have an
actual value to the owner but which under ordinary conditions the owner would be unable
to sell for an amount even approximating its real value. As market value presupposes a
willing buyer, the usual test breaks down in such a case, and hence it is sometimes said that
such property has no market value. In one sense this is true; but it is certain that for that
reason it cannot be taken for nothing. From the necessity of the case the value must be
arrived at from the opinions of well-informed persons, based upon the purposes for which
the property is suitable. This is not taking the “value in use” to the owner as distinguished
from the market value. What is done is merely to take into consideration the purposes for
which the property is suitable as a means of ascertaining what reasonable purchasers would
in all probability be willing to give for it, which in a general sense may be said to be the
market value.
If you determine that a property is, in fact, a “special purpose” property, you should
consider that fact in determining the value of the property.
The value of a “special purpose” property is to be determined by what a purchaser who
desired to buy such a “special purpose” property, but did not have to have it, would be
willing to give for it, and what a seller who had such a “special purpose” property and
desired to sell it, but did not have to sell it, would be willing to take for it.
Comment
See In re Grand Haven Highway, 357 Mich 20; 97 NW2d 748 (1959).
History
M Civ JI 90.07 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-13
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.08 Assessed Value
The owners of certain parcels have introduced in evidence the assessed values placed on
the property by the [ name of assessing authority ] for real estate taxes. The assessed values
are not controlling, but you have a right to consider these assessments in connection with
all other evidence in arriving at the market value of the property.
The law requires that assessments for real estate tax purposes be made at 50 percent of the
true cash value.
Note on Use
If the property owner has introduced evidence of the condemning authority’s assessed
valuation of the property, this instruction should be given.
Comment
See In re Memorial Hall Site, 316 Mich 360; 25 NW2d 516 (1947); Detroit v Sherman, 68
Mich App 494; 242 NW2d 818 (1976); Muskegon v Berglund Food Stores, Inc, 50 Mich
App 305; 213 NW2d 195 (1973).
History
M Civ JI 90.08 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.09 Highest and Best Use
In deciding the market value of the subject property, you must base your decision on the
highest and best use of the property.
By “highest and best use” we mean the most profitable and advantageous use the owner
may make of the property even if the property is presently used for a different purpose or
is vacant, so long as there is a market demand for such use.
Comment
See St Clair Shores v Conley, 350 Mich 458; 86 NW2d 271 (1957); In re Condemnation of
Lands in Battle Creek, 341 Mich 412; 67 NW2d 49 (1954); In re Dillman, 255 Mich 152;
237 NW 552 (1931); In re Widening of Fulton Street, 248 Mich 13; 226 NW 690 (1929);
Ecorse v Toledo, C S & D R Co, 213 Mich 445; 182 NW 138 (1921).
History
M Civ JI 90.09 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-15
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.10 Possibility of Rezoning
The Court has instructed you on the subject of highest and best use. One of the things that
must be considered in deciding what the highest and best use of the property was at the time
of taking is the zoning classification of the property at that time. However, if there was a
reasonable possibility, absent the threat of this condemnation case, that the zoning
classification would have been changed, you should consider this possibility in arriving at
the value of the property on the date of taking. In order to affect the value of the property,
the possibility of rezoning must be real enough to have caused a prudent prospective buyer
to pay more for the property than he or she would otherwise pay.
Comment
See State Highway Commissioner v Eilender, 362 Mich 697; 108 NW2d 755 (1961).
History
M Civ JI 90.10 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-16 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.11 Refusal to Rezone
You should ignore a refusal to rezone unless you believe that the request to rezone would
also have been denied even in the absence of the condemnation and the planned public
improvement. It is improper for one agency of government to artificially depress the value
of property by unreasonably restrictive zoning so that another agency of government can
obtain it by condemnation at a lower price.
Comment
See Gordon v Warren Planning & Urban Renewal Commission, 388 Mich 82; 199 NW2d
465 (1972); Grand Trunk Western R Co v Detroit, 326 Mich 387; 40 NW2d 195 (1949).
History
M Civ JI 90.11 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-17
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.12 Partial Taking
This case involves what is known as a “partial taking”; that is to say, the property being
acquired by the [ name of condemning authority ] is part of a larger parcel under the control
of the owner.
When only part of a larger parcel is taken, as is the case here, the owner is entitled to recover
not only for the property taken, but also for any loss in the value to his or her remaining
property.
The measure of compensation is the difference between (1) the market value of the entire
parcel before the taking and (2) the market value of what is left of the parcel after the taking.
*(In valuing the property that is left after the taking, you should take into account various
factors, which may include: (1) its reduced size, (2) its altered shape, (3) reduced access,
(4) any change in utility or desirability of what is left after the taking, (5) the effect of the
applicable zoning ordinances on the remaining property, and (6) the use which the [ name
of condemning authority ] intends to make of the property it is acquiring and the effect of
that use upon the owner’s remaining property.)
Further, in valuing what is left after the taking, you must assume that the [ name of
condemning authority ] will use its newly acquired property rights to the full extent allowed
by the law.
Note on Use
*The six factors listed in this paragraph are illustrative, not exclusive. But see MCL
213.70(2). If no evidence has been introduced on one or more of the factors, it should be
deleted from the instruction.
An alternative test of compensation for a partial taking (i.e., value of the part taken plus
damages to the remainder) may be appropriate in certain cases in lieu of this instruction.
State Highway Commissioner v Flanders, 5 Mich App 572; 147 NW2d 441 (1967); State
Highway Commissioner v Englebrecht, 2 Mich App 572; 140 NW2d 781 (1966). Michigan
Dep’t of Transportation v Sherburn, 196 Mich App 301; 492 NW2d 517 (1992).
Comment
See State Highway Commissioner v Schultz, 370 Mich 78; 120 NW2d 733 (1963); State
Highway Commissioner v Walma, 369 Mich 687; 120 NW2d 833 (1963); State Highway
Commissioner v Sabo, 4 Mich App 291; 144 NW2d 798 (1966).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-18 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 90.12 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-19
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.13 Date of Valuation
In this case, the market value of the property *(both before and after the taking) must be
determined as of [ applicable date ] and not at any earlier or later date.
Note on Use
*The parenthetical phrase should be read to the jury in a partial taking case.
Comment
See State Highway Commission v Mobarak, 49 Mich App 115; 211 NW2d 539 (1973).
History
M Civ JI 90.13 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-20 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.14 Date of Valuation: Early Date of Taking
The market value of the property is to be determined as of the date of taking which shall be
decided by you.
In some situations, the government’s actions with respect to a particular property have an
impact which deprives an owner of the practical benefits of ownership of the property. In
such a case, you may find that the government’s actions constitute a “taking” of the
property at a date earlier than the date legal title is transferred to the government. This does
not mean that the government has actually seized or confiscated the property, but merely
that the impact of the government’s actions on the property is such that the law treats the
situation as though a taking has occurred.
The test to be applied in determining whether or not a taking has occurred is whether the
actions of the government substantially contributed to and accelerated the decline in value
of the property.
You should first determine whether or not such a taking in the legal sense occurred. Then
you must determine the date that such taking occurred. Then you must determine the value
of the property on that date.
Comment
See In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project, 376 Mich 311; 136 NW2d 896 (1965);
Heinrich v Detroit, 90 Mich App 692; 282 NW2d 448 (1979).
History
M Civ JI 90.14 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-21
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.15 Effect of Proposed Public Improvement
The process of determining the value on the date of taking may be complicated by the
government’s actions leading up to the taking, if those actions have had an effect on the
market value of the property. In such case, you must disregard any change in value resulting
from such actions and grant compensation on the basis of what the market value of the
property would be if such actions had not occurred. In other words, in arriving at market
value you should disregard any conditions which may exist in this area resulting from the
prospect of condemnation for this project and the other proceedings leading up to this
condemnation case.
You should determine the value of the property as though this project had not been
contemplated.
This does not mean that the announcement of the project acts to insulate the properties
concerned from normal economic forces. The market may go up or down, the property may
deteriorate or be improved, and you should recognize those factors. However, a change in
value directly traceable to the prospect of this condemnation should not penalize either
owners or the public. By the same token, you should disregard any increases in value which
may have occurred by reason of the prospect of the completion of the project.
Note on Use
This instruction applies in total taking cases and to the before value only in a partial taking
case.
In public utility condemnation cases, the word “condemnor’s” should be substituted for the
word “government’s” in the first paragraph.
Comment
See United States v Miller, 317 US 369; 63 S Ct 276; 87 L Ed 336 (1943); In re Urban
Renewal, Elmwood Park Project, 376 Mich 311; 136 NW2d 896 (1965); Heinrich v
Detroit, 90 Mich App 692; 282 NW2d 448 (1979); Detroit Board of Education v Clarke,
89 Mich App 504; 280 NW2d 574 (1979); In re Medical Center Rehabilitation Project, 50
Mich App 164; 212 NW2d 780 (1973); Madison Realty Co v Detroit, 315 F Supp 367 (ED
Mich, 1970).
History
M Civ JI 90.15 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-22 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.16 Comparable Market Transactions
The witnesses who have expressed opinions about market value have relied upon various
market transactions to help them arrive at their opinions. These transactions are referred to
as “comparables” and may include sales, offers to sell, offers to buy and rentals.
These witnesses have been permitted to testify as to the price and other terms and
circumstances of these transactions which they consider to be comparable to the owner’s
property as shedding light on the value of the owner’s property. Generally, the more similar
one property is to another, the closer the price paid for the one may be expected to approach
the value of the other. *(Thus, in weighing the opinion of a witness as to the value of the
subject property based upon other market transactions, you may consider the following
matters:
(a)Was the transaction freely entered into in good faith?
(b)If the transaction was on credit, how much should the price be discounted
to reflect the amount which the property would have brought in cash?
(c)How near is the date of the other transaction to the date of valuation in this
case?
(d)How near is the size and shape of the property to the size and shape of the
owner’s property?
(e)How similar are the physical features, including both improvements and
natural features?
(f)How similar is the use to which the other property is, or may be, put, to the
use which is, or may be, made of the owner’s property?
(g)How far is the other property from the owner’s property, and is the distance
important?
(h)How similar is the neighborhood of the other property to the neighborhood
of the owner’s property?
(i)Is the zoning classification the same on both properties?)
You should also consider the extent to which the witness has taken into account whatever
dissimilarities may exist. If you are not satisfied that the transactions being used as
comparables are, in fact, comparable, then you may consider that fact in weighing [ his / or
/ her ] opinion.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-23
Chapter 90: Condemnation
You should bear in mind that comparable sales are not themselves direct evidence of value,
but merely the basis on which the witnesses have formed their opinions of value.
You should apply these standards to all witnesses rendering an opinion of value.
Note on Use
*The list of matters that the jury may consider is illustrative, but not exclusive. If there is
no evidence as to one or more of the matters, it should be deleted from this instruction.
Comment
See Western Michigan University Board of Trustees v Slavin, 381 Mich 23; 158 NW2d 884
(1968); In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 291 Mich 313; 289 NW 493 (1939);
Commission of Conservation v Hane, 248 Mich 473; 227 NW 718 (1929); State Highway
Commission v McGuire, 29 Mich App 32; 185 NW2d 187 (1970).
History
M Civ JI 90.16 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-24 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.17 Easements
The [ name of condemning authority ] is attempting to acquire through this condemnation
proceeding certain limited rights in the owner’s lands. The rights being acquired are as
follows: [ describe and define the rights being acquired ]. The owner will have and retain
all the uses of [ his / her ] land not inconsistent with those easement rights.
Note on Use
On measure of compensation, see M Civ JI 90.12 and the Note on Use thereunder.
Comment
See Cantieny v Friebe, 341 Mich 143; 67 NW2d 102 (1954); Hasselbring v Koepke, 263
Mich 466; 248 NW 869 (1933); Nicholls v Healy, 37 Mich App 348; 194 NW2d 727
(1971).
History
M Civ JI 90.17 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-25
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.18 Total Taking
The [ name of condemning authority ] has the right and duty to acquire and take the entire
property whenever the acquisition of the part actually needed would destroy the practical
value or utility of the remainder of the property. It is for you to determine whether or not
the practical value or utility of the remainder is, in fact, being destroyed.
The burden of proof is on the owner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
practical value or utility of the remainder of the property has been destroyed.
Comment
See MCL 213.54(1); MCL 213.365; State Highway Commission v Mobarak, 49 Mich App
115; 211 NW2d 539 (1973).
History
M Civ JI 90.18 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-26 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.19 Benefits
You must disregard any testimony which indicates or implies that because of this taking the
remaining property has in any way benefited. You may only consider testimony that bears
on damages to the subject property.
Note on Use
This instruction should only be given if the benefits issue has been raised, inadvertently or
otherwise, at trial.
The instruction should not be given if the applicable statute authorizes offset of benefit and
the issue has been properly pleaded.
Comment
See Custer Twp v Dawson, 178 Mich 367; 144 NW 862 (1914); State Highway Commission
v McLaughlin, 16 Mich App 22; 167 NW2d 468 (1969); State Highway Commissioner v
Sabo, 4 Mich App 291; 144 NW2d 798 (1966).
History
M Civ JI 90.19 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-27
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.20 Compensation for Fixtures; Definition
The market value of the property taken includes the value of its fixtures. An item is a fixture
if it meets all three of the following criteria:
The item is attached *(or constructively attached) to the land or to a building or structure
attached to the land.
*(“Constructively attached” means that an item is a fixture even though it is not physically
attached if it is a part of something else that is physically attached, and when the item, if
removed, either could not generally be used elsewhere or would leave the part remaining
unfit for use.)
The item is a necessary or useful part, considering the purpose for which the land, building,
or structure is used.
The surrounding circumstances indicate that the owner intended to make the attachment
*(or constructive attachment) permanent.
†(Improvements made by a tenant are to be valued on the basis of their useful life without
regard to the term of the lease.)
Note on Use
*The parenthetical paragraph in subsection 1 and the phrases in parentheses preceded by an
asterisk should be used only when applicable.
†The final paragraph of this instruction should be used only if applicable.
Comment
Wayne County v Britton Trust, 454 Mich 608; 563 NW2d 674 (1997). Stocks of goods and
ordinary movable office furniture are not fixtures. Britton.
For a discussion of just compensation for improvements made by a tenant, see Almota
Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co v United States, 409 US 470; 93 S Ct 791; 35 L Ed 2d
1 (1973).
History
M Civ JI 90.20 was added February 1, 1981. Amended October 1998.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-28 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.21 Fixtures: Election to Remove—Compensation
In this case, the owner has elected to remove fixtures from the property. When the owner
makes such an election, the market value of the property including the fixtures must be
decreased by the value of the fixtures removed. The owner shall be awarded the cost of
removing the fixtures, moving them to a new location, and reinstalling them at the new
location.
Note on Use
An owner may not recover moving expenses for the fixtures that have been duplicated by
relocation benefits paid under federal, state, or local law. MCL 213.63a.
The condemning authority cannot be required to pay more to move a fixture than its value-
in-place. In re Grand Haven Highway, 357 Mich 20; 97 NW2d 748 (1959).
Comment
A condemnee automatically receives value-in-place for fixtures without the necessity of an
election. However, a condemnee may elect to remove fixtures and receive the value of the
property as enhanced by the fixtures less the value-in-place of the fixtures that have or will
be severed plus the cost of detaching, moving, and reattaching the fixtures in the new
location. Wayne County v Britton Trust, 454 Mich 608; 563 NW2d 674 (1997).
History
M Civ JI 90.21 was added February 1, 1981. Amended October 1998.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-29
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.22 Effect of View
During the course of this trial, you were taken to the subject property. In addition to the
testimony which you have heard and the exhibits which you have seen here in the
courtroom, you may also consider what you saw when you visited the property if you
believe the things you saw would be helpful to you in reaching a decision.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given in lieu of M Civ JI 3.12, since in a condemnation case the
view encompasses the item to be valued.
Comment
See In re Grand Haven Highway, 357 Mich 20; 97 NW2d 748 (1959); In re Widening of
Michigan Avenue, 299 Mich 544; 300 NW 877 (1941); In re Widening of Bagley Avenue,
248 Mich 1; 226 NW 688 (1929).
History
M Civ JI 90.22 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-30 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.22A Valuation Witnesses [DELETED]
[INSTRUCTION DELETED]
History
M Civ JI 90.22A was added October 1981. Amended July 2017. Deleted October 2018
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-31
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.23 Range of Testimony
In reaching a verdict, you must keep within the range of the testimony submitted. You may
accept the lowest figure submitted as to a particular item of damage, the highest figure
submitted, or a figure somewhere between the highest and lowest. You may not go below
the lowest figure or above the highest figure submitted.
In this case, the lowest valuation placed in evidence for the property is $________.____ and
the highest valuation is $________.____. Any award between those two figures would be
a proper jury verdict; any award which is not between those two figures would not be a
valid jury verdict.
Note on Use
The second paragraph of the instruction is appropriate only in a total taking case without
the issues contemplated by M Civ JI 90.12 Partial Taking; 90.14 Date of Valuation: Early
Date of Taking; 90.18 Total Taking (destruction of practical value or utility); 90.19
Benefits; 90.21 Compensable Business Property: Measure of Compensation, or other
damage claims. Where those issues are involved, the second paragraph of the instruction
may require modification.
Comment
See In re Grand Haven Highway, 357 Mich 20; 97 NW2d 748 (1959); In re Acquisition of
Land for Civic Center, 335 Mich 528; 56 NW2d 375 (1953).
History
M Civ JI 90.23 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-32 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.24 Mechanics of Verdict
When you retire to the jury room, your first duty is to elect a jury foreman. You may have
all the various exhibits that have been admitted in evidence, and your notes, with you. You
will also have a prepared Form of Jury Verdict which will contain a blank line in which you
should insert the amount of just compensation as determined by you. I also want to
emphasize that your verdict does not have to be unanimous. If any five of you agree on a
verdict, that constitutes a legal jury verdict. The foreman must sign the verdict.
Note on Use
If two or more parcels are consolidated for trial, the jury should be instructed: “When any
five of you agree on a verdict as to a parcel, that will be the verdict on that parcel. However,
the same five members of the jury do not have to agree on all of the parcels.”
The uniform condemnation statute of 1980 (MCL 213.51 et seq.) does not specify a verdict
form. The form of verdict for actions brought under this statute will depend on the nature
of the particular case.
History
M Civ JI 90.24 was added February 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 90-33
Chapter 90: Condemnation
M Civ JI 90.30 Going Concern
The defendant claims that condemnation of the property destroyed the business.
If you find that the defendant cannot relocate the business, the defendant is entitled to just
compensation for the value of the business as a going concern. If you find that the business
can be relocated, the defendant is not entitled to compensation for the value of the business
as a going concern.
Comment
City of Detroit v King, 207 Mich App 169; 523 NW2d 644 (1994); Department of
Transportation v Campbell, 175 Mich App 629; 438 NW2d 267 (1988); Detroit v
Michael’s Prescriptions, 143 Mich App 808; 373 NW2d 219 (1985); Detroit v Whalings,
Inc, 43 Mich App 1; 202 NW2d 816 (1972).
The Committee has found no Michigan appellate decisions that either permit or deny
compensation for a partial taking of a going concern.
A defendant may not recover both going concern and business interruption damages
because the theories are mutually exclusive. Detroit v Larned Associates, 199 Mich App
36; 501 NW2d 189 (1993).
History
M Civ JI 90.30 was added October 1998.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 90-34 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 90.31 Business Interruption
Just compensation includes damages caused by interruption of a business or avoiding
interruption of the business.
Note on Use
Additional instructions may be needed if there are issues about whether specific damages
are compensable as business interruption damages. See Spiek v Department of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); State Highway Comm’r v Gulf Oil
Corp, 377 Mich 309; 140 NW2d 500 (1966); Mackie v Watt, 374 Mich 300; 132 NW2d 113
(1965).
Lost profits are not compensable as business interruption damages. Detroit v Larned
Associates, 199 Mich App 36; 501 NW2d 189 (1993).
A defendant may not recover both going concern and business interruption damages
because the theories are mutually exclusive. Larned Associates.
Comment
In re Grand Haven Highway, 357 Mich 20; 97 NW2d 748 (1959); Grand Rapids & Indiana
Railroad Co v Weiden, 70 Mich 390; 38 NW 294 (1888); Allison v Chandler, 11 Mich 542
(1863); Larned Associates; Detroit v Hamtramck Community Federal Credit Union, 146
Mich App 155; 379 NW2d 405 (1985).
History
M Civ JI 90.31 was added March 1999.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-1
CHAPTER 97
Child Protection Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.01 Preliminary Instructions to Prospective Jurors ..................................... 97-4
M Civ JI 97.02 Selection of Fair and Impartial Jury....................................................... 97-5
M Civ JI 97.03 Challenges ............................................................................................. 97-6
M Civ JI 97.04 Brief Description ................................................................................... 97-7
M Civ JI 97.05 Introduction to Parties, Counsel, and Witnesses.................................. 97-8
M Civ JI 97.06 Reading of Petition................................................................................ 97-9
M Civ JI 97.07 Juror Oath Before Voir Dire ................................................................ 97-10
M Civ JI 97.08 Seating of Jurors.................................................................................. 97-11
M Civ JI 97.09 Juror Oath Following Selection ........................................................... 97-12
M Civ JI 97.10 Description of Trial Procedure ............................................................ 97-13
M Civ JI 97.11 Function of Judge and Jury.................................................................. 97-14
M Civ JI 97.12 Jury Must Only Consider Evidence; What Evidence Is; Prohibited Actions by
Jurors.......................................................................................................................... 97-15
M Civ JI 97.13 Judging Credibility and Weight of Evidence........................................ 97-18
M Civ JI 97.14 Questions Not Evidence ...................................................................... 97-20
M Civ JI 97.15 Court’s Questioning Not Reflective of Opinion................................... 97-21
M Civ JI 97.16 Questions by Jurors Allowed............................................................... 97-22
M Civ JI 97.17 Objections ........................................................................................... 97-23
M Civ JI 97.18 Disregard Out-of-Presence Hearings .................................................. 97-24
M Civ JI 97.19 Jurors Not to Discuss Case .................................................................. 97-25
M Civ JI 97.20 Recesses .............................................................................................. 97-27
M Civ JI 97.21 Caution about Publicity in Cases of Public Interest............................. 97-28
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.22 Visiting Scene/Conducting Experiments ............................................. 97-29
M Civ JI 97.23 Notetaking by Jurors Allowed ............................................................. 97-30
M Civ JI 97.24 Notetaking Not Allowed...................................................................... 97-31
M Civ JI 97.25 Inability to Hear Witness or See Exhibit.............................................. 97-32
M Civ JI 97.26 Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel..................................... 97-33
M Civ JI 97.27 Number of Jurors ................................................................................ 97-34
M Civ JI 97.28 Instructions to be Taken as a Whole................................................... 97-35
M Civ JI 97.29 Deliberations and Verdict ................................................................... 97-36
M Civ JI 97.30 Maintaining an Open Mind ................................................................. 97-37
M Civ JI 97.31 Duties of Judge and Jury ..................................................................... 97-38
M Civ JI 97.32 Evidence.............................................................................................. 97-39
M Civ JI 97.33 Witnesses-Credibility .......................................................................... 97-41
M Civ JI 97.34 Circumstantial Evidence...................................................................... 97-43
M Civ JI 97.35 Statutory Grounds............................................................................... 97-44
M Civ JI 97.36 Definitions ........................................................................................... 97-46
M Civ JI 97.37 Standard of Proof................................................................................ 97-48
M Civ JI 97.38 No Duty to Present Evidence .............................................................. 97-49
M Civ JI 97.39 Treatment of One Child as Evidence of Treatment of Another Child . 97-50
M Civ JI 97.40 Improvement in Circumstances Not Controlling................................. 97-51
M Civ JI 97.41 Not Necessary to Prove Each Fact Alleged.......................................... 97-52
M Civ JI 97.42 Unfit Home by Reason of Neglect or Cruelty—Res Ipsa Loquitur....... 97-53
M Civ JI 97.43 Findings Re: Statutory Grounds .......................................................... 97-54
M Civ JI 97.43A Legitimate Practice of Religious Beliefs ........................................... 97-56
M Civ JI 97.44 Court to Determine Disposition .......................................................... 97-57
M Civ JI 97.45 Not a Criminal Proceeding .................................................................. 97-58
M Civ JI 97.46 Deliberations and Verdict ................................................................... 97-59
M Civ JI 97.47 Communications with the Court ......................................................... 97-61
M Civ JI 97.48 Exhibits................................................................................................ 97-62
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-3
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.49 Verdict................................................................................................. 97-63
M Civ JI 97.50 Dismissal of Extra Juror ....................................................................... 97-64
M Civ JI 97.51 Bailiff’s Oath........................................................................................ 97-65
M Civ JI 97.52 Begin Deliberations ............................................................................. 97-66
M Civ JI 97.60 Form of Verdict: Statutory Grounds Alleged....................................... 97-67
M Civ JI 97.61 Form of Verdict: One Statutory Ground Alleged [ Instruction
Deleted]...................................................................................................................... 97-71
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.01 Preliminary Instructions to Prospective Jurors
(1) [ Good morning / Good afternoon ]. I am Judge [ _________], and it is my pleasure
and privilege to welcome you to the [_________] County Circuit Court.
(2) I know that jury service may be a new experience for some of you. Jury duty is one of
the most serious duties that members of a free society are called upon to perform.
(3) The jury is an important part of this court. The right to a trial by jury is an ancient
tradition and is part of our legal heritage. The parties have a right to a jury that is selected
fairly, that comes to the case without bias, and that will attempt to reach a verdict based on
the evidence presented. Because you are making very important decisions in this case, you
are to evaluate the evidence carefully and avoid decisions based on generalizations, gut
feelings, prejudices, sympathies, stereotypes, or biases. The law and your oath demands
that you return a just verdict, based solely on the evidence, your reason and common sense,
and these instructions. As jurors, your sole duty is to find the truth and do justice. Jurors
must be as free as humanly possible from bias, prejudice, or sympathy for either side. Each
side in a trial is entitled to jurors who keep open minds until the time comes to decide the
case. Take the time you need to test what might be reflexive unconscious responses and to
reflect carefully and consciously about the evidence. I caution you to avoid reaching
conclusions that may have been influenced by unintended stereotypes or associations. You
must each reach your own conclusions about this case individually, but you should do so
only after listening to and considering the opinions of the other jurors, who may have
different backgrounds and perspectives from yours. Working together will help achieve a
fair result.
History
M Civ JI 97.01 was added March 2005. Amended October 2019, July 2024.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-5
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.02 Selection of Fair and Impartial Jury
(1)A trial begins with the selection of a jury. The purpose of this process is to obtain
information about you that will help us choose a fair and impartial jury to hear this case.
(2)During jury selection the lawyers and I will ask you questions. This is called the voir
dire. The questions are meant to find out if you know anything about the case. Also, we
need to find out if you have any opinions or personal experiences that might influence you
for or against any of the parties or witnesses.
(3)The questions may probe deeply into your attitudes, beliefs and experiences. They are
not meant to be an unreasonable prying into your private lives. The law requires that we get
this information so that an impartial jury can be chosen.
(4)If you do not hear or understand a question, you should say so. If you do understand it,
you should answer it truthfully and completely. Please do not hesitate to speak freely about
anything you believe we should know.
Note on Use
The judge may indicate the method he or she wishes jurors to follow in answering
questions.
History
M Civ JI 97.02 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.03 Challenges
During jury selection you may be excused from serving on the jury in one of two ways.
First, I may excuse you for cause; that is, I may decide that there is a valid reason why you
cannot or should not serve in this case. Second, a lawyer for one of the parties may excuse
you without giving any reason for doing so. This is called a peremptory challenge. The law
gives each party the right to excuse a certain number of jurors in this way. If you are
excused, you should not feel bad or take it personally. As I explained before, there simply
may be something that causes you to be excused from this particular case.
History
M Civ JI 97.03 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-7
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.04 Brief Description
You have been called here today as prospective jurors in the Family Division of the
[ ________ ] County Circuit Court. This is a child protection proceeding. It is not a criminal
case.
History
M Civ JI 97.04 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.05 Introduction to Parties, Counsel, and Witnesses
(1) I will now introduce the parties to this case, the lawyers, and the witnesses, and you
will be asked if you know any of them.
(2) The petitioner is [ ____________ ]. The petitioner’s case will be presented by
[ Prosecutor, Attorney General, other Attorney ]. The People of the State of Michigan are
represented by [ _____________ ], an assistant prosecuting attorney for [ ________ ]
County.*
(3) The [ mother/father/parents/guardian/nonparent adult/ respondent/custodian ] [ is/are ]
[ ____________/ and ____________ ] and [ he/she/they ] [ is/are ] represented by lawyer
________________.
(4) [ _____________ ], a lawyer, has been appointed by the Court to represent the [ child/
children ]. (If both a lawyer-guardian ad litem and an attorney have been appointed for one
or more of the children, give the following instead: [ __________ ], a lawyer, has been
appointed by the court to represent the best interests of the [ child/children ] and is called
the lawyer-guardian ad litem for the [ child/children ]. [ ___________ ], a lawyer, has been
appointed by the court to represent the wishes of [ child’s name ].)
(5) The witnesses who may testify in this case are: (read list of witnesses).
Note on Use
The alternative language in subsection 2 recognizes that Petitioner is not always the State
of Michigan or the Family Independence Agency.
* This sentence should be read only if the prosecutor appears on behalf of the People, as
opposed to appearing on behalf of or as legal consultant to, for example, the Family
Independence Agency. MCL 712A.17(4) and (5), and MCR 3.914.
History
M Civ JI 97.05 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-9
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.06 Reading of Petition
We are here today on a petition filed by [ _________ ], a Children’s Protective Services
worker for the [ ________ ] County Family Independence Agency*, alleging that the Court
has jurisdiction over [ names of children ], who [ was/were ] born on [ ______ ], and [ is/
are ] now ____ years of age. Under Michigan law, the Family Division of the Circuit Court
has jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child under 18 years of age found within the
County: (read all pertinent statutory allegations from MCL 712A.2(b)).
The allegations which the petitioner will attempt to prove are as follows: (read factual
allegations in petition.)
Note on Use
* Because others may file petitions, this sentence may need to modified accordingly.
History
M Civ JI 97.06 was added March 2005. Amended July 2017.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.07 Juror Oath Before Voir Dire
(1)I will now ask you to stand and swear to truthfully and completely answer all the
questions that you will be asked about your qualifications to serve as jurors in this case. If
you have religious beliefs against taking an oath, you may affirm that you will answer all
the questions truthfully and completely.
(2)Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that you will truthfully
and completely answer all questions about your qualifications to serve as jurors in this
case?
History
M Civ JI 97.07 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-11
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.08 Seating of Jurors
The [ bailiff/clerk ] will now draw the names of [ six/seven ] prospective jurors. As your
name is called, please come forward and take your seat in the jury box, starting in the back
row with the seat closest to the back of the courtroom, and filling in across the back row
and then the front row in the same manner.
History
M Civ JI 97.08 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.09 Juror Oath Following Selection
Members of the jury. I will now ask you to stand and swear or affirm to perform your duty
to try this case justly and to reach a true verdict. Please rise and raise your right hand:
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that, in this case now before the court, you will justly
decide the questions submitted to you and unless you are discharged by the Court from
further deliberation, you will render a true verdict; that you will render your verdict only on
the evidence introduced and in accordance with the instructions of the Court?
History
M Civ JI 97.09 was added March 2005. Amended July 2024.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-13
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.10 Description of Trial Procedure
(1)Now I will explain some of the legal principles you will need to know and the procedure
we will follow in this trial.
(2)First, [ Prosecutor, Attorney General, other Attorney ] will make an opening statement
in which [ he/she ] will give [ his/her ] theory of the case. The other lawyers do not have to
make opening statements, but if they choose to do so, they may make an opening statement
after [ Prosecutor, Attorney General, other Attorney ] makes [ his/her ], or they may wait
until later. These opening statements are not evidence. They are only meant to help you
understand how each party sees the case.
(3)Next, [ Prosecutor, Attorney General, other Attorney ] will present [ his/her ] evidence.
[ He/she ] may call witnesses to testify and may show you exhibits such as documents or
physical objects. The other lawyers have the right to cross-examine, that is, to question,
[ Mr./Ms. ________’s ] witnesses.
(4)After [ Prosecutor, Attorney General, other Attorney ] has presented all of [ his/her ]
evidence, the other lawyers may also offer evidence, but they do not have to. If they do call
any witnesses, [ Prosecutor, Attorney General, other Attorney ] has the right to cross-
examine them. [ He/she ] may also call witnesses to contradict the testimony of the other
parties’ witnesses.
(5)After all the evidence has been presented, the lawyers for each party will make their
closing arguments. Like opening statements, they are not evidence. They are only meant to
help you understand the evidence and the way each party sees the case. You must base your
verdict only on the evidence.
Note on Use
The alternative language in subsections 2-4 recognizes that Petitioner is not always the
State of Michigan or the Family Independence Agency.
History
M Civ JI 97.10 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.11 Function of Judge and Jury
(1)My responsibility as the judge in this trial is to make sure that the trial is run fairly and
efficiently, to make decisions about evidence, and to instruct you about the law that applies
to this case. You must take the law as I give it to you. Nothing I say is meant to reflect my
own opinions about the facts of the case. As jurors, you are the ones who will decide this
case.
(2)Your responsibility as jurors is to decide what the facts of the case are. That is your job
and no one else’s. You must think about all the evidence and then decide what each piece
of evidence means and how important you think it is. This includes how much you believe
what each of the witnesses said. What you decide about any fact in this case is final.
History
M Civ JI 97.11 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-15
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.12 Jury Must Only Consider Evidence; What Evidence Is;
Prohibited Actions by Jurors
(1)When it is time for you to decide the case, you are only allowed to consider the evidence
that was admitted in the case. Evidence includes only the sworn testimony of the witnesses,
the exhibits, such as documents or other things which I admit into evidence, and anything
else I tell you to consider as evidence.
*(It may also include some things which I specifically tell you to consider as evidence.)
(2)There are some things presented in the trial that are not evidence, and I will now explain
what is not evidence:
(a)The lawyers’ statements, commentaries, and arguments are not evidence.
They are only meant to help you understand the evidence and each side’s legal
theories. You should only accept things the lawyers say that are supported by
the evidence or by your own common sense and general knowledge. However,
an admission of a fact by a lawyer is binding on [ his / her ] client.
(b)Questions by the lawyers, you or me to the witnesses are not evidence. You
should consider these questions only as they give meaning to the witnesses’
answers.
(c)My comments, rulings, [ summary of the evidence, ] and instructions are
also not evidence. It is my duty to see that the trial is conducted according to
the law, and to tell you the law that applies to this case. However, when I make
a comment or give an instruction, I am not trying to influence your vote or
express a personal opinion about the case. If you believe that I have an opinion
about how you should decide this case, you must pay no attention to that
opinion. You are the only judges of the facts, and you should decide this case
from the evidence.
(3)In addition, you are not to consider anything about the case from outside of the
courtroom as it is not evidence admitted during the trial. Under the law, the evidence you
consider to decide the case must meet certain standards. For example, witnesses must swear
to tell the truth, and the lawyers must be able to cross-examine them. Because information
obtained outside of the courtroom does not have to meet these standards, it could give you
incorrect or misleading information that might unfairly favor one side, or you may begin to
improperly form an opinion on information that has not been admitted. This would
compromise the parties’ right to have a verdict rendered only by the jurors and based only
on the evidence you hear and see in the courtroom. So, to be fair to both sides, you must
follow these instructions. I will now describe some of the things you may not consider from
outside of the courtroom:
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-16 Michigan Supreme Court
(a)Newspaper, television, radio and other news reports, emails, blogs and
social media posts and commentary about this case are not evidence. Until I
discharge you as jurors, do not search for, read, listen to, or watch any such
information about this case from any source, in any form whatsoever.
(b)Opinions of people outside of the trial are not evidence. You are not to
discuss or share information, or answer questions, about this case at all in any
manner with anyone—this includes family, friends or even strangers—until
you have been discharged as a juror. Don’t allow anyone to say anything to you
or say anything about this case in your presence. If anyone does, advise them
that you are on the jury hearing the case, ask them to stop, and let me know
immediately.
(c)Research, investigations and experiments not admitted in the courtroom are
not evidence. You must not do any investigations on your own or conduct any
research or experiments of any kind. You may not research or investigate
through the Internet or otherwise any evidence, testimony, or information
related to this case, including about a party, a witness, an attorney, a court
officer, or any topics raised in the case.
(d)Except as otherwise admitted in trial, the scene is not evidence. You must
not visit the scene of the occurrence that is the subject of this trial. If it should
become necessary that you view or visit the scene, you will be taken as a group.
You must not consider as evidence any personal knowledge you have of the
scene.
(4)To avoid even the appearance of unfairness or improper conduct on your part, you must
follow the following rules of conduct:
(a)While you are in the courtroom and while you are deliberating, you are
prohibited altogether from using a computer, cellular telephone or any other
electronic device capable of making communications. You may use these
devices during recesses so long as your use does not otherwise violate my
instructions.
(b)Until I have discharged you as a juror, you must not talk to any party,
lawyer, or witness even if your conversation has nothing to do with this case.
This is to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.
(5)If you discover that any juror has violated any of my instructions about prohibited
conduct, you must report it to me.
(6)After you are discharged as a juror, you may talk to anyone you wish about the case.
Until that time, you must control your natural desire to discuss the case outside of what I’ve
said is permitted.
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History
M Civ JI 97.12 was added March 2005. Amended November 2015.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-18 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.13 Judging Credibility and Weight of Evidence
(1) It is your job to decide what the facts of this case are. You must decide which witnesses
you believe and how important you think their testimony is. You do not have to accept or
reject everything a witness says. You are free to believe all, none, or part of any person's
testimony.
(2) In deciding which testimony you believe, you should rely on your own common sense
and everyday experience. However, in deciding whether you believe a witness's testimony,
you must set aside any bias or prejudice you have based on the witness's disability, gender
or gender identity, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin,
socioeconomic status or any other factor irrelevant to the rights of the parties.
Each of us may have biases about or certain perceptions or stereotypes of other people. We
may be aware of some of our biases, though we may not share them with others. We may
not be fully aware of some of our other biases. Our biases often affect how we act, favorably
or unfavorably, toward someone. Bias can affect our thoughts, how we remember, what we
see and hear, whom we believe or disbelieve, and how we make important decisions.
Witnesses can have the same implicit biases. As jurors you are being asked to make very
important decisions in this case. You must not let bias, prejudice, or public opinion
influence your decision. You must not be biased in favor of or against any party, witness,
or lawyer because of his or her disability, gender or gender identity, race, religion, ethnicity,
sexual orientation, age, national origin, socioeconomic status or any other factor irrelevant
to the rights of the parties. Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence presented. You
must carefully evaluate the evidence and resist any urge to reach a verdict that is influenced
by bias for or against any party, witness, or lawyer.
Take the time you need to reflect carefully about the evidence. I caution you to avoid
reaching conclusions that may have been influenced by unintended stereotypes or
associations. You must each reach your own conclusions about this case individually, but
you should do so only after listening to and considering the opinions of the other jurors,
who may have different backgrounds and perspectives from yours. Working together will
help achieve a fair result.
As you deliberate with your fellow jurors, it is important to keep an open mind about the
evidence, including how it may be viewed through different perspectives. I encourage you
to explain to your fellow jurors the reasons why you believe the evidence supports your
decision to vote in a certain way. It is equally important for you to listen to your fellow
jurors and to carefully consider any differing points of view during your deliberations.
(3) There is no fixed set of rules for judging whether you believe a witness, but it may help
you to think about these questions:
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
(a) Was the witness able to see or hear clearly? How long was the witness watching
or listening? Was anything else going on that might have distracted the witness?
(b) Does the witness seem to have a good memory?
(c) How does the witness look and act while testifying? Does the witness seem to be
making an honest effort to tell the truth, or does the witness seem to evade the
questions or argue with the lawyers?
(d) Does the witness’s age or maturity affect how you judge his or her testimony?
(e) Does the witness have any bias or prejudice or any personal interest in how this
case is decided?
(f) Have there been any promises, threats, suggestions, or other influences that
affect how the witness testifies?
(g) In general, does the witness have any special reason to tell the truth, or any
special reason to lie?
(h) All in all, how reasonable does the witness’s testimony seem when you think
about all the other evidence in the case?
Comment
The November 2021 amendment added gender identity to the list of things that should not
influence the jury’s decision.
The May 2023 amendments were drawn from amended instructions suggested by the
American College of Trial Lawyers and are “designed to counter cognitive flaws and focus
jurors’ attention, increase their use of deliberative thought, mitigate ‘confirmation bias,’
and broaden participation during jury deliberation.” Improving Jury Deliberations
through Jury Instructions Based on Cognitive Science, American College of Trial
Lawyers, February 2019.
History
Added March 2005. Amended October 2019, November 2021, May 2023.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-20 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.14 Questions Not Evidence
The questions the lawyers ask the witnesses are not evidence. Only the answers are
evidence. You should not think that something is true just because one of the lawyers asks
questions that assume or suggest that it is true.
History
M Civ JI 97.14 was added March 2005.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.15 Court’s Questioning Not Reflective of Opinion
I may ask questions of some of the witnesses. These questions are not meant to reflect my
opinion about the evidence. If I ask questions, my only reason would be to ask about things
that may not have been fully explored.
History
M Civ JI 97.15 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-22 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.16 Questions by Jurors Allowed
(1)During the trial you may think of an important question that would help you understand
the facts in this case. You are allowed to ask such questions.
(2)You should wait to ask questions until after a witness has finished testifying. If you still
have an important question after all of the lawyers have finished asking their questions,
don’t ask it yourself. Instead, raise your hand, write the question down, and pass it to the
bailiff. [ He / she ] will give it to me. Do not show the question to the other jurors, or
announce what the question is.
(3)There are rules of evidence that a trial must follow. If your question is allowed under
those rules, I will ask the witness your question. If your question is not allowed, I will either
rephrase it or I will not ask it at all.
Note on Use
Allowing jurors to ask questions is optional.
History
M Civ JI 97.16 was added March 2005. Amended November 2015.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.17 Objections
During the trial the lawyers may object to certain questions or statements made by the other
lawyers or witnesses. I will rule on these objections according to the law. My rulings are
not meant to reflect my opinion about the facts of the case.
History
M Civ JI 97.17 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-24 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.18 Disregard Out-of-Presence Hearings
Sometimes the lawyers and I will have discussions out of your hearing. Also, while you are
in the jury room I may have to take care of other matters that have nothing to do with this
case. Please pay no attention to these interruptions.
History
M Civ JI 97.18 was added March 2005.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.19 Jurors Not to Discuss Case
(1) Because the law requires that cases be decided only on the evidence presented during
the trial and only by the deliberating jurors, you must keep an open mind and not make a
decision about anything in the case until after you have (a) heard all of the evidence, (b)
heard the closing arguments of counsel, (c) received all of my instructions on the law and
the verdict form, and (d) any alternate jurors have been excused. At that time, you will be
sent to the jury room to decide the case. Sympathy must not influence your decision. Nor
should your decision be influenced by prejudice regarding disability, gender or gender
identity, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin, socioeconomic
status, or any other factor irrelevant to the rights of the parties.
(2) [ Alternative A ] (Before you are sent to the jury room to decide the case, you may
discuss the case among yourselves during recesses in the trial, but there are strict rules that
must be followed:
First, you may only discuss the case when (a) all of you are together, (b) you
are all in the jury room, and (c) no one else is present in the jury room. You
must not discuss the case under any other circumstances. The reason you may
not discuss the case with other jurors while some of you are not present is that
all of you are entitled to participate in all of the discussions about the case.
Second, as I stated before, you must keep an open mind until I send you to the
jury room to decide the case. Your discussions before then are only tentative.
Third, you do not have to discuss the case during the trial. But if you choose to
do so, you must follow the rules I have given you.)
[ Alternative B ] (Before you are sent to the jury room to decide the case, you are not to
discuss the case even with the other members of the jury. This is to ensure that all of you
are able to participate in all of the discussions about the case, and so that you do not begin
to express opinions about the case until it has been submitted to you for deliberation.)
Comment
The November 2021 amendment added gender identity to the list of things that should not
influence the jury’s decision.
Note on Use
The court will choose between Alternative A or B in paragraph 2 based on the court’s
decision whether to permit the jurors to discuss the evidence among themselves during trial
recesses.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-26 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 97.19 was added March 2005. Amended November 2015, October 2019.
Amended November 2021.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.20 Recesses
(1)If I call for a recess during the trial, I will either send you back to the jury room or allow
you to leave the building. During these recesses you must not discuss the case with anyone
or let anyone discuss it with you or in your presence. If someone tries to do that, tell him or
her to stop, and explain that as a juror you are not allowed to discuss the case. If he or she
continues, leave them at once and report the incident to me as soon as you return to court.
(2)You must not talk to the parties, lawyers, or the witnesses about anything at all, even if
it has nothing to do with the case.
(3)It is very important that you only get information about the case here in court, when you
are acting as the jury and when the parties, the lawyers, and I are all here.
History
M Civ JI 97.20 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-28 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.21 Caution about Publicity in Cases of Public Interest
(1)During the trial, do not read, listen to, or watch any news reports about the case. Under
the law, the evidence you consider to decide the case must meet certain standards. For
example, witnesses must swear to tell the truth, and the lawyers must be able to cross-
examine them. Because news reports do not have to meet these standards, they could give
you incorrect or misleading information that might unfairly favor one side. So, to be fair to
both sides, you must follow this instruction.
(2)(Give the instruction below when recessing)
Remember, for the reasons I explained to you earlier, you must not read, listen to, or watch
any news reports about this case while you are serving on this jury.
Note on Use
Give this instruction only if media coverage is expected.
History
M Civ JI 97.21 was added March 2005.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.22 Visiting Scene/Conducting Experiments
Do not go to the scene of any of the incidents alleged in the petition. If it is necessary for
you to view a scene, you will be taken there as a group under my supervision. Do not make
any investigation of your own or conduct an experiment of any kind.
History
M Civ JI 97.22 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-30 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.23 Notetaking by Jurors Allowed
You may take notes during the trial if you wish, but of course, you don’t have to. If you do
take notes, you should be careful that it does not distract you from paying attention to all
the evidence. When you go to the jury room to decide on your verdict, you may use your
notes to help you remember what happened in the courtroom. If you take notes, do not let
anyone see them. After you have begun your deliberations, it is then permissible to allow
other jurors to see your notes. You must turn them over to the [ bailiff / clerk ] during
recesses. If you do take notes, please write your name on the first page. The notes will be
destroyed at the end of trial.
History
M Civ JI 97.23 was added March 2005. Amended November 2015.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.24 Notetaking Not Allowed
I don’t believe that it is desirable or helpful for you to take notes during this trial. If you
take notes, you might not be able to give your full attention to the evidence. Therefore,
please do not take any notes while you are in the courtroom.
History
M Civ JI 97.24 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-32 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.25 Inability to Hear Witness or See Exhibit
If you cannot hear a question by a lawyer, an answer by a witness, or anything I say, please
raise your hand. When I recognize you, you should indicate what you did not hear. Do not
hesitate to ask something be repeated, as it is very important that you hear everything that
is said.
History
M Civ JI 97.25 was added March 2005.
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M Civ JI 97.26 Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel
From time to time throughout the trial I may address the lawyers as counsel, which is
another word for lawyer.
History
M Civ JI 97.26 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-34 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.27 Number of Jurors
You can see that we have chosen a jury of seven. After you have heard all the evidence and
my instructions, there will be a drawing by lot to decide which one of you will be excused
in order to form a jury of six.
Note on Use
For multi-day trials.
History
M Civ JI 97.27 was added March 2005.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.28 Instructions to be Taken as a Whole
I may give you more instructions during the trial, and at the end of the trial I will give you
detailed instructions about the law in this case. You should consider all of my instructions
as a connected series. Taken together, they are the law which you must follow.
History
M Civ JI 97.28 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-36 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.29 Deliberations and Verdict
After all of the evidence has been presented and the lawyers have given their closing
arguments, I will give you detailed instructions about the rules of law that apply to this case.
You will then go to the jury room to decide on your verdict.
History
M Civ JI 97.29 was added March 2005.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.30 Maintaining an Open Mind
It is important for you to keep an open mind and not make a decision about anything in the
case until you go to the jury room to decide the case.
History
M Civ JI 97.30 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-38 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.31 Duties of Judge and Jury
(1)Members of the jury, the evidence and arguments in this case are finished, and I will now
instruct you on the law. That is, I will explain the law that applies to this case.
(2)Remember that you have taken an oath to return a true and just verdict, based only on
the evidence and my instructions on the law. You must not let sympathy or prejudice
influence your decision.
(3)It is my duty to instruct you on the law. You must take the law as I give it to you. If a
lawyer says something different about the law, follow what I say. At various times, I have
already given you some instructions about the law. You must take all my instructions
together as the law you are to follow. You should not pay attention to some instructions and
ignore others.
(4)As jurors, you must decide what the facts of this case are. You must think about all the
evidence and then decide what each piece of evidence means and how important you think
it is. This includes whether you believe what each of the witnesses said.
(5)To sum up, it is your job to decide what the facts of the case are, to apply the law as I
give it to you, and, in that way, to decide the case.
History
M Civ JI 97.31 was added March 2005.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.32 Evidence
(1)When you discuss the case and decide on your verdict, you may only consider the
evidence that has been properly admitted in this case. Therefore, it is important for you to
understand what is evidence and what is not evidence.
(2)The evidence in this case includes only the sworn testimony of witnesses (the exhibits
which I admitted into evidence, and anything else I told you to consider as evidence).
(3)Many things are not evidence and you must be careful not to consider them as evidence.
I will now describe some of the things that are not evidence.
(4)The fact that a petition was filed alleging that the Court has jurisdiction over [ Children’s
names ], and that [ he / she / they ] [ was / were ] placed in foster care pending this hearing,
and that [ Mother’s, Father’s, Guardian’s, Nonparent Adult’s or Custodian’s names ] [ is /
are ] present in court today is not evidence.
(5)The lawyers’ statements and arguments are not evidence. They are only meant to help
you understand the evidence and the theory of each party. The questions which the lawyers
ask witnesses are also not evidence. You should consider these questions only as they give
meaning to the witnesses’ answers. You should only accept things the lawyers say that are
supported by the evidence or by your own common sense and general knowledge.
(6)My comments, rulings, questions and instructions are also not evidence. It is my duty to
see that the trial is conducted according to the law and to tell you the law that applies to this
case. However, when I make a comment or give an instruction, I am not trying to influence
your vote or express a personal opinion about the case. If you believe that I have an opinion
about how you should decide this case, you must pay no attention to that opinion. You are
the only judges of the facts and you should decide this case from the evidence.
(7)At times during the trial, I have excluded evidence that was offered or stricken testimony
that was heard. Do not consider those things in deciding the case. Make your decision only
on the evidence that I let in, and nothing else.
(8)Your decision should be based on all of the evidence regardless of which party produced
it.
(9)You should use your own common sense and general knowledge in weighing and
judging the evidence, but you should not use any personal knowledge you may have about
a place, person or event. To repeat once more, you must decide this case based only on the
evidence admitted during the trial.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-40 Michigan Supreme Court
Note on Use
The reference in Subsection 4 to foster care should only be used if the fact the child is in
foster care is made known to the jury. Subsection 7 should only be given when warranted.
History
M Civ JI 97.32 was added March 2005.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.33 Witnesses-Credibility
(1) As I said before, it is your job to decide what the facts of this case are. You must decide
which witnesses you believe and how important you think their testimony is. You do not
have to accept or reject everything a witness said. You are free to believe all, none, or part
of any person’s testimony.
(2) In deciding which testimony you believe, you should rely on your own common sense
and everyday experience. However, in deciding whether you believe a witness’s testimony,
you must set aside any bias or prejudice you may have regarding a witness’s disability,
gender or gender identity, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin,
socioeconomic status or any other factor irrelevant to the rights of the parties.
Each of us may have biases about or certain perceptions or stereotypes of other people. We
may be aware of some of our biases, though we may not share them with others. We may
not be fully aware of some of our other biases. Our biases often affect how we act,
favorably or unfavorably, toward someone. Bias can affect our thoughts, how we
remember, what we see and hear, whom we believe or disbelieve, and how we make
important decisions. Witnesses can have the same implicit biases. As jurors you are being
asked to make very important decisions in this case. You must not let bias, prejudice, or
public opinion influence your decision. You must not be biased in favor of or against any
party, witness, or lawyer because of his or her disability, gender or gender identity, race,
religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, national origin, socioeconomic status or any
other factor irrelevant to the rights of the parties. Your verdict must be based solely on the
evidence presented. You must carefully evaluate the evidence and resist any urge to reach
a verdict that is influenced by bias for or against any party, witness, or lawyer.
(3) There is no fixed set of rules for judging whether you believe a witness, but it may help
you to think about these questions:
(a) Was the witness able to see or hear clearly? How long was the witness
watching or listening? Was anything else going on that might have distracted
the witness?
(b) Did the witness seem to have a good memory?
(c) How did the witness look and act while testifying? Did the witness seem
to be making an honest effort to tell the truth, or did the witness seem to evade
the questions or argue with the lawyers?
(d) Does the witness’s age or maturity affect how you judge his or her
testimony?
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-42 Michigan Supreme Court
(e) Does the witness have any bias or prejudice or any personal interest in
how this case is decided?
(f) Have there been any promises, threats, suggestions, or other influences
that affected how the witness testified?
(g) In general, does the witness have any special reason to tell the truth, or any
special reason to lie?
(h) All in all, how reasonable does the witness’s testimony seem when you
think about all the other evidence in the case?
(4) Sometimes the testimony of different witnesses will not agree, and you must decide
which testimony you accept. You should think about whether the disagreement involves
something important or not, and whether you think someone is lying or is simply mistaken.
People see and hear things differently, and witnesses may testify honestly but simply be
wrong about what they thought they saw or remembered. It is also a good idea to think
about which testimony agrees best with the other evidence in the case.
(5) However, you may conclude that a witness deliberately lied about something that is
important to how you decide the case. If so, you may choose not to accept anything that
witness said. On the other hand, if you think the witness lied about some things but told the
truth about others, you may simply accept the part you think is true and ignore the rest.
Comment
The November 2021 amendment added gender identity to the list of things that should not
influence the jury’s decision.
History
M Civ JI 97.33 was added March 2005. Amended October 2019. Amended November
2021.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.34 Circumstantial Evidence
(1)Facts can be proved by direct evidence from a witness or an exhibit. Direct evidence is
evidence about what we actually see or hear. For example, if you look outside and see rain
falling, that is direct evidence that it is raining.
(2)Facts can also be proved by indirect, or circumstantial, evidence. Circumstantial
evidence is evidence that normally or reasonably leads to other facts. So, for example, if
you see a person come in from outside wearing a raincoat covered with small drops of
water, that would be circumstantial evidence that it is raining.
(3)You may consider circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence by itself, or a
combination of circumstantial evidence and direct evidence, can be used to prove a fact.
History
M Civ JI 97.34 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-44 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.35 Statutory Grounds
(1) The issue that you, the jury, will have to decide is whether one or more of the statutory
grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.* If you find that one or more of the
statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven, then the Court will have
jurisdiction over [ children’s names ]. I will now explain what those statutory grounds are.
The Court has jurisdiction over a child**:
(a) If that child’s parent or other person legally responsible for the care and
maintenance of that child, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide
proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care
necessary for his or her health or morals, or
(b) If that child is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental
well-being, or
(c) If that child is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian or other
custodian, or
(d) If that child is without proper custody or guardianship, or
(e) If that child’s home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty,
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian,
nonparent adult or other custodian, is an unfit place for that child to live in, or
(f) If the juvenile is dependent and in danger of substantial physical or
psychological harm when,
(i) the juvenile is homeless or not domiciled with a parent or other legally
responsible person, or
(ii) the juvenile has repeatedly run away from home and is beyond the
control of a parent or other legally responsible person, or
(iii) the juvenile is alleged to have performed or engaged in a commercial
sexual activity, or a delinquent act that is the result of force, fraud,
coercion or manipulation exercised by a parent or other adult, or
(iv) the juvenile’s custodial parent or legally responsible person has died
or has become permanently incapacitated and no appropriate parent or
legally responsible person is willing and able to provide care for the
juvenile, or
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
(g) If that child’s parent has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply
with a limited guardianship placement plan regarding the child, or
(h) If that child’s parent has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply
with a court-structured plan regarding the child, or
(i) If that child has a guardian appointed for him or her under the Michigan
Estates and Protected Individuals Code, and
(i) that child’s parent, having the ability to support or assist in supporting
the child, has failed or neglected, without good cause, to provide regular
and substantial support for the child for a period of two years or more
before the filing of the petition, or if a support order has been entered, has
failed to substantially comply with the order for a period of two years or
more before the filing of the petition, and
(ii) that child’s parent, having the ability to visit, contact or communicate
with the child, has regularly and substantially failed or neglected, without
good cause, to do so for a period of two years or more before the filing of
the petition.
Note on Use
* If only one statutory ground is alleged in the petition, substitute “the statutory ground”
for “one or more of the statutory grounds” throughout these instructions.
** The court should select the subsections that apply.
Comment
MCL 712A.2(b)(1)-(6)
History
M Civ JI 97.35 was added March 2005. Amended October 2019.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-46 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.36 Definitions
(1) Neglect means harm to a child's health or welfare by a person responsible for the child's
health or welfare that occurs through negligent treatment, including, but not limited to, the
failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, though financially able
to do so, or the failure to seek financial or other reasonable means to provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical care.
(2) Child neglect means harm or threatened harm to a child’s health or welfare by a parent,
legal guardian or any other person responsible for the child’s health or welfare that occurs
through either of the following:
(a) Negligent treatment, including the failure to provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical care, though financially able to do so, or by the
failure to seek financial or other reasonable means to provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter or medical care.
(b) Placing a child at an unreasonable risk to the child’s health or welfare by
failure of the parent, legal guardian or other person responsible for the child’s
health or welfare to intervene to eliminate that risk when that person is able to
do so and has, or should have, knowledge of the risk.
(3) The legal definition of cruelty is the same as the common understanding of the word
cruelty. It implies physical or emotional mistreatment of a child.
(4) Depravity means a morally corrupt act or practice.
(5) The legal definition of criminality is the same as the common understanding of the
word criminality. Criminality is present when a person violates the criminal laws of the
State of Michigan or of the United States. Whether a violation of the criminal laws of the
State of Michigan or of the United States by a parent, guardian, nonparent adult or
custodian renders the home or environment of a child an unfit place for the child to live in
is for you to decide based on all of the evidence in the case.
(6) A child is without proper custody or guardianship when he or she is: 1) left with, or
found in the custody of, a person other than a legal parent, legal guardian or other person
authorized by law or court order to have custody of the child, and 2) the child was originally
placed, or came to be, in the custody of a person not legally entitled to custody of the child
for either an indefinite period of time, no matter how short, or for a definite, but
unreasonably long, period of time. What is unreasonably long depends on all the
circumstances. It is proper for a parent or guardian to place his or her child with another
person who is legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the child and who is able
to and does provide the child with proper care and maintenance. A baby sitter, relative or
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-47
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other care-giver is not legally responsible for the care and maintenance of a child after the
previously agreed-upon period of care has ended.
(7) Education means learning based on an organized educational program that is
appropriate, given the age, intelligence, ability, and any psychological limitations of a
child, in the subject areas of reading, spelling, mathematics, science, history, civics,
writing, and English grammar.
(8) A child is abandoned when the child’s [ parent(s)/guardian/custodian ] leave(s) the
child for any length of time, no matter how short, with the intention of never returning for
the child. The intent of the [ parent(s) / guardian / custodian ] to abandon the child may be
inferred from the [ parent’s / parents’ / guardian’s / custodian’s ] words or actions
surrounding the act of leaving the child.
(9) “Commercial sexual activity” means one or more of the following for which anything
of value is given or received by any person:
(i) An act of sexual penetration or sexual contact.
(ii) Any conduct constituting child sexually abusive activity or child sexually
abusive material.
(iii) Any sexually explicit performance.
Note on Use
Only read those statutory provisions that apply to the facts of the case.
Pursuant to MCL 750.462a(c)(i), sexual penetration or sexual contact are to be defined as
in MCL 750.520a. Pursuant to MCL 750.462a(c)(ii), conduct in violation of MCL
750.145c constitutes commercial sexual activity. Pursuant to MCL 750.462a(c)(iii), a
sexually explicit performance is to be defined as in MCL 722.673(g).
Comment
MCL 712A.2(b)(1)(B) and (C), MCL 722.602(1)(b),(d); MCL 722.622(k); MCL 750.145c.
History
M Civ JI 97.36 was added March 2005. Amended July 2017, October 2019.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-48 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.37 Standard of Proof
The standard of proof in this case is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Proof by a
preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence that a statutory ground alleged in
the petition is true outweighs the evidence that that statutory ground is not true.
History
M Civ JI 97.37 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-49
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.38 No Duty to Present Evidence
[ Mother’s, father’s, guardian’s, nonparent adult’s or custodian’s names ] [ has/
have ] no duty to present evidence that the statutory grounds alleged in the
petition are not true. It is your duty to decide from the evidence that you have
heard whether one or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition are true.
Note on Use
Give this instruction only if the respondent(s) present no evidence.
History
M Civ JI 97.38 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-50 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.39 Treatment of One Child as Evidence of Treatment of
Another Child
You have heard testimony about [ another child/other children ] of [ mother’s/father’s
names ], namely, [ children’s names ]. [ That child/those children ] [ is/are ] not the
subject(s) of the petition(s) before you now.* How a parent treats one child is evidence of
how that parent may treat another child. Therefore, if you choose to believe the evidence,
presented by any party, relating to how [ mother’s/father’s names ] treated [ that other
child/those other children ], you may consider it in making your decision in relation to [ this
child/any or all of these children ].*
Note on Use
* Do not read this sentence if the “other child or children” are also subjects of the present
petition.
History
M Civ JI 97.39 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-51
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.40 Improvement in Circumstances Not Controlling
If you find that one or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been
proven, the fact that circumstances may have improved since [ date petition filed or another
more appropriate date, where applicable ] does not negate your finding.
History
M Civ JI 97.40 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-52 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.41 Not Necessary to Prove Each Fact Alleged
It is not necessary that each and every fact alleged in the petition be proven before you can
find that one or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven. It is
necessary, however, that sufficient facts be proven so that, in your judgment, you can find
by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the
petition have been proven.
History
M Civ JI 97.41 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-53
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.42 Unfit Home by Reason of Neglect or Cruelty—Res Ipsa
Loquitur
You may, but are not required to, find that the child’s home or environment was an unfit
place for the child to live in by reason of neglect or cruelty on the part of his or her parent,
guardian, nonparent adult or custodian if you find all the following:
(a)The child has suffered an injury or injuries.
(b)The child was not capable of inflicting the injury or injuries on himself or
herself.
(c)The injury or injuries are such that would not ordinarily occur unless they
were caused by another person inflicting them on the child or another person
not providing proper care and supervision for the child in order to prevent the
injury or injuries.
(d)The child was in the exclusive control of his or her parent, guardian,
nonparent adult or custodian at the time the injury or injuries occurred. The
term “custodian” includes any other person to whom the parent or guardian
entrusted the care of the child if the parent or guardian knew, or should have
known, that that person might injure the child or permit the child to be injured
through lack of proper care and supervision.
(e)The true explanation of what happened to the child is more likely to be
within the knowledge of the parent, guardian, nonparent adult or custodian
than the petitioner.
Comment
Jones v Poretta, 428 Mich 132 (1987).
History
M Civ JI 97.42 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-54 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.43 Findings Re: Statutory Grounds
You must find that one or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been
proven if:
(a)you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [ children’s names ],
mother, or father, or both, when able to do so, neglected or refused to provide
proper or necessary support, medical, surgical or other care necessary for [ his
/ her / their ] health or morals, or
(b)you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [ children’s names ] [ was
/ were ] subject to a substantial risk of harm to [ his / her / their ] mental well-
being, or
(c)you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [ children’s names ] [ was
/ were ] abandoned by [ his / her / their ] [ mother / father / parents / guardian
/ custodian ], or
(d)you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [ children’s names ] [ was
/ were ] without proper custody or guardianship, or
(e)you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the home or environment
of [ children’s names ] was an unfit place for [ him / her / them ] to live in by
reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality or depravity on the part of
[ his / her / their ] [ mother, father, or both /guardian / nonparent adult /
custodian ], or
(f)you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [ children’s names ]
mother, or father, or both, [ has / have ] substantially failed, without good
cause, to comply with a limited guardianship placement plan regarding the
[ child / children ], or
(g)you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [ children’s names ]
mother, or father, or both, [ has / have ] substantially failed, without good
cause, to comply with a court-structured plan regarding the [ child / children ],
or
(h)you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [ children’s names ] [ has
/ have ] a guardian appointed for [ him / her / them ] under the Michigan
Estates and Protected Individuals Code, and
(i)that [ children’s names ] mother, or father, or both, having the ability to
support or assist in supporting the [ child / children ], [ has / have ] failed
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
or neglected, without good cause, to provide regular and substantial
support for the [ child / children ] for a period of two years or more before
the filing of the petition, or if a support order has been entered, [ has /
have ] failed to substantially comply with the order for a period of two
years or more before the filing of the petition, and
(ii)that [ children’s names ] mother, or father, or both, having the ability to
visit, contact or communicate with the [ child / children ]), [ has / have ]
regularly and substantially failed or neglected, without good cause, to do
so for a period of two years or more before the filing of the petition.
If you find that none of those have been proven, then you must find that none of the
statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.
Note on Use
Read only those paragraphs that apply to the case.
History
M Civ JI 97.43 was added March 2005. Amended June 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-56 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.43A Legitimate Practice of Religious Beliefs
If you find that _____ [ was / were] legitimately practicing [ his / her / their ] religious
beliefs when [ he / she / they ] did not provide specified medical treatment for _____, [ he
/ she / they ] shall not, for that reason alone, be considered a negligent parent or guardian.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given if the instruction is requested by a respondent parent and
if a rational view of the evidence supports the conclusion that the failure to provide medical
treatment was based on the respondent’s legitimate practice of his or her religious beliefs.
In re Piland, 503 Mich 1032 (2019).
Comment
MCL 722.634. In re Piland, 324 Mich App 337 (2018). The Supreme Court affirmed the
holding of the Court of Appeals that MCL 722.634 applies to child protective proceedings.
503 Mich 1032 (2019).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-57
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.44 Court to Determine Disposition
You are not to concern yourselves with what will happen to [ children’s names ] if you
should find that one or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been
proven. If the Court has jurisdiction of [ this child / these children ], that does not
necessarily mean that [ he / she / they ] will be removed from their home or made [ a ward
/ wards ] of the court either temporarily or permanently. If the Court has jurisdiction of
[ this child / these children ], the Court will then decide at a later time what to do about [ this
child / these children ] and [ his / her / their ] family. There are many options available to
the Court.
History
M Civ JI 97.44 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-58 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.45 Not a Criminal Proceeding
I instruct you that this is a child protection proceeding. It is not a criminal case. Therefore,
the issue before you is not that of guilt or innocence, but whether one or more of the
statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven. You should not consider this
proceeding to be in any way involved with the criminal law so far as your deliberations are
concerned.
History
M Civ JI 97.45 was added March 2005.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.46 Deliberations and Verdict
(1)You will be given a written copy of the final jury instructions for your use in the jury
room for deliberation. [ I will also provide you with an electronically recorded copy of these
instructions. ]
(2)When you go to the jury room, you should first choose a foreperson. [ He / she ] should
see to it that your discussions are carried on in a businesslike way and that everyone has a
fair chance to be heard.
(3)When at least five of you agree upon a verdict, it will be received as the jury’s verdict.
In the jury room you will discuss the case among yourselves, but ultimately each of you
will have to make up your own mind. Any verdict must represent the individual, considered
judgment of at least five of you.
(4)It is your duty as jurors to talk to each other and make every reasonable effort to reach
agreement. Express your opinions and the reasons for them, but keep an open mind as you
listen to your fellow jurors. Rethink your opinions and do not hesitate to change your mind
if you decide you were wrong. Try your best to work out your differences.
(5)However, although you should try to reach agreement, none of you should give up your
honest opinion about the case just because other jurors disagree with you or just for the sake
of reaching a verdict. In the end, your vote must be your own, and you must vote honestly
and in good conscience.
(6)During your deliberations, and before you reach a verdict, you must not disclose
anything about your discussions to others outside the jury room, not even how your voting
stands. Therefore, until you reach a verdict, do not disclose that information, even in the
courtroom.
(7)During your deliberations you may not communicate with persons outside the jury room
(other than the judge), or seek information by any means, including cellular telephones or
other electronic devices. In other words, you cannot talk to anyone on the phone,
correspond with anyone, or electronically communicate with anyone about this case. You
can only discuss the case in the jury room with your fellow jurors during deliberations. You
may not use these electronic means to investigate or communicate about the case because
it is important that you decide the case based solely on the evidence presented in the
courtroom and my instructions on the law. Information from the Internet or available
through social media might be wrong, incomplete, or inaccurate.
If you discover a juror has violated my instructions, you should report it to me right away.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-60 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 97.46 was added March 2005. Amended November 2015.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-61
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.47 Communications with the Court
(1)If you want to communicate with me while you are deliberating, please have your
foreperson write a note and deliver it to the bailiff. It is not proper for you to talk directly
with the judge, lawyers, court officers, or other people involved in the case.
(2)As you discuss the case, you must not let anyone, even me, know how your voting
stands. Therefore, until you reach a verdict, do not reveal this to anyone outside the jury
room.
History
M Civ JI 97.47 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-62 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.48 Exhibits
(Option 1) If you want to look at any or all of the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence, just ask for them.
(Option 2) You may take the exhibits which have been admitted into evidence into the jury
room with you.
Note on Use
Either option is acceptable.
History
M Civ JI 97.48 was added March 2005.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.49 Verdict
[ You are to render separate verdicts as to each parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or other
custodian. ]** There are only two possible verdicts in this case:
[ As to ____________ (mother’s name) ]**
(1)One or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.
(2)None of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.
[ As to ____________ (father’s name) ]**
(1)One or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.
(2)None of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.
[ As to ____________ (the guardian, nonparent adult, or other custodian’s name) ]**
(1)One or more of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.
(2)None of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition have been proven.
These possible verdicts are set forth in the verdict form(s) which you will receive. Only one
of the possible verdicts may be returned by you [ as to each child ]* [and] [ as to each
parent, guardian, nonparent adult, or other custodian ]**. When at least five of you have
agreed upon one verdict [ as to each child ]* [and] [ as to each parent, guardian, nonparent
adult, or other custodian ],** your foreperson should mark that verdict.
Note on Use
* Use this phrase if jurisdiction is being sought for more than one child.
** Use this phrase if the adjudication concerns the fitness of both parents as envisioned by
In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 (2014). If the case does not involve the fitness of a guardian,
nonparent adult or other custodian, reference to such a person should be eliminated. In
cases with multiple respondent fathers, add two possible verdicts for each.
History
M Civ JI 97.49 was added March 2005. Amended June 2015. Amended May 2016.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-64 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.50 Dismissal of Extra Juror
Members of the jury: You will recall that at the beginning of the trial, I told you that while
seven jurors were seated to hear this case, only six would deliberate and decide the case.
Seven jurors were selected in the event one of you become ill or otherwise could not
complete the case. Fortunately, all of you remained healthy, so we must now excuse one of
you from further participation in this trial. If you are excused, you may either leave or may
remain in the courtroom to see what the verdict will be. If you are excused, please don’t feel
your time has been wasted. You may have been needed and your participation was
important to the administration of justice. The [ bailiff / clerk ] will now draw the name of
one juror by lot. [ Bailiff draws name ]. Thank you [ name of juror ], you may step down.
Note on Use
Use when a jury of seven has been seated.
History
M Civ JI 97.50 was added March 2005. Amended July 2024.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-65
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.51 Bailiff’s Oath
Do you solemnly swear that you will, to the best of your ability, keep the persons sworn as
jurors in this trial from separating from each other, that you will not permit any
communication to be made to them, or to any of them, orally or otherwise, that you will not
communicate with them, or with any of them, orally or otherwise, except upon the order of
this Court, or to ask them if they have agreed upon a verdict, until they shall be discharged,
and that you will not, before they render their verdict, communicate to any person the state
of their deliberations or the verdict they have agreed upon?
History
M Civ JI 97.51 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-66 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 97.52 Begin Deliberations
Members of the jury: Throughout this trial I have told you not to discuss the case among
yourselves or with anyone else. Now is the time for you to discuss it among yourselves.
Please follow the bailiff to the jury room to begin your deliberations.
History
M Civ JI 97.52 was added March 2005. Amended July 2024.
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Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.60 Form of Verdict: Statutory Grounds Alleged
We the jury find that:
As to Mother*
[ ] None of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition concerning [ child’s name ] has
been proven.
OR
One or more of the following statutory grounds alleged in the petition concerning [ child’s
name ] has/have been proven:
[ ][ Name of mother ], when able to do so, neglected or refused to provide proper or
necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for [ name of
child ]’s health or morals.
[ ] [ Name of child ] is subject to a substantial risk of harm to [ his / her ] mental well-being.
[ ][ Name of child ] has been abandoned by [ name of mother ].
[ ][ Name of child ] is without proper custody or guardianship.
[ ][ Name of child ]’s home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness,
criminality, or depravity on the part of [ name of mother ], is an unfit place for [ name of
child ] to live in.
[ ][ Name of child ]’s mother has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply with
a limited guardianship placement plan regarding [ name of child ].
[ ][ Name of child ]’s mother has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply with
a court-structured plan regarding [ name of child ].
[ ][ Name of child ] has a guardian appointed for [ him / her ] under the Michigan Estates
and Protected Individuals Code, and
(i)[ Name of child ]’s mother, having the ability to support or assist in
supporting [ name of child ], has failed or neglected, without good cause, to
provide regular and substantial support for [ name of child ] for a period of two
years or more before the filing of the petition, or if a support order has been
entered, has failed to substantially comply with the order for a period of two
years or more before the filing of the petition, and
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-68 Michigan Supreme Court
(ii)[ Name of child ]’s mother, having the ability to visit, contact or
communicate with [ name of child ], has regularly and substantially failed or
neglected, without good cause, to do so for a period of two years or more
before the filing of the petition.
As to Father*
[ ] None of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition concerning [ child’s name ] has
been proven.
OR
One or more of the following statutory grounds alleged in the petition concerning [ child’s
name ] has/have been proven:
[ ][ Name of father ], when able to do so, neglected or refused to provide proper or
necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary for [ name of
child ]’s health or morals.
[ ] [ Name of child ] is subject to a substantial risk of harm to [ his / her ] mental well-being.
[ ][ Name of child ] has been abandoned by [ name of father ].
[ ][ Name of child ] is without proper custody or guardianship.
[ ][ Name of child ]’s home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness,
criminality, or depravity on the part of [ name of father ], is an unfit place for [ name of
child ] to live in.
[ ][ Name of child ]’s father has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply with a
limited guardianship placement plan regarding [ name of child ].
[ ][ Name of child ]’s father has substantially failed, without good cause, to comply with a
court-structured plan regarding [ name of child ].
[ ][ Name of child ] has a guardian appointed for [ him / her ] under the Michigan Estates
and Protected Individuals Code and
(i)[ Name of child ]’s father, having the ability to support or assist in
supporting [ name of child ], has failed or neglected, without good cause, to
provide regular and substantial support for [ name of child ] for a period of two
years or more before the filing of the petition, or if a support order has been
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-69
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
entered, has failed to substantially comply with the order for a period of two
years or more before the filing of the petition, and
(ii)[ Name of child ]’s father, having the ability to visit, contact or
communicate with [ name of child ], has regularly and substantially failed or
neglected, without good cause, to do so for a period of two years or more
before the filing of the petition.
As to the Guardian, Nonparent Adult, or Other Custodian:
[ ] None of the statutory grounds alleged in the petition concerning [ child’s name ] has
been proven.
OR
One or more of the following statutory grounds alleged in the petition concerning [ child’s
name ] has/have been proven:
[ ][ Name of guardian, nonparent adult or other custodian ], when able to do so, neglected
or refused to provide proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other
care necessary for [ name of child ]’s health or morals.
[ ] [ Name of child ] is subject to a substantial risk of harm to [ his / her ] mental well-being.
[ ][ Name of child ] has been abandoned by [ name of guardian, nonparent adult or other
custodian ].
[ ][ Name of child ] is without proper custody or guardianship.
[ ][ Name of child ]’s home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness,
criminality, or depravity on the part of [ name of guardian, nonparent adult or other
custodian ], is an unfit place for [ name of child ] to live in.
Note on Use
* Use this format if the adjudication concerns the fitness of both parents as envisioned by
In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394 (2014). In cases with multiple respondent fathers, add two
possible verdicts for each. Use only those statutory grounds that are applicable.
In the Committee's opinion, special verdict forms are not prohibited.
History
Added March 2005. Amended June 2015. Amended May 2016.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-70 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 97-71
Chapter 97: Child Protective Proceedings
M Civ JI 97.61 Form of Verdict: One Statutory Ground Alleged
[ Instruction Deleted]
We, the jury, find that:
[ ] The statutory ground alleged in the petition concerning (child’s name) has been proven.
[ ] The statutory ground alleged in the petition concerning (child’s name) has not been
proven.
Note on Use
In the Committee's opinion, special verdict forms are not prohibited.
History
Added March 2005. Deleted June 2015.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 97-72 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 100-1
CHAPTER 100
Rent ActionResidential
Property
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 100-2
M Civ JI 100.01 Rent Action: Explanation of Statutes; Defense of Failure to Keep Premises
Fit for Use Intended / Failure to Repair / Noncompliance with Health or Safety Laws /
Retaliatory Rent Increase ........................................................................................... 100-7
M Civ JI 100.02 Rent Action: Burden of Proof............................................................ 100-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 100-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introduction
Litigation of disputes between tenants and landlords generally falls into one of two
categories: (1) actions for possession for nonpayment of rent and (2) actions for possession
for termination of tenancy. Affirmative defenses and counterclaims generally involve
claims of failure by the landlord to keep the premises in reasonable repair in the rent cases
and claims of retaliatory eviction in the termination cases.
Although various statutes may have some application in landlord-tenant disputes
depending upon the particular circumstances, three statutes have general application.
1. MCL 554.134 sets forth the basic requisites for termination of the estates involved in
landlord-tenant matters in the following language:
(1) Except as provided otherwise in this section, an estate at will or by sufferance may be
terminated by either party by 1 month’s notice given to the other party. If the rent reserved
in a lease is payable at periods of less than 3 months, the time of notice is sufficient if it is
equal to the interval between the times of payment. Notice is not void because it states a
day for the termination of the tenancy that does not correspond to the conclusion or
commencement of a rental period. The notice terminates the tenancy at the end of a period
equal in time to that in which the rent is made payable.
(2) If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent on a lease at will or otherwise, the landlord
may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant a written 7-day notice to quit.
(3) A tenancy from year to year may be terminated by either party by a notice to quit,
given at any time to the other party. The notice shall terminate the lease at the expiration
of 1 year from the time of the service of the notice.
(4) If a tenant holds over after a lease is terminated pursuant to a clause in the lease
providing for termination because the tenant, a member of the tenant’s household, or other
person under the tenant’s control has manufactured, delivered, possessed with intent to
deliver, or possessed a controlled substance on the leased premises, the landlord may
terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant a written 7-day notice to quit. This subsection
applies only if a formal police report has been filed alleging that the person has unlawfully
manufactured, delivered, possessed with intent to deliver, or possess a controlled
substance on the leased premises. For purposes of this subsection, “controlled substance”
means a substance or a counterfeit substance classified in schedule 1, 2, or 3 pursuant to
sections 7211, 7212, 7213, 7214, 7215, and 7216 of Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of
1978, being sections 333.7211, 333.7212, 333.7213, 333.7214, 333.7215, and 333.7216 of
the Michigan Compiled Laws.
2. 1968 PA 295 contains statutory covenants imposed by law on residential landlords. That
statute is contained in MCL 554.139, which provides as follows:
(1) In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or licensor covenants:
Michigan Supreme Court Page 100-3
Chapter 100: Rent-Action—Residential Property
(a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by the parties.
(b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease or license,
and to comply with the applicable health and safety laws of the state and of the local
unit of government where the premises are located, except when the disrepair or
violation of the applicable health or safety laws has been caused by the tenants [ sic ]
willful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct.
(2) The parties to the lease or license may modify the obligations imposed by this section
where the lease or license has a current term of at least 1 year.
(3) The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed, and the privilege of a
prospective lessee or licensee to inspect the premises before concluding a lease or license
shall not defeat his right to have the benefit of the covenants established herein.
3. 1972 PA 120 governs summary proceedings for the recovery of land, and is contained in
MCL 600.5701–.5759. Section 5714 outlines the grounds for summary recovery of
possession:
(1) The person entitled to any premises may recover possession thereof by summary
proceedings in the following cases:
(a) When a person holds over any premises, after failing or refusing to pay rent due
under the lease or agreement by which he holds within 7 days from the service of a
written demand for possession for nonpayment of the rent due. For the purpose of this
provision, rent due shall not include any accelerated indebtedness by reason of a
breach of the lease under which the premises are held.
(b) When a person holds over any premises in any of the following circumstances:
(i)After termination of the lease, pursuant to a power to terminate provided in the
lease or implied by law.
(ii)After the term for which they are demised to him or to the person under whom
he holds.
(iii)After the termination of his estate by a notice to quit as provided by section 34
of chapter 66 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, as amended, being section 554.134
of the Compiled Laws of 1948. [ Notice must be at least as long as rental period. ]
(c) When the person in possession wilfully or negligently causes a serious and
continuing health hazard to exist on the premises, or causes extensive and continuing
physical injury to the premises, which was discovered or should reasonably have been
discovered by the party seeking possession not earlier than 90 days before the
institution of proceedings under this chapter and when the person in possession
neglects or refuses for 7 days after service of a demand for possession of the premises
to deliver up possession of the premises or to substantially restore or repair the
premises.
(d) When a person takes possession of premises by means of a forcible entry, holds
possession of premises by force after a peaceable entry or comes into possession of
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 100-4 Michigan Supreme Court
premises by trespass without color of title or other possessory interest.
(e) When a person continues in possession of any premises sold by virtue of any
mortgage or execution, after the time limited by law for redemption of the premises.
(f) When a person continues in possession of any premises sold and conveyed by any
executor or administrator under license from the probate court or under authority in
the will.
(2) A tenant or occupant of housing operated by a city, village, township or other unit of
local government, as provided in Act No. 18 of the Public Acts of the Extra Session of
1933, as amended, being sections 125.651 to 125.709e of the Compiled Laws of 1948, is
not deemed to be holding over under subdivision (b) of subsection (1) unless the tenancy
or agreement has been terminated for just cause, as provided by lawful rules of the local
housing commission or by law.
Section 5720 sets forth specific statutory defenses to actions for possession:
(1) A judgment for possession of the premises for an alleged termination of tenancy shall
not be entered against a defendant if 1 or more of the following is established:
(a) That the alleged termination was intended primarily as a penalty for the
defendant’s attempt to secure or enforce rights under the lease or agreement or under
the laws of the state, of a governmental subdivision of this state, or of the United
States.
(b) That the alleged termination was intended primarily as a penalty for the
defendant’s complaint to a governmental authority with a report of plaintiff’s
violation of a health or safety code or ordinance.
(c) That the alleged termination was intended primarily as retribution for a lawful act
arising out of the tenancy, including membership in a tenant organization and a lawful
activity of a tenant organization arising out of the tenancy.
(d) That the alleged termination was of a tenancy in housing operated by a city,
village, township or other unit of local government and was terminated without cause.
(e) That the plaintiff attempted to increase the defendant’s obligations under the lease
or contract as a penalty for the lawful acts as are described in subdivisions (a) to (c)
and that the defendant’s failure to perform the additional obligations was the primary
reason for the alleged termination of tenancy.
(f) That the plaintiff committed a breach of the lease which excuses the payment of
rent if possession is claimed for nonpayment of rent.
(g) That the rent allegedly due, in an action where possession is claimed for
nonpayment of rent, was paid into an escrow account under section 130 of Act No.
167 of the Public Acts of 1917, being section 125.530 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws; was paid pursuant to a court order under section 134(5) of Act No. 167 of the
Public Acts of 1917, as amended, being section 125.534 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws; or was paid to a receiver under section 135 of Act No. 167 of the Public Acts of
Michigan Supreme Court Page 100-5
Chapter 100: Rent-Action—Residential Property
1917, being section 125.535 of the Michigan Compiled Laws of 1948.
(2) If a defendant who alleges a retaliatory termination of the tenancy shows that within
90 days before the commencement of summary proceedings the defendant attempted to
secure or enforce rights against the plaintiff or to complain against the plaintiff, as
provided in subsection (1)(a), (b), (c), or (e), by means of official action to or through a
court or other governmental agency and the official action has not resulted in dismissal or
denial of the attempt or complaint, a presumption in favor of the defense of retaliatory
termination arises, unless the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
the termination of tenancy was not in retaliation for the acts. If the defendant’s alleged
attempt to secure or enforce rights or to complain against the plaintiff occurred more than
90 days before the commencement of proceedings or was terminated adversely to the
defendant, a presumption adverse to the defense of retaliatory termination arises and the
defendant has the burden to establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
At common law, the tenant’s obligation to pay rent was independent of covenants by the
landlord to repair the premises or to comply with health and safety laws and regulations. As
a result, breach by the landlord of covenants to repair was not a defense to an action by the
landlord to recover possession for nonpayment of rent. Reaume v Wayne Circuit Judge, 299
Mich 305; 300 NW 97 (1941).
The so-called “tenants’ rights” legislation exemplified by 1968 PA 295, however,
drastically altered that situation. As pointed out by the court of appeals in Rome v Walker,
38 Mich App 458, 463–465; 196 NW2d 850, 853–854 (1972):
[ U]nder prior practice the tenant could raise no affirmative defenses on his behalf in an
action by the landlord to regain possession for nonpayment of rent. The only defense was
payment of the rent. 1968 PA 297, however, revolutionized the rights of tenants in this
respect. MCL 600.5637(5) now allows the tenant to raise the question of a breach of the
lease by the landlord ‘which excuses the payment of rent’. While the phrase, ‘which
excuses the payment of rent’, is undefined, it is clear from an examination of the language
of MCL 600.5646(3) that the Legislature intended that any defense which the tenant may
have can be raised in the proceeding brought by the landlord to regain possession for
alleged nonpayment of rent.
The intent of the new language is clear. Tenants may now raise any defense, which would
justify the withholding of rent, in an action by the landlord to regain possession for
nonpayment of rent. Upon motion by either party, the court shall determine if summary
judgment of possession should be granted to the moving party. If, as here, the trial court
determines that the tenants’ counterclaim raises a substantial question of fact, the court
should deny the landlord’s motion for summary judgment and the question of possession
will thereby abide the determination of the case on the merits.
The current authorization for abatement is found in MCL 600.5741.
The instructions which follow are designed to deal with the situations which most often
occur in landlord-tenant disputes when the issues relate to the recent statutes. In some cases,
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 100-6 Michigan Supreme Court
the instructions do not cover a particular issue or an aspect of a particular issue. In such
situations, it is appropriate for the Court to add to the model instructions. The landlord-
tenant instructions should be used with the applicable General Instructions as well as M Civ
JI 16.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof to construct a logical and cohesive jury charge.
History
This Introduction was added April 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 100-7
Chapter 100: Rent-Action—Residential Property
M Civ JI 100.01 Rent Action: Explanation of Statutes; Defense of
Failure to Keep Premises Fit for Use Intended / Failure to Repair /
Noncompliance with Health or Safety Laws / Retaliatory Rent
Increase
This is an action by the landlord [ name of landlord ] to recover possession of the premises
located at [ address of premises ] for nonpayment of rent.
The law of our state provides that if a tenant fails or refuses to pay rent when due, the
landlord or someone acting for the landlord may give the tenant seven days’ written notice
to either pay the rent due or leave the premises. If the tenant does not pay the rent or move
within the seven-day period, then the landlord may recover possession of the [ house /
apartment / [ other ] ] in court proceedings.
*(The law of our state also provides that the landlord has the duty [ to keep the [ house /
apartment / [ other ] ] fit for the use intended / to keep the [ house / apartment / [ other ] ]
in reasonable repair / to comply with applicable health and safety laws of this state and of
[ name of city, township or county ] ] during the term of the lease.)
*(The landlord has these duties even if the tenant inspected or could have inspected the
[ house / apartment / [ other ] ] before moving in.)
*([ This duty / These duties ] of the landlord may be modified by agreement between the
landlord and the tenant whenever the term of the lease is for at least one year.)
*(Unless the [ landlord / landlord’s agent ] knew or should have known of the [ need for
repairs / condition complained of ], or the landlord’s actions excuse notice, then notice of
the [ need for repairs / condition complained of ] is necessary to hold the landlord
responsible for [ not making repairs / not correcting the condition ]. Notice is not necessary,
however, regarding [ repairs needed / conditions complained of ] in common areas.)
*(The landlord is not responsible for the condition complained of by the tenant if the
condition was caused by the tenant’s own willful or irresponsible conduct or lack of
conduct.)
*(The law provides that if the landlord breaches [ his / her ] [ duty / duties ] to keep the
premises in the condition required by law, the tenant need not pay any of the rent which is
excused by the landlord’s breach.)
*†(The law of our state also provides that the landlord may not raise the rent to punish the
tenant for [ describe lawful acts of tenant ].)
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 100-8 Michigan Supreme Court
Note on Use
*These paragraphs in parentheses should be used only if applicable.
†See MCL 600.5720(1)(e) on retaliatory rent increase for lawful acts of the tenant as a
defense to a rent action.
Comment
The landlord may recover possession by summary proceedings if the tenant does not pay
the rent or move after the seven days’ written notice. MCL 600.5714.
The landlord’s duty to keep the premises in reasonable repair, fit for the use intended, and
to abide by health and safety laws, is found in MCL 554.139. See also Bayview Estates, Inc
v Bayview Estates Mobile Homeowners Association, 508 F2d 405 (CA 6, 1974). The
amount of rent which is found to be excused by the landlord’s breach should be deducted
from the rent due. MCL 600.5741.
On the requirement of notice to the landlord, and exceptions, see 49 Am Jur 2d, Landlord
and Tenant, §§ 778, 838, pp 719, 805.
History
M Civ JI 100.01 was added April 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 100-9
Chapter 100: Rent-Action—Residential Property
M Civ JI 100.02 Rent Action: Burden of Proof
The landlord has the burden of proving:
(a) *(that [ he / she ] is the landlord and that [ name ] is [ his / her ] tenant);
(b) that the rental rate is $________.____ per [ month / week / [ other ] ] for
the [ period / periods ] of time for which the landlord claims rent, and the total
amount due is $________.____; and
(c) †(that the landlord served the tenant with a written seven-day notice to
quit).
*(The tenant, [ name of tenant ], has the burden of proving:
(a) that
**(the landlord knew or should have known of the [ need for repairs /
condition complained of ] or the landlord’s actions excused notice); and
(b) that
the landlord failed [ to keep the [ house / apartment / [ other ] ] fit for
the use intended / to keep the [ house / apartment / [ other ] ] in reasonable
repair / to comply with applicable health and safety laws of this state and of
[ name of city, township or county ] ] during the term of the lease.
‡(The tenant has the burden of proof on [ his / her ] claim that the rent claimed by the
landlord is an increase in rent to punish [ him / her ] for [ describe lawful acts of tenant ].)
*(The tenant has the burden of proof on [ his / her ] claim that [ he / she ] paid the rent
during the [ period / periods ] for which the landlord claims rent.)
If you find that the landlord met [ his / her ] burden of proof, and you find that the tenant
has not met [ his / her ] burden of proof on any of [ his / her ] defenses, your verdict should
be for the landlord in the full amount claimed.
If you find that the landlord has not met [ his / her ] burden of proof, your verdict should be
for the tenant.
If you find that the landlord has met [ his / her ] burden of proof, and you find that the tenant
has met [ his / her ] burden of proof, then you should deduct [ any of the rent that you find
to be excused by the landlord’s failure to [ make repairs / correct conditions ] / any rent
which has been paid / any amount which you find is a retaliatory increase in the rent ].
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 100-10 Michigan Supreme Court
Note on Use
*These paragraphs in parentheses should be used only if applicable.
†If there are factual issues related to proper service or notice, subsection c must be
augmented.
**If the need for repair or condition complained of is in a common area, subsection a should
be deleted. See 49 Am Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant, §§ 778, 838, pp 719, 805.
‡See MCL 600.5720(1)(e) on retaliatory rent increase for lawful acts of the tenant as a
defense to a rent action.
This instruction should be used with M Civ JI 8.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof.
Comment
The elements of proper notice are found in MCL 600.5716, and the requirements of service
are found in MCL 600.5718. A just cause hearing and additional notice requirements apply
if public or other assisted housing is involved. MCL 600.5714.
History
M Civ JI 100.02 was added April 1, 1981. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 101-1
CHAPTER 101
Termination Action
Residential Property
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 101-2
M Civ JI 101.01 Termination Action: Explanation of Statutes .................................... 101-7
M Civ JI 101.02 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—Explanation of
Statute........................................................................................................................ 101-8
M Civ JI 101.03 Termination Action: Issues—Notice of Termination / Retaliatory
Termination.............................................................................................................. 101-10
M Civ JI 101.04 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—Tenant Burden of
Proof......................................................................................................................... 101-11
M Civ JI 101.05 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—Landlord Burden of
Proof......................................................................................................................... 101-13
M Civ JI 101.06 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—Tenant Burden of Proof on
Complaint within Ninety Days.................................................................................. 101-15
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 101-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introduction
Litigation of disputes between tenants and landlords generally falls into one of two
categories: (1) actions for possession for nonpayment of rent and (2) actions for possession
for termination of tenancy. Affirmative defenses and counterclaims generally involve
claims of failure by the landlord to keep the premises in reasonable repair in the rent cases
and claims of retaliatory eviction in the termination cases.
Although various statutes may have some application in landlord-tenant disputes
depending upon the particular circumstances, three statutes have general application.
1. MCL 554.134 sets forth the basic requisites for termination of the estates involved in
landlord-tenant matters in the following language: (1) Except as provided otherwise in this
section, an estate at will or by sufferance may be terminated by either party by 1 month’s
notice given to the other party. If the rent reserved in a lease is payable at periods of less
than 3 months, the time of notice is sufficient if it is equal to the interval between the times
of payment. Notice is not void because it states a day for the termination of the tenancy
that does not correspond to the conclusion or commencement of a rental period. The
notice terminates the tenancy at the end of a period equal in time to that in which the rent
is made payable.
(2) If a tenant neglects or refuses to pay rent on a lease at will or otherwise, the landlord
may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant a written 7-day notice to quit.
(3) A tenancy from year to year may be terminated by either party by a notice to quit,
given at any time to the other party. The notice shall terminate the lease at the expiration
of 1 year from the time of the service of the notice.
(4) If a tenant holds over after a lease is terminated pursuant to a clause in the lease
providing for termination because the tenant, a member of the tenant’s household, or other
person under the tenant’s control has manufactured, delivered, possessed with intent to
deliver, or possessed a controlled substance on the leased premises, the landlord may
terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant a written 7-day notice to quit. This subsection
applies only if a formal police report has been filed by the landlord alleging that the person
has unlawfully manufactured, delivered, possessed with intent to deliver, or possess a
controlled substance on the leased premises. For purposes of this subsection, “controlled
substance” means a substance or a counterfeit substance classified in schedule 1, 2, or 3
pursuant to sections 7211, 7212, 7213, 7214, 7215, and 7216 of Act No. 368 of the Public
Acts of 1978, being sections 333.7211, 333.7212, 333.7213, 333.7214, 333.7215, and
333.7216 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
2. 1968 PA 295 contains statutory covenants imposed by law on residential landlords. That
statute is contained in MCL 554.139, which provides as follows:
(1) In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or licensor covenants:
Michigan Supreme Court Page 101-3
Chapter 101: Termination-Action—Residential Property
(a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by the parties.
(b) To keep the premises in reasonable repair during the term of the lease or license,
and to comply with the applicable health and safety laws of the state and of the local
unit of government where the premises are located, except when the disrepair or
violation of the applicable health or safety laws has been caused by the tenants [ sic ]
willful or irresponsible conduct or lack of conduct.
(2) The parties to the lease or license may modify the obligations imposed by this section
where the lease or license has a current term of at least 1 year.
(3) The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed, and the privilege of a
prospective lessee or licensee to inspect the premises before concluding a lease or license
shall not defeat his right to have the benefit of the covenants established herein.
3. 1972 PA 120 governs summary proceedings for the recovery of land, and is contained in
MCL 600.5701–.5759. Section 5714 outlines the grounds for summary recovery of
possession:
(1) The person entitled to any premises may recover possession thereof by summary
proceedings in the following cases:
(a) When a person holds over any premises, after failing or refusing to pay rent due
under the lease or agreement by which he holds within 7 days from the service of a
written demand for possession for nonpayment of the rent due. For the purpose of this
provision, rent due shall not include any accelerated indebtedness by reason of a
breach of the lease under which the premises are held.
(b) When a person holds over any premises in any of the following circumstances:
(i)After termination of the lease, pursuant to a power to terminate provided in the
lease or implied by law.
(ii)After the term for which they are demised to him or to the person under whom
he holds.
(iii)After the termination of his estate by a notice to quit as provided by section 34
of chapter 66 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, as amended, being section 554.134
of the Compiled Laws of 1948. [ Notice must be at least as long as rental period. ]
(c) When the person in possession wilfully or negligently causes a serious and
continuing health hazard to exist on the premises, or causes extensive and continuing
physical injury to the premises, which was discovered or should reasonably have been
discovered by the party seeking possession not earlier than 90 days before the
institution of proceedings under this chapter and when the person in possession
neglects or refuses for 7 days after service of a demand for possession of the premises
to deliver up possession of the premises or to substantially restore or repair the
premises.
(d) When a person takes possession of premises by means of a forcible entry, holds
possession of premises by force after a peaceable entry or comes into possession of
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 101-4 Michigan Supreme Court
premises by trespass without color of title or other possessory interest.
(e) When a person continues in possession of any premises sold by virtue of any
mortgage or execution, after the time limited by law for redemption of the premises.
(f) When a person continues in possession of any premises sold and conveyed by any
executor or administrator under license from the probate court or under authority in
the will.
(2) A tenant or occupant of housing operated by a city, village, township or other unit of
local government, as provided in Act No. 18 of the Public Acts of the Extra Session of
1933, as amended, being sections 125.651 to 125.709e of the Compiled Laws of 1948, is
not deemed to be holding over under subdivision (b) of subsection (1) unless the tenancy
or agreement has been terminated for just cause, as provided by lawful rules of the local
housing commission or by law.
Section 5720 sets forth specific statutory defenses to actions for possession:
(1) A judgment for possession of the premises for an alleged termination of tenancy shall
not be entered against a defendant if 1 or more of the following is established:
(a) That the alleged termination was intended primarily as a penalty for the
defendant’s attempt to secure or enforce rights under the lease or agreement or under
the laws of the state, of a governmental subdivision of this state, or of the United
States.
(b) That the alleged termination was intended primarily as a penalty for the
defendant’s complaint to a governmental authority with a report of plaintiff’s
violation of a health or safety code or ordinance.
(c) That the alleged termination was intended primarily as retribution for a lawful act
arising out of the tenancy, including membership in a tenant organization and a lawful
activity of a tenant organization arising out of the tenancy.
(d) That the alleged termination was of a tenancy in housing operated by a city,
village, township or other unit of local government and was terminated without cause.
(e) That the plaintiff attempted to increase the defendant’s obligations under the lease
or contract as a penalty for the lawful acts as are described in subdivisions (a) to (c)
and that the defendant’s failure to perform the additional obligations was the primary
reason for the alleged termination of tenancy.
(f) That the plaintiff committed a breach of the lease which excuses the payment of
rent if possession is claimed for nonpayment of rent.
(g) That the rent allegedly due, in an action where possession is claimed for
nonpayment of rent, was paid into an escrow account under section 130 of Act No.
167 of the Public Acts of 1917, being section 125.530 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws; was paid pursuant to a court order under section 134(5) of Act No. 167 of the
Public Acts of 1917, as amended, being section 125.534 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws; or was paid to a receiver under section 135 of Act No. 167 of the Public Acts of
Michigan Supreme Court Page 101-5
Chapter 101: Termination-Action—Residential Property
1917, being section 125.535 of the Michigan Compiled Laws of 1948.
(2) If a defendant who alleges a retaliatory termination of the tenancy shows that within
90 days before the commencement of summary proceedings the defendant attempted to
secure or enforce rights against the plaintiff or to complain against the plaintiff, as
provided in subsection (1)(a), (b), (c), or (e), by means of official action to or through a
court or other governmental agency and the official action has not resulted in dismissal or
denial of the attempt or complaint, a presumption in favor of the defense of retaliatory
termination arises, unless the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
the termination of tenancy was not in retaliation for the acts. If the defendant’s alleged
attempt to secure or enforce rights or to complain against the plaintiff occurred more than
90 days before the commencement of proceedings or was terminated adversely to the
defendant, a presumption adverse to the defense of retaliatory termination arises and the
defendant has the burden to establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
At common law, the tenant’s obligation to pay rent was independent of covenants by the
landlord to repair the premises or to comply with health and safety laws and regulations. As
a result, breach by the landlord of covenants to repair was not a defense to an action by the
landlord to recover possession for nonpayment of rent. Reaume v Wayne Circuit Judge, 299
Mich 305; 300 NW 97 (1941).
The so-called “tenants’ rights” legislation exemplified by 1968 PA 295, however,
drastically altered that situation. As pointed out by the court of appeals in Rome v Walker,
38 Mich App 458, 463–465; 196 NW2d 850, 853–854 (1972):
[ U]nder prior practice the tenant could raise no affirmative defenses on his behalf in an
action by the landlord to regain possession for nonpayment of rent. The only defense was
payment of the rent. 1968 PA 297, however, revolutionized the rights of tenants in this
respect. MCL 600.5637(5) now allows the tenant to raise the question of a breach of the
lease by the landlord ‘which excuses the payment of rent’. While the phrase, ‘which
excuses the payment of rent’, is undefined, it is clear from an examination of the language
of MCL 600.5646(3) that the Legislature intended that any defense which the tenant may
have can be raised in the proceeding brought by the landlord to regain possession for
alleged nonpayment of rent.
The intent of the new language is clear. Tenants may now raise any defense, which would
justify the withholding of rent, in an action by the landlord to regain possession for
nonpayment of rent. Upon motion by either party, the court shall determine if summary
judgment of possession should be granted to the moving party. If, as here, the trial court
determines that the tenants’ counterclaim raises a substantial question of fact, the court
should deny the landlord’s motion for summary judgment and the question of possession
will thereby abide the determination of the case on the merits.
The current authorization for abatement is found in MCL 600.5741.
The instructions which follow are designed to deal with the situations which most often
occur in landlord-tenant disputes when the issues relate to the recent statutes. In some cases,
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 101-6 Michigan Supreme Court
the instructions do not cover a particular issue or an aspect of a particular issue. In such
situations, it is appropriate for the Court to add to the model instructions. The landlord-
tenant instructions should be used with the applicable General Instructions as well as M Civ
JI 16.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof to construct a logical and cohesive jury charge.
History
This Introduction was added April 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 101-7
Chapter 101: Termination-Action—Residential Property
M Civ JI 101.01 Termination Action: Explanation of Statutes
This case involves a termination of tenancy. Under the law of this state a landlord may seek
to recover possession of the [ house / apartment / [ other ] ] after giving the tenant a proper
notice of termination.
In this case, the rent is paid on a [ monthly / weekly / [ other ] ] basis, and therefore the
landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant [ one month’s / one week’s /
[ other ] ] notice. This notice of termination must be in writing, and shall be dated and
signed by the landlord, [ his / her ] attorney or [ his / her ] agent. The landlord may seek to
recover possession of the premises by legal action if the tenant does not move by the end
of the notice period.
Comment
Requirements of notice to terminate a tenancy are found in MCL 554.134; MCL 600.5716;
and MCL 600.5718. After proper notice, the landlord may recover possession by summary
proceedings, MCL 600.5714, unless other defenses are proved, e.g., retaliatory eviction.
History
M Civ JI 101.01 was added April 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 101-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 101.02 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—
Explanation of Statute
By statute, a landlord is not entitled to possession of the premises—
(a)*(if termination of the tenancy was intended primarily as a penalty for the
tenant’s attempt to secure or enforce rights under the lease or rental agreement,
or under the laws of the State of Michigan or its governmental subdivisions or
of the United States)
(b)*(if termination of the tenancy was intended primarily as a penalty for the
tenant’s complaint to a governmental authority concerning a violation of any
health or safety code or ordinance)
(c)*(if termination of the tenancy was intended primarily as retribution for any
lawful act arising out of the tenancy, including membership in a tenant
organization and a lawful activity of a tenant organization arising out of the
tenancy)
(d)*(if it is a tenancy in housing operated by a city, village, township, or other
unit of local government, and was terminated without cause)
(e)*(if termination of the tenancy was intended primarily as a penalty because
of the tenant’s failure to perform additional obligations under the lease or
contract imposed by the landlord—
(i) as a result of the tenant’s attempt to secure or enforce rights under the
lease or rental agreement, under the laws of the State of Michigan or its
governmental subdivisions or of the United States
(ii) as a result of the tenant’s complaint to a governmental authority
concerning a violation of any health or safety code or ordinance
(iii) as retribution for any lawful act arising out of the tenancy)
Note on Use
*Select the subsections applicable to the facts of case.
Comment
The defense of retaliatory eviction is not applicable where the landlord is seeking
repossession of premises upon the expiration of the term of a fixed lease. Frenchtown Villa
Michigan Supreme Court Page 101-9
Chapter 101: Termination-Action—Residential Property
v Meadors, 117 Mich App 683; 324 NW2d 133 (1982).
History
M Civ JI 101.02 was added April 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 101-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 101.03 Termination Action: Issues—Notice of Termination
/ Retaliatory Termination
There is an issue in this case of whether the landlord served the tenant with a written [ one
month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice to terminate the tenancy.
There is *(also) an issue in this case of whether the landlord intended primarily to penalize
or retaliate against the tenant for exercising [ his / her ] rights as a tenant in one or more of
the ways claimed by the tenant as I have explained to you in these instructions.
Note on Use
Requirements of the notice to terminate a tenancy are found in MCL 554.134.
This instruction should precede an applicable burden of proof instruction, M Civ JI 101.04,
101.05 or 101.06.
*Insert if applicable.
Comment
The defense of retaliatory eviction is not applicable where the landlord is seeking
repossession of premises upon the expiration of the term of a fixed lease. Frenchtown Villa
v Meadors, 117 Mich App 683; 324 NW2d 133 (1982).
History
M Civ JI 101.03 was added April 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 101-11
Chapter 101: Termination-Action—Residential Property
M Civ JI 101.04 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—
Tenant Burden of Proof
The landlord has the burden of proving that [ he / she ] served the tenant with
a written [ one month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice to terminate the
tenancy.
The tenant has the burden of proving that the termination of tenancy by the
landlord was intended primarily as a penalty or retaliation for exercising [ his
/ her ] rights as a tenant in one or more of the ways that I previously described.
Your verdict will be for the landlord if [ he / she ] served the tenant with the
required [ one month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice, unless the termination
of tenancy was intended primarily as a penalty or retaliation.
Your verdict will be for the tenant if the landlord did not serve the tenant with
the required [ one month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice, or if the termination
of tenancy was intended primarily as a penalty or retaliation.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given if there is no claim by the tenant that he or she attempted
to secure or enforce rights or complained within ninety days before the termination action
was commenced.
This instruction should also be given if the evidence of such an attempt is insufficient to go
to the jury, or, for example, if it is clear that the attempt or complaint was made more than
ninety days before the termination action, or resulted in a dismissal or denial.
This instruction should be used with M Civ JI 8.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof.
Comment
Requirements of notice to terminate a tenancy are found in MCL 554.134.
See MCL 600.5720(2) for burden of proof on retaliatory termination. The defense of
retaliatory eviction is not applicable where the landlord is seeking repossession of premises
upon the expiration of the term of a fixed lease. Frenchtown Villa v Meadors, 117 Mich
App 683; 324 NW2d 133 (1982).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 101-12 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 101.04 was added April 1, 1981. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 101-13
Chapter 101: Termination-Action—Residential Property
M Civ JI 101.05 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—
Landlord Burden of Proof
The landlord has the burden of proving that [ he / she ] served the tenant with
a written [ one month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice to terminate the
tenancy.
In this case the tenant has [ attempted to secure or enforce rights against the
landlord / complained against the landlord [ describe complaint ] ] to [ name
of court / name of governmental agency ] within ninety days of the
commencement of this termination action, [ date action filed ], and the
[ attempt / complaint ] has not been dismissed or denied.
Under these circumstances, the law places on the landlord the burden of
proving that [ his / her ] termination of the tenancy was not intended primarily
as a penalty or retaliation against the tenant for [ that act / those acts ].
Your verdict will be for the landlord if [ he / she ] served the tenant with the
required [ one month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice, and if the termination
of tenancy was not intended primarily as a penalty or retaliation for [ that act /
those acts ].
Your verdict will be for the tenant if the landlord did not serve the tenant with
the required [ one month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice or if the termination
of tenancy was intended primarily as a penalty or retaliation for [ that act /
those acts ].
Note on Use
This instruction should be given if there is no dispute on the facts indicated in the second
paragraph.
If the tenant claims that the termination is in retaliation both for his or her complaint within
the ninety-day period and for a complaint or attempt to secure rights prior to the ninety-day
period, this instruction must be modified. The landlord has the burden of proof to show that
he or she was not retaliating against the tenant only with regard to a complaint or attempt
to secure rights within the ninety-day period, while the tenant has the burden of proof to
show that the landlord was retaliating with regard to any complaint or attempt to secure
rights prior to the ninety-day period.
This instruction should be used with M Civ JI 8.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 101-14 Michigan Supreme Court
Comment
Requirements of notice to terminate a tenancy are found in MCL 554.134.
See MCL 600.5720(2) for burden of proof on retaliatory termination. The defense of
retaliatory eviction is not applicable where the landlord is seeking repossession of premises
upon the expiration of the term of a fixed lease. Frenchtown Villa v Meadors, 117 Mich
App 683; 324 NW2d 133 (1982).
History
M Civ JI 101.05 was added April 1, 1981. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 101-15
Chapter 101: Termination-Action—Residential Property
M Civ JI 101.06 Termination Action: Retaliatory Termination—
Tenant Burden of Proof on Complaint within Ninety Days
The landlord has the burden of proving that [ he / she ] served the tenant with a written [ one
month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice to terminate the tenancy.
In this case the tenant claims that [ he / she ] has [ attempted to secure or enforce rights
against the landlord / complained against the landlord [ describe complaint ] ] to [ name of
court / name of governmental agency ] within ninety days of the commencement of this
termination action, [ date action filed ], and the [ attempt / complaint ] has not been
dismissed or denied. The tenant has the burden of proof on this claim.
If you find that the tenant has met [ his / her ] burden of proof on this claim, then the
landlord has the burden of proving that [ his / her ] termination of the tenancy was not
intended primarily as a penalty or retaliation against the tenant for [ that act / those acts ].
If you find that the tenant has not met [ his / her ] burden of proof that [ he / she ] [ attempted
to secure or enforce rights / complained ] within ninety days before this termination action,
then the burden of proof is on the tenant to show that the termination of tenancy was
intended by the landlord primarily as a penalty or retaliation against the tenant.
Your verdict will be for the landlord if [ he / she ] served the tenant with the required [ one
month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice, and if the termination of tenancy was not intended
primarily as a penalty or retaliation against the tenant.
Your verdict will be for the tenant if the landlord did not serve the tenant with the required
[ one month’s / one week’s / [ other ] ] notice or if the termination of tenancy was intended
primarily as a penalty or retaliation against the tenant.
Note on Use
This instruction should be used where there are factual issues relating to the complaint or
attempt to secure rights, i.e., whether the complaint was made within the ninety-day period,
or whether it was dismissed or denied.
If the tenant claims that the termination is in retaliation both for his or her complaint within
the ninety-day period and for a complaint or attempt to secure rights prior to the ninety-day
period, this instruction must be modified. The landlord has the burden of proof to show that
he or she was not retaliating against the tenant only with regard to a complaint or attempt
to secure rights within the ninety-day period, while the tenant has the burden of proof to
show that the landlord was retaliating with regard to any complaint or attempt to secure
rights prior to the ninety-day period.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 101-16 Michigan Supreme Court
This instruction should be used with M Civ JI 8.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof.
Comment
Requirements of notice to terminate a tenancy are found in MCL 554.134.
See MCL 600.5720(2) for burden of proof on retaliatory termination. The defense of
retaliatory eviction is not applicable where the landlord is seeking repossession of premises
upon the expiration of the term of a fixed lease. Frenchtown Villa v Meadors, 117 Mich
App 683; 324 NW2d 133 (1982).
History
M Civ JI 101.06 was added April 1, 1981. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-1
CHAPTER 105
Employment Discrimination
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 105-3
M Civ JI 105.01 Employment Discrimination Statute (Disparate Treatment)—
Explanation................................................................................................................. 105-4
M Civ JI 105.02 Employment Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)—Definition ..... 105-5
M Civ JI 105.03 Employment Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)—Cautionary
Instruction as to Business Judgment.......................................................................... 105-6
M Civ JI 105.04 Employment Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)—Burden of
Proof........................................................................................................................... 105-7
M Civ JI 105.04A Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof —Retaliation ........ 105-8
M Civ JI 105.05 Employment Discrimination (Constructive Discharge)—Definition.. 105-9
M Civ JI 105.10 Employment Discrimination—Sexual Harassment—Explanation... 105-10
M Civ JI 105.12 Employment Discrimination—Quid Pro Quo Harassment—
Burden of Proof........................................................................................................ 105-11
M Civ JI 105.14 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—
Burden of Proof—Employer Defendant................................................................... 105-13
M Civ JI 105.18 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—
Burden of Proof—Unwelcome Sexual Conduct or Communication ........................ 105-14
M Civ JI 105.20 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—
Sexually Hostile Work Environment......................................................................... 105-15
M Civ JI 105.24 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—
Employer Liability..................................................................................................... 105-16
M Civ JI 105.26 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—
Notice....................................................................................................................... 105-17
M Civ JI 105.28 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—
Prompt Remedial Action .......................................................................................... 105-18
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 105.30 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—
Damages—Tangible Employment Act Not Required ............................................... 105-19
M Civ JI 105.32 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—
Burden of Proof—Employee Defendant .................................................................. 105-20
M Civ JI 105.41 Employment Discrimination—Mitigation of Damages for Loss of
Compensation .......................................................................................................... 105-21
M Civ JI 105.42 Employment Discrimination—Mitigation of Damages for Loss of
Compensation: Conditional and Unconditional Offers by Defendant ..................... 105-23
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-3
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
Introduction
In adopting the employment discrimination instructions in 1985, the Committee
deliberately eschewed reliance on the “order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class
action challenging employment discrimination,” articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 800; 93 S Ct 1817, 1823; 36 L
Ed 2d 668, 676 (1973). As the Supreme Court was well aware, Title VII claims are not tried
to a jury (Albemarle Paper Co v Moody, 422 US 405, 422–444; 95 S Ct 2362, 2385; 45 L
Ed 2d 280, 312–313 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)), and McDonnell Douglas was not
written as a prospective jury charge.
It was precisely because the McDonnell Douglas formulation would “add little to the
juror’s understanding of the case and, even worse, may lead jurors to abandon their own
judgment and to seize upon poorly understood legalisms to decide the ultimate question of
discrimination” (Loeb v Textron, Inc, 600 F2d 1003, 1016 (CA 1, 1979)) that the
Committee decided not to develop its instructions around the McDonnell Douglas model.
Since the adoption of these instructions the Michigan Supreme Court has issued two
opinions discussing the McDonnell Douglas approach. In DeBrow v Century 21 Great
Lakes, Inc, 463 Mich 534; 620 NW2d 836 (2001), the Court held that the shifting burdens
of producing evidence described in McDonnell Douglas are not applicable in cases
involving direct evidence of discrimination (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc v Thurston,
469 US 111, 121; 105 S Ct 613; 83 L Ed2d 523 (1985). In Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464
Mich 456; 628 NW2d 515 (2001), the Court explained that in cases based solely on indirect
or circumstantial evidence in which the McDonnell Douglas approach does apply, the jury
should not be instructed on its application:
As the Supreme Court explained in Burdine, supra at 256, n 8, the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework is merely intended “to progressively sharpen the inquiry into
the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.” It is important to keep in mind,
therefore, that for purposes of claims brought under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, the
McDonnell Douglas approach merely provides a mechanism for assessing motions for
summary disposition and directed verdict in cases involving circumstantial evidence of
discrimination. It is useful only for purposes of assisting trial courts in determining whether
there is a jury-submissible issue on the ultimate fact question of unlawful discrimination.
The McDonnell Douglas model is not relevant to a jury’s evaluation of evidence at trial.
Accordingly, a jury should not be instructed on its application. See Gehrig v Case Corp, 43
F3d 340, 343 (CA 7, 1995) (explaining that, in federal discrimination cases, “[ o]nce the
judge finds that the plaintiff has made the minimum necessary demonstration [ the ‘prima
facie case’ ] and that the defendant has produced an age-neutral explanation, the burden-
shifting apparatus has served its purpose, and the only remaining question—the only
question the jury need answer—is whether the plaintiff is a victim of intentional
discrimination”). (Footnote omitted.)
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 105.01 Employment Discrimination Statute (Disparate
Treatment)—Explanation
(1) The law provides that an employer shall not discriminate against a person regarding
employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment because of
[ religion / race / color / national origin / age / sex I sexual orientation / gender
identity or expression / height / weight / marital status ].
(2) The law also provides that a person shall not retaliate or discriminate against a
person because the person has opposed a violation of the Act, or because the person has
made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under the Act.
Note on Use
The use of any particular subsection will be dictated by the facts of the case.
Comment
MCL 37.2202; MCL 37.2701; 2023 PA 6; 2023 PA 31; 2023 PA 45
History
Added September 2005. Amended July 2012, October 2023.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-5
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.02 Employment Discrimination (Disparate
Treatment)—Definition
The plaintiff must prove that [ he / she ] was discriminated against because of [ religion /
race / color / national origin / age / sex / sexual orientation / gender identity or expression /
height / weight / marital status ].
The discrimination must have been intentional. It cannot have occurred by accident.
Intentional discrimination means that one of the motives or reasons for plaintiff’s [
discharge / failure to be hired / failure to be promoted / failure to be trained / harassment /
[ other ] ] was [ religion / race / color / national origin / age / sex / sexual orientation / gender
identity or expression / height / weight / marital status ]. [ Religion / race / color / national
origin / age / sex / sexual orientation / gender identity or expression / height / weight /
marital status ] does not have to be the only reason, or even the main reason, but it does
have to be one of the reasons which made a difference in determining whether or not to [
discharge / hire / promote / train / harass / [ other ] ] the plaintiff.
Note on Use
Intent to discriminate need not be proven by direct evidence, United States Postal Service
Board of Governors v Aikens, 460 US 711; 103 S Ct 1478; 75 L Ed 2d 403 (1983). Where
circumstantial evidence is relied on, M Civ JI 3.10 should be given.
Comment
MCL 37.2202. This instruction was approved in Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675;
385 NW2d 586 (1986) and Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456; 628 NW2d 515 (2001).
See also Gallaway v Chrysler Corp, 105 Mich App 1; 306 NW2d 368 (1981); Farmington
Education Association v Farmington School District, 133 Mich App 566; 351 NW2d 242
(1984);
2023 PA 6; 2023 PA 31; 2023 PA 45.
History
Added January 1985. Amended October 2023.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 105.03 Employment Discrimination (Disparate
Treatment)—Cautionary Instruction as to Business Judgment
Your task is to determine whether defendant discriminated against the plaintiff. You are not
to substitute your judgment for the defendant’s business judgment, or decide this case based
upon what you would have done.
However, you may consider the reasonableness or lack of reasonableness of defendant’s
stated business judgment along with all the other evidence in determining whether
defendant discriminated or did not discriminate against the plaintiff.
Comment
Adama v Doehler-Jarvis Div of NL Industries, 115 Mich App 82; 320 NW2d 298 (1982);
rev’d on other grounds, 419 Mich 905; 353 NW2d 438 (1984); Bouwman v Chrysler Corp,
114 Mich App 670; 319 NW2d 621 (1982); Gallaway v Chrysler Corp, 105 Mich App 1;
306 NW2d 368 (1981).
History
M Civ JI 105.03 was added January 1985.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-7
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.04 Employment Discrimination (Disparate
Treatment)—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant [ discharged / failed to hire / failed to promote / failed
to train / harassed / [ other ] ] the plaintiff, and
(b) that [ religion / race / color / national origin / age / sex / height /
weight / marital status ] was one of the motives or reasons which made
a difference in determining to [ discharge / fail to hire / fail to promote
/ fail to train / harass / [ other ] ] the plaintiff.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved both of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove both of those
elements.
Comment
This instruction was approved in Cobb v General Motors, unpublished opinion per curiam
of the Court of Appeals decided March 29, 1989 (Docket Nos. 97545, 99515).
History
M Civ JI 105.04 was added January 1985. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 105.04A Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof
Retaliation
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] [ opposed a violation of the civil rights act / made a
charge, filed a complaint, or testified, assisted, or participated in an
investigation, proceeding or hearing, under the Act ];
(b) that was known by the defendant;
(c) that defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff;
and
(d) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.
To establish a causal connection, plaintiff must demonstrate that [ his / her ] participation
in the protected activity was a significant factor in the defendant’s adverse employment
action.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
MCL 37.2701. Barrett v Kirtland Com College, 245 Mich App 306 (2001).
History
Added July 2012. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-9
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.05 Employment Discrimination (Constructive
Discharge)—Definition
The plaintiff [ resigned / left the job ]. Plaintiff claims that [ he / she ] was constructively
discharged by the defendant. Defendant claims that the plaintiff voluntarily [ resigned / left
the job ]. Plaintiff has the burden of proving that [ he / she ] was constructively discharged.
Constructive discharge means that an employer deliberately made an employee’s working
conditions so intolerable that the employee was forced to [ resign / leave the job ].
It is not necessary to show that defendant intended plaintiff to [ resign / leave the job ], so
long as you find that a reasonable person in the same circumstances as plaintiff would have
felt compelled to [ resign / leave the job ].
Note on Use
This instruction is applicable in cases where an employer is indifferent to or tolerant of
harassment of plaintiff by coemployees. Easter v Jeep Corp, 750 F2d 520 (CA 6, 1984).
Comment
See Jenkins v American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785; 369 NW2d 223 (1985); LeGalley
v Bronson Community Schools, 127 Mich App 482; 339 NW2d 223 (1983); Bourque v
Powell Electrical Mfg Co, 617 F2d 61 (CA 5, 1980); Alicea Rosado v Garcia Santiago, 562
F2d 114 (CA 1, 1977); Held v Gulf Oil Co, 684 F2d 427 (CA 6, 1982); Easter.
History
M Civ JI 105.05 was added October 1985.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 105.10 Employment Discrimination—Sexual Harassment—
Explanation
Sexual harassment is a type of sex discrimination prohibited by state law. There are two
types of sexual harassment. The first is known as quid pro quo, which means “this for that.”
The second is known as sexually hostile work environment harassment. In this case
plaintiff claims [ quid pro quo / sexually hostile environment ] harassment.
Comment
MCL 37.2103(j); Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297 (2000); 2023 PA 6; 2023 PA 31.
History
Added February 1987. Amended March 1995, June 2006, October 2023.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-11
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.12 Employment Discrimination—Quid Pro Quo
Harassment—Burden of Proof
On plaintiff’s claim of quid pro quo harassment, plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that the employer or [ its / his / her ] agent subjected plaintiff to unwelcome [ sexual
advances / requests for sexual favors / other verbal or physical conduct or communication
of a sexual nature ]; and
(b)
(i) that the employer or [ its / his / her ] agent explicitly or implicitly made the
plaintiff’s submission to such conduct or communication a term or condition
to obtain employment; and
or
(ii) that the employer or [ its / his / her ] agent used plaintiff’s submission to or
rejection of such conduct or communication as a factor in a decision affecting
the plaintiff’s employment; and
(c) that [ he / she ] suffered damages.
A decision affecting the plaintiff’s employment must be a tangible employment action. To
be a tangible employment action, the action must constitute a change in employment status
such as hiring, firing, or failing to promote.
To prove that the submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication was a factor
in a decision, plaintiff must demonstrate that the tangible employment action which [ he /
she ] suffered was because of [ his / her ] rejection of, or submission to, the harassment.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MCL 37.2103(j); Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297 (2000);
Haynie v Michigan, 468 Mich 302 (2003); Champion v Nationwide Security, 450 Mich 702
(1996)
; 2023 PA 6; 2023 PA 31.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-12 Michigan Supreme Court
History
Added June 2006. Amended January 2020, October 2023.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-13
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.14 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment—Burden of Proof—Employer Defendant
On plaintiff’s claim of hostile environment sexual harassment against the defendant
employer, plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of [sex / sexual
orientation / gender identity or expression]; and
(b) that [ he / she ] was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; and
(c) that [ he / she ] was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment; and
(d) that the employer was legally responsible for the sexually hostile work environment;
and
(e) that [ he / she ] has suffered damages.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368 (1993); Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297
(2000); Haynie v Michigan, 468 Mich 302 (2003); 2023 PA 6; 2023 PA 31.
History
Added June 2006. Amended January 2020, October 2023.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 105.18 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment—Burden of Proof—Unwelcome Sexual Conduct
or Communication
When I use the phrase “unwelcome sexual conduct or communications,” I mean that
plaintiff is the recipient of unwanted conduct or communication that is inherently sexual.
Comment
Haynie v Michigan, 468 Mich 302 (2003); Corley v Detroit Bd Of Ed, 470 Mich 274 (2004).
History
Added June 2006.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-15
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.20 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment—Sexually Hostile Work Environment
When I use the phrase “sexually hostile work environment,” I mean the work environment
was so tainted that, in the totality of the circumstances, the unwelcome sexual conduct
complained of had the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with [ his / her ]
employment or created an intimidating, hostile or offensive employment environment.
You must view the conduct or communication complained of from an objective standard,
deciding how a reasonable person would have perceived the conduct or communication
alleged in this case.
Comment
Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368 (1993); Faragher v Boca Raton, 524 US 775; 118 SCt
2275; 141 L Ed 2d 662 (1998).
History
Added June 2006.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-16 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 105.24 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment—Employer Liability
When I said the employer must be legally responsible, I mean the plaintiff must prove that
the employer (1) had adequate notice that plaintiff was subjected to sexual harassment, and
(2) failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action which reasonably served to prevent
future harassment of the plaintiff, and (3) further sexual harassment of plaintiff occurred as
a result of the employer’s failure to take adequate remedial action.
Comment
Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368 (1993); Chambers v Trettco, Inc., 463 Mich 297 (2000).
History
Added June 2006.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-17
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.26 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment—Notice
By the term adequate notice, I mean that under the totality of the circumstances either the
employer knew, or a reasonable employer should have known, of a substantial probability
that plaintiff was being sexually harassed.
Comment
Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408 (2005); Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470
Mich 749 (2004); Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297 (2000).
History
Added June 2006.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-18 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 105.28 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment—Prompt Remedial Action
By the term “prompt and adequate remedial action,” I mean that the employer must take
steps reasonably calculated to stop the harassment of the plaintiff. In determining whether
the steps are reasonable, you should consider the totality of the circumstances.
Comment
Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297 (2000).
History
Added June 2006.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-19
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.30 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment—Damages—Tangible Employment Act Not
Required
[ For a sexually hostile work environment claim, ] plaintiff need not suffer the loss of (his/
her) job or other tangible benefit. It is the harassment and resulting change in the work
environment that constitutes the injury.
Note on Use
The bracketed language should only be used if a quid pro quo claim is also being submitted
to the jury.
Comment
Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368 (1993).
History
Added June 2006.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-20 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 105.32 Employment Discrimination—Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment—Burden of Proof—Employee Defendant
On plaintiff’s claim of hostile environment sexual harassment against the defendant
employee, plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of [sex / sexual
orientation / gender identity or expression]; and
(b) that [ he / she ] was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; and
(c) that the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in fact did
substantially interfere with [ his / her ] employment or created an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive work environment; and
(d) that the defendant employee was the agent of the employer; and
(e) that [ he / she ] has suffered damages.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368 (1993); Chambers v Trettco, Inc, 463 Mich 297 (2000);
2023 PA 6; 2023 PA 31.
History
Added June 2006. Amended January 2020, October 2023.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-21
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.41 Employment Discrimination—Mitigation of
Damages for Loss of Compensation
The plaintiff must make every reasonable effort to minimize or reduce [ his / her ] damages
for loss of compensation by seeking employment. This is called “mitigation” of damages.
The defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to mitigate [ his / her ]
damages for loss of compensation.
If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, you must reduce these damages by:
(a) *(what the plaintiff earned) (and)
(b) *(what the plaintiff could have earned with reasonable effort) during the
period for which you determine that [ he / she ] is entitled to damages.
†(If you find that the plaintiff is entitled to future damages, you must reduce these damages
by an amount the plaintiff could reasonably earn or reasonably be expected to earn in the
future.)
Whether the plaintiff was reasonable in not seeking or accepting particular employment is
a question for you to decide. However, the plaintiff is obligated to accept an offer of
employment which is of “a like nature.” In determining whether employment is of “a like
nature,” you may consider, for example, the type of work, the hours worked, the
compensation, the job security, working conditions, and other conditions of employment.
Note on Use
If there are mitigation issues other than for loss of compensation, use M Civ JI 53.05.
*The court should use subsection a, b, or both as applicable.
†This sentence should be used only if applicable. Where the court is prepared to order
reinstatement, future damages are not an issue for the jury. Riethmiller v Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Michigan, 151 Mich App 188; 390 NW2d 227 (1986). In other circumstances, an
instruction on future damages may be appropriate. Adama v Doehler-Jarvis, Division of N
L Industries (On Remand), 144 Mich App 764; 376 NW2d 406 (1985); Goins v Ford Motor
Co, 131 Mich App 185; 347 NW2d 184 (1983); Riethmiller.
Comment
This instruction was cited with approval in Morris v Clawson Tank Co, 459 Mich 256; 587
NW2d 253 (1998).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-22 Michigan Supreme Court
The plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages, including future damages, is also discussed in
Department of Civil Rights v Horizon Tube Fabricating, Inc, 148 Mich App 633; 385
NW2d 685 (1986); Grix v Liquor Control Commission, 304 Mich 269, 277; 8 NW2d 62
(1943); Higgins v Kenneth R Lawrence, DPM, PC, 107 Mich App 178, 181; 309 NW2d
194 (1981); cf Davis v Combustion Engineering, Inc, 742 F2d 916 (CA 6, 1984); Whittlesey
v Union Carbide Corp, 742 F2d 724 (CA 2, 1984).
The plaintiff is obligated to accept employment of “a like nature.” Morris; Higgins;
Flickema v Henry Kraker Co, 252 Mich 406; 233 NW 632; 72 ALR 1046 (1930); Michigan
Employment Relations Commission v Kleen-O-Rama, 60 Mich App 61; 230 NW2d 308
(1975); Rasimas v Michigan Department of Mental Health, 714 F2d 614 (CA 6, 1983), cert
denied, 466 US 950; 104 S Ct 2151; 80 L Ed 2d 537 (1984).
Failure to mitigate is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof is on the defendant.
Morris; Department of Civil Rights v Horizon Tube Fabricating, Inc; Higgins; Fothergill v
McKay Press, 374 Mich 138; 132 NW2d 144 (1965); Flickema; Ogden v George F Alger
Co, 353 Mich 402, 408; 91 NW2d 288 (1958).
History
M Civ JI 105.41 was added February 1987. Amended March 1996.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 105-23
Chapter 105: Employment Discrimination
M Civ JI 105.42 Employment Discrimination—Mitigation of
Damages for Loss of Compensation: Conditional and Unconditional
Offers by Defendant
In this case, defendant has offered to [ hire / promote / reinstate ] the plaintiff to the position
[ previously held / applied for ] or a substantially equivalent position, and plaintiff has
rejected the offer. “Substantially equivalent position” means one with virtually identical
promotion opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities, working conditions, and
status.
Offers to [ hire / promote / reinstate ] are either conditional or unconditional. It is for you
to decide whether defendant’s offer was conditional or unconditional. An offer is
conditional if it involves discriminatory or other unreasonable conditions. An offer is
unconditional if it does not involve discriminatory or other unreasonable conditions.
If an offer is conditional, plaintiff does not have to accept the offer.
If the offer is unconditional, then you should determine whether plaintiff’s rejection of the
offer was reasonable. To be reasonable, plaintiff’s rejection must be grounded in the
employment as contemplated by the offer to [ hire / promote / reinstate ] the plaintiff and
not be for a purely personal reason.
If you determine that defendant unconditionally offered to [ hire / promote / reinstate ] the
plaintiff to the position [ previously held / applied for ] or a substantially equivalent
position, and it was not reasonable for plaintiff to reject the offer, then you shall not award
damages for loss of compensation after the date plaintiff rejected the offer.
If you determine that the offer was conditional, or that it was reasonable for plaintiff to
reject the offer, then you may award damages for loss of compensation after the date
plaintiff rejected the offer, so long as plaintiff is otherwise entitled to damages as I have
explained to you in these instructions.
Note on Use
This instruction should be used with M Civ JI 105.41, Employment Discrimination—
Mitigation of Damages for Loss of Compensation.
This instruction should only be used if defendant has made an offer to hire, promote, or
reinstate the plaintiff, and fact questions about the conditionality of the offer and the
reasonableness of rejecting it are presented.
This instruction must be modified if plaintiff has neither accepted nor rejected the offer.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 105-24 Michigan Supreme Court
In some cases, whether an offer is conditional or unconditional may be a question of law
for the court. Rasheed v Chrysler Corp, 445 Mich 109; 517 NW2d 19 (1994). For a
discussion of conditional and unconditional offers, see Ford Motor Co v Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 458 US 219; 102 S Ct 3057; 73 L Ed 2d 721 (1982);
O’Donnell v Georgia Osteopathic Hospital, Inc, 748 F2d 1543 (CA 11, 1984); and
National Labor Relations Bd v Madison Courier, Inc, 472 F2d 1307 (DC Cir, 1972). In
Ford Motor Co, the court commented that when the employer offers reinstatement in
exchange for dismissal of the lawsuit, the offer is conditional. 458 US 219, 232 fn 18.
Comment
An unconditional offer to hire, promote, or reinstate the plaintiff to the same or a
substantially equivalent position bars damages for loss of compensation after the date the
plaintiff rejects the offer. Ford Motor Co; Jenkins v Southeastern Michigan Chapter,
American Red Cross, 141 Mich App 785; 369 NW2d 223 (1985); Flickema v Henry Kraker
Co, 252 Mich 406; 233 NW 362; 72 ALR 1046 (1930), but see Department of Civil Rights
ex rel Cornell v Edward W Sparrow Hospital Ass’n, 423 Mich 548; 377 NW2d 755 (1985)
(an offer of reinstatement to a job without removing the discriminatory dress code is not an
unconditional offer). See also the Note on Use for this instruction.
Failure to mitigate is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof is on the defendant.
Department of Civil Rights v Horizon Tube Fabricating, Inc, 148 Mich App 633; 385
NW2d 685 (1986); Higgins v Kenneth R Lawrence, DPM, PC, 107 Mich App 178; 309
NW2d 194 (1981); Fothergill v McKay Press, 374 Mich 138; 132 NW2d 144 (1965);
Flickema; Ogden v George F Alger Co, 353 Mich 402, 408; 91 NW2d 288 (1958).
Whether plaintiff’s rejection of an offer was reasonable is a question for the jury. Rasheed.
The court stated that it is reasonable to reject an offer of a position that is not substantially
equivalent or has a discriminatory or other unreasonable condition, but it is not reasonable
to reject an offer for reasons unrelated to the terms of that offer.
The jury could find that an offer made on the eve of trial and rescinded ten days later was
conditional, and plaintiff’s failure to accept the offer in that period did not preclude
damages for loss of compensation. Paulitch v Detroit Edison Co, 208 Mich App 656; 528
NW2d 200 (1995).
History
M Civ JI 105.42 was added March 1996.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-1
CHAPTER 106
Persons With Disabilities Civil
Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.01 Employment Discrimination Statute—Explanation 3
M Civ JI 106.05 Employment Discrimination—Disability—Definition......................... 106-4
M Civ JI 106.07A Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—Disability............. 106-6
M Civ JI 106.07C Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—Physical or Mental
Examinations...............................................................................................................106-7
M Civ JI 106.07D Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—Accommodation. 106-8
M Civ JI 106.07E Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—Retaliation ........ 106-10
M Civ JI 106.09 Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Duty of
Employer ...................................................................................................................106-11
M Civ JI 106.11A Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue
Hardship—Equipment or Device............................................................................... 106-12
M Civ JI 106.11B Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue
Hardship—Equipment or Device............................................................................... 106-13
M Civ JI 106.11C Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue
Hardship—Equipment or Device............................................................................... 106-14
M Civ JI 106.11D Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue
Hardship—Readers or Interpreters........................................................................... 106-15
M Civ JI 106.11E Employment Discrimination Statute—Accommodation—Undue
Hardship—Reader or Interpreter.............................................................................. 106-16
M Civ JI 106.21 Public Accommodation Statute—Explanation—Accommodation... 106-17
M Civ JI 106.23 Public Accommodation—Disability—Definition .............................. 106-18
M Civ JI 106.25 Public Accommodation—Definition................................................. 106-19
M Civ JI 106.27 Public Service—Definition................................................................ 106-20
M Civ JI 106.29 Public Accommodation—Burden of Proof....................................... 106-21
M Civ JI 106.29A Public Accommodation—Burden of Proof—Retaliation ............... 106-22
M Civ JI 106.30 Educational Institution Statute—Explanation.................................. 106-23
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.31 Accommodation—Educational Institution—Definition ................... 106-25
M Civ JI 106.33 Accommodation—Educational Institution—Disability—Definition. 106-26
M Civ JI 106.35 Accommodation—Educational Institution—Burden of Proof ......... 106-27
M Civ JI 106.36 Educational Institution—Burden of Proof—Retaliation ..................106-28
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-3
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.01 Employment Discrimination Statute—Explanation
We have a state law known as the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, which
provides that an employer shall:
(1)
(a) not discriminate against a person regarding employment, compensation, or
a term, condition, or privilege of employment because of [ a disability / genetic
information ] that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties
of a particular job or position;
(b) not discriminate against a person on the basis of physical or mental
examinations that are not directly related to the requirements of the specific
job;
(c) not discriminate against a person when adaptive devices or aids may be
utilized that enable the individual to perform the specific requirements of the
job;
(d) not require an individual to submit to a genetic test or to provide genetic
information as a condition of employment or promotion;
(e) accommodate a person with a disability unless the employer demonstrates
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
(2)The Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act also provides that a person shall not
retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a violation of the
act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the act.
Note on Use
The use of any particular subsection will be dictated by the facts of the case.
Comment
MCL 37.1202; MCL 37.1602.
History
Added September 2005. Amended July 2012.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.05 Employment Discrimination—Disability—Definition
“Disability” means a determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which
may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the
characteristic [ substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual
and is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or
position / substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual and is
unrelated to the individual’s qualifications for employment or promotion. ]
When I say “major life activity,” I am referring to functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and
working.
When I say “substantially limits,” I mean you should look at the nature and severity of the
impairment, its duration or expected duration, and its permanent or expected permanent or
long-term effect.
When I say unrelated to the individual’s ability,” I mean an individual’s disability does not
prevent the individual from performing the duties of a particular job or position with or
without accommodation.
“Disability” can also mean a history of a determinable physical or mental characteristic like
I have just described.
Lastly, “disability” can also mean being regarded as having a determinable physical or
mental characteristic like I have just described.
*“Disability” does not include either of the following:
(a)A determinable physical or mental characteristic caused by the current
illegal use of a controlled substance by that individual.
(b)A determinable physical or mental characteristic caused by the use of an
alcoholic liquor by that individual, if that physical or mental characteristic
prevents that individual from performing the duties of his or her job.
Note on Use
*Use as applicable.
Comment
MCL 37.1103, Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc , 220 Mich App 212 (1996).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-5
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.07A Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—
Disability
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that (he/she) [ has a disability / has a history of a disability / is
regarded as having a disability ] that is unrelated to the plaintiff’s ability
to perform the duties of a particular job or position; and
(b) that defendant [ discharged / failed or refused to hire / failed to
promote / failed to train / other ] the plaintiff; and
(c) that [ the disability / the history of a disability / being regarded as
having a disability ] was one of the motives or reasons which made a
difference in determining to [ discharge / fail to hire / fail to promote /
fail to train / other ] the plaintiff. The [ disability / history of a disability
/ being regarded as having a disability ] does not have to be the only
reason, or even the main reason, but it does have to be one of the reasons
which made a difference in determining whether to [ discharge / hire /
promote / train / other ] the plaintiff; and
(d) that (he/she) suffered damages as a result of the [ discharge / failure
or refusal to hire / failure to promote / failure to train / other ].
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
MCL 37.1202
History
Added September 2005. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-7
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.07C Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—
Physical or Mental Examinations
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that (he/she) has undergone physical or mental examinations that are
not directly related to the requirements of the specific job; and
(b) that defendant [ discharged / failed or refused to hire / failed to
promote / failed to train / other ] the plaintiff; and
(c) that the information or conditions [ disclosed / revealed / diagnosed ]
[ by / during / in / as a result of ] the physical or mental examination was
one of the motives or reasons which made a difference in determining
to [ discharge / fail to hire / fail to promote / fail to train / other ] the
plaintiff. The information or condition does not have to be the only
reason, or even the main reason, but it does have to be one of the reasons
which made a difference in determining whether to [ discharge / hire /
promote / train / other ] the plaintiff; and
(d) that ( he/she) suffered damages as a result of the [ discharge / failure
or refusal to hire / failure to promote / failure to train / other ].
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
MCL 37.1202
History
Added September 2005. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.07D Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—
Accommodation
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that (he/she) has a disability that is unrelated to (his/her) ability to
perform the duties of a particular job or position; and
*(b) that (he/she) notified defendant in writing of the need for an
accommodation to enable (him/her) to perform the specific
requirements of the job. Notification must have been made within 182
days after the date plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that
an accommodation was needed; and
(c) that defendant [ discharged / failed or refused to hire / failed to
promote / failed to train / other ] the plaintiff for not performing the
specific requirements of the job when the use of the accommodation
would have enabled the plaintiff to do so. The disability does not have
to be the only reason, or even the main reason, but it does have to be one
of the reasons which made a difference in determining whether to
[ discharge / hire / promote / train / other ] the plaintiff; and
(d) that (he/she) suffered damages as a result of the [ discharge / failure
or refusal to hire / failure to promote / failure to train / other ].
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Defendant has the burden of proving that [ the accommodations were provided / the
provision of the accommodations would have imposed an undue hardship ].
Your verdict will also be for the defendant if the defendant proves either of those elements.
Note on Use
This instruction should be preceded by MCJI 106.09.
* Use as applicable where it is alleged plaintiff did not notify defendant and it is alleged
defendant failed to tell the plaintiff how to give notice or of the requirement that notice be
given.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-9
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
Subsection (b) may be eliminated if there is no factual dispute regarding the timing of
notice or if the 182-day period does not apply pursuant to MCL 37.1606(5).
Comment
MCL 37.1202, MCL 37.1210, and MCL 37.1606(5).
History
Added September 2005. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.07E Employment Discrimination—Burden of Proof—
Retaliation
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] [ opposed a violation of the Persons with Disabilities
Civil Rights Act / made a charge, filed a complaint, or testified, assisted,
or participated in an investigation, proceeding or hearing, under the
Act ];
(b) that was known by the defendant;
(c) that defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff;
and
(d) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.
To establish a causal connection, plaintiff must demonstrate that [ his / her ] participation
in the protected activity was a significant factor in the defendant’s adverse employment
action.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements. Your
verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
MCL 37.1602. Bachman v Swan Harbour Associates, 252 Mich App 400, 434 (2002), Aho
v Dept of Corrections, 263 Mich App 281(2004).
History
Added July 2012. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-11
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.09 Employment Discrimination Statute—
Accommodation—Duty of Employer
An employer has a twofold duty to accommodate a disabled person. The first kind of
accommodation is to provide access to the place of employment, in other words, the
alteration of physical structures to allow access. The second kind of accommodation is one
that permits the actual performance of the job duties. This can include, but is not limited to,
[ the purchase of equipment and devices / hiring readers and interpreters / restructuring jobs
/ altering schedules for minor and infrequent duties ].
Defendant does not have a duty to provide accommodations that would impose an undue
hardship.
Comment
MCL 37.1210; Rourk v Oakwood Hospital Corporation, 458 Mich 25 (1998).
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.11A Employment Discrimination Statute—
Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Equipment or Device
An undue hardship is defined by statute. In this case, because [ defendant employs fewer
than four employees / defendant employs four or more but less than 15 employees ], if the
equipment or devices required to accommodate the plaintiff cost more than [ the state
average weekly wage / 1.5 times the state average weekly wage ], that accommodation
imposes an undue hardship. If it is less than or equal to that amount, the accommodation
does not impose an undue hardship.
Comment
MCL 37.1210(2), (3).
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-13
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.11B Employment Discrimination Statute—
Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Equipment or Device
An undue hardship is defined by statute. In this case, because defendant has 15 or more but
less than 25 employees, if the equipment or devices required to accommodate the plaintiff
cost more than 2.5 times the state average weekly wage, [ that accommodation imposes an
undue hardship / you must determine if the accommodation poses an undue hardship* ]. If
it is less than or equal to that amount, the accommodation does not impose an undue
hardship.
Note on Use
*To be used where the plaintiff is an employee because where the plaintiff is an employee
and the cost to accommodate is more than 2.5 times the state average weekly wage, there
is no conclusive statement that there is an undue hardship. MCL 37.1210(6).
Comment
MCL 37.1210(4), (6). Earlier provisions defining an undue hardship, e.g., MCL
37.1210(2), refer to the cost to accommodate a person with a disability. Subsection (6),
however, refers only to the cost to accommodate an employee.
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.11C Employment Discrimination Statute—
Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Equipment or Device
An undue hardship is defined by statute. In this case, because defendant has 15 or more
employees, if the equipment or devices required to accommodate the plaintiff cost more
than 2.5 times the state average weekly wage, you must determine if the accommodation
poses an undue hardship. If it does not exceed that amount, the accommodation does not
impose an undue hardship.
Note on Use
This instruction should be used where the plaintiff is an employee, and the defendant
employs 15 or more employees. MCL 37.1210(6). As noted in the Comment to M Civ JI
106.11B, subsection (6) refers to the cost to accommodate an employee.
Comment
MCL 37.1210(5), (6). An instruction is not provided for cases where defendant has 25 or
more employees. MCL 37.1210(5). As enacted by 1990 PA 121, MCL 37.1210(6) and (12)
began with the clause “If Senate Bill No. 933 or House Bill No. 2273 of the 101st Congress
of the United States is enacted into law, and beginning 2 years after the effective date of
that law[ . ]” That clause was removed by 1998 PA 20. Senate Bill 933 was enacted as the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101. The ADA currently defines an employer
as having 15 or more employees.
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-15
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.11D Employment Discrimination Statute—
Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Readers or Interpreters
An undue hardship is defined by statute. In this case, because [ defendant employs fewer
than four employees / defendant employs four or more but less than 15 employees ], if the
cost to [ hire / retain ] the [ reader / interpreter ] to accommodate the plaintiff is more than
[ seven times the state average weekly wage for the first year the person with a disability is
hired, transferred, or promoted to the job and five times the state average weekly wage for
each year thereafter / 10 times the state average weekly wage for the first year the person
with a disability is hired, transferred, or promoted to the job and seven times the state
average weekly wage for each year thereafter ], that accommodation imposes an undue
hardship. If it is less than or equal to that amount, the accommodation does not impose an
undue hardship.
Comment
MCL 37.1210(8), (9).
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-16 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.11E Employment Discrimination Statute—
Accommodation—Undue Hardship—Reader or Interpreter
An undue hardship is defined by statute. In this case, because defendant has 15 or more
employees, if the cost to [ hire / retain ] the [ reader / interpreter ] to accommodate the
plaintiff is less than or equal to 15 times the state average weekly wage for the first year the
person with a disability is hired, transferred, or promoted to the job and 10 times the state
average weekly wage for each year thereafter, the accommodation does not impose an
undue hardship. If the cost is more than that amount, you must determine if the
accommodation poses an undue hardship.
Comment
MCL 1210(12). An instruction is not provided for cases where defendant has 25 or more
employees. MCL 37.1210(5). As enacted by 1990 PA 121, MCL 37.1210(6) and (12)
began with the clause “If Senate Bill No. 933 or House Bill No. 2273 of the 101st Congress
of the United States is enacted into law, and beginning 2 years after the effective date of
that law[ . ]” That clause was removed by 1998 PA 20. Senate Bill 933 was enacted as the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101. The ADA currently defines an employer
as having 15 or more employees.
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-17
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.21 Public Accommodation Statute—Explanation—
Accommodation
(1)We have a state law known as the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, which
provides that a person shall accommodate a person with a disability for purposes of [ public
accommodation / public service / education / housing ] unless the person demonstrates that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
(2)The Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act also provides that a person shall not
retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a violation of the
act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the act.
Comment
MCL 37.1102(2); MCL 37.1602.
History
Added September 2005. Amended July 2012.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-18 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.23 Public Accommodation—Disability—Definition
Disability means a determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which
may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the
characteristic is unrelated to the individual’s ability to utilize and benefit from a place of
public accommodation or public service.
Disability can also mean a history of a determinable physical or mental characteristic as I
have just described.
Lastly, disability can also mean being regarded as having a determinable physical or mental
characteristic as I have just described.
When I say unrelated to the individual’s ability,” I mean an individual’s disability does not
prevent the individual from utilizing and benefiting from a place of public accommodation
or public service, with or without accommodation.
Comment
MCL 37.1103.
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-19
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.25 Public Accommodation—Definition
Place of public accommodation” means a business, educational institution, refreshment,
entertainment, recreation, health, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or
not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are
extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.
Comment
MCL 37.1301(a)
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-20 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.27 Public Service—Definition
“Public service” means a public facility, department, agency, board, or commission owned,
operated, or managed by or on behalf of this state or a subdivision of this state, a county,
city, village, township, or independent or regional district in this state or a tax exempt
private agency established to provide service to the public, except that public service does
not include a state or county correctional facility with respect to actions or decisions
regarding an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment.
Comment
MCL 37.1301(b)
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-21
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.29 Public Accommodation—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that (he/she) [ has a disability / has a history of a disability / is
regarded as having a disability ] that is unrelated to (his/her) ability to
utilize and benefit from the [ place of public accommodation / public
service ]; and
(b) that (he/she) uses adaptive devices or aids; and
(c) that (he/she) was denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a
[ place of public accommodation / public service ] because of [ a
disability / a history of a disability / being regarded as having a
disability ]; and
(d) that (he/she) was denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a
[ place of public accommodation / public service ] because of his/her
use of adaptive devices or aids; and
(e) that (he/she) suffered damages.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
Particular subparagraphs may be deleted based on the facts of the case.
History
Added September 2005. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-22 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.29A Public Accommodation—Burden of Proof—
Retaliation
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] [ opposed a violation of the Persons with Disabilities
Civil Rights Act / made a charge, filed a complaint, or testified, assisted,
or participated in an investigation, proceeding or hearing, under the
Act ];
(b) that was known by the defendant;
(c) that defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff;
and
(d) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.
To establish a causal connection, plaintiff must demonstrate that [ his / her ] participation
in the protected activity was a significant factor in the defendant’s adverse employment
action.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
MCL 37.1602. Bachman v Swan Harbour Associates, 252 Mich App 400, 434 (2002), Aho
v Dept of Corrections, 263 Mich App 281(2004).
History
Added July 2012. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-23
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.30 Educational Institution Statute—Explanation
(1)We have a state law known as the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, which
provides that an educational institution shall not:
(a) Discriminate in any manner in the full utilization of or benefit from the
institution, or the services provided and rendered by the institution to an
individual because of a disability that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to
utilize and benefit from the institution or its services, or because of the use by
an individual of adaptive devices or aids.
(b) Exclude, expel, limit, or otherwise discriminate against an individual
seeking admission as a student or an individual enrolled as a student in the
terms, conditions, and privileges of the institution, because of a disability that
is unrelated to the individual’s ability to utilize and benefit from the institution,
or because of the use by an individual of adaptive devices or aids.
(c) Make or use a written or oral inquiry or form of application for admission
that elicits or attempts to elicit information, or make or keep a record,
concerning the disability of an applicant for admission for reasons contrary to
the provisions or purposes of this act.
(d) Print or publish or cause to be printed or published a catalog or other notice
or advertisement indicating a preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination based on the disability of an applicant that is unrelated to the
applicant’s ability to utilize and benefit from the institution or its services, or
the use of adaptive devices or aids by an applicant for admission to the
educational institution.
(e) Announce or follow a policy of denial or limitation through a quota or
otherwise of educational opportunities of a group or its members because of a
disability that is unrelated to the group or member’s ability to utilize and
benefit from the institution or its services, or because of the use by the
members of a group or an individual in the group of adaptive devices or aids.
(f) Develop a curriculum or utilize textbooks and training or learning materials
which promote or foster physical or mental stereotypes.
(2)The Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act also provides that a person shall not
retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a violation of the
act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the act.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-24 Michigan Supreme Court
Note on Use
The use of any particular subsection will be dictated by the facts of the case.
Comment
MCL 37.1402; MCL 37.1602.
History
Added July 2012.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-25
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.31 Accommodation—Educational Institution—
Definition
“Educational institution” means a public or private institution or a separate school or
department of a public or private institution including an academy, college, elementary or
secondary school, extension course, kindergarten, nursery, school system, school district,
or university, and a business, nursing, professional, secretarial, technical, or vocational
school, and includes an agent of an educational institution.
Note on Use
Use only if there is a dispute over whether the defendant is an educational institution, and
eliminate those examples that do not apply.
Comment
MCL 37.1401
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-26 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.33 Accommodation—Educational Institution—
Disability—Definition
“Disability means a determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which
may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the
characteristic is unrelated to the individual’s ability to utilize and benefit from educational
opportunities, programs, and facilities at an educational institution
Disability can also mean a history of a determinable physical or mental characteristic as I
have just described.
Lastly, disability can also mean being regarded as having a determinable physical or mental
characteristic as I have just described.
When I say unrelated to the individual’s ability,” I mean an individual’s disability does not
prevent the individual from utilizing and benefiting from educational opportunities,
programs, and facilities at an educational institution.
History
Added September 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 106-27
Chapter 106: Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act
M Civ JI 106.35 Accommodation—Educational Institution—Burden
of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] [ has a disability / has a history of a disability / is
regarded as having a disability ] that is unrelated to [ his / her ] ability to
utilize and benefit from the educational institution; and
(b) that (he/she) uses adaptive devices or aids; and
(c) that (he/she) was [ excluded / expelled / limited / other ] [ while
seeking admission / while enrolled as a student ] in the terms,
conditions, and privileges of the institution because of [ a disability / a
history of a disability / being regarded as having a disability ] that is
unrelated to [ his / her ] ability to utilize and benefit from the educational
institution; and
(d) that (he/she) was [ excluded / expelled / limited / other ] [ while
seeking admission / while enrolled as a student ] in the terms,
conditions, and privileges of the institution because of [ his / her ] use of
adaptive devices or aids; and
(e) that [ he / she] suffered damages.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
Particular subparagraphs may be deleted based on the facts of the case.
Comment
MCL 37.1402
History
Added September 2005. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 106-28 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 106.36 Educational Institution—Burden of Proof—
Retaliation
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] [ opposed a violation of the Persons with Disabilities
Civil Rights Act / made a charge, filed a complaint, or testified, assisted,
or participated in an investigation, proceeding or hearing, under the
Act ];
(b) that was known by the defendant;
(c) that defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff;
and
(d) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.
To establish a causal connection, plaintiff must demonstrate that [ his / her ] participation
in the protected activity was a significant factor in the defendant’s adverse employment
action.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
MCL 37.1602. Bachman v Swan Harbour Associates, 252 Mich App 400, 434 (2002), Aho
v Dept of Corrections, 263 Mich App 281(2004).
History
Added July 2012. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 107-1
CHAPTER 107
Whistleblowers Protection Act
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 107-2
M Civ JI 107.01 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Explanation ................................... 107-3
M Civ JI 107.02 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Protected Activity—Definition...... 107-4
M Civ JI 107.03 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Causation ...................................... 107-6
M Civ JI 107.04 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Good Faith Belief .......................... 107-7
M Civ JI 107.11 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Distinction in Standard of Proof Between
“Report” and “About to Report”................................................................................ 107-8
M Civ JI 107.15 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Burden of Proof............................. 107-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 107-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introduction
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that the approach in McDonnell Douglas Corp v
Green, 411 US 792, 800; 93 S Ct 1817, 1823; 36 L Ed 2d 668, 676 (1973) is not the proper
subject of an instruction to a jury. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456; 628 NW2d 515
(2001). See also the discussion of the McDonnell Douglas formulation in the Introduction
to Chapter 105 Employment Discrimination.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 107-3
Chapter 107: Whistleblowers’ Protection Act
M Civ JI 107.01 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Explanation
We have a state law known as the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act which provides that an
employer shall not [ discharge / or / threaten / or / discriminate against ] an employee
regarding employment, compensation, or a term, condition, location or privilege of
employment because of protected activity.
Comment
MCL 15.362.
History
M Civ JI 107.01 was added April 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 107-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 107.02 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Protected Activity—
Definition
“Protected activity” means:
*(a) [ an employee / a person acting on behalf of an employee ] [ reports / or /
is about to report ] (verbally or in writing) a violation or a suspected violation
of a law or regulation (or rule promulgated pursuant to the law of the state, a
political subdivision of the state, or the United States) by [ his or her employer
/ ** a third party / **a co-employee ] to a public body, unless the employee
knows that the report is false; (or)
*(b) an employee [ participates at the request of a public body / has been
requested by a public body to participate ] in [ an investigation / or / a hearing
/ or / an inquiry held by that public body / or / a court action ].
***The employee’s motive does not matter and you should not consider it in determining
whether the employee engaged in “protected activity.”
****(A request for the employee to participate in [ an investigation / or / a hearing / or / an
inquiry / or / a court action ] is considered protected activity even though the employee does
not actually participate in the [ investigation / or / hearing / or / inquiry / or / court action ].)
Note on Use
*The court should choose one or both of the subsections that apply to the case. The phrases
in parentheses in subsection a. may be deleted if not an issue in the case.
** The court should choose the phrase that applies depending on whether the violation or
suspected violation involves a third party (see Dolan v Continental Airlines/Continental
Express, 454 Mich 373, 382; 563 NW2d 23 (1997), or a co-employee (see Dudewicz v
Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68; 503 NW2d 645 (1993). For the relationship of the
violation or suspected violation to the employment setting, see, e.g., Dolan.
***This paragraph should be used if there is any evidence, argument, or implication
regarding the employee’s motive.
****This paragraph should be used only if the employee does not participate in the
investigation, hearing, inquiry or court action.
Comment
MCL 15.362.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 107-5
Chapter 107: Whistleblowers’ Protection Act
If plaintiff did not engage in protected activity, plaintiff may not recover even if defendant
mistakenly believed that plaintiff engaged in such activity. Chandler v Dowell
Schlumberger, Inc, 456 Mich 395; 572 NW2d 210 (1998).
“Public body” is defined in MCL 15.361(d). For cases on what constitutes a request by a
public body, see Henry v City of Detroit, 234 Mich App 405; 594 NW2d 107 (1999), or a
report to a public body, see Branch v Azalea/Epps Home, Ltd, 189 Mich App 211; 472
NW2d 73 (1991). For circumstances in which a report to a public body employer can
constitute a report to a public body, see Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513; 564
NW2d 532 (1997); but see Dickson v Oakland University, 171 Mich App 68; 429 NW2d
640 (1988).
Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303; 831 NW2d 223 (2013), held that motive is
irrelevant in determining whether the employee engaged in a protected activity.
History
M Civ JI 107.02 was added April 1, 2002. Amended January 2014.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 107-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 107.03 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Causation
When I use the term “because of” I mean that protected activity must be one of the motives
or reasons defendant [ discharged / or / threatened / or / discriminated against ] the plaintiff.
Protected activity does not have to be the only reason, or even the main reason, but it does
have to be one of the reasons that made a difference in defendant’s decision to [ discharge
/ or / threaten / or / discriminate against ] the plaintiff.
*(In order to prove causation, plaintiff must show that a decision-maker or a person who
influenced the decision knew of plaintiff’s protected activity. Knowledge may be shown by
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.)
Note on Use
*This paragraph should be read only if knowledge is an issue in the case. See Kaufman &
Payton, PC v Nikkila, 200 Mich App 250; 503 NW2d 728 (1993); Roberson v Occupational
Health Centers of America, Inc, 220 Mich App 322; 559 NW2d 86 (1996); Roulston v
Tendercare (Michigan) Inc, 239 Mich App 270; 608 NW2d 525 (2000); Barrett v Kirtland
Community College, 245 Mich App 306; 628 NW2d 63 (2001); see also Melchi v Burns
Int’l Sec Serv, Inc, 597 F Supp 575 (ED Mich 1984).
Comment
On the meaning of “because of” in the employment discrimination context, see Hazle v
Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456; 628 NW2d 515 (2001), and other cases cited in the
comment to M Civ JI 105.02 Employment Discrimination (Disparate Treatment)—
Definition.
History
M Civ JI 107.03 was added April 1, 2002. Amended April 1, 2004.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 107-7
Chapter 107: Whistleblowers’ Protection Act
M Civ JI 107.04 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Good Faith Belief
Plaintiff must reasonably believe that a violation of law or a regulation has occurred. It is
not necessary that an actual violation of law or a regulation has occurred, but the employee
cannot have a reasonable belief if [ he / she ] knows [ his / her ] report is false.
Comment
MCL 15.362; Melchi v Burns Int’l Sec Serv, Inc, 597 F Supp 575 (ED Mich 1984); Clark
County Sch Dist v Breeden, 532 US 268; 121 S Ct 1508; 149 L Ed 2d 509 (2001).
History
M Civ JI 107.04 was added April 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 107-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 107.11 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Distinction in
Standard of Proof Between “Report” and “About to Report”
If the plaintiff claims that he or she reported a violation or suspected violation of law or
regulation to a public body, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
[ he / she ] made such a report.
If the plaintiff claims that he or she was about to report a violation or suspected violation
of law or regulation to a public body, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she was about to report such a violation.
Note on Use
This instruction should be followed by the definitions of preponderance and clear and
convincing evidence in M Civ JI 8.01.
This instruction must be given whenever “about to report” is an issue in the case.
Comment
The clear and convincing requirement for an employee “about to report” a violation or
suspected violation is found in MCL 15.363(4).
History
M Civ JI 107.11 was added April 1, 2002.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 107-9
Chapter 107: Whistleblowers’ Protection Act
M Civ JI 107.15 Whistleblowers’ Protection Act: Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] was engaged in a protected activity as defined in
these instructions; and
(b) the defendant [ discharged / or / threatened / or / discriminated
against ] the plaintiff; and
(c) the [ discharge / threat / discrimination ] was because of protected
activity; and
(d) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the [ discharge / threat /
discrimination ].
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if you find that the plaintiff has failed to prove any
one of these elements.
Comment
West v General Motors, 469 Mich 177 (2003).
History
M Civ JI 107.15 was added April 1, 2002. Amended July 2012, January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 107-10 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 108-1
CHAPTER 108
Public Accommodations
M Civ JI 108.01 Public Accommodation or Services; Prohibited Practices—
Explanation ........................................................................................................................ 2
M Civ JI 108.02 Public Accommodation—Definition................................................... 108-3
M Civ JI 108.03 Public Service—Definition.................................................................. 108-4
M Civ JI 108.04 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Disparate
Treatment—Definition................................................................................................ 108-5
M Civ JI 108.06 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Burden Of
Proof............................................................................................................................ 108-6
M Civ JI 108.06A Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination-Burden of Proof-
Retaliation ................................................................................................................... 108-7
M Civ JI 108.07 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Sexual
Harassment—Explanation........................................................................................... 108-8
M Civ JI 108.09 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Quid Pro Quo
Harassment—Burden of Proof.................................................................................... 108-9
M Civ JI 108.11 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Hostile
Environment Harassment—Burden of Proof ............................................................ 108-10
M Civ JI 108.12 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Hostile
Environment Harassment—Unwelcome Sexual Conduct or Communication—
Definition................................................................................................................... 108-11
M Civ JI 108.13 Public Accommodation/Public Service Discrimination—Hostile
Environment Harassment—Sexually Hostile Environment—Definition ................... 108-12
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 108-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 108.01 Public Accommodation or Services; Prohibited
Practices—Explanation
(1) We have a state law known as the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, which provides that
a person shall not deny a person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of a place of public accommodation
or public service because of [ religion / race / color / national origin / age / sex / sexual
orientation / gender identity or expression / height / weight / marital status ].
(2) The law also provides that a person shall not retaliate or discriminate against a person
because the person has opposed a violation of the act, or because the person has made a
charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under the act.
Note on Use
The use of any particular subsection will be dictated by the facts of the case.
Comment
MCL 37.2302; MCL 37.2701
; 2023 PA 6; 2023 PA 31; 2023 PA 45.
History
Added June September 2005. Amended July 2012, October 2023.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 108-3
Chapter 108: Public Accommodations
M Civ JI 108.02 Public Accommodation—Definition
When I use the term “place of public accommodation” I mean a business, or an educational,
refreshment, entertainment, recreation, health, or transportation facility, or institution of
any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.
A “place of public accommodation” also includes the facilities of the following private
clubs:
(a) A country club or golf club.
(b) A boating or yachting club.
(c) A sports or athletic club.
(d) A dining club, except a dining club that in good faith limits its membership to the
members of a particular religion for the purpose of furthering the teachings or principles of
that religion and not for the purpose of excluding individuals of a particular [ sex / sexual
orientation / gender identity or expression ] race, or color.
Note on Use
The list of entities included as a public accommodation should be tailored to the facts of the
case.
Comment
MCL 37.2301(a)
; 2023 PA 6; 2023 PA 31; 2023 PA 45.
History
Added December 2008. Amended October 2023.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 108-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 108.03 Public Service—Definition
When I use the term “public service” I mean a public facility, department, agency, board,
or commission, owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of this state, a political
subdivision, or an agency of this state or of a political subdivision or a tax exempt private
agency established to provide service to the public, except that public service does not
include a state or county correctional facility with respect to actions and decisions regarding
an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment.
Note on Use
The list of entities included as a public service should be tailored to the facts of the case.
Comment
MCL 37.2301(b)
, as amended by 2023 PA 6 2023 PA 31; 2023 PA 45.
History
Added December 2008, October 2023.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 108-5
Chapter 108: Public Accommodations
M Civ JI 108.04 Public Accommodation/Public Service
Discrimination—Disparate Treatment—Definition
The plaintiff must prove that [ he / she ] was discriminated against because of [ religion /
race / color / national origin / age / sex / height / weight / marital status ]. The discrimination
must have been intentional. It cannot have occurred by accident. Intentional discrimination
means that one of the motives or reasons for the alleged denial of the full and equal
enjoyment of a public accommodation or public service was [ religion / race / color /
national origin / age / sex / height / weight / marital status ]. [ Religion / race / color /
national origin / age / sex / height / weight / marital status ] does not have to be the only
reason, or even the main reason, but it does have to be one of the reasons that made a
difference in determining whether to afford plaintiff the full and equal enjoyment of a
public accommodation or public service.
History
Added December 2008.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 108-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 108.06 Public Accommodation/Public Service
Discrimination—Burden Of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] was discriminated against on the basis of [ religion /
race / color / national origin / age / sex / height / weight / marital status ],
(b) by defendant,
(c) resulting in the denial of the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations,
(d) of a [ place of public accommodation / public service ].
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
Haynes v Neshewat, 477 Mich 29 (2007).
History
Added December 2008. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 108-7
Chapter 108: Public Accommodations
M Civ JI 108.06A Public Accommodation/Public Service
Discrimination-Burden of Proof-Retaliation
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] [ opposed a violation of the civil rights act / made a
charge, filed a complaint, or testified, assisted, or participated in an
investigation, proceeding or hearing, under the Act ];
(b) that was known by the defendant;
(c) that defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff;
and
(d) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.
To establish a causal connection, plaintiff must demonstrate that [ his / her ] participation
in the protected activity was a significant factor in the defendant’s adverse employment
action.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
MCL 37.2701. Barrett v Kirtland Com College, 245 Mich App 306 (2001).
History
Added July 2012. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 108-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 108.07 Public Accommodation/Public Service
Discrimination—Sexual Harassment—Explanation
Discrimination based on sex includes sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is a type of sex
discrimination prohibited by state law. There are two types of sexual harassment. The first
is known as quid pro quo, which means “this for that.” The second is known as sexually
hostile environment harassment. In this case plaintiff claims [ quid pro quo / sexually
hostile environment ] harassment.
History
Added December 2008.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 108-9
Chapter 108: Public Accommodations
M Civ JI 108.09 Public Accommodation/Public Service
Discrimination—Quid Pro Quo Harassment—Burden of Proof
On plaintiff’s claim of quid pro quo harassment, plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that the defendant subjected plaintiff to unwelcome [ sexual
advances / requests for sexual favors / other verbal or physical conduct
or communication of a sexual nature ]; and
(b) that the defendant explicitly or implicitly used the plaintiff’s
submission to or rejection of such conduct or communication as a factor
in a decision affecting the decision to afford plaintiff the full and equal
enjoyment of a public accommodation or public service; and
(c) that [ he / she ] suffered damages.
To prove that the submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication was a factor
in a decision, plaintiff must demonstrate that the action that [ he / she ] suffered was
because of [ his / her ] rejection of, or submission to, the harassment.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
Diamond v Witherspoon, 265 Mich App 673 (2005).
History
Added December 2008. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 108-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 108.11 Public Accommodation/Public Service
Discrimination—Hostile Environment Harassment—Burden of
Proof
On plaintiff’s claim of hostile environment sexual harassment against the defendant,
plaintiff has the burden of proving the following elements, and I’ll define these terms in a
moment:
(a)that [ he / she ] was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis of gender; and
(b)that [ he / she ] was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; and
(c)that [ he / she ] was subjected to a sexually hostile environment; and
(d)that the defendant was legally responsible for the sexually hostile environment; and
(e)that [ he / she ] has suffered damages.
Your verdict will be for plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements. Your
verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
History
Added December 2008.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 108-11
Chapter 108: Public Accommodations
M Civ JI 108.12 Public Accommodation/Public Service
Discrimination—Hostile Environment Harassment—Unwelcome
Sexual Conduct or Communication—Definition
When I use the phrase “unwelcome sexual conduct or communication,” I mean that
plaintiff is the recipient of unwanted conduct or communication that is inherently sexual.
Comment
Haynie v Michigan, 468 Mich 302 (2003); Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274 (2004).
History
Added December 2008.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 108-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 108.13 Public Accommodation/Public Service
Discrimination—Hostile Environment Harassment—Sexually
Hostile Environment—Definition
When I use the phrase “sexually hostile environment,” I mean the environment was so
tainted that, in the totality of the circumstances, the unwelcome sexual conduct complained
of had the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with [ his / her ] full and equal
enjoyment of the public accommodation or public service.
You must view the conduct or communication complained of from an objective standard,
deciding how a reasonable person would have perceived the conduct or communication
alleged in this case.
Comment
Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368 (1993); Faragher v Boca Raton, 524 US 775; 118 SCt
2275; 141 L Ed 2d 662 (1998).
History
Added December 2008.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 110-1
CHAPTER 110
Wrongful Discharge
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 110-2
M Civ JI 110.01 Introductory Instruction Where Wrongful Discharge Is Combined with
Other Claims............................................................................................................... 110-3
M Civ JI 110.05 Wrongful Discharge: Employment Relationship Terminable at Will Unless
Terms or Conditions to the Contrary ......................................................................... 110-4
M Civ JI 110.06 Wrongful Discharge: Employment Policies or Terms or Conditions of the
Employment Contract ................................................................................................ 110-5
M Civ JI 110.07 Wrongful Discharge: Employment Policies or Terms or Conditions of the
Employment Contract—Express or Implied ............................................................... 110-7
M Civ JI 110.10 Wrongful Discharge: Good or Just Cause Contract or Policy—Burden of
Proof........................................................................................................................... 110-8
M Civ JI 110.11 Wrongful Discharge: Satisfaction Contract or Policy—Burden of
Proof......................................................................................................................... 110-11
M Civ JI 110.12 Wrongful Discharge: Special Conditions or Performance Standards—
Burden of Proof........................................................................................................ 110-13
M Civ JI 110.13 Wrongful Discharge: Procedural Terms or Conditions—Burden of
Proof......................................................................................................................... 110-14
M Civ JI 110.20 Wrongful Discharge: Mitigation of Damages [ No Instruction
Prepared ]................................................................................................................. 110-15
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 110-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introduction
These instructions are entitled “Wrongful Discharge.” This does not mean that the
Committee has a position on whether an action for “wrongful discharge” exists under
Michigan law separate from an action for breach of contract or violation of legitimate
expectations. See Bullock v Automobile Club of Michigan, 432 Mich 472; 444 NW2d 114
(1989), reh’g denied, 433 Mich 1201 (1989), cert denied, 493 US 1072; 110 S Ct 1118; 107
L Ed 2d 1024 (1990). As used in these instructions, “wrongful discharge” is merely a
convenient label for characterizing Toussaint-type claims.
These instructions are not intended to be all-inclusive with respect to such evolving issues
as contract modification or adverse economic circumstances. See Bullock; In re Certified
Question (Bankey v Storer Broadcasting Co), 432 Mich 438; 443 NW2d 112 (1989);
McCart v J Walter Thompson USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109; 469 NW2d 284 (1991); Ewers v
Stroh Brewery Co, 178 Mich App 371; 443 NW2d 504 (1989).
These instructions may not be applicable to actions for breach of definite term contracts, or
individual written employment contracts. If there are claims based on such contracts, or
claims for promissory estoppel, detrimental reliance, or other contract-type theories of
recovery, supplemental instructions will be necessary.
Generally, these instructions do not apply to claims brought by employees where the
remedy is provided by a collective bargaining agreement. Hickman v General Motors Corp,
177 Mich App 246, 251; 441 NW2d 430 (1989).
The Committee has not drafted an instruction defining the terms “cause” and “good cause”
or “just cause.” While such an instruction may be given if the parties can agree on a
definition, the Committee’s decision not to draft a definition rests on three premises. First,
it would be difficult to construct any definition applicable to all cases. Second, providing a
standard definition might hamper the parties’ efforts to delineate through evidence and
argument the meaning of “cause” in a specific employment setting. Third, the Michigan
case law since Toussaint does not appear to be evolving a standard definition of “cause”
beyond the general observations made in Toussaint.
The Michigan Supreme Court has held that because a wrongful discharge action is a
contract action, the common-law tort collateral source rule does not apply, and an employer
is entitled to a set off from a wrongful discharge damages award for plaintiff’s
unemployment compensation benefits. Corl v Huron Castings, Inc, 450 Mich 620; 544
NW2d 278 (1996).”
Michigan Supreme Court Page 110-3
Chapter 110: Wrongful Discharge
M Civ JI 110.01 Introductory Instruction Where Wrongful Discharge
Is Combined with Other Claims
In this case, plaintiff presents [ number of claims ]. One claim is that the termination of
plaintiff’s employment violated [ a term or condition of the employment relationship / and
/ or / one or more of defendant’s employment policies ]. Another claim is that the
termination was [ unlawful / discriminatory / other ] because [ describe discrimination or
other claim ]. Each claim consists of different elements which plaintiff must prove. Each
claim is entitled to separate consideration.
I will now instruct you on the law applicable to each claim.
Note on Use
Where there are more than two claims, this instruction should be modified accordingly.
History
M Civ JI 110.01 was added December 1990.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 110-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 110.05 Wrongful Discharge: Employment Relationship
Terminable at Will Unless Terms or Conditions to the Contrary
An employment relationship is terminable at will unless an employer has agreed otherwise
or the employer’s policies provide otherwise. Terminable at will means that the
employment relationship may be terminated by either party at any time, with or without
cause, for any reason or for no reason at all. However, the employment relationship is not
terminable at will if one or more of the express or implied terms or conditions of the
employment relationship provide otherwise. (Where it is claimed that there was an
agreement for job security based on oral statements, those statements must be clear and
unequivocal.)
Note on Use
The sentence in parentheses should not be read to the jury if there is no issue as to whether
the statements are clear and unequivocal.
Comment
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980);
Valentine v General American Credit, Inc, 420 Mich 256; 362 NW2d 628 (1984); Bullock
v Automobile Club of Michigan, 432 Mich 472; 444 NW2d 114, reh’g denied, 433 Mich
1201 (1989), cert denied, 493 US 1072; 110 S Ct 1118; 107 L Ed 2d 1024 (1990). Rowe v
Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 437 Mich 627; 473 NW2d 268 (1991).
History
M Civ JI 110.05 was added December 1990. Amended January 1993.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 110-5
Chapter 110: Wrongful Discharge
M Civ JI 110.06 Wrongful Discharge: Employment Policies or Terms
or Conditions of the Employment Contract
The plaintiff claims that the following were [ terms or conditions of the employment
relationship / and / or / defendant’s employment policies ]:
(a) that the employment relationship can be terminated by the employer if the
employer is dissatisfied with the [ employee / or / employee’s services ].
(b) that the employment relationship can be terminated by the employer if the
employer has good or just cause.
(c) [ Describe special conditions or performance standards ].
(d) [ Describe other terms or conditions or policies ].
The plaintiff has the burden of proving the [ term / condition / terms and conditions ] which
[ he / she ] claims [ was / were ] part of the employment relationship [ and / or / defendant’s
employment policies ].
Note on Use
This instruction should be given only if there is a factual issue as to the terms or conditions
of the employment contract or the employment policy involved.
Delete any subsection that is not applicable.
Subsections c. and d. are included to recognize that it may be necessary to instruct the jury
on terms or conditions or policies that do not fall under either subsection a. or subsection
b. The court may describe in subsection c. special conditions or performance standards,
e.g., where continued employment is conditioned on the employee’s meeting sales or
production quotas. Cf. Bullock v Automobile Club of Michigan, 432 Mich 472; 444 NW2d
114 (1989), reh’g denied, 433 Mich 1201 (1989), cert denied, 493 US 1072; 110 S Ct 1118;
107 L Ed 2d 1024 (1990); Farrell v Automobile Club of Michigan, 155 Mich App 378; 399
NW2d 531 (1986).
The court may describe in subsection d. job security provisions that do not fall into any of
the usual categories, e.g., “You will be employed as long as the Smith family owns a
majority of the company’s stock and you are doing the job.” See Damrow v Thumb
Cooperative Terminal, Inc, 126 Mich App 354; 337 NW2d 338 (1983); lv denied, 418
Mich 899 (1983).
These instructions do not define what constitutes an “employer’s policy.” Additional
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 110-6 Michigan Supreme Court
instructions may be necessary if there is a dispute over whether a particular document,
statement, or practice amounts to a policy of the employer.
History
M Civ JI 110.06 was added December 1990.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 110-7
Chapter 110: Wrongful Discharge
M Civ JI 110.07 Wrongful Discharge: Employment Policies or Terms
or Conditions of the Employment Contract—Express or Implied
A term or condition of employment may be either express or implied.
(a) A term or condition is express if the employer and employee have agreed
with one another orally or in writing that the employment will not be
terminated except in accordance with that term or condition.
(b) A term or condition is implied if the employer has caused the employee to
have a legitimate expectation that [ his / her ] employment will not be
terminated except in accordance with that term or condition. The employee’s
expectation must arise from the employer’s oral or written policy statements,
or the employer’s actions, as fairly understood. Plaintiff must believe that [ his
/ her ] employment could not be terminated except in accordance with that
term or condition, and plaintiff’s expectation must have been reasonable under
all of the circumstances.
Comment
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980);
Bullock v Automobile Club of Michigan, 432 Mich 472; 444 NW2d 114 (1989), reh’g
denied, 433 Mich 1201 (1989), cert denied, US; 110 S Ct 1118; 107 L Ed 2d 1024 (1990).
It is an issue for the jury whether the contract or policy has a just cause provision if there is
sufficient evidence of 1) an express oral or written agreement or 2) a legitimate expectation
that employment will not be terminated except for just cause, which expectation is
grounded in the employer’s policy statements. Toussaint at 598–599; Renny v Port Huron
Hospital, 427 Mich 415, 428; 398 NW2d 327 (1986) reh’g denied, 428 Mich 1206 (1987);
Bullock.
It is necessary that the employee actually believe that employment will not be terminated
except for good or just cause. Struble v Lacks Industries, Inc, 157 Mich App 169; 403
NW2d 71 (1986), lv denied, 426 Mich 879 (1986). But an employee’s subjective belief
alone is not sufficient to create a just cause contract or policy. Schwartz v Michigan Sugar
Co, 106 Mich App 471; 308 NW2d 459 (1981); Riethmiller v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan, 151 Mich App 188; 390 NW2d 227 (1986).
History
M Civ JI 110.07 was added December 1990.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 110-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 110.10 Wrongful Discharge: Good or Just Cause Contract or
Policy—Burden of Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that *(an employment relationship existed between plaintiff and
defendant.)
(b) that the employment relationship could not be terminated unless defendant
had good or just cause.
(c) that plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the defendant.
(d) that plaintiff was performing the duties of [ his / her ] employment up to
the time of termination.
(e) that plaintiff suffered economic damages as a result of the termination.
The defendant has the burden of proving that it had good or just cause to terminate the
plaintiff’s employment.
In order to decide whether there was good or just cause for the termination of plaintiff’s
employment, you must determine whether plaintiff actually engaged in the conduct
complained of by the defendant and whether that conduct was the actual reason for the
termination of plaintiff’s employment.
If the plaintiff did not engage in the conduct, or if that was not the actual reason for the
termination, then there was not good or just cause.
‡(If you decide that plaintiff did engage in the conduct and that the conduct was the reason
for the termination, then you must decide whether defendant had a [ rule / policy ], whether
that [ rule / policy ] was consistently applied, and whether plaintiff’s conduct violated that
[ rule / policy ]. If you decide that the conduct violated a consistently applied [ rule /
policy ], then defendant had good or just cause and you cannot substitute your judgment as
to the reasonableness of that [ rule / policy ].)
‡(If you decide that defendant had no [ rule / policy ], or if you decide that defendant had a
[ rule / policy ] but it was applied only selectively, then it is up to you to decide whether the
conduct of the plaintiff amounted to good or just cause for the termination; that is, whether
an employer would terminate someone’s employment for that reason.)
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved each of those elements, and
the defendant has not proved that it had good or just cause to terminate plaintiff’s
Michigan Supreme Court Page 110-9
Chapter 110: Wrongful Discharge
employment.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements, or if the defendant has proved that it had good or just cause to terminate the
plaintiff’s employment.
Note on Use
*Delete paragraph (a) if it is not an issue.
†Paragraph (d) may require modification if, for example, at the time of termination,
plaintiff was absent from work due to an approved leave.
‡The paragraphs in parentheses should be used only if applicable.
Comment
In Rasch v City of East Jordan, 141 Mich App 336, 340–341; 367 NW2d 856 (1985), the
court held that it is error to refuse to give a requested instruction that the defendant had the
burden of proving that the discharge was for just cause. See also Saari v George C. Dates
& Associates, Inc, 311 Mich 624; 19 NW2d 121 (1945); and Johnson v Jessop, 332 Mich
501; 51 NW2d 915 (1952); but see Obey v McFadden Corp, 138 Mich App 767; 360 NW2d
292 (1984), lv den, 422 Mich 911 (1985). This instruction is based on Rasch.
In the case of a good or just cause (as contracted with a satisfaction) contract or policy,
when an employee is discharged for alleged specific misconduct, it is up to the jury to
decide if the employee did what the employer claims he or she did; it is not sufficient to
show that the discharge was in good faith or reasonable. Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579, 621–623; 398 NW2d 327 (1980).
Where specific misconduct or violation of defendant’s rules or standards is the claimed
basis for the discharge, the jury is permitted to determine whether that is the employer’s
true reason for the discharge. Id. at 622, 624.
Violation of uniformly applied rules constitutes good or just cause, and the only questions
for the jury are whether the employer actually had a rule or policy and whether the
employee was discharged for violation of it. Id. at 624. Employers are entitled to establish
their own standards for job performance and to dismiss for nonadherence to those
standards, and the jury may not substitute its own judgment and decide the reasonableness
of those standards. Id. at 623, 624.
If there is no rule or policy, or if there is in practice no real rule because of an employer’s
selective enforcement of the stated rule or policy, then the jury may determine whether the
conduct of an employee constituted good or just cause for the termination, that is, whether
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 110-10 Michigan Supreme Court
it is the type of conduct that justifies terminating employment (does it demonstrate that the
employee was no longer doing the job?). Id.
History
M Civ JI 110.10 was added December 1990. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 110-11
Chapter 110: Wrongful Discharge
M Civ JI 110.11 Wrongful Discharge: Satisfaction Contract or
Policy—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) * that (an employment relationship existed between plaintiff and
defendant.)
(b) that the employment relationship could not be terminated unless
defendant was dissatisfied with [ plaintiff / or / plaintiff’s work ].
(c) that plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the defendant.
(d) that defendant was not dissatisfied with [ plaintiff / or / plaintiff’s
work ].
(e) that plaintiff suffered economic damages as a result of the
termination.
In deciding whether the employer is dissatisfied with the employee’s services, you may not
concern yourself with whether the employer’s dissatisfaction is reasonable, †(but you are
to decide whether the dissatisfaction is insincere, in bad faith, dishonest, or not the real
reason).
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
*Delete paragraph (a) if it is not an issue.
†The phrase in parentheses should be used only if there is some evidence that the claimed
dissatisfaction is not the true reason for the discharge.
This instruction should only be given where the parties agree that the case involves a
satisfaction contract or where there is sufficient evidence to warrant submission of the issue
to the jury of whether the agreement is a satisfaction contract.
Comment
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980);
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 110-12 Michigan Supreme Court
Schmand v Jandorf, 175 Mich 88; 140 NW 996 (1913).
The employer may discharge under a satisfaction contract as long as it is in good faith
dissatisfied with the employee’s performance or behavior. However, where the employee
has secured a promise not to be discharged except for cause, he or she has contracted for
more than the employer’s promise to act in good faith or to provide continued employment
absent employer dissatisfaction.
History
M Civ JI 110.11 was added December 1990. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 110-13
Chapter 110: Wrongful Discharge
M Civ JI 110.12 Wrongful Discharge: Special Conditions or
Performance Standards—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) * that (an employment relationship existed between plaintiff and
defendant.)
(b) that the employment relationship could only be terminated in
accordance with [ describe special conditions or performance
standards ].
(c) that plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the defendant.
(d) that the termination of employment was not in accordance with
[ describe special conditions or performance standards ].
(e) that plaintiff suffered economic damages as a result of the
termination.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
*Delete paragraph (a) if it is not an issue.
Comment
A wrongful discharge action may be maintained based on a claim that an employer failed
to follow its policy regarding laying off employees. King v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co,
177 Mich App 531; 442 NW2d 714 (1989).
History
M Civ JI 110.12 was added December 1990. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 110-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 110.13 Wrongful Discharge: Procedural Terms or
Conditions—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) * that (an employment relationship existed between plaintiff and
defendant.)
(b) that the employment relationship could only be terminated in accordance
with [ describe procedural terms or conditions ].
(c) that plaintiff’s employment was terminated by the defendant.
(d) that the termination of employment was not in accordance with [ describe
procedural terms or conditions ].
(e) that plaintiff suffered economic damages as a result of the termination.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of
those elements.
Note on Use
*Delete paragraph (a) if it is not an issue.
Comment
Where an employee manual sets forth procedures for warning and temporary suspension
prior to discharge, plaintiff may maintain a wrongful discharge action for the employer’s
failure to follow these procedures. Damrow v Thumb Cooperative Terminal, Inc, 126 Mich
App 354; 337 NW2d 338 (1983), lv den, 418 Mich 899 (1983).
History
M Civ JI 110.13 was added December 1990. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 110-15
Chapter 110: Wrongful Discharge
M Civ JI 110.20 Wrongful Discharge: Mitigation of Damages [ No
Instruction Prepared ]
Comment
The committee has prepared no instruction on wrongful discharge—mitigation of damages.
An instruction on mitigation of damages for wrongful discharge cases may be adapted from
M Civ JI 105.41 Employment Discrimination—Mitigation of Damages for Loss of
Compensation.
See Farrell v School-District No. 2 of Twp of Rubicon, 98 Mich 43; 56 NW 1053 (1893);
Bruno v Detroit Institute of Technology, 51 Mich App 593; 215 NW2d 745 (1974). See also
cases cited in comment to M Civ JI 105.41 Employment Discrimination—Mitigation of
Damages for Loss of Compensation.
History
M Civ JI 110.20 was added December 1990.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 110-16 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 112-1
CHAPTER 112
Franchise Investment Law
M Civ JI 112.01 Franchise Investment Law; Prohibited Practices—Explanation........ 112-2
M Civ JI 112.02 Franchise—Definition ....................................................................... 112-3
M Civ JI 112.03 Franchisee and Franchisor—Definition............................................. 112-4
M Civ JI 112.04 Offer or Offer to Sell—Definition...................................................... 112-5
M Civ JI 112.05 Person—Definition............................................................................ 112-6
M Civ JI 112.06 Sale or Sell—Definition ..................................................................... 112-7
M Civ JI 112.07 Franchise Fee—Definition................................................................. 112-8
M Civ JI 112.08 Payment for Goods and Services as Franchise Fee ........................... 112-9
M Civ JI 112.09 Payments That Do Not Constitute a Franchise Fee......................... 112-10
M Civ JI 112.10 Franchise Investment Law—Burden of Proof ................................. 112-11
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 112-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 112.01 Franchise Investment Law; Prohibited Practices—
Explanation
We have a state law known as the Franchise Investment Law, which provides that a person
shall not, in connection with the filing, offer, sale, or purchase of any franchise, directly or
indirectly:
(a) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(b) make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact that makes
the statement misleading in light of the circumstances under which it was made; and
(c) engage in any act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person.
When I use the phrase “scheme or artifice to defraud,” I mean any plan or pattern intended
to deceive others in order to obtain something of value.
When I use the phrase “material fact” I mean that the statement cannot be an opinion, belief,
speculation, or prediction. It must relate to something past or present that can be proved or
disproved. Additionally, it must be of enough importance in the matter that a reasonable
person would be likely to rely on it.
When I use the word rely,” I mean that plaintiff would not have [ entered into the contract
/ [ describe other action ] ] if defendant had not [ created the false impression / made the [
representation / promise ] ], even if the [false impression / representation / promise ] was
not the only reason for plaintiff’s action.
Comment
MCL 445.1505. A private right of action is permitted by MCL 445.1531. United
States v Goldblatt, 813 F2d 619 (CA 3, 1987). The definitions of “material fact” and
“rely” are taken from M Civ JI 128.10 and 128.11.
History
Added July 2017.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 112-3
Chapter 112: Franchise Investment Law
M Civ JI 112.02 Franchise—Definition
When I use the term “franchise,” I mean a contract or agreement, either express or implied,
whether oral or written, between two or more persons to which all of the following apply:
(a) A franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of offering, selling, or
distributing goods or services under a marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial
part by a franchisor.
(b) A franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of offering, selling, or
distributing goods or services substantially associated with the franchisor's trademark,
service mark, trade name, logotype, advertising, or other commercial symbol designating
the franchisor or its affiliate.
(c) The franchisee is required to pay, directly or indirectly, a franchise fee.
Comment
MCL 445.1502(3)(a)-(c).
History
Added July 2017.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 112-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 112.03 Franchisee and Franchisor—Definition
When I use the term “franchisee,” I mean a person to whom a franchise is granted. When
I use the term “franchisor,” I mean a person who grants a franchise and includes a
subfranchisor.
Comment
MCL 445.1502(4)-(5).
History
Added July 2017.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 112-5
Chapter 112: Franchise Investment Law
M Civ JI 112.04 Offer or Offer to Sell—Definition
The terms “offer” or “offer to sell” include an attempt to offer to dispose of a franchise or
interest in a franchise for value. It also includes solicitation of an offer to buy a franchise
or interest in a franchise for value. It does not include the renewal or extension of an
existing franchise where there is no interruption in the operation of the franchised business
by the franchisee.
Comment
MCL 445.1503(3).
History
Added July 2017.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 112-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 112.05 Person—Definition
When I use the term person,” I mean an individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture,
association, joint stock company, trust, or unincorporated organization.
Comment
MCL 445.1503(5).
History
Added July 2017.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 112-7
Chapter 112: Franchise Investment Law
M Civ JI 112.06 Sale or Sell—Definition
The terms “sale” or “sell” include a contract or agreement of sale of a franchise or interest
in a franchise for value. It also means a contract to sell or disposition of a franchise or
interest in a franchise for value.
Comment
MCL 445.1503(8).
History
Added July 2017.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 112-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 112.07 Franchise Fee—Definition
“Franchise fee” means a fee or charge that a franchisee or subfranchisor is required to pay
or agrees to pay for the right to enter into a business under a franchise agreement, including,
but not limited to, payments for goods and services.
Comment
MCL 445.1503(1).
History
Added July 2017.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 112-9
Chapter 112: Franchise Investment Law
M Civ JI 112.08 Payment for Goods and Services as Franchise Fee
If a franchisee is forced to pay a price in excess of a bona fide wholesale price for goods or
if the franchisee is required to purchase excess goods for which there is no well-established
market in this state, the excess costs borne by the franchisee in favor of the franchisor
constitutes the payment of an indirect franchise fee.
Comment
Hamade v Sunoco, Inc, 271 Mich App 145, 157; 721 NW2d 233 (2006).
History
Added July 2017.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 112-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 112.09 Payments That Do Not Constitute a Franchise Fee
The following are not the payment of a franchise fee:
(a) The purchase or agreement to purchase goods, equipment, or fixtures directly or on
consignment at a bona fide wholesale price.
(b) The payment of a reasonable service charge to the issuer of a credit card by an
establishment accepting or honoring the credit card.
(c) Amounts paid to a trading stamp company by a person issuing trading stamps in
connection with the retail sale of merchandise or service.
(d) Payments made in connection with the lease or agreement to lease of a franchised
business operated by a franchisee on the premises of a franchisor as long as the
franchised business is incidental to the business conducted by the franchisor at such
premises.
Note on Use
Use only those subsections that are applicable.
Comment
MCL 445.1503(1).
History
Added July 2017.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 112-11
Chapter 112: Franchise Investment Law
M Civ JI 112.10 Franchise Investment Law—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(1) that in connection with the filing, offer, sale, or purchase of any franchise, the
defendant:
(a) employed any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; or
(b) made any untrue statement of a material fact or failed to state a material fact
that was necessary to prevent the statements that were made from being
misleading under the circumstances; or
(c) engaged in any act, practice, or course of business that operated as a fraud
or deceit upon any person; and
(2) that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the alleged misrepresentation or omission; and
(3) that the plaintiff suffered damages.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
History
Added July 2017. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 112-12 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 113-1
CHAPTER 113
Consumer Protection Act
M Civ JI 113.01 Trade or Commerce; Prohibited Practices-Explanation.................... 113-2
M Civ JI 113.02 Unfair, Unconscionable, or Deceptive Methods, Acts, or
Practices ..................................................................................................................... 113-3
M Civ JI 113.03 Trade or Commerce-Definition ......................................................... 113-4
M Civ JI 113.04 Loss—Definition ............................................................................... 113-5
M Civ JI 113.05 Material—Definition ......................................................................... 113-6
M Civ JI 113.07 Bona Fide Error—Definition.............................................................. 113-7
M Civ JI 113.09 Unfair, Unconscionable, or Deceptive Methods, Acts, or Practices—Burden
of Proof ...................................................................................................................... 113-8
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 113-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 113.01 Trade or Commerce; Prohibited Practices-
Explanation
We have a state law known as the Consumer Protection Act, which provides that certain
unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the conduct of trade or
commerce are unlawful.
Note on Use
MCL 445.904 provides that the Act does not apply to certain regulated transactions or
conduct and methods, acts, or practices already made unlawful by certain other statutes.
Comment
MCL 445.903.
History
Added July 2012.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 113-3
Chapter 113: Consumer Protection Act
M Civ JI 113.02 Unfair, Unconscionable, or Deceptive Methods, Acts,
or Practices
The methods, acts, or practices which are protected by the Consumer Protection Act
include:
(a) ______________________________________.
(b) ______________________________________.
(c) _______________________________________.
Note on Use
The applicable provisions of MCL 445.903 should be inserted and read as indicated by the
proofs.
Comment
MCL 445.903.
History
Added July 2012.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 113-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 113.03 Trade or Commerce-Definition
When I use the term “trade or commerce” I mean the conduct of a business providing
goods, property, or service primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. [ “Trade
or commerce” includes the advertising, solicitation, offering for sale or rent, sale, lease, or
distribution of a service or property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, or any
other article, or a business opportunity. ] [ “Trade or commerce” does not include the
purchase or sale of a franchise, but does include pyramid promotional schemes. ]
Note on Use
Use only if there is an issue concerning whether defendant was acting in trade or commerce.
Use the bracketed language only if appropriate. If a franchise, or pyramid promotional
scheme is involved, additional instructions defining those terms may be necessary. Those
instructions should be based on the definitions
found in the Franchise Investment Law,
MCL 445.1502 and the Pyramid Promotional Scheme Act, MCL 445.2582.
Comment
MCL 445.902(g).
History
Added July 2012. Amended July 2019.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 113-5
Chapter 113: Consumer Protection Act
M Civ JI 113.04 Loss—Definition
When I use the term “loss,” I mean either a monetary damage or the prevention of the
fulfillment of plaintiff’s reasonable expectations.
Comment
MCL 445.911(2); Mayhill v AH Pond, 129 Mich App 178 (1983).
History
Added July 2012.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 113-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 113.05 Material—Definition
When I use the term “material,” or “material fact,” I mean a fact that is important to the
transaction, or one which the defendant knew or should have known would influence the
plaintiff in entering into the transaction.
Comment
See Papin v Demski, 17 Mich App 151, 169 NW2d 351 (1969).
History
M Civ JI 113.05 was added July 2012.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 113-7
Chapter 113: Consumer Protection Act
M Civ JI 113.07 Bona Fide ErrorDefinition
Defendant claims that, if there was a violation of the Consumer Protection Act, it was a
bona fide error, which will limit the amount of recovery. If you find a violation of the act
to have occurred, you will decide if this defense has been established.
To establish this defense, the defendant has the burden of proving:
(a) that the violation occurred because of a good faith error on the part of the
defendant; and
(b) that defendant maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid this
error.
If you find that defendant has proved both of those elements, then you must find that the
violation was a bona fide error. If both of those elements were not proved, the violation is
not a bona fide error.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given if bona fide error is pled.
Comment
The bona fide error defense, limiting recovery to actual damages, is set forth at MCL
445.911(8). See Head v Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc, 234 Mich App 94, 593 NW2d
595 (1999), and Temborius v Slatkin, 157 Mich App 587, 403 NW2d 821 (1986).
History
M Civ JI 113.07 was added July 2012. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 113-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 113.09 Unfair, Unconscionable, or Deceptive Methods, Acts,
or Practices—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant engaged in trade or commerce;
(b) that defendant committed one or more of the prohibited methods, acts, or
practices alleged by plaintiff; and
(c) that plaintiff suffered a loss as a result of defendant’s violation of the act.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
When the particular statutory provision the plaintiff is proceeding under includes an
element of fraud, the Court should include an instruction defining that element. Brownlow
v McCall Enterprises, 315 Mich App 103 (2016).
History
M Civ JI 113.09 was added July 2012. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 114-1
CHAPTER 114
Invasion of Privacy Act
M Civ JI 114.01 Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion into Another’s Private Affairs—
Elements..................................................................................................................... 114-2
M Civ JI 114.02 Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion Into Another’s Private Affairs—Burden of
Proof........................................................................................................................... 114-3
M Civ JI 114.03 Invasion of Privacy—Public Disclosure of Private Facts—
Elements..................................................................................................................... 114-4
M Civ JI 114.04 Invasion of Privacy—Public Disclosure of Private Facts—Burden of
Proof........................................................................................................................... 114-5
M Civ JI 114.05 Invasion of Privacy—Publicity Which Places Plaintiff in a False Light—
Elements..................................................................................................................... 114-6
M Civ JI 114.06 Invasion of Privacy—Publicity Which Places Plaintiff in a False Light—
Burden of Proof.......................................................................................................... 114-7
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 114-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 114.01 Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion into Another’s Private
Affairs—Elements
Plaintiff claims that defendant is responsible for invasion of [ his / her ] privacy. The claim
here is that defendant intruded into plaintiff’s private affairs. The elements of this claim are
the following:
(a) the existence of a secret and private subject matter,
(b) a right possessed by the plaintiff to keep that subject matter private, and
(c) that defendant, without consent, obtained information about that subject
matter through some method objectionable to a reasonable person.
It is not necessary that the information be revealed or made available to others in order for
there to be an invasion of privacy.
Comment
Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175 (2003); Dalley v Dykema Gossett, 287 Mich App 296
(2010).
History
Added July 2012.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 114-3
Chapter 114: Invasion of Privacy Act
M Civ JI 114.02 Invasion of Privacy—Intrusion Into Another’s
Private Affairs—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) the existence of a secret and private subject matter,
(b) a right possessed by the plaintiff to keep that subject matter private, and
(c) that defendant, without consent, obtained information about that subject
matter through an objectionable method.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
History
Added July 2012. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 114-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 114.03 Invasion of Privacy—Public Disclosure of Private
Facts—Elements
Plaintiff claims that defendant is responsible for invasion of [ his / her ] privacy. The claim
here is that defendant publicly disclosed private facts about plaintiff. The elements of this
claim are the following:
(a) the intentional public disclosure of private information about the plaintiff
that is not already a matter of public record or otherwise open to the public,
(b) that was highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(c) that was of no legitimate concern to the public.
It is not necessary that the disclosure be made to the general public. It is sufficient if the
disclosure is made to one or more persons such as fellow employees, club members, church
members, family, neighbors or others whose knowledge of the facts would be embarrassing
to the plaintiff.
Comment
Doe v Henry Ford Health System, 308 Mich App 592 (2014) (holding that the disclosure
of private facts must be intentionally done), Beaumont v Brown, 401 Mich 80 (1977)
overruled in part on other grounds, Bradley v Saranac Bd of Education, 455 Mich 285
(1997); Duran v Detroit News, 200 Mich App 622 (1993); Fry v Ionia Sentinel-Standard,
101 Mich App 725 (1980).
History
Added July 2012. Amended May 2016.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 114-5
Chapter 114: Invasion of Privacy Act
M Civ JI 114.04 Invasion of Privacy—Public Disclosure of Private
Facts—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant intentionally publicly disclosed private information about
the plaintiff that was not already a matter of public record or otherwise open to
the public,
(b) that was highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(c) that was of no legitimate concern to the public.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
Doe v Henry Ford Health System, 308 Mich App 592 (2014)(holding that the disclosure of
private facts must be intentionally done).
History
Added July 2012. Amended May 2016, January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 114-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 114.05 Invasion of Privacy—Publicity Which Places Plaintiff
in a False Light—Elements
Plaintiff claims that defendant is responsible for invasion of [ his / her ] privacy. The claim
here is that defendant placed plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. The elements of this
claim are the following:
(a) a disclosure to the general public or to a large number of people,
(b) of information that was highly objectionable to a reasonable person, which
attributed to plaintiff characteristics, conduct, or beliefs that were false and
placed plaintiff in a false light, and
(c) the defendant must have had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as
to the falsity of the disclosed information and the false light in which the
plaintiff would be placed.
Note on Use
If the plaintiff is a public figure, actual malice must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Battaglieri v Mackinac Center, 261 Mich App 296 (2004). See M Civ JI 8.01. In
Collins v Detroit Free Press, Inc., 245 Mich. App. 27, 32 (2001), the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that “[ t]he First Amendment requires courts to determine whether the
plaintiff is a public or private figure….” Collins involved allegations of both defamation
and false light.
Comment
Dadd v Mount Hope Church, 486 Mich 857 (2010); Duran v Detroit News, 200 Mich App
622 (1993); Battaglieri v Mackinac Center, 261 Mich App 296 (2004); Early Detection
Center, PC v New York Life Ins Co, 157 Mich App 618, 630 (1986).
History
Added July 2012.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 114-7
Chapter 114: Invasion of Privacy Act
M Civ JI 114.06 Invasion of Privacy—Publicity Which Places Plaintiff
in a False Light—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant disclosed to the general public or a large number of people,
(b) information that was unreasonable and highly objectionable to a
reasonable person, which attributed to plaintiff characteristics, conduct, or
beliefs that were false and placed plaintiff in a false light, and
(c) that defendant must have had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard
as to the falsity of the published information and the false light in which the
plaintiff would be placed.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
If the plaintiff is a public figure, actual malice must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Battaglieri v Mackinac Center, 261 Mich App 296 (2004).
History
Added July 2012. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 114-8 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 115-1
CHAPTER 115
Assault and Battery
M Civ JI 115.01 Assault—Definition ........................................................................... 115-2
M Civ JI 115.02 Battery—Definition ........................................................................... 115-3
M Civ JI 115.05 Assault and Battery—Defense of Self-Defense................................. 115-4
M Civ JI 115.06 Assault and Battery—Defense of Consent by Voluntarily Entering a
Mutual Affray ............................................................................................................. 115-5
M Civ JI 115.07 Assault and Battery—Provocation by Mere Words Not a Defense .. 115-6
M Civ JI 115.08 Assault and Battery—Defense— Right to Resist an Unlawful
Arrest.......................................................................................................................... 115-7
M Civ JI 115.09 Battery—Defense—Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officer in
Lawful Arrest .............................................................................................................. 115-8
M Civ JI 115.20 Assault—Burden of Proof ................................................................. 115-9
M Civ JI 115.21 Battery—Burden of Proof ............................................................... 115-10
M Civ JI 115.30 Partial Privilege of Merchant as to Exemplary Damages and Damages for
Mental Anguish—False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Assault, Battery, Libel,
Slander ..................................................................................................................... 115-11
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 115-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 115.01 Assault—Definition
An assault is any intentional, unlawful threat or offer to do bodily injury to another by force,
under circumstances which create a well-founded fear of imminent peril, coupled with the
apparent present ability to carry out the act if not prevented.
Comment
See Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich 396; 295 NW 201 (1940).
History
M Civ JI 115.01 was added September 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 115-3
Chapter 115: Assault and Battery
M Civ JI 115.02 Battery—Definition
A battery is the willful or intentional touching of a person against that person’s will [ by
another / by an object or substance put in motion by another person ].
Comment
See Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich 396; 295 NW 201 (1940).
History
M Civ JI 115.02 was added September 1982.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 115-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 115.05 Assault and Battery—Defense of Self-Defense
A person who is assaulted may use such reasonable force as may be, or reasonably appears
at the time to be, necessary to protect himself or herself from bodily harm in repelling the
assault.
Comment
See Anders v Clover, 198 Mich 763; 165 NW 640 (1917); Kent v Cole, 84 Mich 579; 48
NW 168 (1891).
History
M Civ JI 115.05 was added September 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 115-5
Chapter 115: Assault and Battery
M Civ JI 115.06 Assault and Battery—Defense of Consent by
Voluntarily Entering a Mutual Affray
If plaintiff voluntarily engaged in a fight with defendant for the sake of fighting and not as
a means of self-defense, then plaintiff may not recover for an assault or battery unless the
defendant beat the plaintiff excessively or used unreasonable force.
Comment
See Galbraith v Fleming, 60 Mich 403; 27 NW 581 (1886).
History
M Civ JI 115.06 was added September 1982.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 115-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 115.07 Assault and Battery—Provocation by Mere Words
Not a Defense
Words alone, no matter how insulting, do not justify an assault or battery against the person
who utters the words.
Comment
See Gungrich v Anderson, 189 Mich 144; 155 NW 379 (1915); Goucher v Jamieson, 124
Mich 21; 82 NW 663 (1900).
History
M Civ JI 115.07 was added September 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 115-7
Chapter 115: Assault and Battery
M Civ JI 115.08 Assault and Battery—Defense— Right to Resist an
Unlawful Arrest
A citizen has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. However, the amount of force a citizen
may use to resist an unlawful arrest must be reasonable under the circumstances.
Comment
See People v Krum, 374 Mich 356; 132 NW2d 69 (1965).
History
M Civ JI 115.08 was added September 1982.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 115-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 115.09 Battery—Defense—Use of Force by Law Enforcement
Officer in Lawful Arrest
If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge,
that he or she is being lawfully arrested by a law enforcement officer, it is the duty of that
person to refrain from resisting the arrest.
An arresting officer may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect a lawful arrest.
However, an officer who uses more force than is reasonably necessary to effect a lawful
arrest commits a battery upon the person arrested to the extent the force used was excessive.
Comment
See Delude v Raasakka, 391 Mich 296; 215 NW2d 685 (1974); Firestone v Rice, 71 Mich
377; 38 NW 885 (1888).
History
M Civ JI 115.09 was added September 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 115-9
Chapter 115: Assault and Battery
M Civ JI 115.20 Assault—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant made an intentional and unlawful threat or offer to do bodily
injury to the plaintiff
(b) that the threat or offer was made under circumstances which created in
plaintiff a well-founded fear of imminent peril
(c) that defendant had the apparent present ability to carry out the act if not
prevented
Your verdict will be for plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements (and the
defendant has failed to prove the defense of [ describe defense ]). Your verdict will be for
the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those elements.
History
M Civ JI 115.20 was added September 1982. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 115-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 115.21 Battery—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving that [ defendant willfully and intentionally touched the
plaintiff against the plaintiff’s will / defendant put in motion an object or substance that
touched the plaintiff against the plaintiff’s will ].
Your verdict will be for plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements (and the
defendant has failed to prove the defense of [ describe defense ]). Your verdict will be for
the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those elements.
History
M Civ JI 115.21 was added September 1982. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 115-11
Chapter 115: Assault and Battery
M Civ JI 115.30 Partial Privilege of Merchant as to Exemplary
Damages and Damages for Mental Anguish—False Arrest, False
Imprisonment, Assault, Battery, Libel, Slander
If you find that [ defendant / defendant’s agent / defendant’s employee ] believed and had
probable cause to believe that plaintiff [ had taken / had aided or abetted in the taking of ]
goods for sale in the store, you may not award the plaintiff exemplary damages or damages
for mental anguish unless you find that [ defendant / defendant’s agent / defendant’s
employee ] —
(a) used unreasonable force, or
(b) detained plaintiff an unreasonable length of time, or
(c) acted with an unreasonable disregard of plaintiff’s rights or sensibilities, or
(d) acted with intent to injure plaintiff.
Note on Use
This instruction should not be used in cases involving partial privilege of a merchant where
a demand for retraction is an issue. See MCL 600.2911(2)(b).
Comment
See MCL 600.2917; Bonkowski v Arlan’s Department Store, 383 Mich 90; 174 NW2d 765
(1970).
History
M Civ JI 115.30 was added September 1982.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 115-12 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 116-1
CHAPTER 116
False Arrest and Imprisonment
M Civ JI 116.01 False Arrest—Definition.................................................................... 116-2
M Civ JI 116.02 False Imprisonment—Definition ....................................................... 116-3
M Civ JI 116.05 False Arrest—Law Enforcement Officer—Probable Cause to Arrest for
Felony without Warrant............................................................................................. 116-4
M Civ JI 116.06 False Arrest—Defense—Right of Private Citizen to Arrest ............... 116-6
M Civ JI 116.07 False Arrest—Arrest with Warrant ................................................... 116-7
M Civ JI 116.20 False Arrest—Burden of Proof .......................................................... 116-8
M Civ JI 116.21 False Imprisonment—Burden of Proof ............................................. 116-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 116-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 116.01 False Arrest—Definition
False arrest is an unlawful taking, seizing or detaining of a person, either by touching or
putting hands on him or her, or by any other act that indicates an intention to take him or
her into custody and subjects the person arrested to the actual control and will of the person
making the arrest.
The act must have been performed with the intent to make an arrest and must have been so
understood by the person arrested.
Comment
See Bonkowski v Arlan’s Department Store, 383 Mich 90; 174 NW2d 765 (1970); Bruce v
Meijers Supermarkets, Inc, 34 Mich App 352; 191 NW2d 132 (1971); Hill v Taylor, 50
Mich 549; 15 NW 899 (1883).
History
M Civ JI 116.01 was added September 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 116-3
Chapter 116: False Arrest and Imprisonment
M Civ JI 116.02 False Imprisonment—Definition
False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of an individual’s personal liberty or freedom
of movement. To constitute a false imprisonment, there must be an intentional and unlawful
restraint, detention or confinement that deprives a person of his or her personal liberty or
freedom of movement against his or her will. The restraint necessary to create liability for
false imprisonment may be imposed either by actual physical force or by an express or
implied threat of force.
*(It is not necessary for the detention or confinement to be in a jail or prison.)
Note on Use
*The sentence in parentheses should be used when applicable.
Comment
See Stowers v Wolodzko, 386 Mich 119; 191 NW2d 355 (1971); Tumbarella v Kroger Co,
85 Mich App 482; 271 NW2d 284 (1978); Hess v Wolverine Lake, 32 Mich App 601; 189
NW2d 42 (1971).
History
M Civ JI 116.02 was added September 1982.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 116-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 116.05 False Arrest—Law Enforcement Officer—Probable
Cause to Arrest for Felony without Warrant
An arrest is lawful if the defendant had probable cause to make the arrest. An arrest is
unlawful if the defendant did not have probable cause.
There was probable cause if you find that—
(a) the defendant was aware of information, facts or circumstances which were
sufficient to lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that the crime of
[ specify felony ] [ had been committed / was in the process of being
committed ] and that plaintiff was the person who [ had committed it / was in
the process of committing it ], and
(b) the defendant believed that the crime of [ specify felony ] [ had been
committed / was in the process of being committed ] and that plaintiff was the
person who [ had committed it / was in the process of committing it ].
The elements of the crime of [ specify felony ] are [ state elements of the felony ].
An arrest made with probable cause is lawful even if *(the crime of [ specify felony ] had
not actually been committed, nor was it in the process of being committed) *(or) *(the
crime of [ specify felony ] had been committed or was in the process of being committed,
but plaintiff was not the person who had committed it or was in the process of committing
it).
Note on Use
*Include one or more of the phrases in parentheses as applicable.
Comment
See MCL 764.15. See also Hammitt v Straley, 338 Mich 587; 61 NW2d 641 (1953); People
v Bressler, 223 Mich 597; 194 NW 559 (1923).
If plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of arrest without a warrant, then defendant has the
burden of going forward with evidence that the arrest was lawful. Donovan v Guy, 347
Mich 457; 80 NW2d 190 (1956); MRE 301.
If defendant is a private security guard, see MCL 338.1080.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 116-5
Chapter 116: False Arrest and Imprisonment
History
M Civ JI 116.05 was added September 1982.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 116-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 116.06 False Arrest—Defense—Right of Private Citizen to
Arrest
An arrest is lawful if it is made by a private citizen in any one of the following
circumstances:
(a) for a felony committed in [ his / her ] presence
(b) when the person to be arrested had committed a felony although not in the
presence of the citizen
(c) *(when [ he / she ] is summoned by a peace officer to assist said officer in
making an arrest)
†(The elements of the crime of [ specify felony ] are [ state elements of the felony ].)
Note on Use
*Delete subparagraph c if not an issue.
†If defendant relies wholly on subparagraph c, the last paragraph of this instruction should
not be given.
If defendant is a private security guard, see MCL 338.1080.
Comment
Subsections a through c of this instruction state substantially, in the language of the statute,
three of four circumstances in which a private citizen has a right to arrest. MCL 764.16. See
also Bright v Littlefield, ___ Mich ___; 641 NW2d 587 (2002); Freeman v Meijer, Inc, 95
Mich App 475; 291 NW2d 87 (1980); Nash v Sears Roebuck & Co, 12 Mich App 553; 163
NW2d 471 (1968); Maliniemi v Gronlund, 92 Mich 222; 52 NW 627 (1892). For rights of
a merchant, agent, or employee of a merchant, or independent contractor providing security
for a merchant, to make an arrest, see MCL 764.16(d).
History
M Civ JI 116.06 was added September 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 116-7
Chapter 116: False Arrest and Imprisonment
M Civ JI 116.07 False Arrest—Arrest with Warrant
An arrest is lawful if defendant made such arrest pursuant to a warrant naming [ name of
plaintiff ], and did not act in bad faith.
Comment
An arrest made pursuant to a warrant which is valid on its face is a lawful arrest. See Gooch
v Wachowiak, 352 Mich 347; 89 NW2d 496 (1958); Tryon v Pingree, 112 Mich 338, 345;
70 NW 905, 907 (1897); Barker v Anderson, 81 Mich 508; 45 NW 1108 (1890).
History
M Civ JI 116.07 was added September 1982.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 116-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 116.20 False Arrest—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] was arrested by defendant
(b) that [ he / she ] was aware of the arrest and it was against [ his / her ] will
(c) that defendant intended to arrest the plaintiff
(d) that such arrest was unlawful
Your verdict will be for plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements (and the
defendant has failed to prove the defense of [ describe defense ]). Your verdict will be for
the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those elements.
History
M Civ JI 116.20 was added September 1982. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 116-9
Chapter 116: False Arrest and Imprisonment
M Civ JI 116.21 False Imprisonment—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] was imprisoned; that is, [ he / she ] was restrained, detained
or confined by defendant and thereby deprived of [ his / her ] personal liberty
or freedom of movement
(b) that such imprisonment was against [ his / her ] will
(c) that defendant accomplished the imprisonment by actual physical force or
by an express or implied threat of force
(d) that defendant intended to deprive plaintiff of [ his / her ] personal liberty
or freedom of movement
(e) that such imprisonment was unlawful
Your verdict will be for plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements (and the
defendant has failed to prove the defense of [ describe defense ]). Your verdict will be for
the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those elements.
History
M Civ JI 116.21 was added September 1982. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 116-10 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 117-1
CHAPTER 117
Malicious Prosecution
M Civ JI 117.01 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding................................... 117-2
M Civ JI 117.02 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding: Burden of Proof ....... 117-3
M Civ JI 117.03 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding: Termination in Favor of
Accused ...................................................................................................................... 117-5
M Civ JI 117.04 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding: Probable Cause........ 117-6
M Civ JI 117.20 Malicious Prosecution—Civil Proceeding.......................................... 117-8
M Civ JI 117.21 Malicious Prosecution—Civil Proceeding—Burden of Proof ............ 117-9
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 117-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 117.01 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding
The elements of malicious prosecution are the following:
(a) a prosecution caused or continued by one person against another
(b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the person who was prosecuted
(c) absence of probable cause for initiating or continuing the proceeding
(d) initiating or continuing the proceeding with malice or a primary purpose
other than that of bringing the offender to justice
Comment
Matthews v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 456 Mich 365; 572 NW2d 603 (1998); Drobczyk v
Great Lakes Steel Corp, 367 Mich 318; 116 NW2d 736 (1962); Rivers v Ex-Cell-O Corp,
100 Mich App 824; 300 NW2d 420 (1980).
See MCL 600.2907 and Camaj v S S Kresge Co, 426 Mich 281; 393 NW2d 875 (1986), for
the availability of treble damages where the underlying action was a “straw-party” suit.
History
M Civ JI 117.01 was added September 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 117-3
Chapter 117: Malicious Prosecution
M Civ JI 117.02 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding:
Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant caused or continued a prosecution against the plaintiff.
(b) that the proceeding was terminated in favor of the plaintiff.
(c) that defendant initiated or continued the proceeding without probable
cause.
(d) that defendant initiated or continued the proceeding with malice or a
primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.
*(The defendant has the burden of proving the defense that [ describe defense ].)
Your verdict will be for plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements (and the
defendant has failed to prove the defense of [ describe defense ]). Your verdict will be for
the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those elements.
Note on Use
*The sentence and the phrases preceded by an asterisk should be used only if an affirmative
defense is at issue.
Whether the proceeding terminated in favor of the plaintiff is a question of law if there are
no disputed issues of material fact. Cox v Williams, 233 Mich App 388; 593 NW2d 173
(1999). If the trial judge determines as a matter of law that the proceeding terminated in
plaintiff’s favor, the jury should be so instructed and subsection (b) of this instruction
should be deleted.
Probable cause is a question of law if there are no disputed issues of material fact. Matthews
v Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 456 Mich 365, 381-382; 572 NW2d 603 (1998). If the trial
judge determines as a matter of law that defendant did not have probable cause, the jury
should be so instructed and subsection (c) of this instruction should be deleted.
Comment
It is a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution that the prosecutor exercised
independent discretion to initiate and maintain a prosecution, unless defendant knowingly
provided false information on which the prosecutor based the decision to prosecute or
unless defendant knowingly omitted exculpatory information which would have dissuaded
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 117-4 Michigan Supreme Court
the prosecutor from prosecuting the plaintiff. Matthews v Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 456
Mich 365; 572 NW2d 603 (1998). (Where the prosecutor exercises independent discretion,
it negates the first element of the cause of action; defendant is not considered to be the one
who caused or continued the prosecution.)
For a discussion of the defense of reliance on advice of an attorney (including on the
direction and advice of a prosecuting attorney) see Matthews, 456 Mich 365, 379-381.
History
M Civ JI 117.02 was added September 1982. Amended December 2002, January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 117-5
Chapter 117: Malicious Prosecution
M Civ JI 117.03 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding:
Termination in Favor of Accused
A criminal proceeding is terminated in favor of an accused if the accused is acquitted. It is
also considered terminated in favor of an accused in other circumstances that I will now
describe to you.
In this case, you must find that the proceeding terminated in favor of the plaintiff if
[ describe facts and circumstances that, if found, would constitute a favorable termination,
i.e., dismissal because of failure of complaining witness to testify, coerced guilty plea ].
You must find that the proceeding did not terminate in favor of the plaintiff if [ describe
facts and circumstances that, if found, would not constitute a favorable termination ].
Note on Use
Whether the proceeding terminated in favor of the plaintiff is a mixed question of law and
fact. Cox v Williams, 233 Mich App 388; 593 NW2d 173 (1999). If there are disputed issues
of material fact, the trial judge should instruct the jury on the circumstances that would
constitute a favorable termination. See, Blase v Appicelli, 195 Mich App 174; 489 NW2d
129 (1992).
Comment
Dismissal of criminal charges at the request of the prosecution or the complaining witness
is a termination of proceedings in favor of the accused. Cox v Williams, 233 Mich App 388;
593 NW2d 173 (1999). Dismissal of criminal charges pursuant to a plea bargain is not a
termination in favor of the accused, but such a settlement or compromise if brought about
by duress, coercion or unfair means is a termination in favor of an accused. Blase (guilty
plea taken under advisement and charges dismissed when no convictions after six months;
claimed improper coercion by trial judge); see also, Kostrzewa v City of Troy, 247 F3d 633
(6th Cir 2001) (dismissal of obstruction of police officer charge and guilty plea to driving
offense, claim that alleged plea bargain was induced by a threat to prosecute on the
obstruction charge for which there was no probable cause).
History
M Civ JI 117.03 was added December 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 117-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 117.04 Malicious Prosecution—Criminal Proceeding:
Probable Cause
Defendant had probable cause if, based on the facts and circumstances known to [ him/her ]
at the time [ he/she ] [ initiated/ continued ] the criminal proceeding, [ he/she ] reasonably
believed that plaintiff was guilty of a crime. Probable cause may be based on information
received from others, but only if the information is of such a reliable kind and from such
reliable sources that a reasonable person would believe the information is true.
*( In this case you must find that defendant had probable cause if [ describe facts and
circumstances that, if found, would constitute probable cause ]. You must find that
defendant did not have probable cause if [ describe facts and circumstances that, if found,
would not constitute probable cause ]. )
Note on Use
*This paragraph may be used if appropriate.
Probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. Matthews v Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
456 Mich 365, 381-382; 572 NW2d 603 (1998). This instruction may be used if there are
disputed issues of material fact.
In lieu of giving this instruction, the trial judge may instruct the jury to complete a special
verdict form setting forth the circumstances under which they find the proceedings were
initiated or continued, and the trial judge then will determine as a matter of law whether the
facts as found by the jury constitute probable cause. (This approach is recommended in
Matthews v Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 456 Mich 365, 382 n 22; 572 NW2d 603 (1998).
If a special verdict form is used, it should be carefully drafted to ensure that the jury decides
all facts necessary to enable the court to determine probable cause. The difficulty in drafting
such special verdict forms, as well as in setting forth in an instruction the hypothetical facts
which, if proved, constitute probable cause is discussed in Comment Note – Probable
Cause or Want Thereof, in Malicious Prosecution Action, as Question of Law for Court or
Fact for Jury, 87 ALR2d 183 (1963).
Comment
This instruction is based on the frequently cited instruction to the jury in Wilson v Bowen,
64 Mich 133; 31 NW 81 (1887), quoted with approval most recently in Matthews. Probable
cause involves an objective test—what a reasonable person would believe. Matthews. It is
reversible error to allow the jury to determine probable cause without having been given a
definition of probable cause. Abdul-Mujeeb v Sears Roebuck & Co, 154 Mich App 249; 397
NW2d 193 (1986).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 117-7
Chapter 117: Malicious Prosecution
It is not sufficient to merely define probable cause for the jury, the correct practice is for
the trial court to instruct the jury under what set of facts and circumstances which may be
found from the evidence the defendant would or would not have probable cause. Renda v
International Union, UAW, 366 Mich 58; 114 NW2D 343 (1962); Slater v Walter, 148
Mich 650, 656-657; 112 NW 682 (1907); Wilson. The reason for this rule is that while the
jury resolves factual disputes, whether the facts constitute probable cause is a question of
law for the court. See, e.g., Matthews, 456 Mich 365, 382. However, a failure to augment
a definition of probable cause may or may not result in reversible error. Compare Wilson
and Renda.
Malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause, but probable cause may not be inferred
from an absence of malice. Matthews, 456 Mich 365, 378.
The affirmative defense of reliance on advice of an attorney after full and fair disclosure of
material facts should not be confused with probable cause. Matthews, 456 Mich 365, 379-
380.
History
M Civ JI 117.04 was added December 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 117-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 117.20 Malicious Prosecution—Civil Proceeding
The elements of malicious prosecution are the following:
(a) a civil proceeding [ instituted / continued / procured ] by one person against
another.
(b) termination of the proceeding in favor of the person against whom it was
brought.
(c) absence of probable cause for bringing or continuing the proceeding.
(d) malice or a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper
adjudication of the claim on which the proceeding is based.
(e) special injury resulting in damages.
Comment
See Friedman v Dozorc, 412 Mich 1, 74; 312 NW2d 585, 615 (1981). See also Drobczyk v
Great Lakes Steel Corp, 367 Mich 318; 116 NW2d 736 (1962); Drouillard v Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co, 107 Mich App 608; 310 NW2d 15 (1981); Rivers v Ex-Cell-O Corp, 100
Mich App 824; 300 NW2d 420 (1980); Fort Wayne Mortgage Co v Carletos, 95 Mich App
752; 291 NW2d 193 (1980); Taft v J L Hudson Co, 37 Mich App 692; 195 NW2d 296
(1972); LaLone v Rashid, 34 Mich App 193; 191 NW2d 98 (1971).
See MCL 600.2907 and Camaj v S S Kresge Co, 426 Mich 281; 393 NW2d 875 (1986), for
the availability of treble damages where the underlying action was a “straw-party” suit.
History
M Civ JI 117.20 was added September 1982.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 117-9
Chapter 117: Malicious Prosecution
M Civ JI 117.21 Malicious Prosecution—Civil Proceeding—Burden
of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant [ instituted / continued / procured ] a civil proceeding
against the plaintiff.
(b) that the proceeding was terminated in favor of the plaintiff.
(c) that defendant brought or continued the proceeding without probable
cause.
(d) that defendant brought or continued the proceeding with malice or a
primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the
claim on which the proceeding was based.
(e) that plaintiff sustained special injury resulting in damages.
Your verdict will be for plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements (and the
defendant has failed to prove the defense of [ describe defense ]). Your verdict will be for
the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those elements.
History
M Civ JI 117.21 was added September 1982. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 117-10 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 118-1
CHAPTER 118
Libel and Slander
M Civ JI 118.01 Libel—Definition ............................................................................... 118-2
M Civ JI 118.02 Slander—Definition........................................................................... 118-3
M Civ JI 118.03 Libel, Slander—Statement of and Concerning the Plaintiff .............. 118-4
M Civ JI 118.04 Libel, Slander—Meaning of a Statement .......................................... 118-5
M Civ JI 118.05 Libel, Slander—Burden of Proof ....................................................... 118-6
M Civ JI 118.06 Libel or Slander of Public Figure or Public Person (Actual Malice) ... 118-8
M Civ JI 118.07 Libel, Slander—Common-Law Qualified Privilege (Actual Malice) . 118-10
M Civ JI 118.08 Libel or Slander of Private Person—Nonprivileged
Communication........................................................................................................ 118-11
M Civ JI 118.19 Libel-Actual Damages (Public Figure or Public Person)................... 118-12
M Civ JI 118.20 Libel—Economic Damages (Private Individual)............................... 118-13
M Civ JI 118.21 Libel—Exemplary Damages............................................................. 118-14
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 118-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 118.01 Libel—Definition
Libel is a statement *(of fact) which is false in some material respect and is communicated
to a third person by [ printing / writing / signs / pictures ] and has a tendency to harm a
person’s reputation.
Note on Use
*The words in parentheses should be used if the alleged defamatory statement is one of pure
fact. They should not be used if the alleged defamatory statement involves opinion and fact.
Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974); 2
Restatement Torts, 2d, § 566, pp 170–171.
Comment
Watson v Detroit Journal Co, 143 Mich 430; 107 NW 81 (1906). A statement of pure
opinion is not actionable. Gertz.
History
M Civ JI 118.01 was added August 1983.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 118-3
Chapter 118: Liability and Slander
M Civ JI 118.02 Slander—Definition
Slander is a statement *(of fact) which is false in some material respect and is
communicated to a third person by [ words / gestures ] and has a tendency to harm a
person’s reputation.
Note on Use
*The words in parentheses should be used if the alleged defamatory statement is one of pure
fact. They should not be used if the alleged defamatory statement involves opinion and fact.
Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974); Restatement
(Second) of Torts §566, at 170–171.
Comment
Watson v Detroit Journal Co, 143 Mich 430; 107 NW 81 (1906). A statement of pure
opinion is not actionable. Gertz.
History
M Civ JI 118.02 was added August 1983.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 118-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 118.03 Libel, Slander—Statement of and Concerning the
Plaintiff
The statement must have been of and concerning the plaintiff.
Comment
A person does not have a cause of action for defamation unless it is he or she who is
defamed. Lewis v Soule, 3 Mich 514 (1855); Watson v Detroit Journal Co, 143 Mich 430;
107 NW 81 (1906); Ball v White, 3 Mich App 579; 143 NW2d 188 (1966). Others who are
injured indirectly by the defamation may have a derivative suit (i.e., loss of consortium).
Peisner v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 104 Mich App 59; 304 NW2d 814 (1981); aff’d in part
on other grounds, 421 Mich 125; 364 NW2d 600 (1984).
A corporation has a cause of action for defamation. Heritage Optical Center, Inc v Levine,
137 Mich App 793; 359 NW2d 210 (1984).
History
M Civ JI 118.03 was added August 1983.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 118-5
Chapter 118: Liability and Slander
M Civ JI 118.04 Libel, Slander—Meaning of a Statement
The meaning of a statement is that meaning which, under the circumstances, a reasonable
person who [ hears / sees ] the statement reasonably understands to be the meaning
intended.
Comment
Ellis v Whitehead, 95 Mich 105; 54 NW 752 (1893). See also Restatement (Second) Torts
§563, at 162–164.
History
M Civ JI 118.04 was added August 1983.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 118-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 118.05 Libel, Slander—Burden of Proof
Plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant made the statement *(of fact) complained of to a third
person by [ printing / writing / signs / pictures / words / gestures ], and
(b) † that (the statement was of and concerning the plaintiff, and)
(c) that the statement was false in some material respect, and the statement had
a tendency to harm the plaintiff’s reputation, and
(d) that (as a result of the statement, the plaintiff suffered some damage, and)
(e) [ Insert M Civ JI 118.06 and/or M Civ JI 118.07 and/or M Civ JI 118.08
as applicable. ]
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
*The words in parentheses should be used if the alleged defamatory statement is one of pure
fact. They should not be used if the alleged defamatory statement involves opinion.
Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co, 497 US 1; 110 S Ct 2695; 111 L Ed 2d 1 (1990);
Restatement Torts, 2d, § 566, pp 170–171.
†If M Civ JI 118.06 is inserted in subsection (e), then delete subsection (b).
‡ With regard to the applicability of any of these instructions (M Civ JI 118.05-118.21)
where libel or slander per se of a private individual is at issue, compare Gertz v Robert
Welch, Inc, 418 US 323, 324; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974) (“For the reasons set
forth below, we hold that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive
damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth”), with Burden v Elias Bros Big Boy Restaurants, 240 Mich
App 723; 613 NW2d 378 (2000) and its interpretation of MCL 600.2911.
Generally, as to any single statement, if M Civ JI 118.08 is used, neither M Civ JI 118.06
nor M Civ JI 118.07 would be appropriate. Also, if M Civ JI 118.08 is used, the words
“some damage” in subsection d should be changed to “economic damage.” MCL
600.2911(7); Glazer v Lamkin, 201 Mich App 432; 506 NW2d 570 (1993).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 118-7
Chapter 118: Liability and Slander
Comment
On the issue of material falsity, see Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 440 Mich
238; 487 NW2d 205 (1992), cert den, 507 US 967; 113 S Ct 1401; 122 L Ed 2d 774 (1993);
Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84; 476 NW2d 112 (1991), cert den, 503 US
907; 112 S Ct 1267; 117 L Ed 2d 495 (1992).
History
M Civ JI 118.05 was added August 1983. Amended November 1990, January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 118-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 118.06 Libel or Slander of Public Figure or Public Person
(Actual Malice)
Because plaintiff was a [ public official / public figure ] at the time of the alleged [ libel /
slander ], plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) the statement was of and concerning [ him / her ], and
(i) the defendant had knowledge that the statement was false, or
(ii) the defendant acted with reckless disregard as to whether the statement
was false.
“Reckless disregard” means that defendant must have made the statement with a high
degree of awareness of its probable falsity, or must have entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of the statement.
Comment
Although this instruction does not use the words “actual malice,” it does incorporate the
definition of that term. Use of the term in jury instructions has been criticized. Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc v Connaughton, 491 US 657, 666 n7; 105 L Ed 2d 562, 576 n7; 109
S Ct 2678, 2685 n7 (1989); Masson v New Yorker Magazine, Inc, 501 US 496; 115 L Ed
2d 447; 111 S Ct 2419 (1991).
On the meaning of “reckless disregard,” see Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc, 491 US at
667, 692; 105 L Ed 2d 562; 109 S Ct 2678 (1989). Failure to give an instruction on
“reckless disregard” has been criticized. Faxon v Republican State Committee, 244 Mich
App 468; 624 NW2d 509 (2001).
The privilege to make communications about public figures or public persons is of
constitutional magnitude. New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254; 84 S Ct 710; 11 L
Ed 2d 686 (1964). This constitutional privilege has been incorporated into Michigan law by
case law, Arber v Stahlin, 382 Mich 300; 170 NW2d 45 (1969), and more recently by
statute, 1988 PA 396, MCL 600.2911(6).
Nonmedia defendants are entitled to the constitutional privilege regarding defamatory
publications that concern a public official or public figure. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc v
Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 US 749; 105 S Ct 2939; 86 L Ed 2d 593 (1985). See also
Vandentoorn v Bonner, 129 Mich App 198; 342 NW2d 297 (1983).
Whether a person is a public figure or public person is a question of law for the trial court
and should not be submitted to the jury unless the facts are in dispute. Bufalino v Detroit
Michigan Supreme Court Page 118-9
Chapter 118: Liability and Slander
Magazine, Inc, 433 Mich 766; 449 NW2d 410 (1989).
History
M Civ JI 118.06 was added August 1983. Amended November 1990, August 1991.
Amended June 2003.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 118-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 118.07 Libel, Slander—Common-Law Qualified Privilege
(Actual Malice)
Because *(under Michigan law) in this case, the defendant had a qualified privilege to
communicate information, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant had
knowledge that the statement was false, or that the defendant acted with reckless disregard
as to whether the statement was false.
Note on Use
*This phrase should be read in any case where both constitutional privilege and qualified
privilege are issues.
Comment
Although this instruction does not use the words “actual malice,” it does incorporate the
definition of that term. Use of the term has been criticized. Harte-Hanks Communications,
Inc v Connaughton, 491 US 657, 666 n7; 105 L Ed 2d 562, 576 n7; 109 S Ct 2678, 2685
n7 (1989); Masson v New Yorker Magazine, Inc, 501 US 496; 115 L Ed 2d 447; 111 S Ct
2419; 59 USLW 4726, 4730 (1991).
The qualified privilege to communicate information in the public interest is no longer
recognized in Michigan. Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 427 Mich 157; 398
NW2d 245 (1986). However, the Rouch decision does not affect the privilege of fair
comment and other common-law qualified privileges. Id. at 180, n 13. Michigan law has
long recognized such other common-law privileges as the privilege applicable to
communications on matters of shared interest or duty. See Bufalino v Maxon Bros, Inc, 368
Mich 140; 117 NW2d 150 (1962); Wynn v Cole, 91 Mich App 517; 284 NW2d 144 (1979);
Dalton v Herbruck Egg Sales Corp, 164 Mich App 543; 417 NW2d 496 (1987); Smith v
Fergan, 181 Mich App 594; 450 NW2d 3 (1989). For other qualified or conditional
privileges, see Restatement (Second) of Torts §597, at 277–281.
History
M Civ JI 118.07 was added August 1983. Amended November 1990, August 1991.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 118-11
Chapter 118: Liability and Slander
M Civ JI 118.08 Libel or Slander of Private Person—Nonprivileged
Communication
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent in making the
statement.
When I use the word “negligent,” I mean the failure to do something which a reasonably
careful *person would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful *person
would not do, under the circumstances that you find existed in this case. It is for you to
decide what a reasonably careful *person would do or would not do under such
circumstances.
Note on Use
*Use of the word “person” may be inappropriate. See Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US
323; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974); Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 427
Mich 157; 398 NW2d 245 (1986).
History
M Civ JI 118.08 was added November 1990.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 118-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 118.19 Libel-Actual Damages (Public Figure or Public
Person)
If you find that [ plaintiff ] is entitled to damages then you may award the actual damages
suffered by [ plaintiff ] to his or her property, business, trade, profession, occupation, or
feelings.
Note on Use
This instruction should be incorporated into M Civ JI 50.01 and used in a public person or
public figure case. See Peisner v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 421 Mich 125; 364 NW2d 600
(1984), for an actual damages instruction incorporating M Civ JI 50.01.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 118-13
Chapter 118: Liability and Slander
M Civ JI 118.20 Libel—Economic Damages (Private Individual)
If you find that [ plaintiff ] is entitled to damages, then you should award [ plaintiff ] any
economic damages that [ plaintiff ] has proven. By economic damages, I mean any tangible
loss suffered by [ plaintiff ] as a result of [ defendant’s ] statement, such as lost wages,
benefits, income, or profits. You should also award [ plaintiff ] any attorney fees incurred
by [ plaintiff ] as a result of [ defendant’s ] statement.
Note on Use
This instruction should be used in a “private person case.” See MCL 600.2911(7).
History
M Civ JI 118.20 was added December 6, 2004.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 118-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 118.21 Libel—Exemplary Damages
The damages on which I have already instructed you are called actual damages. If you find
that plaintiff is entitled to actual damages, you may then consider an award of exemplary
damages. Exemplary damages may not be awarded to punish or to make an example of the
defendant, but may only be awarded to compensate the plaintiff for any incremental or
increased injury to plaintiff’s feelings that you find were caused by defendant’s bad faith
or ill will. However, you may not award exemplary damages for any injury to feelings
which you include in your award of actual damages.
In order to recover exemplary damages, plaintiff has the burden of proving the following
elements:
(a) that defendant published the statements complained of with bad faith or ill
will, and
(b) that before starting this lawsuit, plaintiff gave notice to defendant to publish
a retraction, and allowed defendant a reasonable time to do so, and
(c) that plaintiff incurred some incremental or increased injury to feelings
attributable to [ his / her ] sense of indignation and outrage, and
(d) that any such incremental or increased injury to feelings was caused by
defendant’s bad faith or ill will.
You may consider the publication, lack of publication, adequacy or inadequacy of a
retraction or correction as bearing on whether the defendant acted in good or bad faith.
If you find that plaintiff has proven all of these elements, you must determine the amount
of money that reasonably, fairly and adequately compensates [ him / her ] for such
incremental or increased injury to feelings. In determining this amount, you may consider
the publication, lack of publication, adequacy or inadequacy of a retraction or correction.
A retraction or correction does not necessarily preclude an award of exemplary damages.
Note on Use
This instruction may not be applicable in private defamation, nonpublic interest cases. See
Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 418 US 323; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974). With regard
to damages available and limitations on exemplary damages and damages in private
plaintiff actions, see MCL 600.2911(2) and MCL 600.2911(7). These sections have been
construed to mean that: Under subsection 7, if the publication of the defamatory falsehood
is negligent, a private plaintiff must prove economic damages but cannot recover for
injuries to feelings. Under subsection 2(a), however, if a private plaintiff proves actual
Michigan Supreme Court Page 118-15
Chapter 118: Liability and Slander
malice, the plaintiff is entitled to, among other things, actual damages to reputation or
feelings.” Glazer v Lamkin, 201 Mich App 432, 437; 506 NW2d 570, 572–573 (1993).
Comment
See Peisner v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 421 Mich 125; 364 NW2d 600 (1984); MCL
600.2911.
In order to recover exemplary and punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted with common-law malice. Common-law malice is bad faith or ill will.
Peisner, 421 Mich at 141–142; 364 NW2d at 608. The plaintiff must also prove that he or
she notified the defendant of a request for a retraction and allowed the defendant a
reasonable time to do so. MCL 600.2911(2)(b). However, “[ t]he publication of such a
retraction does not preclude an award of exemplary and punitive damages, but is admissible
on the question of defendant’s good faith and in mitigation and reduction of such damages.”
Peisner, 421 Mich at 130; 364 NW2d at 603.
The court in Peisner reiterated its long-held view that exemplary damages are purely
compensatory and not intended to punish or make an example of a defendant. Id. at 135;
364 NW2d at 605.
History
M Civ JI 118.21 was added February 1986.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 118-16 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 119-1
CHAPTER 119
Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress
M Civ JI 119.01 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress—Burden of Proof ......... 119-2
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 119-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 119.01 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress—Burden
of Proof
Plaintiff claims that defendant is responsible for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. For this claim, plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous,
(b) that defendant’s conduct was intentional or reckless,
(c) that defendant’s conduct caused plaintiff severe emotional distress, and
(d) that defendant’s conduct caused plaintiff damages.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175; 670 NW2d 675 (2003); Dalley v Dykema Gossett, 287
Mich App 296; 788 NW2d 679 (2010).
History
M Civ JI 119.01 was added October 2014. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 125-1
CHAPTER 125
Tortious Interference With
Contract
M Civ JI 125.01 Tortious Interference with Contract: Elements ................................ 125-2
M Civ JI 125.02 Tortious Interference with Contract: Contract/Consideration—
Definitions .................................................................................................................. 125-3
M Civ JI 125.03 Tortious Interference with Contract: Intent—Definition.................. 125-4
M Civ JI 125.04 Tortious Interference with Contract: Improper—Definition ............ 125-5
M Civ JI 125.05 Tortious Interference with Contract: Breach—Definition ................ 125-7
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 125-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 125.01 Tortious Interference with Contract: Elements
Plaintiff claims that defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with plaintiff’s
contract with [ name of other party to contract ]. In order to establish the claim, plaintiff
has the burden of proving:
(a) that plaintiff had a contract with [ name of other party to contract ] at the
time of the claimed interference.
(b) that defendant knew of the contract at that time.
(c) that defendant intentionally interfered with the contract.
(d) that defendant improperly interfered with the contract.
(e) that defendant’s conduct caused [ name of breaching party ] to breach the
contract.
(f) that plaintiff was damaged as a result of defendant’s conduct.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
If the validity of a contract is an issue, this instruction must be modified.
Comment
This instruction is supported by Jim-Bob, Inc v Mehling, 178 Mich App 71, 95–96; 443
NW2d 451 (1989); Woody v Tamer, 158 Mich App 764, 773–774; 405 NW2d 213 (1987);
and Trepel v Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, 135 Mich App 361, 374; 354 NW2d 341
(1984).
For a discussion of knowledge or constructive knowledge in the context of a claim of
tortious interference with contract, see Restatement Torts, 2d, § 766 comment i, pp 11–12.
History
M Civ JI 125.01 was added March 1993. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 125-3
Chapter 125: Tortious Interference With Contract
M Civ JI 125.02 Tortious Interference with Contract: Contract/
Consideration—Definitions
A contract is an agreement to do or not to do a particular thing in exchange for adequate
consideration. The agreement may be oral or in writing.
When I use the words “adequate consideration,” I mean a benefit for one party to the
contract or a loss sustained or a responsibility assumed by the other party to the contract.
Note on Use
Additional instructions may be required depending on the facts of the case.
Comment
The definition of contract comes from McInerney v Detroit Trust Co, 279 Mich 42, 46; 271
NW 545 (1937).
The definition of consideration comes from Levitz v Capitol Savings & Loan Co, 267 Mich
92, 96; 255 NW 166 (1934), and Dow Chemical Co v Dept of Treasury, 185 Mich App 458,
468; 462 NW2d 765 (1990).
If no contract exists, an action for tortious interference with contract cannot be maintained.
Williams v DeMan, 7 Mich App 71; 151 NW2d 247 (1967). An action for tortious
interference with contract may be maintained if there is a contract, even though plaintiff is
not able to enforce it for reasons such as the statute of frauds. Northern Plumbing &
Heating, Inc v Henderson Bros, Inc, 83 Mich App 84, 92–93; 268 NW2d 296 (1978). But
see Restatement (Second) of Torts §766 cmt f, at 10, for the distinction between void and
voidable contracts.
History
M Civ JI 125.02 was added March 1993.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 125-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 125.03 Tortious Interference with Contract: Intent—
Definition
When I say that plaintiff must prove that defendant intentionally interfered with the
contract, I mean that
(a) defendant’s primary, but not necessarily sole, purpose was to cause [ name
of breaching party ] to breach the contract, or
(b) defendant acted knowing that [ his / her ] conduct was certain or
substantially certain to cause [ name of breaching party ] to breach the
contract.
Comment
This instruction is adapted from Restatement (Second) of Torts §766 cmt j, at 12. See also
Derosia v Austin, 115 Mich App 647, 654; 321 NW2d 760 (1982); Formall, Inc v
Community National Bank of Pontiac, 166 Mich App 772, 781; 421 NW2d 289 (1988).
History
M Civ JI 125.03 was added March 1993.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 125-5
Chapter 125: Tortious Interference With Contract
M Civ JI 125.04 Tortious Interference with Contract: Improper—
Definition
Improper interference is conduct that is fraudulent, not lawful, not ethical, or not justified
under any circumstances. If defendant’s conduct was lawful, it is still improper if it was
done without justification and for the purpose of interfering with plaintiff’s contractual
rights, but plaintiff must specifically show affirmative acts by defendant that corroborate
that defendant had the wrongful purpose of interfering with plaintiff’s contractual rights.
Comment
See Feldman v Green, 138 Mich App 360; 360 NW2d 881 (1984); Formall, Inc v
Community National Bank of Pontiac, 166 Mich App 772, 780; 421 NW2d 289 (1988). See
also Trepel v Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, 135 Mich App 361, 374; 354 NW2d 341
(1984); Weitting v McFeeters, 104 Mich App 188, 198; 304 NW2d 525 (1981); Feaheny v
Caldwell, 175 Mich App 291, 304; 437 NW2d 358 (1989); Wilkinson v Powe, 300 Mich
275; 1 NW2d 539 (1942); Bahr v Miller Bros Creamery, 365 Mich 415; 112 NW2d 463
(1961).
In determining whether defendant’s conduct was improper, courts have considered the
following factors:
1.the nature of defendant’s conduct;
2.defendant’s motive or reasons for its actions;
3.the interests of plaintiff with which the defendant’s conduct allegedly
interfered;
4.the interests that defendant sought to advance;
5.society’s interest in (a) protecting the freedom of defendant to engage in such
conduct, and (b) protecting contractual relationships, business relationships, or
expectancies such as that held or sought by plaintiff;
6.how directly defendant’s conduct influenced the breaching party; and
7.the nature of the relationships of plaintiff, defendant, and the other party to the
contract.
In appropriate cases, instructions dealing with these factors may be given. This list of
factors is consistent with the view of the Michigan courts that the preferred guidelines are
those articulated in §767 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is increasingly endorsed
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 125-6 Michigan Supreme Court
by Michigan courts. See, e.g., Jim-Bob, Inc v Mehling, 178 Mich App 71, 96–97; 443
NW2d 451 (1989); Woody v Tamer, 158 Mich App 764, 775; 405 NW2d 213 (1987).
History
M Civ JI 125.04 was added March 1993. Amended March 1994.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 125-7
Chapter 125: Tortious Interference With Contract
M Civ JI 125.05 Tortious Interference with Contract: Breach—
Definition
“Breach” means the failure to perform a promise, duty, or obligation that is required and
due under a contract.
Note on Use
If there is a claim of anticipatory breach, partial breach, or any other reason why this
instruction should not be read to the jury, an alternative instruction must be substituted.
Comment
Woody v Tamer, 158 Mich App 764, 774–775; 405 NW2d 213 (1987).
History
M Civ JI 125.05 was added March 1993.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 125-8 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 126-1
CHAPTER 126
Tortious Interference with
Business Relationship or
Expectancy
M Civ JI 126.01 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy:
Elements..................................................................................................................... 126-2
M Civ JI 126.02 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy: Business
Relationship or Expectancy—Definition..................................................................... 126-4
M Civ JI 126.03 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy: Intent—
Definition.................................................................................................................... 126-5
M Civ JI 126.04 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy:
Improper—Definition................................................................................................. 126-6
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 126-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 126.01 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or
Expectancy: Elements
Plaintiff claims that defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with plaintiff’s
business relationship or expectancy with [ name of third party ]. In order to establish the
claim, plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that plaintiff had a business relationship or expectancy with [ name of third
party ] at the time of the claimed interference.
(b) that the business relationship or expectancy had a reasonable likelihood of
future economic benefit for plaintiff.
(c) that defendant knew of the business relationship or expectancy at the time
of the claimed interference.
(d) that defendant intentionally interfered with the business relationship or
expectancy.
(e) that defendant improperly interfered with the business relationship or
expectancy.
(f) that defendant’s conduct caused [ name of third party ] to disrupt or
terminate the business relationship or expectancy.
(g) that plaintiff was damaged as a result of defendant’s conduct.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if you find that the plaintiff has proved all of those
elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if you find that the plaintiff has failed to prove any
one of those elements.
Comment
This instruction is supported by Jim-Bob, Inc v Mehling, 178 Mich App 71, 95–96; 443
NW2d 451 (1989); Michigan Podiatric Medical Ass’n v National Foot Care Program, Inc,
175 Mich App 723, 735; 438 NW2d 349 (1989); Feaheny v Caldwell, 175 Mich App 291,
301; 437 NW2d 358 (1989); Bonelli v Volkswagen of America, Inc, 166 Mich App 483,
496–498; 421 NW2d 213 (1988); Woody v Tamer, 158 Mich App 764, 773–774; 405
NW2d 213 (1987); Feldman v Green, 138 Mich App 360; 360 NW2d 881 (1984); and
Trepel v Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, 135 Mich App 361, 374; 354 NW2d 341 (1984).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 126-3
Chapter 126: Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy
History
M Civ JI 126.01 was added March 1993. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 126-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 126.02 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or
Expectancy: Business Relationship or Expectancy—Definition
Plaintiff claims that the business relationship or expectancy in this case is [ describe as
briefly as possible the business relationship or expectancy claimed ].
The relationship or expectancy need not be evidenced by a contract, but there must be a
realistic expectation. The law requires more than wishful thinking, hope, or optimism; what
is required is a reasonable likelihood or probability of future economic benefit for the
plaintiff.
Comment
Trepel v Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, 135 Mich App 361; 354 NW2d 341 (1984); Joba
Construction Co, Inc v Burns & Roe, Inc, 121 Mich App 615; 329 NW2d 760 (1982);
Schipani v Ford Motor Co, 102 Mich App 606, 621–623; 302 NW2d 307 (1981).
History
M Civ JI 126.02 was added March 1993.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 126-5
Chapter 126: Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy
M Civ JI 126.03 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or
Expectancy: Intent—Definition
When I say that plaintiff must prove that defendant intentionally interfered with the
business relationship or expectancy, I mean that
(a) defendant’s primary, but not necessarily sole, purpose was to interfere with
plaintiff’s business relationship or expectancy, or
(b) defendant acted knowing that [ his / her ] conduct was certain or
substantially certain to cause interference with plaintiff’s business relationship
or expectancy.
Comment
This instruction is adapted from Restatement (Second) of Torts §766 cmt j, at 12. See also
Derosia v Austin, 115 Mich App 647, 654; 321 NW2d 760 (1982); Formall, Inc v
Community National Bank of Pontiac, 166 Mich App 772, 781; 421 NW2d 289 (1988).
History
M Civ JI 126.03 was added March 1993.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 126-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 126.04 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or
Expectancy: Improper—Definition
Improper interference is conduct that is fraudulent, not lawful, not ethical, or not justified
under any circumstances. If defendant’s conduct was lawful, it is still improper if it was
done without justification and for the purpose of interfering with plaintiff’s business
relationship or expectancy, but plaintiff must specifically show affirmative acts by
defendant that corroborate that defendant had the wrongful purpose of interfering with
plaintiff’s business relationship or expectancy.
Comment
See Feldman v Green, 138 Mich App 360; 360 NW2d 881 (1984); Formall, Inc v
Community National Bank of Pontiac, 166 Mich App 772, 780; 421 NW2d 289 (1988). See
also Trepel v Pontiac Osteopathic Hospital, 135 Mich App 361, 374; 354 NW2d 341
(1984); Weitting v McFeeters, 104 Mich App 188, 198; 304 NW2d 525 (1981); Feaheny v
Caldwell, 175 Mich App 291, 304; 437 NW2d 358 (1989); Wilkinson v Powe, 300 Mich
275; 1 NW2d 539 (1942); Bahr v Miller Bros Creamery, 365 Mich 415; 112 NW2d 463
(1961).
In determining whether defendant’s conduct was improper, courts have considered the
following factors:
1.the nature of defendant’s conduct;
2.defendant’s motive or reasons for its actions;
3.the interests of plaintiff with which the defendant’s conduct allegedly
interfered;
4.the interests that defendant sought to advance;
5.society’s interest in (a) protecting the freedom of defendant to engage in such
conduct, and (b) protecting contractual relationships, business relationships or
expectancies such as that held or sought by plaintiff;
6.how directly defendant’s conduct influenced the breaching party; and
7.the nature of the relationships of plaintiff, defendant, and the other party to the
contract.
In appropriate cases, instructions dealing with these factors may be given. This list of
factors is consistent with the view of the Michigan courts that the preferred guidelines are
Michigan Supreme Court Page 126-7
Chapter 126: Tortious Interference with Business Relationship or Expectancy
those articulated in §767 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is increasingly endorsed
by Michigan courts. See, e.g., Jim-Bob, Inc v Mehling, 178 Mich App 71, 96–97; 443
NW2d 451 (1989); Woody v Tamer, 158 Mich App 764, 775; 405 NW2d 213 (1987).
History
M Civ JI 126.04 was added March 1993. Amended March 1994.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 126-8 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 128-1
CHAPTER 128
Fraud and Misrepresentation
M Civ JI 128.01 Fraud Based on False Representation............................................... 128-2
M Civ JI 128.02 Fraud Based on Failure to Disclose Facts (Silent Fraud).................... 128-4
M Civ JI 128.03 Fraud Based on Bad-Faith Promise ................................................... 128-6
M Civ JI 128.04 Innocent Misrepresentation ............................................................. 128-8
M Civ JI 128.10 Material Fact—Definition ................................................................. 128-9
M Civ JI 128.11 Reliance—Definition ....................................................................... 128-10
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 128-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 128.01 Fraud Based on False Representation
Plaintiff claims that defendant defrauded [ him / her / it ]. To establish fraud, plaintiff has
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence:
(a) that defendant made a representation of [ a material fact / material facts ].
(b) that the representation was false when it was made.
(c) that defendant knew the representation was false when [ he / she / it ] made
it, or defendant made it recklessly, that is, without knowing whether it was
true.
(d) that defendant made the representation with the intent that plaintiff rely on
it.
(e) that plaintiff relied on the representation.
(f) that plaintiff was damaged as a result of [ his / her / its ] reliance.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements by clear
and convincing evidence.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements by clear and convincing evidence.
Note on Use
If more than one type of fraud is at issue, the final paragraph of this instruction must be
revised to instruct the jury that the verdict will be for the defendant only if plaintiff fails to
prove any of the types of fraud claimed.
This instruction should be accompanied by the definition of clear and convincing evidence
in M Civ JI 8.01.
This instruction is intended to be used in a tort action for damages for fraud. It is not
designed for use in other types of cases.
Comment
Candler v Heigho, 208 Mich 115; 175 NW 141 (1919); Blanksma v King, 172 Mich 666;
138 NW 236 (1912). Candler was overruled in part insofar as it purported to hold that all
six traditional common-law elements of fraud must be proved in an innocent
Michigan Supreme Court Page 128-3
Chapter 128: Fraud and Misrepresentation
misrepresentation case. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Black, 412 Mich 99, 116;
313 NW2d 77 (1981).
For a discussion of Michigan cases on the quantum of proof in fraud actions, see Disner v
Westinghouse Electric Corp, 726 F2d 1106 (CA 6, 1984); but see Mina v General Star
Indemnity Co, 218 Mich App 678; 555 NW2d 1 (1996).
History
M Civ JI 128.01 was added December 1994. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 128-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 128.02 Fraud Based on Failure to Disclose Facts (Silent
Fraud)
Plaintiff claims that defendant defrauded [ him / her / it ] by failing to disclose material
facts. To establish this, plaintiff has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence:
(a) that defendant failed to disclose [ a material fact / material facts ] about
[ insert subject matter of the claim ].
(b) that defendant had actual knowledge of the [ fact / facts ].
(c) that defendant’s failure to disclose the [ fact / facts ] caused plaintiff to
have a false impression.
(d) that when defendant failed to disclose the [ fact / facts ], defendant knew
the failure would create a false impression.
(e) that when defendant failed to disclose the [ fact / facts ], defendant
intended that plaintiff rely on the resulting false impression.
(f) that plaintiff relied on the false impression.
(g) that plaintiff was damaged as a result of [ his / her / its ] reliance.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements by clear
and convincing evidence.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements by clear and convincing evidence.
Note on Use
This instruction should not be used unless the trial judge has determined that defendant had
a duty to disclose. Toering v Glupker, 319 Mich 182; 29 NW2d 277 (1947); Fassihi v
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, PC, 107 Mich App 509; 309 NW2d 645
(1981).
If more than one type of fraud is at issue, the final paragraph of this instruction must be
revised to instruct the jury that the verdict will be for the defendant only if plaintiff fails to
prove any of the types of fraud claimed.
This instruction should be accompanied by the definition of clear and convincing evidence
Michigan Supreme Court Page 128-5
Chapter 128: Fraud and Misrepresentation
in M Civ JI 8.01.
This instruction is intended to be used in a tort action for damages for fraud. It is not
designed for use in other types of cases.
Comment
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Black, 412 Mich 99, 124–128; 313 NW2d 77
(1981).
For a discussion of Michigan cases on the quantum of proof in fraud actions, see Disner v
Westinghouse Electric Corp, 726 F2d 1106 (CA 6, 1984); but see Mina v General Star
Indemnity Co, 218 Mich App 678; 555 NW2d 1 (1996).
History
M Civ JI 128.02 was added December 1994. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 128-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 128.03 Fraud Based on Bad-Faith Promise
Plaintiff claims that defendant defrauded [ him / her / it ] by making a promise of future
conduct. To establish this, plaintiff has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence:
(a) that defendant promised that
[ describe promise alleged by plaintiff ].
(b) that at the time defendant made the promise, [ he / she / it ] did not intend
to keep it.
(c) that defendant made the promise with the intent that plaintiff rely on it.
(d) that plaintiff relied on the promise.
(e) that plaintiff was damaged as a result of [ his / her / its ] reliance.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements by clear
and convincing evidence.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements by clear and convincing evidence.
Note on Use
If more than one type of fraud is at issue, the final paragraph of this instruction must be
revised to instruct the jury that the verdict will be for the defendant only if plaintiff fails to
prove any of the types of fraud claimed.
This instruction should be accompanied by the definition of clear and convincing evidence
in M Civ JI 8.01.
Comment
This instruction is based on the bad-faith exception to the rule that fraud cannot be based
on promises of future conduct. Hi-Way Motor Co v International Harvester Co, 398 Mich
330; 247 NW2d 813 (1976); Rutan v Straehly, 289 Mich 341; 286 NW 639 (1939); Laing
v McKee, 13 Mich 124; 87 Am Dec 738 (1865); Jim-Bob, Inc v Mehling, 178 Mich App 71,
90; 443 NW2d 451 (1989).
A mere broken promise standing alone is not sufficient evidence of fraud. Marrero v
McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp, 200 Mich App 438; 505 NW2d 275 (1993); see also Hi-
Way Motor Co (evidence was too remote to show fraudulent intent at the time the promise
Michigan Supreme Court Page 128-7
Chapter 128: Fraud and Misrepresentation
was made).
For a discussion of Michigan cases on the quantum of proof in fraud actions, see Disner v
Westinghouse Electric Corp, 726 F2d 1106 (CA 6, 1984); but see Mina v General Star
Indemnity Co, 218 Mich App 678; 555 NW2d 1 (1996).
History
M Civ JI 128.03 was added December 1994. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 128-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 128.04 Innocent Misrepresentation
Plaintiff claims that defendant made an innocent misrepresentation of material fact. To
establish this, plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that defendant made a representation of [ a material fact / material facts ].
(b) that the representation was made in connection with the making of a
contract between plaintiff and defendant.
(c) that the representation was false when it was made.
(d) that plaintiff would not have entered into the contract if defendant had not
made the representation.
(e) that plaintiff had a loss as a result of entering into the contract.
(f) that plaintiff’s loss benefited the defendant.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff has failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Black, 412 Mich 99; 313 NW2d 77 (1981); Irwin
v Carlton, 369 Mich 92; 119 NW2d 617 (1963); Converse v Blumrich, 14 Mich 109, 123;
90 Am Dec 230 (1866).
An action for innocent misrepresentation may be maintained even though plaintiff’s loss is
greater than defendant’s gain. Aldrich v Scribner, 154 Mich 23; 117 NW2d 581 (1908).
History
M Civ JI 128.04 was added December 1994. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 128-9
Chapter 128: Fraud and Misrepresentation
M Civ JI 128.10 Material Fact—Definition
A material fact cannot be an opinion, belief, speculation or prediction. It must relate to
something past or present that can be proved or disproved.
A material fact must be of enough importance in the matter that a reasonable person would
be likely to rely on it.
Note on Use
This instruction should be used with M Civ JI 128.01, 128.02, and 128.04.
Comment
Cases discussing material include Lebeis v Rutzen, 289 Mich 1; 286 NW 134 (1939); Starr
v Kleiser, 224 Mich 75; 194 NW 568 (1923); and Hall v Johnson, 41 Mich 286; 2 NW 55
(1879).
Cases distinguishing statements of fact from statements of opinion or belief, predictions of
future performance, or normal puffing include Hayes Construction Co v Silverthorn, 343
Mich 421; 72 NW2d 190 (1955); Graham v Myers, 333 Mich 111; 52 NW2d 621 (1952);
Mesh v Citrin, 299 Mich 527; 300 NW2d 870 (1941); and Van Tassel v McDonald Corp,
159 Mich App 745; 407 NW2d 6 (1987).
History
M Civ JI 128.10 was added December 1994.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 128-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 128.11 Reliance—Definition
When I use the word relied, I mean that plaintiff would not have [ entered into the contract
/ [ describe other action ] ] if defendant had not made the [ representation / false impression
/ promise ], even if the [ representation / false impression / promise ] was not the only
reason for plaintiff’s action.
Comment
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Black, 412 Mich 99, 121; 313 NW2d 77 (1981);
Callihan v Talkowski, 372 Mich 1, 6; 124 NW2d 788 (1963); McDonald v Smith, 139 Mich
211; 102 NW 668 (1905).
History
M Civ JI 128.11 was added December 1994.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 130-1
CHAPTER 130
Promissory Estoppel
M Civ JI 130.01 Promissory Estoppel.......................................................................... 130-2
M Civ JI 130.05 Promissory Estoppel: Promise—Definition....................................... 130-5
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 130-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 130.01 Promissory Estoppel
The plaintiff claims that the defendant is liable to [ him / her / it ] based on promissory
estoppel. To establish this claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving:
(a) that the defendant made a promise to [ the plaintiff / *[ name of other
person ] ] that was clear and definite.
(b) that when the promise was made, the defendant knew or should reasonably
have expected that this promise would induce the plaintiff to [ take / refrain
from ] some action.
(c) that the plaintiff did [ take / refrain from ] some action in reliance on the
promise.
(d) that the plaintiff was damaged as a result of [ his / her / its ] reliance.
Your verdict will be for the plaintiff if the plaintiff has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the defendant if the plaintiff failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Note on Use
*Insert the name of a promisee other than the plaintiff if applicable. A person other than
the promisee has a cause of action for promissory estoppel if the promisor should
reasonably have expected the third person to act or refrain from acting in reliance. First
Security Savings Bank v Aitken, 226 Mich App 291, 312; 573 NW2d 307 (1997). However,
if the promise has been fulfilled, the third person cannot maintain an action. Parkhurst
Homes, Inc v McLaughlin, 187 Mich App 357; 466 NW2d 404 (1991).
These instructions are not applicable in cases involving a defense of equitable estoppel
because the elements are different from the elements of a cause of action for damages based
on promissory estoppel. Compare Huhtala v Travelers Ins Co, 401 Mich 118; 257 NW2d
640 (1977) (contracts statute of limitations applies to promissory estoppel action) with
Cincinnati Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 454 Mich 263, 269–270; 562 NW2d 648 (1997)
(equitable estoppel as waiver of defense of statute of limitations). In Huhtala, the court
explained that equitable estoppel is essentially a doctrine of waiver and conduct that might
not constitute a clear and definite promise can be sufficient to establish an estoppel;
promissory estoppel does not establish waiver, but substitutes for consideration in a case
where there are no mutual promises, and it enables the promisee to assert a claim against
the promisor independent of any other claim he or she may have against the promisor. 401
Mich at 132, 133.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 130-3
Chapter 130: Promissory Estoppel
Comment
State Bank of Standish v Curry, 442 Mich 76; 500 NW2d 104 (1993); Huhtala.
Although promissory estoppel is traditionally viewed as an equitable doctrine in Michigan,
the claim may be submitted to the jury where the remedy sought is money damages or other
nonequitable relief. Ecco, Ltd v Balimoy Mfg Co, 179 Mich App 748; 446 NW2d 546
(1989).
Applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact,
and the trial court needs to determine as a matter of law whether it is proper to invoke the
doctrine of promissory estoppel by making a threshold inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the making of the promise and the promisee’s reliance. Standish, 442 Mich at
84. Standish suggests that this threshold inquiry involves a determination that the doctrine
must be invoked to avoid injustice. See RS Bennett & Co v Economy Mechanical
Industries, Inc, 606 F2d 182 (CA 7, 1979), cited in Standish, 442 Mich at 85 n 6. Certainly
the avoidance of injustice requirement of promissory estoppel is equitable in nature and
presents a policy decision for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. Commentators
have cited this as the majority view, and several courts in other jurisdictions have held that
whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise is a question of law
for the court and is not submissible to the jury. See 4 Williston, Contracts §8:5 (4th ed);
Hoffman v Red Owl Stores, Inc, 26 Wisc 2d 683; 133 NW2d 267 (1965); D & S Coal Co v
USX Corp, 678 F Supp 1318 (ED Tenn, 1988), aff’d, 872 F2d 1024 (CA 6, 1989); Cohen
v Cowles Media Co, 479 NW2d 387 (Minn, 1992); see also Taylor v First of America Bank-
Wayne, 973 F2d 1284 (CA 6, 1992); contra Alaska v First National Bank, 629 P2d 78 (Ala,
1981) (question of law if reasonable minds do not differ).
Promissory estoppel is not available as a cause of action for a person who suffers an injury
relying on an enforceable contract promise because the usual remedies for breach of
contract apply. Promissory estoppel substitutes for consideration in a case where there are
no mutual promises. Huhtala. Where the reliance claimed by the promisee is bargained-
for and is performance required under a contract between the parties, the promisee must
rely on contract remedies and cannot sue on a promissory estoppel theory. See General
Aviation v Cessna Aircraft Co, 703 F Supp 637 (WD Mich, 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds, 13 F3d 178 (CA 6, 1993); Paradata Computer Networks v Telebit
Corp, 830 F Supp 1001 (ED Mich, 1993). Whether reliance is also performance under a
contract is usually resolved by the court as a matter of law.
The measure of damages in an action based on promissory estoppel is what the plaintiff lost
in relying on the defendant’s promise. Joerger v Gordon Food Service, 224 Mich App 167;
568 NW2d 365 (1997); see also Vogue v Shopping Centers, Inc (After Remand), 402 Mich
546; 266 NW2d 148 (1978)(lost profits recoverable); In re Estate of Timko, 51 Mich App
662; 215 NW2d 750 (1974) (voluntary unilateral promise to make charitable contribution;
damages are what was promised).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 130-4 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 130.01 was added March 1999. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 130-5
Chapter 130: Promissory Estoppel
M Civ JI 130.05 Promissory Estoppel: Promise—Definition
A “promise” is words, writing, or other conduct that shows an intent to act or refrain from
acting in a certain way. To be a promise, it must be made in such a manner that the person
to whom it is made is justified in believing that a commitment has been made to [ him / her
/ it ].
*(A statement of opinion or a prediction of future events is not a promise.)
Note on Use
*This paragraph should be used only if it is applicable to the facts in the case.
Comment
State Bank of Standish v Curry, 442 Mich 76; 500 NW2d 104 (1993); Charter Township of
Ypsilanti v General Motors Corp, 201 Mich App 128; 506 NW2d 556 (1993).
History
M Civ JI 130.05 was added March 1999.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 130-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-1
CHAPTER 140
Contract ActionUCC
M Civ JI 140.01 Contract Action—UCC: Explanation and Burden of Proof ................ 140-3
M Civ JI 140.02 Contract Action—UCC: Offer and Acceptance.................................. 140-5
M Civ JI 140.03 Contract Action—UCC: Acceptance with Different or Additional
Terms ......................................................................................................................... 140-6
M Civ JI 140.04 Contract Action—UCC: Enforceability of Contract: Statute of
Frauds......................................................................................................................... 140-7
M Civ JI 140.05 Contract Action—UCC: Contract Terms—Written Acceptance or
Confirmation with Different or Additional Terms ...................................................... 140-9
M Civ JI 140.11 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Acceptance of Nonconforming
Goods ....................................................................................................................... 140-11
M Civ JI 140.12 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Revocation of Acceptance ............ 140-13
M Civ JI 140.13 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Rejection of Goods—Installment
Contract.................................................................................................................... 140-15
M Civ JI 140.14 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Rejection of Goods or Part of the
Goods ....................................................................................................................... 140-17
M Civ JI 140.15 Contract Action—UCC: Anticipatory Repudiation—Definition ....... 140-19
M Civ JI 140.21 Contract Action—UCC: Lost or Damaged Goods (Risk of Loss—Absence of
Breach) ..................................................................................................................... 140-20
M Civ JI 140.22 Contract Action—UCC: Lost or Damaged Goods (Risk of Loss—Seller’s
Breach) ..................................................................................................................... 140-22
M Civ JI 140.23 Contract Action—UCC: Lost or Damaged Goods (Risk of Loss—Buyer’s
Breach) ..................................................................................................................... 140-23
M Civ JI 140.31 Contract Action—UCC: Resale by Seller—Private Sale ................... 140-24
M Civ JI 140.32 Contract Action—UCC: Resale by Seller—Public Sale..................... 140-25
M Civ JI 140.41 Contract Action—UCC: Express Warranty—Definition................... 140-26
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 140-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 140.42 Contract Action—UCC: Express Warranty—Burden of Proof ......... 140-27
M Civ JI 140.43 Contract Action—UCC: Implied Warranty of Merchantability—
Definition.................................................................................................................. 140-28
M Civ JI 140.44 Contract Action—UCC: Implied Warranty of Merchantability—Elimination
or Modification......................................................................................................... 140-29
M Civ JI 140.45 Contract Action—UCC: Implied Warranty of Merchantability—Burden of
Proof......................................................................................................................... 140-31
M Civ JI 140.51 Contract Action—UCC: Warranty of Title (Ownership)................... 140-33
M Civ JI 140.52 Contract Action—UCC: Warranty of Title (Encumbrances) ............ 140-34
M Civ JI 140.53 Contract Action—UCC: Warranty of Title (Ownership and Encumbrances—
Burden of Proof)....................................................................................................... 140-35
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-3
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.01 Contract Action—UCC: Explanation and Burden of
Proof
This case involves a claim by the [ seller / buyer ] for breach of a contract for the sale of
goods. A contract for the sale of goods is an agreement between a buyer and a seller who
by their words and conduct show that they intend to make a contract.
The [ seller / buyer ] has the burden of proving that:
(a) (the contract exists)
(b) (the [ buyer / seller ] breached the contract)
(c) (the [ seller / buyer ] was damaged by the breach of contract).
(The [ buyer / seller ] has the burden of proving the defense of [ describe defense ].)
This case also involves a counterclaim by the [ buyer / seller ] that the [ seller / buyer ]
breached this contract. With respect to the counterclaim, the [ buyer / seller ] has the burden
of proving that:
(d) (the [ seller / buyer ] breached the contract)
(e) (the [ buyer / seller ] was damaged by the breach of contract).
(The [ seller / buyer ] has the burden of proving the defense of [ describe
defense ].)
Note on Use
If any of the matters in this instruction are admitted or otherwise not an issue in the case,
this instruction must be modified to exclude such matters.
Comment
As to what constitutes a contract for the sale of goods, see Lorenz Supply Co v American
Standard Inc, 419 Mich 610; 358 NW2d 845 (1984).
The burden of proving the existence of a contract is on the party alleging the contract.
American Parts Co Inc v American Arbitration Association, 8 Mich App 156; 154 NW2d
5 (1967).
The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense and the burden of proof is on the party
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 140-4 Michigan Supreme Court
opposing enforcement. Fairway Machinery Sales Co v Continental Motors Corp, 40 Mich
App 270; 198 NW2d 757 (1972). However, the moving party has the burden of proving part
performance under the exception of MCL 440.2201(3)(c). R G Moeller Co v Van Kampen
Construction Co, 57 Mich App 308; 225 NW2d 742 (1975).
History
M Civ JI 140.01 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-5
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.02 Contract Action—UCC: Offer and Acceptance
A contract for the sale of goods exists when a [ seller / buyer ] offers to [ sell / buy ] goods
and a [ buyer / seller ] accepts that offer. Acceptance occurs when the [ seller / buyer ]
through words or actions indicates in any reasonable manner that [ he / she / it ] intends to
enter into a contract under the terms proposed by the [ buyer / seller ].
*(Acceptance must occur within the time specified in the offer. If no time is specified, then
acceptance must occur within a reasonable time.)
*(If the offer is to buy goods for immediate shipment or delivery, the offer may be accepted
by a promise to ship or deliver or by actual shipment or delivery.)
Note on Use
*The paragraphs in parentheses should be read only when applicable.
Comment
MCL 440.2206, .2204.
History
M Civ JI 140.02 was added January 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 140-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 140.03 Contract Action—UCC: Acceptance with Different or
Additional Terms
The [ seller / buyer ] made an offer to the [ buyer / seller ]. The [ buyer / seller ] sent a
written response to the offer. You must decide whether the response was an acceptance.
The [ buyer’s / seller’s ] response was an acceptance if it indicated that the [ buyer / seller ]
intended to enter into a contract, even though the response stated terms that were not in the
offer or that were different from those in the offer.
However, if the response indicated that the [ buyer / seller ] intended to accept the offer
only if the [ seller / buyer ] agreed to the additional or different terms, then the response is
not an acceptance unless the [ seller / buyer ] later indicated in any reasonable manner that
[ he / she / it ] agreed to those terms.
Comment
MCL 440.2207(1). See also Challenge Machinery Co v Mattison Machine Works, 138
Mich App 15; 359 NW2d 232 (1984).
History
M Civ JI 140.03 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-7
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.04 Contract Action—UCC: Enforceability of Contract:
Statute of Frauds
A contract is enforceable if there is some writing or writings *(signed by the [ seller / buyer
/ seller’s agent / buyer’s agent ]) sufficient to show that the seller and buyer intended to
enter into a contract. The writing or writings do not have to contain all of the terms of the
contract, but must specify the quantity of goods to be [ sold / purchased ].
†(“Signed” includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to
adopt or accept a writing.)
Note on Use
*If both the buyer and the seller are merchants, this instruction must be modified to reflect
the special provisions of MCL 440.2201(2). If the status of either party as a merchant is an
issue, see M Civ JI 140.05 b for the definition of merchant.
†This paragraph should be used only if applicable.
This instruction applies to contracts for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more.
MCL 440.2201(1), but note that section 2201(1) was amended by 2002 PA 15 to raise the
amount from $500 to $1,000. It does not apply to cases under MCL 440.2201(3)(a) for
goods which are to be specially manufactured (see S C Gray Inc v Ford Motor Co, 92 Mich
App 789; 286 NW2d 34 (1979)) or to cases of part performance under MCL 440.2201(3)(c)
(see West Central Packing Inc v A F Murch Co, 109 Mich App 493; 311 NW2d 404
(1981)).
Comment
MCL 440.2201(1), (2), .1201(2)(kk). MCL 440.1201(39), defining “signed”, was amended
effective July 1, 2013 and was redesignated MCL 440.1201(2)(kk).
On the applicability of the statute of frauds to modifications or extensions of existing
contracts, see S C Gray Inc; West Central Packing Inc.
Between merchants, what constitutes a reasonable time for sending a confirmatory writing
is a jury question. Barron v Edwards, 45 Mich App 210; 206 NW2d 508 (1973). A
confirmation between merchants requires a quantity term. Ace Concrete Products Co v
Charles J Rogers Construction Co, 69 Mich App 610; 245 NW2d 353 (1976); In re Estate
of Frost, 130 Mich App 556; 344 NW2d 331 (1983) (“all” is sufficient quantity term).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
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History
M Civ JI 140.04 was added January 1987. Amended April 2014.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-9
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.05 Contract Action—UCC: Contract Terms—Written
Acceptance or Confirmation with Different or Additional Terms
*(If you decide there is an enforceable contract,) you must *(then) decide what terms are
included in the contract. The contract will include those terms in the offer to which the
[ buyer / seller ] agreed.
It will include additional or different terms contained in the written [ acceptance /
response ] if the [ buyer / seller ] through [ his / her / its ] words or actions indicated in any
reasonable manner that [ he / she / it ] agreed to the additional or different terms.
It will also include additional terms that were not agreed to if:
(a) the [ seller / buyer ] did not notify the [ buyer / seller ] that [ he / she / it ]
objected to the additional terms within a reasonable time after receiving the
written [ acceptance / response ], and
(b) the seller and buyer are both merchants, that is, people who deal in [ specify
types of goods ] or who, by their occupations, hold themselves out as having
knowledge or skill about [ specify types of goods ] or transactions involving
[ specify types of goods ], and
(c) the offer did not limit acceptance only to those terms contained in the offer,
and
(d) the additional terms in the [ acceptance / response ] do not materially alter
the terms contained in the offer.
Note on Use
*The words in parentheses should be used if applicable to the case.
Subparagraph b of this instruction defines merchant. See MCL 440.2104(1), (3).
This instruction does not apply to cases where, although no contract is formed via the
exchange of forms, the parties by performance recognize the existence of a contract. MCL
440.2207(3); see also American Parts Inc v American Arbitration Association, 8 Mich App
156, 176; 154 NW2d 5 (1967).
Comment
MCL 440.2207.
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Page 140-10 Michigan Supreme Court
Additional terms become part of the contract if a merchant fails to object to them, but
different terms do not become part of the contract if there is a failure to object. American
Parts Inc v American Arbitration Association; Challenge Machinery Co v Mattison
Machine Works, 138 Mich App 15; 359 NW2d 232 (1984); S C Gray Inc v Ford Motor Co,
92 Mich App 789; 286 NW2d 34 (1979).
History
M Civ JI 140.05 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-11
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.11 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Acceptance of
Nonconforming Goods
The buyer is entitled to accept goods and recover damages if the goods or the manner, time,
or place of their delivery do not conform to the contract, and the buyer notifies the seller of
the nonconformity within a reasonable time after [ he / she / it ] discovered or should have
discovered the nonconformity. The buyer has the burden of proving that [ he / she / it ] gave
the seller the required notification.
In this case, the buyer accepted all of the goods. The buyer claims that the [ goods / manner,
time, or place of delivery ] did not conform to the contract in that [ describe
nonconformity ].
Goods are nonconforming if they are not in accordance with the contract requirements and
their value to the buyer is substantially impaired.
You must decide whether the [ goods / manner, time, and place of their delivery ]
conformed to the contract and, if not, whether the buyer notified the seller of the
nonconformity within a reasonable time after [ he / she / it ] discovered or should have
discovered the nonconformity.
If you determine that the [ goods / manner, time, or place of their delivery ] did not conform
to the contract, and the buyer notified the seller of the nonconformity within a reasonable
time after [ he / she / it ] discovered or should have discovered the nonconformity, then the
seller has breached the contract.
If you determine that the [ goods / manner, time, and place of their delivery ] conformed to
the contract, or that the buyer failed to notify the seller of the nonconformity within a
reasonable time after [ he / she / it ] discovered or should have discovered the
nonconformity, then the seller has not breached the contract.
Note on Use
If there are issues about acceptance, this instruction must be modified. See MCL 440.2606
for the definition of acceptance.
Comment
MCL 440.2601, .2607(3), .2714(1).
The buyer has the burden of proving that he notified the seller of the nonconformity. S C
Gray Inc v Ford Motor Co, 92 Mich App 789; 286 NW2d 34 (1979).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 140-12 Michigan Supreme Court
For a discussion of reasonable time to notify of nonconformity, see Michigan Sugar Co v
Jebavy-Sorenson Orchard Co, 66 Mich App 642; 239 NW2d 693 (1976).
History
M Civ JI 140.11 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-13
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.12 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Revocation of
Acceptance
The buyer must accept goods from the seller if the goods and the manner, time, and place
of their [ delivery / tender ] conform to the contract.
In this case, the buyer accepted the goods and then revoked that acceptance. A buyer is
entitled to revoke acceptance of all or some of the goods only if those goods do not conform
to the contract, and the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of those goods to the
buyer, and if:
(a) the buyer notified the seller of the revocation within a reasonable time after
the buyer [ discovered / should have discovered ] the nonconformity,
and
(b)
(i) the buyer accepted the goods on the reasonable assumption that the
nonconformity would be cured and it was not cured [ within the time
agreed / within a reasonable time ],
or
(ii) the buyer did not discover the nonconformity, and the buyer’s
acceptance was reasonably induced either by difficulty of discovery before
acceptance or by the seller’s assurances.
The buyer has the burden of proving that [ he / she / it ] gave the seller the
required notification.
*(If you determine that the buyer rightfully revoked the acceptance, then the seller has
breached the contract.)
If you determine that the buyer has wrongfully revoked the acceptance, then the buyer has
breached the contract.
Note on Use
*The paragraph in parentheses should be used if there is a counterclaim by the buyer.
The buyer cannot revoke acceptance after a substantial change in condition of the goods
which is not caused by their own defects. MCL 440.2608(2). If that is an issue, this
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instruction must be modified.
Comment
MCL 440.2608.
The buyer can only revoke acceptance of commercial lots or units.
Subsection b.1 of this instruction incorporates the definition of seasonable found in MCL
440.1205(2).
For a discussion of what constitutes substantial impairment, see Colonial Dodge Inc v
Miller, 420 Mich 452; 362 NW2d 704 (1984).
If a buyer revokes acceptance under MCL 440.2608(1)(b) on the basis of a defect that was
not known at the time of acceptance, the seller has no right to cure after the buyer has
revoked; it is reversible error to instruct the jury that it is a defense to plaintiff’s claim for
revocation that the seller has made all reasonable and necessary efforts to repair any alleged
defects. Head v Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc, 234 Mich App 94; 593 NW2d 595
(1999). (But efforts to repair are relevant on the questions whether the buyer revoked in a
reasonable time and whether the nonconformity substantially impaired the value of the
goods.)
A buyer does not have a remedy under MCL 440.2608 against a manufacturer not in privity
with the buyer. Henderson v Chrysler Corp, 191 Mich App 337; 477 NW2d 505 (1991), lv
denied, 439 Mich 1010; 485 NW2d 501 (1992).
History
M Civ JI 140.12 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-15
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.13 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Rejection of Goods—
Installment Contract
The buyer rejected some of the goods. The [ buyer / seller ] claims that the contract is an
installment contract. An installment contract is one that requires or authorizes the seller to
deliver goods in separate installments and the buyer to accept each installment separately.
*(A contract can be an installment contract even if it contains the clause [ “each delivery is
a separate contract” / [ other equivalent clause ] ].) You must determine whether this
contract is an installment contract.
If it is an installment contract, the buyer must accept an installment if:
(a) the goods in that installment and the manner, time, and place of their
[ delivery / tender ] conform to the contract. (Tender means that the seller has
put and holds goods at the buyer’s disposal and has given the buyer any
notification reasonably necessary to enable [ him / her / it ] to take delivery.)
or
(b) the goods in that installment or the manner, time, or place of their [ delivery
/ tender ] do not conform to the contract, but the nonconformity does not
substantially impair the value of that installment.
or
(c) the goods in that installment or the manner, time, or place of their [ delivery
/ tender ] do not conform to the contract, but the nonconformity does not
substantially impair the value of the whole contract and the seller gives
adequate assurance of its cure.
†The buyer is entitled to reject an installment if the goods in that installment, or the manner,
time, or place of their [ delivery / tender ] do not conform to the contract, and the
nonconformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured, and
the buyer notified the seller of the nonconformity within a reasonable time after the
[ delivery / tender ]. The buyer has the burden of proving that [ he / she / it ] gave the seller
the required notification.
If you determine that the buyer was entitled to reject an installment(s), then the seller has
breached the contract.
You must then determine whether the breach is a breach of [ an installment / one or more
of the installments ] or a breach of the whole contract. If the nonconformity of [ an
installment / one or more of the installments ] substantially impaired the value of the whole
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contract, then there is a breach of the whole contract.
If you determine that the buyer was not entitled to reject [ an installment / one or more of
the installments ], then the buyer has breached the contract.
Note on Use
*Use the sentence in parentheses if applicable to the case.
†If the contract defines substantial impairment, or the contract or surrounding
circumstances imply specific requirements as to quality, time, quantity, assortment, or the
like, then these portions of the instruction may have to be modified. See UCC Official
Comment Number 4 at MCL 440.2612.
If there are issues concerning reinstatement of the contract, this instruction may require
modification. See MCL 440.2612(3).
Comment
MCL 440.2612. See also MCL 440.2602.
History
M Civ JI 140.13 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-17
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.14 Contract Action—UCC: Buyer’s Rejection of Goods or
Part of the Goods
*(The buyer rejected [ all / some ] of the goods (and accepted the rest of the goods).)
†(If the contract is not an installment contract,) the buyer must accept goods from the seller
if the goods and the manner, time, and place of their [ delivery / tender ] conform to the
contract. ‡(Tender means that the seller has put and holds goods at the buyer’s disposal and
has given the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable [ him / her / it ] to take
delivery.) The buyer is entitled to reject [ all / some ] of the goods if the goods or the
manner, time, or place of their [ delivery / tender ] do not conform to the contract and the
buyer notifies the seller of the nonconformity within a reasonable time after [ delivery /
tender ]. The buyer has the burden of proving that [ he / she / it ] gave the seller the required
notification.
If you determine that the [ goods / manner, time, and place of their [ delivery / tender ] ]
conformed to the contract or that the buyer failed to notify the seller of [ his / her / its ]
rejection within a reasonable time after [ delivery / tender ], then the buyer has breached the
contract.
**(If you determine that the [ goods / manner, time, or place of their [ delivery / tender ] ]
did not conform to the contract and that the buyer notified the seller of [ his / her / its ]
rejection within a reasonable time after [ delivery / tender ], then the seller has breached the
contract.)
Note on Use
*Delete this sentence if M Civ JI 140.13 is used.
†This phrase should be read if M Civ JI 140.13 is used.
‡The definition in parentheses should be read when appropriate.
**The paragraph in parentheses should be used if there is a counterclaim by the buyer.
A buyer who has accepted (see the definition in MCL 440.2606) goods may not reject, but
may be entitled to revoke acceptance (M Civ JI 140.12). Colonial Dodge Inc v Miller, 420
Mich 452; 362 NW2d 704 (1984).
Comment
MCL 440.2601, .2602, .2603.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 140-18 Michigan Supreme Court
In certain situations involving shipment contracts, a buyer can only reject for material delay
or loss. MCL 440.2504. The right of the seller to cure is a limitation on the right to reject.
MCL 440.2508.
There may also be contractual limitations on the right to reject. See North American Steel
Corp v Siderius Inc, 75 Mich App 391; 254 NW2d 899 (1977) (but where seller refused to
comply with trade usage term of contract calling for price adjustment for nonconforming
steel, buyer was entitled to reject).
History
M Civ JI 140.14 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-19
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.15 Contract Action—UCC: Anticipatory Repudiation—
Definition
The [ buyer / seller ] claims that the [ seller / buyer ] breached the contract by repudiating
[ his / her / its ] obligations under the contract before performance was due.
Repudiation occurs when a [ seller / buyer ] distinctly tells, or through [ his / her / its ]
actions clearly shows, the [ buyer / seller ] that [ he / she / it ] does not intend or is unable
to perform the contract or any part of the contract, and the loss of performance substantially
impairs the value of the contract to the [ buyer / seller ].
You must determine whether the [ seller / buyer ] breached the contract by repudiation.
Comment
MCL 440.2610. See also Buys v Travis, 243 Mich 470; 220 NW 798 (1928); Fredonia
Broadcasting Corp Inc v RCA Corp, 481 F2d 781 (CA 5, 1973).
History
M Civ JI 140.15 was added January 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
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M Civ JI 140.21 Contract Action—UCC: Lost or Damaged Goods (Risk
of Loss—Absence of Breach)
The buyer has failed to pay for [ lost / damaged ] goods. The buyer must pay for [ lost /
damaged ] goods when:
(a)the buyer has accepted the goods, or
(b)conforming goods are [ lost / damaged ]
(i)*(within a commercially reasonable time after [ the goods are delivered
to the carrier / the goods are duly tendered by the carrier at the
(ii)*(after the seller delivers the goods to [ name of bailee ] and [ gives the
buyer the notification or documents necessary to enable the buyer to take
delivery / the bailee acknowledges the buyer’s right to possession of the
goods ].)
(iii)*([ after the buyer has received the goods, if the seller is a merchant /
or / after the seller has duly tendered delivery of the goods if the seller is
not a merchant ].)
Note on Use
*The court should choose the subsection that is applicable. If there is an issue of which
subsection applies, this instruction must be modified.
This instruction does not apply if there is a contractual agreement to the contrary, or if the
sale is on approval. See MCL 440.2509(4). (See Hayward v Postma, 31 Mich App 720;
188 NW2d 31 (1971) for a discussion of contractual agreements on risk of loss.)
If an issue, this instruction may have to be supplemented to indicate the special rules
relating to negotiable and nonnegotiable documents of title.
Comment
MCL 440.2509, .2709.
See Eberhard Manufacturing Co v Brown, 61 Mich App 268; 232 NW2d 378 (1975)
(applying MCL 440.2509(1) to a “shipment” contract), and Hayward (applying MCL
440.2509(3)).
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-21
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
History
M Civ JI 140.21 was added January 1987. Amended July 2017.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 140-22 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 140.22 Contract Action—UCC: Lost or Damaged Goods (Risk
of Loss—Seller’s Breach)
The buyer does not have to pay for [ lost / damaged ] goods if:
*(a)the goods, or the manner, time, or place of their delivery did not conform to the
contract, or
(b)the buyer has accepted the goods, but has rightfully revoked that acceptance before the
goods are [ lost / damaged ]. If the buyer has rightfully revoked, the buyer does not have to
pay for the goods and the buyer may recover damages from the seller to the extent that [ he
/ she / it ] has not or will not receive insurance proceeds.
Note on Use
*Subsection a applies only if a tender or delivery so fails to conform to the contract as to
give the buyer a right of rejection. MCL 440.2510(1).
Comment
MCL 440.2510(1), (2).
History
M Civ JI 140.22 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-23
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.23 Contract Action—UCC: Lost or Damaged Goods (Risk
of Loss—Buyer’s Breach)
If the buyer repudiated or otherwise breached the contract after existing conforming goods
were shipped, marked, or otherwise designated to the contract, to the extent that the seller
[ has not received / will not receive ] insurance proceeds, [ he / she / it ] may recover
damages from the buyer if the goods were [ lost / damaged ] within a commercially
reasonable time after the repudiation or other breach.
Comment
MCL 440.2510(3).
History
M Civ JI 140.23 was added January 1987.
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Page 140-24 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 140.31 Contract Action—UCC: Resale by Seller—Private Sale
The seller resold the goods at a private sale. If you find that the buyer breached the contract,
you must then determine whether the seller resold the goods in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner, and whether the resale was reasonably identified as
referring to the broken contract.
Good faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction. A private resale is
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner if the amount of goods sold, the time,
place, terms, method, and manner of sale are all commercially reasonable, and the seller
gives the buyer reasonable notification of [ his / her / its ] intention to resell.
*(A seller may resell the goods pursuant to a commercially reasonable contract which the
seller entered into with another prior to the buyer’s breach.)
Note on Use
*Use the sentence in parentheses if it is applicable to the case.
Comment
MCL 440.2706.
History
M Civ JI 140.31 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-25
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.32 Contract Action—UCC: Resale by Seller—Public Sale
The seller resold the goods at a public sale. If you find that the buyer breached the contract,
you must then determine whether the seller resold the goods in good faith and in a
commercially reasonable manner and whether this resale was reasonably identified as
referring to the broken contract.
Good faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction. A public sale is conducted
in a commercially reasonable manner if:
(a) The amount of goods sold, the time, place, terms, method, and manner of
sale are all commercially reasonable.
(b) The sale is made at a usual place or market for public sale if one is
reasonably available.
(c) *(Only existing, conforming goods are sold.)
(d) The seller gives the buyer reasonable notice of the time and place of the
resale (unless you determine that the goods are perishable or threaten to decline
in value speedily).
(e) [ The goods are within the view of those attending the sale / The notice of
sale states the place where the goods are located and provides for reasonable
inspection by prospective bidders ].
Note on Use
*Do not use subsection c if there is a recognized market for a public sale of futures in goods
of the kind.
Comment
MCL 440.2706.
Uganski v Little Giant Crane and Shovel Inc, 35 Mich App 88; 192 NW2d 580 (1971) (sale
by purchaser).
History
M Civ JI 140.32 was added January 1987.
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M Civ JI 140.41 Contract Action—UCC: Express Warranty—
Definition
An express warranty is a statement, promise, or description made in writing, orally, or
through other means by the seller to the buyer that the goods have certain characteristics or
will meet certain standards, which becomes part of the basis of the bargain. A description
of the goods, a sample, or a model, which is made a part of the basis of the bargain, creates
an express warranty that all of the goods will conform to that description, sample, or model.
A seller can create an express warranty without intending to make a warranty, or without
using words such as “warranty” or “guarantee.”
An expression of the seller’s opinion, a statement of value or recommendation is sales talk
or trade puffing and is not an express warranty.
Comment
MCL 440.2313.
Statutory extension of express warranties of goods that have been repaired is found in MCL
440.2313b.
History
M Civ JI 140.41 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-27
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.42 Contract Action—UCC: Express Warranty—Burden of
Proof
The buyer has the burden of proving:
(a) that the seller made an express warranty, and
(b) that the goods did not conform to the warranty at the time of sale or within
the time period covered by the warranty, and
(c) that the buyer notified the seller of the nonconformity within a reasonable
time after [ he / she / it ] discovered or should have discovered the
nonconformity, and
(d) that as a result of the nonconformity the buyer sustained damages.
Your verdict will be for the buyer if you find that the buyer has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the seller if you find that the buyer failed to prove any one of those
elements.
Comment
MCL 440.2313, .2607(3).
On the requirement of notice, see S C Gray Inc v Ford Motor Co, 92 Mich App 789, 804–
805; 286 NW2d 34, 40–41 (1979); Fargo Machine & Tool Co v Kearney & Trecker Corp,
428 F Supp 364, 375 (ED Mich, 1977).
History
M Civ JI 140.42 was added January 1987. Amended January 2020.
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M Civ JI 140.43 Contract Action—UCC: Implied Warranty of
Merchantability—Definition
In every contract of sale by a merchant who regularly sells goods of the same kind as those
purchased by the buyer, the law implies a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable.
Merchantable means that the goods:
(a) are fit for the ordinary purpose(s) for which such goods are used, and
(b) are acceptable in the trade under the contract description, and
(c) *(are of fair, average quality, and)
(d) are of even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units
†(within variations permitted by the agreement), and
(e) ‡(are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as required by the
agreement, and)
(f) ‡(conform to any statement of fact made upon their container or label.)
Note on Use
*Subsection c applies only to fungible goods, and should be used only if applicable.
†This phrase should be used only if variations are permitted by the agreement.
‡Subsection e and f should be used only if applicable.
If it is an issue, the definition of merchant is found in M Civ JI 140.05 b.
This instruction does not cover implied warranties from course of dealing or usage of trade.
See MCL 440.2314(3).
Comment
MCL 440.2314.
History
M Civ JI 140.43 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-29
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.44 Contract Action—UCC: Implied Warranty of
Merchantability—Elimination or Modification
The seller claims that the implied warranty of merchantability was changed or eliminated.
*(If, before entering the contract, the buyer examined the goods or the sample or model as
fully as [ he / she / it ] desired, or refused to examine the goods, there is no implied warranty
regarding defects that would have been discovered by an examination.)
*(Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, the warranty is eliminated by expressions
like “as is” or “with all faults” or other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty.)†
The implied warranty of merchantability may *(also) be changed or eliminated by:
(a) *(specific language, if it includes the word “merchantability”‡);
(b) *(the course of prior dealings between the buyer and seller);
(c) *(the way the buyer and seller have performed this contract);
(d) *(custom in the trade).
Note on Use
*The sentences and words in parentheses should be used only if applicable to the case.
†To be effective to change or eliminate the warranty of merchantability, in a writing
expressions like “as is” or “with all faultsmust be conspicuous. Lumber Mutual Insurance
Co v Clarklift, Inc, 224 Mich App 737; 569 NW2d 681 (1997). Whether the expression is
conspicuous is a question of law for the court. MCL 440.1201(10).
‡To be effective to change or eliminate the warranty of merchantability, specific written
language that includes the word “merchantability” must be conspicuous. Whether the
written language is conspicuous is a question of law for the court. MCL 440.1201(j).
Comment
MCL 440.2316.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 USC§2301 et seq., and the Michigan Consumer
Protection Act, MCL 445.903, also govern the validity of some disclaimers of implied
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warranties of merchantability and fitness.
Michigan cases on exclusion and modification of implied warranties include S C Gray, Inc
v Ford Motor Co, 92 Mich App 789, 807–808; 286 NW2d 34, 41–42 (1979) (where
writings conflict as to warranties, UCC warranties are in effect); Mallory v Conida
Warehouses, Inc, 134 Mich App 28; 350 NW2d 825 (1984) (disclaimer tag insufficient to
exclude warranty); McGhee v GMC Truck & Coach Division, General Motors Corp, 98
Mich App 495; 296 NW2d 286 (1980) (disclaimers of warranty in documents of sale are
sufficient); Ambassador Steel Co v Ewald Steel Co, 33 Mich App 495; 190 NW2d 275
(1971) (seller of noncommercial-quality steel breached warranty of fitness for ordinary
purpose; warranty not excluded where buyer neither inspected nor refused to inspect).
There are special rules on implied warranties for cattle, sheep, and hogs. MCL
440.2316(3)(d).
History
M Civ JI 140.44 was added January 1987. Amended November 1999.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-31
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.45 Contract Action—UCC: Implied Warranty of
Merchantability—Burden of Proof
The buyer has the burden of proving:
(a) that at the time of [ tender of delivery / delivery ], the goods were not
merchantable, and
(b) that the buyer notified the seller that the goods were not merchantable
within a reasonable time after [ he / she / it ] discovered or should have
discovered it, and
(c) that as a result of the nonmerchantability, the buyer sustained damages.
Goods can be not merchantable at the time of [ tender of delivery / delivery ] even though
the defect does not manifest itself until later. It is for you to determine whether the goods
were merchantable at the time of [ tender of delivery / delivery ].
*(The seller has the burden of proving that the implied warranty of merchantability was
changed or eliminated.)
Your verdict will be for the buyer if the buyer has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the seller if the buyer has failed to prove any one of those elements
*(or if you find that the implied warranty of merchantability was changed or eliminated).
Note on Use
*The sentence and phrases in parentheses should not be read to the jury if change or
elimination of the implied warranty of merchantability is not an issue in the case.
Comment
MCL 440.2314.
On the requirement of notice, see MCL 440.2607(3). See also Eaton Corp v Magnavox Co,
581 F Supp 1514, 1534 (ED Mich, 1984).
A buyer is limited to a UCC cause of action and has no action for negligence or products
liability if the buyer seeks recovery for economic loss caused by a defective product
purchased for commercial purposes. Neibarger v Universal Cooperatives, Inc, 439 Mich
512; 486 NW2d 612 (1992); McGhee v General Motors Corp, 98 Mich App 495; 296
NW2d 286 (1980).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 140-32 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 140.45 was added January 1987. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-33
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.51 Contract Action—UCC: Warranty of Title
(Ownership)
In every contract for the sale of goods the law implies a warranty that at the time for
delivery the seller will own the goods outright, free of all other claims, or that the seller will
have the right to transfer complete ownership of the goods to the buyer.
This warranty can be changed or eliminated by specific language. This warranty is also
changed or eliminated if the buyer knows or has reason to know that the seller does not own
the goods outright, or is selling only a limited interest which the seller or someone else may
have in the goods.
Comment
MCL 440.2312.
The specific language required to exclude the implied warranty of title must be “very
precise and unambiguous.” Jones v Linebaugh, 34 Mich App 305, 309; 191 NW2d 142, 144
(1971).
History
M Civ JI 140.51 was added January 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 140-34 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 140.52 Contract Action—UCC: Warranty of Title
(Encumbrances)
In every contract for the sale of goods, the law implies a warranty that the goods will be
delivered free from all security interests, liens, or other encumbrances the buyer did not
know about at the time the contract was made.
Note on Use
This instruction does not cover the warranty against patent or trademark infringement. See
MCL 440.2312(3).
Comment
MCL 440.2312.
The Committee has found no reported Michigan cases resolving the issue of whether the
warranty against encumbrances can be eliminated or modified by specific contract
language.
History
M Civ JI 140.52 was added January 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 140-35
Chapter 140: Contract Action—UCC
M Civ JI 140.53 Contract Action—UCC: Warranty of Title (Ownership
and Encumbrances—Burden of Proof)
The buyer has the burden of proving:
(a) that at the time for delivery [ the seller did not own the goods outright,
free of all other claims / the seller did not have the right to transfer complete
ownership of the goods to the buyer / the goods were encumbered by a security
interest or other lien that the buyer did not know about at the time the contract
was made ], and
(b) that, within a reasonable time of learning this, the buyer notified the
seller.
*(The seller has the burden of proving that this warranty was changed or eliminated.)
Your verdict will be for the buyer if the buyer has proved all of those elements.
Your verdict will be for the seller if the buyer has failed to prove any one of those elements,
or
*(the warranty was changed or eliminated, or)
†(the buyer had actual knowledge of the encumbrance at the time the contract was made.)
Note on Use
*This language should be read only in a warranty of title— ownership case.
†This language should be read only in a warranty of title—encumbrances case.
Comment
MCL 440.2312.
On the requirement of notice, see Jones v Linebaugh, 34 Mich App 305, 310–311; 191
NW2d 142, 145 (1971), and the UCC Official Comment at MCL 440.2312.
History
M Civ JI 140.53 was added January 1987. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 140-36 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 141-1
CHAPTER 141
Contract DamagesUCC
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 141-2
M Civ JI 141.01 Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Delivery of Nonconforming
Goods Which the Buyer Accepts—Buyer’s Damages................................................. 141-3
M Civ JI 141.02 Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Failure to Deliver/
Repudiation/Delivery of Nonconforming Goods Rejected/Acceptance Rightfully
Revoked—Buyer’s Damages ...................................................................................... 141-5
M Civ JI 141.11 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonpayment after
Acceptance—Seller’s Action for Price ........................................................................ 141-7
M Civ JI 141.12 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonpayment—Goods
Identified to the Contract—No Resale— Seller’s Action for Price ............................. 141-8
M Civ JI 141.13 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonpayment—Lost or
Damaged Goods—Seller’s Action for Price ................................................................ 141-9
M Civ JI 141.14 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonacceptance or
Repudiation—Seller Resells— Seller’s Damages...................................................... 141-10
M Civ JI 141.15 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by Nonacceptance or
Repudiation—Seller’s Damages ............................................................................... 141-11
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 141-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introduction
Equitable and Other Alternative Buyer and Seller Remedies
The following instructions apply to cases wherein the aggrieved party seeks damages.
However, under the Uniform Commercial Code, remedies can be cumulative for aggrieved
sellers and buyers of goods. Legal remedies such as replevin (i.e., claim and delivery) under
MCL 440.2711 and reclamation under MCL 440.2702 are not included in this chapter. In
appropriate cases, the jury must be instructed as to any additional legal remedies.
Equitable remedies such as specific performance under MCL 440.2711 and cancellation
(rescission) under MCL 440.2703 are not included in this chapter because they are not tried
to a jury.
History
This Introduction was added February 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 141-3
Chapter 141: Contract Damages—UCC
M Civ JI 141.01 Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Delivery
of Nonconforming Goods Which the Buyer Accepts—Buyer’s
Damages
If you find that the seller has breached the contract, you must compute the buyer’s damages
as follows:
(a) First, you must determine the value of the goods at the time and place of
acceptance—their actual value.
(b) Second, you must determine the value the goods would have had at the time
and place of acceptance if they had conformed to the requirements of the
contract.
(c) Then you must subtract the actual value of the goods from the value the
goods would have had if they had conformed to the contract.
(d) *(You must add to this amount any of the following damages you find the
buyer had:
(i) any reasonable expenses incident to the seller’s delay or other breach
such as [ specify expenses that are claimed and in issue ],
(ii) other losses that you find resulted from the seller’s breach, such as
[ insert consequential damages that are claimed and in issue ], if you find
that the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know of them, and
the buyer could not reasonably have prevented them,
(iii) any injury to person or property proximately resulting from any
breach of warranty.)
Note on Use
*Delete any of these subsections that are not an issue in the law-suit.
This instruction applies only to buyers who accepted and did not effectively revoke the
acceptance. If there is a fact question as to acceptance or effective revocation after
acceptance, this instruction must be modified and both this instruction and M Civ JI 141.02
should be given. MCL 440.2608(1).
If the buyer claims damages in the ordinary course of events in an amount other than the
difference between the value of the goods accepted and their value as warranted, and if
there is sufficient evidence that the buyer’s measure of damages is reasonable, sections a,
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 141-4 Michigan Supreme Court
b, and c of this instruction should be replaced by an appropriate description of the alternate
reasonable measure of damages. MCL 440.2714(1).
Form of verdict M Civ JI 241.01 may be used with this instruction.
Comment
MCL 440.2714, .2715. The usual measure of damages under MCL 440.2714(2) is the
difference between the value of goods accepted and their value as warranted, unless special
circumstances require a different measure. S C Gray v Ford Motor Co, 92 Mich App 789;
286 NW2d 34 (1979).
Consequential damages under MCL 440.2714 are discussed in Martel v Duffy-Mott Corp,
15 Mich App 67; 166 NW2d 541 (1968).
Other reasonable expenses under subsection d.1 of this instruction may include an award
of actual attorney’s fees. Cady v Dick Loehr’s Inc, 100 Mich App 543; 299 NW2d 69
(1980).
History
M Civ JI 141.01 was added February 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 141-5
Chapter 141: Contract Damages—UCC
M Civ JI 141.02 Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Failure to
Deliver/Repudiation/Delivery of Nonconforming Goods Rejected/
Acceptance Rightfully Revoked—Buyer’s Damages
If you find that the seller breached the contract by [ failing to make delivery of the goods
called for in the contract / repudiating [ his / her / its ] obligations under the contract /
delivering nonconforming goods which the buyer rejected or for which the buyer rightfully
revoked [ his / her / its ] acceptance ] you must compute the buyer’s damages as follows:
(a) First you must determine certain amounts:
(i) [ the cost of substitute goods the buyer purchased / the market price of
substitute goods at the time the buyer learned of the breach ], and
(ii) the amount the buyer paid to the seller, and
(iii) the contract price, and
(iv) the expenses the buyer saved as a result of the breach.
(b) After you have determined these amounts, you must add the [ cost to the
buyer of purchasing substitute goods / market price of substitute goods at the
time the buyer learned of the breach ] to the amount the buyer paid to the seller.
From this amount you must subtract the contract price, and you must also
subtract the expenses the buyer saved as a result of the seller’s breach.
(c) *(You must add to this amount any of the following damages that you find
the buyer had:
(i) expenses reasonably incurred in [ inspection / receipt / transportation /
care / custody ] of goods the buyer rightfully rejected, and
(ii) commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses / commissions ] incurred
by the buyer in connection with the purchase of substitute goods, and
(iii) other losses that you find resulted from the seller’s breach, such as
[ insert consequential damages that are claimed and in issue ], if you find
that the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know of them, and
the buyer could not reasonably have prevented them by the purchase of
substitute goods or otherwise, and
(iv) any injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach
of warranty, and
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 141-6 Michigan Supreme Court
(v) any other reasonable expenses incident to the seller’s delay or other
breach, such as [ insert those expenses that are claimed and in issue ].)
Note on Use
*Delete any of these subsections that are not an issue in the lawsuit. Form of verdict M Civ
JI 241.02 may be used with this instruction.
Comment
MCL 440.2711–.2713, .2715.
History
M Civ JI 141.02 was added February 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 141-7
Chapter 141: Contract Damages—UCC
M Civ JI 141.11 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by
Nonpayment after Acceptance—Seller’s Action for Price
If you find that the buyer breached the contract by failing to pay for the goods after the
buyer had accepted them, or after the buyer wrongfully revoked the acceptance, you must
award the seller the price due under the contract together with any commercially reasonable
[ charges / expenses / commissions ] the seller had because of the buyer’s breach.
Comment
MCL 440.2709, .2710. See also Haken v Scheffler, 24 Mich App 196; 180 NW2d 206
(1970).
History
M Civ JI 141.11 was added February 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 141-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 141.12 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by
Nonpayment—Goods Identified to the Contract—No Resale— Seller’s
Action for Price
If you find that the buyer breached the contract by failing to pay the price as it became due
after the goods were identified to the contract, and that [ the seller made reasonable efforts
to sell the goods at a reasonable price and was unable to do so / circumstances indicate that
the seller would not have been able to sell the goods at a reasonable price ], then you must
award the seller the price due under the contract.
You must add to this amount any of the following damages you find the seller had:
(a) *(any commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses / commissions ] the
seller incurred after the buyer’s breach in stopping delivery, and in the
[ transportation / care / custody ] of goods, and in connection with return or
efforts to resell the goods) and
(b) *(any other commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses / commissions ]
resulting from the buyer’s breach.)
Note on Use
*Delete section a or b if not an issue in the lawsuit.
Comment
MCL 440.2709, .2710.
History
M Civ JI 141.12 was added February 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 141-9
Chapter 141: Contract Damages—UCC
M Civ JI 141.13 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by
Nonpayment—Lost or Damaged Goods—Seller’s Action for Price
If you find that the buyer must pay for [ lost / damaged ] goods, you must award the seller
the price due under the contract.
You must add to this amount any of the following damages you find the seller had:
(a) *(any commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses / commissions ] the
seller incurred after the buyer’s breach in stopping delivery, and in the
[ transportation / care / custody ] of goods, and in connection with return or
efforts to resell the goods) and
(b) *(any other commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses / commissions ]
resulting from the buyer’s breach.)
Note on Use
*Delete section a or b if not an issue in the lawsuit.
Comment
MCL 440.2709, .2710.
History
M Civ JI 141.13 was added February 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 141-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 141.14 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by
Nonacceptance or Repudiation—Seller Resells— Seller’s Damages
If you find that the buyer breached the contract by [ wrongfully rejecting the goods /
wrongfully revoking the acceptance / failing to pay [ on / or / before ] delivery / repudiating
[ his / her / its ] obligations under the contract ], and that the seller’s resale was in good faith
and commercially reasonable, you must compute the seller’s damages as follows:
(a) You must determine the unpaid contract price, and you must also determine
the price at which the seller resold the goods.
(b) Then you must subtract the resale price from the unpaid contract price.
From this amount you must then subtract any expenses the seller saved as a
result of the buyer’s breach.
(c) *(You must add to this amount any of the following damages you find the
seller had:
(i) any commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses / commissions ] the
seller incurred after the buyer’s breach in stopping delivery, and in the
[ transportation / care / custody ] of goods, and in connection with the
return or resale of the goods, and
(ii) any other commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses /
commissions ] resulting from the buyer’s breach.)
Note on Use
*Delete either or both of these subsections if not an issue in the lawsuit.
Form of verdict M Civ JI 241.14 may be used with this instruction.
Comment
MCL 440.2706, .2703.
For the availability of damages under MCL 440.2708(2) where the seller has resold, see
Comment, M Civ JI 141.15.
History
M Civ JI 141.14 was added February 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 141-11
Chapter 141: Contract Damages—UCC
M Civ JI 141.15 Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by
Nonacceptance or Repudiation—Seller’s Damages
If you find that the buyer breached the contract by [ wrongfully rejecting the goods /
wrongfully revoking the acceptance / failing to pay [ on / or / before ] delivery / repudiating
[ his / her / its ] obligations under the contract ], you must compute the seller’s damages as
follows:
(a) First, you must determine the unpaid contract price.
(b) Second, you must also determine the market price of the goods at the time
and place where the goods were to be tendered to the buyer.
(c) Then you must subtract the market price from the unpaid contract price.
From this amount you must then subtract any expenses the seller saved as a
result of the buyer’s breach.
(d) *(You must add to this amount any of the following damages you find the
seller had:
(i) any commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses / commissions ] the
seller incurred after the buyer’s breach in stopping delivery, and in the
[ transportation / care / custody ] of goods, and in connection with the
return or resale of the goods.
(ii) any other commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses /
commissions ] resulting from the buyer’s breach.)
If you find that the damages you have computed will not put the seller in as good a position
as the seller would have been in if the buyer had performed, then you must determine the
seller’s damages in a different way:
(e) First you must determine the profit, including reasonable overhead, the
seller would have made if the buyer had performed.
(f) From this lost profit figure, you must then subtract [ any payments the buyer
made to the seller / and / the seller’s proceeds from any resale ].
(g) You must add to this amount any of the following damages you find the
seller had:
(i) any commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses / commissions ]
which the seller incurred after the buyer’s breach in stopping delivery, and
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 141-12 Michigan Supreme Court
in the [ transportation / care / custody ] of goods, and in connection with
the return or resale of the goods.
(ii) any other commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses /
commissions ] resulting from the buyer’s breach,
(iii) any costs reasonably incurred as a result of the buyer’s breach.
Note on Use
*Delete either or both of these subsections if not an issue in the lawsuit.
Form of verdict M Civ JI 241.15 may be used with this instruction.
Comment
MCL 440.2708.
MCL 440.2708(2) by its terms contemplates application to the lost-volume seller who
resold the unit to another at the same price.
The applicability of MCL 440.2708(2) seems fairly well settled in cases involving a
specialty item with no reasonably accessible market. Detroit Power Screwdriver v Ladney,
25 Mich App 478; 181 NW2d 828 (1970).
History
M Civ JI 141.15 was added February 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-1
CHAPTER 142
Contracts
M Civ JI 142.01 Introduction and Burden of Proof..................................................... 142-3
M Civ JI 142.10 Offer—Defined.................................................................................. 142-5
M Civ JI 142.11 Duration of Offer............................................................................... 142-6
M Civ JI 142.12 Revocation of Offer........................................................................... 142-7
M Civ JI 142.13 Acceptance........................................................................................ 142-8
M Civ JI 142.14 Time of Acceptance........................................................................... 142-9
M Civ JI 142.15 Counteroffer ................................................................................... 142-10
M Civ JI 142.16 Consideration.................................................................................. 142-11
M Civ JI 142.17 Adequacy of Consideration............................................................. 142-12
M Civ JI 142.18 Need Not Be in Writing ................................................................... 142-13
M Civ JI 142.19 Modification.................................................................................... 142-14
M Civ JI 142.20 Breach of Contract/Substantial Performance................................. 142-16
M Civ JI 142.21 Time of Performance ...................................................................... 142-17
M Civ JI 142.22 Conditions Precedent...................................................................... 142-18
M Civ JI 142.30 Introduction to Damages ................................................................ 142-19
M Civ JI 142.31 Contract Damages: Benefit of Bargain............................................ 142-20
M Civ JI 142.32 Lost Profits ...................................................................................... 142-21
M Civ JI 142.33 Reliance Damages ........................................................................... 142-22
M Civ JI 142.34 Consequential Damages.................................................................. 142-23
M Civ JI 142.35 Mitigation........................................................................................ 142-24
M Civ JI 142.40 Duress ............................................................................................. 142-25
M Civ JI 142.41 Waiver............................................................................................. 142-26
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.42 Impracticability ............................................................................... 142-27
M Civ JI 142.43 Frustration of Purpose .................................................................... 142-28
M Civ JI 142.50 Introduction to Contract Interpretation ......................................... 142-29
M Civ JI 142.51 Must Consider All Parts of Contract................................................ 142-30
M Civ JI 142.52 Effect of Incorporated Documents.................................................. 142-31
M Civ JI 142.53 Words Given Ordinary Meaning ..................................................... 142-32
M CIV JI 142.53A Giving Effect to Every Word ......................................................... 142-33
M Civ JI 142.54 Custom and Usage of Trade / Business / Industry .......................... 142-34
M Civ JI 142.55 Conduct of Parties........................................................................... 142-35
M CIV JI 142.56 Determining the Meaning of Ambiguous Language in an Agreement 142-
36
M CIV JI 142.57 Interpretation Against the Drafter ................................................. 142-37
M Civ JI 142.60 Affirmative Defense—Release ........................................................ 142-38
M Civ JI 142.61 Affirmative Defense—Failure of Performance.............................. 142-39
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-3
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.01 Introduction and Burden of Proof
This case involves a claim by [ name of party ] that [ name of party being sued on contract ]
breached a contract. A contract is a legally enforceable agreement to do or not to do
something.
[ Name of party ] has the burden of proving:
(a) that there was a contract between [ him / her / it ] and [ name of party being
sued on contract ];
(b) that [ name of party being sued on contract ] breached the contract; and
(c) that [ name of party ] suffered damages as a result of the breach.
*In this case, the parties do not dispute [ that there was a contract between them / that a
contract between them was breached. ]
Your verdict will be for [ name of party ] if [ name of party ] has proved all of those
elements. Your verdict will be for [ name of party being sued on contract ] if [ name of
party ] has failed to prove any one of those elements.
This case also involves a counterclaim by [ name of party bringing counterclaim ] that
[ name of party against whom counterclaim is brought ] breached a contract. With respect
to the counterclaim, [ name of party bringing counterclaim ] has the burden of proving:
**(a) that there was a contract between [ him / her / it ] and [ name of party
against whom counterclaim is brought ];
(b) that [ name of party against whom counterclaim is brought ] breached the
contract; and
(c) that [ name of party bringing counterclaim ] suffered damages as a result
of the breach.
The [ name of party being sued on contract / name of party against whom counterclaim is
brought ] has the burden of proving the defense of [ describe defense ].
Note on Use
* To be used on those occasions when there is no question that a contract existed or that it
was breached.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-4 Michigan Supreme Court
** This sentence should be deleted if the counterclaim arises out of the same contract
alleged by the party bringing the original breach of contract claim.
This instruction must be modified to reflect matters that are admitted or otherwise not at
issue.
Comment
McInerney v Detroit Trust Co, 279 Mich 42 (1937).
History
M Civ JI 142.01 was added March 2005. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-5
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.10 Offer—Defined
In order for there to be a contract, there must be an offer by one party, an acceptance of the
offer by the other party, and consideration for the offer and acceptance. Mere discussions
and negotiations are not a substitute for the formal requirements of a contract. I will now
define those terms for you.
An offer to make a contract is a proposal to enter into a bargain, communicated by words
or conduct, that would reasonably lead the person to whom the proposal is made to believe
that the proposal is intended to create a contract. No particular form of an offer is required,
although the essential terms of the contract must be reasonably clear, definite and certain.
Comment
Eerdmans v Maki, 226 Mich App 360 (1997); Consolidated Properties, Inc v Henry Ford
Trade School Alumni Ass’n, 7 Mich App 383 (1967); Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444
Mich 107 (1993); Kirchoff v Morris, 282 Mich 90 (1937).
History
M Civ JI 142.10 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.11 Duration of Offer
Unless the person making the offer specifies when the offer expires, an offer remains open
for a reasonable time, unless revoked earlier. What constitutes a reasonable period is for
you to decide and must be determined from the particular circumstances of the case and
from any conditions declared in the terms of the offer.
Comment
Burton v Ladd, 211 Mich 382 (1920); CE Tackels, Inc v Fantin, 341 Mich 119 (1954).
History
M Civ JI 142.11 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-7
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.12 Revocation of Offer
An offer may be revoked by the person who made it. It may be revoked for any reason or
no reason. It does not need to be in writing. To be effective, the revocation must be
communicated to the other party before the offer is accepted.
Comment
Board of Control of Eastern Michigan University v Burgess, 45 Mich App 183 (1973);
Kutsche v Ford, 222 Mich 442 (1923).
History
M Civ JI 142.12 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.13 Acceptance
Acceptance is a statement or conduct by a person receiving an offer that would reasonably
lead the person who made the offer to believe that the material terms of the offer have been
agreed to [ although an offer may require a specific form of acceptance ]. A response that
changes, adds to, or qualifies the material terms of the offer is not an acceptance. A material
term is one that goes to the essence of the agreement.
Comment
Ludowici-Celadon Co v McKinley, 307 Mich 149 (1943); Pakideh v Franklin Commercial
Mortgage Group, 213 Mich App 636 (1995); Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich
107 (1993); Harper Building Co v Kaplan, 332 Mich 651 (1952).
History
M Civ JI 142.13 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-9
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.14 Time of Acceptance
An acceptance becomes effective when it is communicated to the person who made the
offer. An offer that has been revoked or is no longer open cannot be accepted.
Comment
Kutsche v Ford, 222 Mich 442 (1923); Pakideh v Franklin Commercial Mortgage Group,
213 Mich App 636 (1995).
History
M Civ JI 142.14 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.15 Counteroffer
If a response changes, adds to or qualifies one or more of the material terms of the offer, it
is not an acceptance but rather a counteroffer. A counteroffer is a new offer by the party
making that proposal. The new offer must in turn be agreed to by the party who made the
original offer for there to be an acceptance. A counteroffer may be accepted or rejected like
any other offer. A material term is one that goes to the essence of the agreement.
Comment
Harper Building Co v Kaplan, 332 Mich 651 (1952).
History
M Civ JI 142.15 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-11
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.16 Consideration
A contract must be supported by consideration. Consideration is something of value given
in exchange for the promise. However, an act done in the past cannot be consideration for
a later contract. Doing or promising to do what one is already obligated to do is not
consideration. The consideration does not need to be expressed in writing.
Comment
DeCamp v Scofield, 75 Mich 449 (1889); Kirchoff v Morris, 282 Mich 90 (1937); Higgins
v Monroe Evening News, 404 Mich 1 (1978); Yerkovich v AAA, 461 Mich 732 (2000).
History
M Civ JI 142.16 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.17 Adequacy of Consideration
The consideration for a promise or act does not have to be equal in value to the promise or
act. It is enough if the consideration is given, in whole or in part, in exchange for the
promise. If one party performed any act at the request of the other party, no matter how
small or nominal, then there was valuable consideration to support the contract, provided
that the party performed such act in good faith.
Note on Use
There is not a separate instruction for the affirmative defense that the contract was illusory.
In that situation, the jury looks to whether the consideration is so insubstantial that it
imposes no obligation. Ile v Foremost Ins Co, 293 Mich App 309, 315 (2011) (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed), p 370), rev’d on other grounds 493 Mich 915 (2012)); MI
Civil Jur Contracts § 5, Mutuality of Obligation (2014); Amerisure Mut Ins Co v Carey
Transp Inc, 578 F Supp 2d 888, 921 (WD Mich, 2008).
Comment
Harris v Chain Store Realty Bond & Mortgage Co, 329 Mich 136 (1950); Levitz v Capitol
Savings & Loan Co, 267 Mich 92 (1934).
History
M Civ JI 142.17 was added March 2005. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-13
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.18 Need Not Be in Writing
There is no requirement that a contract be in writing, that it be dated, or that it be signed by
either party. It can be entirely oral, or it can be partly oral and partly in writing. In this case
it is alleged by [ name of party ] that the contract was [ in writing / oral ].
Note on Use
This instruction may need to be omitted or modified if there is a statute of frauds issue.
Comment
Pangburn v Sifford, 216 Mich 153 (1921).
History
M Civ JI 142.18 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.19 Modification
The parties to a contract can agree to modify a contract by changing one or more of its terms
while continuing to be bound by the rest of the contract. Whether the contract was modified
by the parties depends on their intent as shown by their words, whether written or oral, or
their conduct. In this case, the parties agree that they entered into a contract.
[ Name of party ] claims that after this contract was made, the parties agreed to change the
terms of the original contract. To find that the terms of the original contract were changed,
you must decide that there is clear and convincing evidence that:
(a)there was a mutual agreement to modify or waive the terms of the original contract, and
(b)unless the agreement to modify or waive the contract was in writing signed by [ name of
party being sued on contract ], that [ name of party ] gave consideration in exchange
for the modification and that [ name of party being sued on contract ] agreed to the
change in the terms of the original contract.
If you decide this was shown by clear and convincing evidence, then the parties changed
their original contract and they are bound by the contract as modified.
Otherwise, the parties did not change their original contract.
* The fact there was a written modification or anti-waiver clause in the original contract
does not bar the parties from modifying or waiving those clauses. [ Name of party claiming
there was an amendment ] must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parties
intended, as shown by their words or conduct, to modify or waive the modification or anti-
waiver clause as well.
Note on Use
This instruction should be accompanied by M Civ JI 8.01, Meaning of Burden of Proof,
which defines clear and convincing evidence. The names of the parties may require a
change depending upon who relies on the modification.
* Use if applicable.
Comment
Quality Products & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362 (2003). MCL 566.1
provides:
An agreement hereafter made to change or modify, or to discharge in whole or in
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-15
Chapter 142: Contracts
part, any contract, obligation, or lease, or any mortgage or other security interest
in personal or real property, shall not be invalid because of the absence of
consideration: Provided, That the agreement changing, modifying, or
discharging such contract, obligation, lease, mortgage or security interest shall
not be valid or binding unless it shall be in writing and signed by the party against
whom it is sought to enforce the change, modification, or discharge.
History
M Civ JI 142.19 was added March 2005. Amended July 2017.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-16 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.20 Breach of Contract/Substantial Performance
Each party to a contract has a duty to perform his or her obligations under the contract. A
contract is breached or broken when a party does not substantially perform what the party
promised to do in the contract. When I say that [ name of party being sued on contract ]
must have “substantially performed” the contract or that “substantial performance” of the
contract is required, I mean that, although there may have been some deviations or
omissions from the performance called for by the language of the contract, [ name of party ]
received the important and essential benefits for which the contract was made. The extent
of nonperformance is to be viewed in light of the full performance promised. If the defect
or uncompleted performance is of such extent and nature that there has not been practical
fulfillment of the terms of the contract, then there has not been substantial performance. A
party who substantially performs may be required to pay as damages the costs of remedying
any defects in performance.
Comment
Gordon v Great Lakes Bowling Corp, 18 Mich App 358 (1969); P & M Construction Co v
Hammond Ventures, Inc, 3 Mich App 306 (1966).
History
M Civ JI 142.20 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-17
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.21 Time of Performance
The parties dispute whether [ name of party being sued on contract ] performed in a timely
manner. When a contract does not express a time for its performance, the law implies that
it shall be performed within a reasonable period of time. What is a reasonable time is a
question for you to decide based on the evidence, bearing in mind the subject matter of the
contract and the surrounding circumstances.
Comment
Duke v Miller, 355 Mich 540 (1959); Walter Toebbe & Co v Dept of State Hwy, 144 Mich
App 21 (1985).
History
M Civ JI 142.21 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-18 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.22 Conditions Precedent
[ Name of party being sued on contract ] claims that [ name of party ] and [ he / she / it ]
agreed that [ name of party being sued on contract ] did not have to perform [ his / her / its ]
part of the contract unless [ insert condition precedent ]. This requirement is called a
condition precedent. A condition precedent is a fact or event that the parties intend must
take place before there is a right to performance. [ Name of party ] denies that this condition
was part of the contract.
Whether a provision in a contract is a condition precedent which excuses performance
depends on the intent of the parties. The parties’ intent is to be ascertained from a fair and
reasonable construction of the language used in light of the surrounding circumstances
when they executed the contract.
If you find that this condition was part of the contract, you must decide whether the event
occurred. If you decide that the condition occurred, then [ name of party being sued on
contract ] was required to perform its part of the contract. [ Name of party ] has the burden
of proof that the condition precedent occurred.
If you decide the condition was not part of the contract, then [ name of party being sued on
contract ] was required to perform [ his / her / its ] part of the contract.
Comment
Reed v Citizens Ins Co, 198 Mich App 443 (1993); Koski v Allstate Ins, 456 Mich 439
(1998); MacDonald v Perry, 342 Mich 578 (1955); Knox v Knox, 337 Mich 109 (1953).
History
M Civ JI 142.22 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-19
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.30 Introduction to Damages
If you find that [ name of party being sued on contract ] is liable to [ name of party ] for
breach of contract, then you must determine the amount of money, if any, to award to
[ name of party ] as contract damages. The following instructions tell you how to do that.
If you find that [ name of party being sued on contract ] is not liable, then you do not need
to consider the subject of damages.
[ Name of party ] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of any
damages to be awarded. However, [ name of party ] is not required to prove its damages
with mathematical precision because it is not always possible that a party can prove the
exact amount of its damages. Therefore, it is necessary only that [ name of party ] prove its
damages to a reasonable certainty or a reasonable probability. However, you may not award
damages on the basis of guess, speculation or conjecture.
Comment
Joerger v Gordon Food Services, 224 Mich App 167 (1997); Fera v Village Plaza, 396
Mich 639 (1976).
History
M Civ JI 142.30 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-20 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.31 Contract Damages: Benefit of Bargain
Contract damages are intended to give the party the benefit of the party’s bargain by
awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put [ him / her / it ] in as
good a position as [ he / she / it ] would have been in had the contract been fully performed.
The injured party should receive those damages naturally arising from the breach. [ Name
of party ] cannot recover a greater amount as damages than [ he / she / it ] could have gained
by the full performance of the contract.
Comment
Jim-Bob, Inc v Mehling, 178 Mich App 71 (1989); Lawrence v Will Darrah & Assoc, 445
Mich 1 (1994); Earl Dubey & Sons, Inc v Macomb Concrete Corp, 81 Mich App 662
(1978); Tross v HE Clark Co, 274 Mich 263 (1936); Dierickx v Vulcan Indus, 10 Mich App
67 (1968).
History
M Civ JI 142.31 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-21
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.32 Lost Profits
Damages for breach of contract may include lost profits. Loss of profits may be recovered
for a breach of contract if,
(a) It is reasonably probable that the profits would have been earned except for
the breach,
(b) The amount of loss can be shown with a reasonable degree of certainty, and
(c) There is a reliable basis in the evidence for computing the loss of profits.
Loss of profits is measured by net profits, not gross profits.
Note on Use
Lost profits are a type of benefit of the bargain damages.
Comment
Kolton v Nassar, 358 Mich 154 (1959); The Vogue v Shopping Centers, Inc, 402 Mich 546
(1978); Joerger v Gordon Food Serv, 224 Mich App 167 (1997); Fera v Village Plaza, 396
Mich 639 (1976); Getman v Mathews, 125 Mich App 245 (1983).
History
M Civ JI 142.32 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-22 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.33 Reliance Damages
If you do not award damages to [ name of party ] that would put [ him / her / it ] in as good
as a position had the contract been performed, you may still award damages that put [ him
/ her / it ] in the same position as if the contract had never been made. Your award should
compensate [ name of party ] for any losses [ he / she / it ] incurred because of reliance on
[ name of party being sued on contract ] to perform the contract.
You may not award both types of damages if the result would be to put [ name of party ] in
a better position than [ he / she / it ] would have been in had the contract been performed.
Comment
Holton v Monarch Motor Car Co, 202 Mich 271 (1918); Earl Dubey & Sons, Inc v Macomb
Concrete Corp, 81 Mich App 662 (1978).
History
M Civ JI 142.33 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-23
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.34 Consequential Damages
In addition to any award for damages naturally arising from the breach, you also may
include amounts to compensate [ name of party ] for consequential damages.
Consequential damages are those additional damages that were contemplated by both
parties at the time they made the contract.
Comment
Huler v Nassar, 322 Mich 1 (1948); Dierickx v Vulcan Indus, 10 Mich App 67 (1968)
Lawrence v Will Darrah & Assoc, 445 Mich 1 (1994).
History
M Civ JI 142.34 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-24 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.35 Mitigation
In fixing the amount of damages, you should not include any loss that [ name of party ]
could have prevented by exercising reasonable care and diligence when [ he / she / it ]
learned or should have learned of the breach. The burden is on [ name of party being sued
on contract ] to prove that [ name of party ] failed to minimize [ his / her / its ] damages and
that the damages should be reduced by a particular amount as a result.
Comment
Ambassador Steel Co v Ewald Steel Co, 33 Mich App 495 (1971).
History
M Civ JI 142.35 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-25
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.40 Duress
[ Name of party being sued on contract ] claims that the agreement upon which [ name of
party ] relies is void because the [ he / she ] was under duress at the time [ his / her ] promise
was made. A person whose agreement to a contract was brought about by duress is not
bound by that agreement. [ Name of party being sued on contract ] must establish that [ he
/ she ] was illegally compelled or coerced to act out of fear of serious injury to [ his / her ]
person, reputation, or fortune.
Comment
Enzymes of America, Inc v Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 207 Mich App 28 (1994), rev’d on
other grds, 450 Mich 889 (1995); Apfelblat v Nat’l Bank Wyandotte-Taylor, 158 Mich App
258 (1987).
History
M Civ JI 142.40 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-26 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.41 Waiver
[ Name of party being sued on contract ] claims that [ his / her / its ] failure to execute the
promise was excused because [ name of party ] waived [ his / her / its ] performance. To
excuse nonperformance, [ name of party being sued on contract ] must prove that [ name
of party ] voluntarily and knowingly gave up [ his / her / its ] right to insist on performance
of [ insert performance obligation ]. In other words, [ name of party ] must have known that
[ he / she / it ] had the right to insist on the completion of [ insert performance obligation ]
by [ name of party being sued on contract ], but nevertheless agreed to give up this right.
A waiver may be expressly stated or it may be implied by acts or conduct, indicating an
intent not to enforce the contractual right such that a reasonable person would think that
performance was no longer required. A waiver of a substantial right requires consideration.
Comment
Fitzgerald v Hubert Herman, Inc, 23 Mich App 716 (1970); Babcock v Public Bank, 366
Mich 124 (1962).
History
M Civ JI 142.41 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-27
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.42 Impracticability
In this case, [ name of party being sued on contract ] has asserted the defense that [ his / her
/ its ] [ partial / full ] performance of the contract was rendered impracticable. A party is
excused from his failure to perform a contract if performance became impracticable after
the contract was made. To be excused, [ he / she / it ] must show that the performance
became impracticable owing to some extreme or unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury
or loss involved. You should determine whether there was an unanticipated circumstance
that made performance of the promise vitally different from what should reasonably have
been within the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract. Those
circumstances may be of such an extent as to abrogate the entire contract, or may relate only
to a portion of the contract. Performance is excused only to the extent the circumstances
encountered make performance impracticable. The extent to which performance is excused
is for you to decide.
Comment
Bissell v LW Edison Co, 9 Mich App 276 (1967).
History
M Civ JI 142.42 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-28 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.43 Frustration of Purpose
Sometimes, if the main purpose of a contract is frustrated or destroyed, a party may not
enforce the contract against the other party; that is, the party may not make the other
perform what the contract required, or make the other pay money damages for failing to do
what the contract required.
In this case, [ name of party being sued on contract ] claims that the main purpose of the
contract in this case was frustrated or destroyed because [ state the facts / circumstances
that allegedly frustrated the defendant’s purpose ]. [ Name of party ] denies this.
[ Name of party being sued on contract ]’s failure to perform is excused if it is more likely
true than not true that:
(1) the contract was at least partially executory, by that I mean the contract had
not yet been fully performed.
(2) [ Name of party being sued on contract ]’s purpose in making the contract
must have been known to both parties when the contract was made, and
(3) this purpose must have been basically frustrated by an event not reasonably
foreseeable at the time the contract was made, the occurrence of which has not
been due to the fault of [ name of party being sued on contract ] and the risk of
which was not assumed by [ him / her / it ].
If you decide that each of these things are more likely true than not true, then [ name of
party being sued on contract ] is excused for failing to keep [ his / her / its ] promise and
you must return a verdict for [ him / her / it ].
Otherwise, [ name of party being sued on contract ] is not excused [ for this reason ].
Comment
Molnar v Molnar, 110 Mich App 622 (1981).
History
M Civ JI 142.43 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-29
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.50 Introduction to Contract Interpretation
[ Name of party ] has the burden to prove what the parties intended the contract to mean.
The contract is to be interpreted so as to give effect to the parties’ intentions. You cannot
make for the parties a different contract than the parties made for themselves. It is the intent
expressed or apparent in the writing that controls.
Comment
Zurich Ins Co v CCR & Co, 226 Mich App 599 (1997); Old Kent Bank v Sobcak, 243 Mich
App 57 (2000).
History
M Civ JI 142.50 was added March 2005. Title amended January 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-30 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.51 Must Consider All Parts of Contract
The written agreement, along with all attachments thereto, is to be considered in
determining the existence or nature of the contractual duties owed by [ name of party being
sued on contract ] to [ name of party ]. In determining the parties’ intentions under the
written contract, you should consider the agreement as a whole, including all of its parts
and attachments.
Comment
Interstate Construction Co v USF&G, 207 Mich 265 (1919); McIntosh v Groomes, 227
Mich 215 (1924).
History
M Civ JI 142.51 was added March 2005.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-31
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.52 Effect of Incorporated Documents
A contract can be made of several different documents if the parties intended that their
agreement would include the various documents together. If you find that the parties
entered into a contract that refers to other existing document[ s] in such a manner as to
establish that they intended to make the terms and conditions of that other document[ s] part
of their contract, you should interpret that incorporated document[ s] as part of the contract
between the parties according to the rules I have given you for interpreting contracts.
Comment
Forge v Smith, 458 Mich 198 (1998).
History
M Civ JI 142.52 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-32 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.53 Words Given Ordinary Meaning
The words of the contract must be given their ordinary meaning.
Comment
Wilkie v Auto Owners, 245 Mich App 521 (2001) rev’d on other grds 469 Mich 41 (2003).
History
M Civ JI 142.53 was added March 2005. Amended January 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-33
Chapter 142: Contracts
M CIV JI 142.53A Giving Effect to Every Word
Additionally, contracts must be interpreted, when possible, so as to give effect to every
word, phrase, and clause in the contract, and to avoid an interpretation that would render
any part of the contract unnecessary, meaningless, void or unenforceable.
History
M Civ JI 142.53A was added January 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-34 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 142.54 Custom and Usage of Trade / Business / Industry
The customs and usages of the [ trade / business / industry ] may be shown to establish a
point on which the contract is ambiguous. To show the existence of a custom or usage of
the [ trade / business / industry ], a party must prove that the custom was well established
and was generally followed in the [ trade / business
/ industry ] at the time the contract was
made. It must also be shown that [ name of party against whom it is being asserted ] knew
of the usage and had reason to know that [ name of other party ] assented to the words of
the contract in accordance with it, or that, if [ name of party against whom it is being
asserted ] did not know of the usage, an ordinary person in that [ name of party against
whom it is being asserted ]’s position would have known of it.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given only if the contract is ambiguous.
Comment
Schroeder v Terra Energy Ltd, 223 Mich App 176 (1997); Independence Twp v Reliance
Bldg Co, 175 Mich App 48 (1989).
History
M Civ JI 142.54 was added March 2005. Amended January 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-35
Chapter 142: Contracts
M Civ JI 142.55 Conduct of Parties
You may consider the conduct of the parties after they entered into the contract and before
they discovered that they disagreed with one another, as evidence of their agreed intent. It
is up to you to decide what the conduct of the parties was, whether the conduct is reasonably
related to the terms in question, and whether it reveals what they intended by the contract.
Note on Use
This instruction should be given only if the contract is ambiguous.
Comment
Schroeder v Terra Energy Ltd, 223 Mich App 176 (1997); L & S Bearing Co v Morton
Bearing Co, 355 Mich 219 (1959); Detroit Greyhound Employees Federal Credit Union v
Aetna Life Ins Co, 381 Mich 683 (1969); McIntosh v Groomes, 227 Mich 215 (1924).
History
M Civ JI 142.55 was added March 2005.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-36 Michigan Supreme Court
M CIV JI 142.56 Determining the Meaning of Ambiguous Language in
an Agreement
When a contract is ambiguous, that is, when the language is reasonably susceptible of two
different interpretations, you must decide its meaning. To determine what the parties
intended by the ambiguous language, you should consider [ the statements of the
representatives of the parties / the conduct of the parties and the custom and usage of the
trade / business / industry ] in accordance with the instructions that I will now give you.
Comment
Klapp v United Insurance Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 469-474; 663 NW2d 447
(2003). The Court should use this instruction only if the contract language is ambiguous.
It should then be followed by M Civ JI 142.53, 142.54 and 142.55, as applicable.
History
M Civ JI 142.56 was added January 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-37
Chapter 142: Contracts
M CIV JI 142.57 Interpretation Against the Drafter
If you cannot determine what the parties intended by the ambiguous language after
reviewing all the evidence admitted during trial, including such things as [ the conduct of
the parties, the statements of the representatives of the parties / the conduct of the parties
and the custom and usage of the trade / business / industry ], then you should interpret the
ambiguous language against the party who prepared the agreement.
Comment
Klapp v United Insurance Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 469-474; 663 NW2d 447
(2003)
History
M Civ JI 142.57 was added January 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-38 Michigan Supreme Court
M CIV JI 142.60 Affirmative Defense—Release
As an affirmative defense to the breach of contract claim, [ name of party being sued on
contract ] claims that [ name of party ] released [ him / her / it ] from all obligations owed
under the contract.
A release is an agreement to give up or abandon one or more claims or rights that one person
may have against the other. There is no particular form or established set of words that is
necessary to prove a release. A release may be oral or may be in writing. A release is valid
if it is fairly and knowingly made.
If you find that [ name of party ] released [ name of party being sued on contract ] from [
his / her / its ] obligations under the contract, your verdict should be in favor of [ name of
party being sued on contract ] as to all released claims.
Comment
66 Am Jur 2d Release § 1; J&J Farmer Leasing, Inc, v Citizens Ins Co of Am, 472 Mich
353, 357 (2005); Adell v Sommers, Schwartz, Silver & Schwartz, PC, 170 Mich App 196,
201 (1988).
History
M Civ JI 142.60 was added January 2022.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 142-39
Chapter 142: Contracts
M CIV JI 142.61 Affirmative Defense—Failure of Performance
As an affirmative defense to the breach of contract claim, [ name of party being sued on
contract ] claims that [ name of party ] did not sufficiently perform under the contract. To
succeed on this defense, [ name of party being sued on contract ] has the burden of proving
that [ name of party ]’s contractual performance was so seriously deficient that the material
purpose of the contract ceased to exist or became worthless, and that the contract supports
voiding it for this reason.
Comment
Innovation Ventures v Liquid Manufacturing, 499 MIch 491 (2016).
History
M Civ JI 142.61 was added January 2022.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 142-40 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 143-1
CHAPTER 143
Sales Representatives' and
Commissions Act
M Civ JI 143.01 Commission—Defined ...................................................................... 143-2
M Civ JI 143.02 Principal—Defined ............................................................................ 143-3
M Civ JI 143.03 Sales Representative—Defined......................................................... 143-4
M Civ JI 143.10 Payment of Commissions Due At The Time of Contract
Termination................................................................................................................ 143-5
M Civ JI 143.11 Payment of Commissions That Become Due After Contract
Termination................................................................................................................ 143-6
M Civ JI 143.12 When Commissions Become Due ..................................................... 143-7
M Civ JI 143.20 Failure to Pay Commissions Due At Time of Termination................. 143-8
M Civ JI 143.21 Failure to Pay Commissions Due After Termination ......................... 143-9
M Civ JI 143.22 Actual Damages / Intentional Failure to Pay Commissions When
Due ........................................................................................................................... 143-10
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 143-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 143.01 Commission—Defined
The term “commission” means compensation accruing to a sales representative for
payment by a principal, the rate of which is expressed as a percentage of the amount of
orders or sales or as a percentage of the dollar amount of profits.
Comment
MCL 600.2961(1)(a).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 143-3
Chapter 143: Sales Representatives’ and Commissions Act
M Civ JI 143.02 Principal—Defined
The term “principal” means a person that either: manufactures, produces, imports, sells, or
distributes a product in this state; or contracts with a sales representative to solicit orders
for or sell a product in this state.
Comment
MCL 600.2961(1)(d). “Person” is defined in MCL 600.2961(1)(b).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 143-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 143.03 Sales Representative—Defined
The term “sales representative” means a person who contracts with or is employed by a
principal for the solicitation of orders or sale of goods and is paid, in whole or in part, by
commission. Sales representative does not include a person who places an order or sale for
a product on his or her own account for resale by that sales representative.
Comment
MCL 600.2961(1)(e). “Person” is defined in MCL 600.2961(1)(b).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 143-5
Chapter 143: Sales Representatives’ and Commissions Act
M Civ JI 143.10 Payment of Commissions Due At The Time of
Contract Termination
The Sales Representatives’ Commissions Act requires all commissions that are due at the
time of termination of a contract between a sales representative and a principal to be paid
within 45 days after the date of termination.
Comment
MCL 600.2961(4).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 143-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 143.11 Payment of Commissions That Become Due After
Contract Termination
The Sales Representatives’ Commissions Act requires commissions that become due after
the contract termination date to be paid within 45 days after the date on which the
commission became due.
Comment
MCL 600.2961(4).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 143-7
Chapter 143: Sales Representatives’ and Commissions Act
M Civ JI 143.12 When Commissions Become Due
The terms of the contract between the principal and sales representative determines when
a commission becomes due.
If the time when the commission is due cannot be determined by a contract between the
principal and sales representative, the past practices between the parties shall control or, if
there are no past practices, the custom and usage prevalent in this state for the business that
is the subject of the relationship between the parties.
Comment
MCL 600.2961(2) and (3).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 143-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 143.20 Failure to Pay Commissions Due At Time of
Termination
Your verdict will be for [ sales representative ] if you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that: (1) commissions were due at the time of termination of the contract between
[ sales representative ] and [ principal ] and (2) [ principal ] failed to pay those commissions
after the date of termination. Otherwise, your verdict will be for [ principal ].
Comment
MCL 600.2961(4).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 143-9
Chapter 143: Sales Representatives’ and Commissions Act
M Civ JI 143.21 Failure to Pay Commissions Due After Termination
Your verdict will be for [ sales representative ] if you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that: (1) commissions became due after the termination of the contract between [
sales representative ] and [ principal ] and (2) [ principal ] failed to pay those commissions.
Otherwise, your verdict will be for [ principal ].
Comment
MCL 600.2961(4).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 143-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 143.22 Actual Damages / Intentional Failure to Pay
Commissions When Due
If your verdict is for [ sales representative ], then you shall award [sales representative] the
actual damages caused by the failure to pay the commissions when due.
In addition, you must determine whether [ principal ] intentionally failed to pay the
commissions when due. If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [ principal ]
intentionally failed to pay the commissions when due, then you shall award [ sales
representative ] an amount in addition to actual damages. That additional amount shall be
the lesser of: (1) two times the amount of commissions due but not paid as required; or (2)
$100,000.00.
Comment
MCL 600.2961(5).
History
Adopted January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-180
CHAPTER 170-180
Probate
Introduction
In 1998, the Michigan legislature enacted the Estates and Protected Individuals Code
(EPIC), a comprehensive revision of probate and estate planning law. The act took effect
on April 1, 2000. The transition rules are reproduced below for the convenience of bench
and bar.
Sec. 8101. (1) This act takes effect April 1, 2000.
(2) Except as provided elsewhere in this act, on this act’s effective date, all of the following
apply:
(a) The act applies to a governing instrument executed by a decedent dying after that date.
(b) The act applies to a proceeding in court pending on that date or commenced after that
date regardless of the time of the decedent’s death except to the extent that in the opinion
of the court the former procedure should be made applicable in a particular case in the
interest of justice or because of the infeasibility of applying this act’s procedure.
(c) A fiduciary, including a person administering the estate of a minor or incompetent,
holding an appointment on that date continues to hold the appointment, but has only the
powers conferred by this act and is subject to the duties imposed with respect to an event
occurring or action taken after that date.
(d) This act does not impair an accrued right or an action taken before that date in a
proceeding. If a right is acquired, extinguished, or barred upon the expiration of a
prescribed period of time that commences to run by the provision of a statute before this
act’s effective date, the provision remains in force with respect to that right.
(e) A rule of construction or presumption provided in this act applies to a governing
instrument executed before that date unless there is a clear indication of a contrary intent.
MCL 700.8101.
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Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-1
CHAPTER 170
Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.01 Will Contests: Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel............ 170-3
M Civ JI 170.02 Will Contests: Will/Codicil—Definition ............................................. 170-4
M Civ JI 170.03 Will Contests: Holographic Will—Definition ..................................... 170-5
M Civ JI 170.04 Will Contests: Cautionary Instruction as to Decedent’s Right to Leave
Property by a Will....................................................................................................... 170-6
M Civ JI 170.05 Will Contests: Letter, Deed, Bill of Sale, Contract as a Will............... 170-7
M Civ JI 170.08 Will Contests: Will—Writings Intended as Wills ............................... 170-9
M Civ JI 170.11 Will Contests: Will Signed by Another for Decedent ...................... 170-11
M Civ JI 170.12 Will Contests: Decedent Signing Will by Mark................................ 170-12
M Civ JI 170.13 Will Contests: Requirements for Witnessing Will ........................... 170-13
M Civ JI 170.15A Will Contests: Proving Execution of Self-Proved Wills.................. 170-14
M Civ JI 170.15B Will Contests: Proving Execution of Will That Is Not Self-Proved. 170-15
M Civ JI 170.16 Will Contests: Proving Execution of Will Where Witnesses Cannot Be
Found [ Instruction Deleted ] ................................................................................... 170-16
M Civ JI 170.17A Will Contests: Execution—Witness Not Remembering or Denying
Contents of Witnessing Clause (Self-Proved Will).................................................... 170-17
M Civ JI 170.17B Will Contests: Execution—Witness Not Remembering or Denying
Contents of Witnessing Clause (Will That Is Not Self-Proved) ................................. 170-18
M Civ JI 170.21 Will Contests: Lost, Destroyed or Otherwise Unavailable Will ....... 170-19
M Civ JI 170.31 Will Contests: Revocation of Will by Physical Means ..................... 170-20
M Civ JI 170.32 Will Contests: Revocation—Presumption from Failure to Produce Original
Will Retained by Decedent....................................................................................... 170-22
M Civ JI 170.33 Will Contests: Revocation—Presumption from Failure to Produce Executed
Duplicate Will Retained by Decedent ...................................................................... 170-23
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M Civ JI 170.34 Will Contests: Conditional Revocation of Will (Dependent Relative
Revocation) .............................................................................................................. 170-24
M Civ JI 170.41 Will Contests: Mental Capacity—Definition ................................... 170-25
M Civ JI 170.42 Will Contests: Mental Capacity—Will Made before or after Adjudication of
Incompetency, after Commitment or While under Guardianship or
Conservatorship ....................................................................................................... 170-26
M Civ JI 170.43 Will Contests: Insane Delusion—Definition .................................... 170-27
M Civ JI 170.44 Will Contests: Undue Influence—Definition; Burden of Proof ....... 170-28
M Civ JI 170.45 Will Contests: Existence of Presumption of Undue Influence—Burden of
Proof [ Instruction Deleted ] .................................................................................... 170-30
M Civ JI 170.46 Will Contests: Fraud in Procurement of Will................................... 170-32
M Civ JI 170.51 Will Contests: Burden of Proof........................................................ 170-33
Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-3
Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.01 Will Contests: Defining Legal Names of Parties and
Counsel
This case is a will contest. The person who presents the document, claiming it is the valid
will of [ name of decedent ], the decedent, is called the proponent. The term “decedent” is
used to refer to the person who is deceased. The proponent is [ state name and indicate
where seated ]. The attorney for the proponent is [ state attorney’s name and indicate
where seated ]. The person who contests the document, claiming it is not the valid will of
[ name of decedent ], the decedent, is called the contestant. The contestant is [ state the
contestant’s name and indicate where seated ]. The attorney for the contestant is [ state
attorney’s name and indicate where seated ]. [ If any other persons are seated at the
counsel table, identify them and describe their function ].
Note on Use
In will contest cases, this instruction should be substituted for M Civ JI 1.02.
History
M Civ JI 170.01 was added January 1984.
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M Civ JI 170.02 Will Contests: Will/Codicil—Definition
A will is a document executed in the manner required by law in which a person directs the
disposition of [ his / her ] property after death.
*(A codicil is a supplement or an addition to a will executed in the manner required by law
that may revoke, change, or add to a will.)
“Executed in the manner required by law” means that the decedent must sign the [ will /
codicil ] and it must be witnessed by at least two persons. The proponent has the burden of
proving that the [ will / codicil ] was executed in the manner required by law.
Note on Use
*This sentence should be read only if applicable.
If the will is a testamentary instrument that merely appoints a personal representative or
other fiduciary, revokes a prior will, or limits the persons who will be entitled to receive the
assets of an intestate estate, this instruction may have to be modified.
If execution requirements of a foreign jurisdiction that differ from Michigan requirements
apply, see MCL 700.2506.
Comment
MCL 700.1108(b), .2502(1), (3). See also Appeal of Jameson, 1 Mich 99 (1848); Byrne v
Hume, 84 Mich 185; 47 NW 679 (1890).
The burden of proving execution is on the proponent. MCL 700.3407(1)(b); In re McIntyre,
355 Mich 238; 94 NW2d 208 (1959).
History
M Civ JI 170.02 was added January 1984. Amended March 2001.
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Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.03 Will Contests: Holographic Will—Definition
The law recognizes what is known as a holographic will. A document in which a person
directs the disposition of [ his / her ] property after death is valid as a holographic will if—
(a) it is dated, and
(b) it was signed by the decedent, and
(c) the material provisions are in the handwriting of the decedent.
The proponent has the burden of proving that the document is a holographic will.
Comment
The holographic will provision (MCL 700.2502(2)) of the Estates and Protected
Individuals Code (EPIC) applies to testamentary instruments that are not properly
witnessed. The EPIC provision departs from prior law in that the testator’s signature no
longer needs to be at the end of a holographic will. This relaxed requirement applies to
holographic wills executed prior to the effective date of EPIC (April 1, 2000) if the testator
died after the effective date. MCL 700.8101(1)(a). See also In re Sutherby Estate, 110 Mich
App 175; 312 NW2d 200 (1981), in which the court upheld a holographic will executed
before the effective date of the predecessor statute, the Revised Probate Code.
History
M Civ JI 170.03 was added January 1984. Amended March 2001.
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M Civ JI 170.04 Will Contests: Cautionary Instruction as to
Decedent’s Right to Leave Property by a Will
*(The law does not require property to be willed to heirs or relatives.) The law allows
everyone who is not [ mentally incapacitated / under undue influence / [ name other
condition ] ] in making a will free to leave [ his / her ] property as [ he / she ] chooses. The
court and jury have no right to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the person
making the will or as to the wisdom or justice of the provisions of the will.
Note on Use
*This sentence should be read when applicable.
Comment
This instruction contains cautions as to the rights of a person in the making of his will.
These cautions are believed necessary to prevent the often mistaken belief of most jurors
that the decedent cannot disinherit heirs and other relatives by his or her will and to prevent
the jurors from improperly trying to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the maker
of the will. See In re Allen’s Estate, 230 Mich 584; 203 NW 479 (1925).
The testator has a right to dispose of his property as he sees fit. In re Kramer’s Estate, 324
Mich 626; 37 NW2d 564 (1949). The law does not require property to be disposed among
the testator’s heirs. In re Fay’s Estate, 197 Mich 675; 164 NW 523 (1917). It concerns no
one what a person’s reasons were in his distribution by will. Brown v Blesch, 270 Mich 576;
259 NW 331 (1935). The jury has no right to substitute its judgment for the judgment of
the testator. In re Hannan’s Estate, 315 Mich 102; 23 NW2d 222 (1946). The jury has no
right to consider that the testator did an apparent injustice in his will. In re Livingston’s
Estate, 295 Mich 637; 295 NW 343 (1940). While the testator’s blood relations are the
natural objects of his bounty, such bounty is not limited by blood relationship, and his blood
relations have no natural or inherent right to his property. Spratt v Spratt, 76 Mich 384; 43
NW 627 (1889).
History
M Civ JI 170.04 was added January 1984.
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Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.05 Will Contests: Letter, Deed, Bill of Sale, Contract as a
Will
A [ document / part of a document ] can be a will if—
(a) the decedent intended that the [ document / part of a document ] be [ his /
her ] will, and
(b) the [ document / part of a document ] transfers property after the decedent’s
death and not during the decedent’s lifetime.
In determining the decedent’s intent, you must consider the contents of the document and
the surrounding facts and circumstances.
The proponent has the burden of proving that the decedent intended the [ document / part
of a document ] to be [ his / her ] will and to transfer [ his / her ] property after death.
Note on Use
This instruction is intended for cases in which there is no dispute that the document or part
of a document has been executed in the manner required by law but the document is in a
form not usual for a will and the issue for the jury is whether the disposition is testamentary
in nature and so intended. In re Merritt’s Estate, 286 Mich 83; 281 NW 546 (1938).
For cases in which a document or writing upon a document is not executed in the manner
required by law and clear and convincing evidence of intent is required (MCL 700.2503),
see M Civ JI 170.08 Will Contests: Will—Writings Intended as Wills.
Comment
MCL 700.1108(b), .2502(3).
Whether a document or part of a document is testamentary in nature depends on its
wording. If it is executed with the formalities of a will and provides for disposition of
property only after death, it is a will. Merritt’s Estate (letter). See also Geisel v Burg, 283
Mich 73; 276 NW 904 (1937) (certificate of deposit; no proof of intent). If the instrument
transfers a present interest in property during the decedent’s lifetime, though possession or
enjoyment of the property does not take place until a future time and after the death of the
decedent, it is not a will. Ireland v Lester, 298 Mich 154; 298 NW 488 (1941) (surviving
partner buy-out contract); In re Lloyd’s Estate, 256 Mich 305; 239 NW 390 (1931) (bill of
sale); Darnell v Smith, 238 Mich 33; 213 NW 59 (1927) (will with deed provision); Cook
v Sadler, 214 Mich 582; 183 NW 82 (1921) (deed).
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If the instrument contains will provisions and deed or other conveyance provisions, the will
provisions may be admitted to probate as a will. Merritt’s Estate.
There is no election of remedies if an instrument is first sued on as being a deed and later
offered for probate as a will. In re Broffee’s Estate, 206 Mich 107; 172 NW 541 (1919).
In determining whether an instrument is a will, if the intention of the decedent is expressed
on the instrument in plain and unmistakable language, the language must govern, and there
is no jury question. If the language is unclear as to testamentary disposition, there is a jury
question, and extrinsic evidence showing the facts and circumstances of the making of the
instrument may be introduced. Lloyd’s Estate.
History
M Civ JI 170.05 was added January 1984.
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Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.08 Will Contests: Will—Writings Intended as Wills
In order to be a valid [ will / [ partial / complete ] revocation of a will / [ addition to /
alteration of ] a will / [ partial / complete ] revival of a formerly revoked [ will / portion of
a will ] ], a document or writing added upon a document that directs the disposition of the
decedent’s property after death must have been executed in the manner required by law.
*If the document or writing added upon a document was not executed in the manner
required by law, it is treated as if it were executed in the manner required by law if the
proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the
document or writing to constitute [ a will / a partial or complete revocation of a will / an
addition to or alteration of a will / a partial or complete revival of [ a formerly revoked will
/ a formerly revoked portion of the will ] ]. In determining the decedent’s intent, you must
consider the contents of the [ document / writing ] and the surrounding facts and
circumstances.
[ Name of party offering the document or writing ] has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute [ [ his
/ her ] will / a partial or complete revocation of [ his / her ] will / an addition to or alteration
of [ his / her ] will / a partial or complete revival of [ a formerly revoked will / a formerly
revoked portion of [ his / her ] will ] ].
Note on Use
This instruction should be preceded by the definition of clear and convincing evidence in
M Civ JI 8.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof, and by the definition of a will and execution
requirements in M Civ JI 170.02 Will Contests: Will/Codicil—Definition.
Comment
MCL 700.2503.
Section 2503 of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC) makes a substantial
departure from prior law by allowing any document or writing on a document to be
admitted to probate to the extent the testator intended it to be his or her will, a partial or
complete revocation of a will, an addition to or an alteration of a will, or a partial or
complete revival of a formerly revoked will or revoked portion of a will. For effective date
provisions of EPIC, see MCL 700.8101 reproduced in the Introduction to this chapter.
EPIC §2503 is identical in its essential language to §2-503 of the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC) (1990). The comment to §2-503 of the UPC states that the intent of the provision is
“to excuse a harmless error in complying with the formal requirements for executing or
revoking a will.” However, the UPC comment urges that courts at the trial and appellate
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level police with rigor the clear and convincing evidentiary standard and “[ t]he larger the
departure from Section 2-502 formality, the harder it will be to satisfy the court that the
instrument reflects the testator’s intent.” The UPC comment indicates that provisions like
§2-503 have been in effect in common-law jurisdictions in Australia (South Australia) and
Canada (Manitoba).
History
M Civ JI 170.08 was added March 2001.
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Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.11 Will Contests: Will Signed by Another for Decedent
If the decedent directed another person to sign [ his / her ] will and that other person signed
the decedent’s name in the decedent’s conscious presence, then the will is considered to be
signed by the decedent in the manner required by law.
Comment
MCL 700.2502(1)(b).
MCL 700.2502(1)(b) requires the “conscious presence” of the testator when the will is
signed for him or her by another, whereas the prior statute (MCL 700.122(1)) specified only
“presence.” However, it is unlikely that this addition represents a change in law because
Michigan cases have long construed “presence” liberally, focusing more on the testator’s
consciousness of what was going on rather than physical proximity or actual viewing. In re
Lane’s Estate, 265 Mich 539; 251 NW 590 (1933); Bradford v Vinton, 59 Mich 139; 26
NW 401 (1886). The “conscious presence test” is discussed in the comment to §2-502 of
the Uniform Probate Code.
History
M Civ JI 170.11 was added January 1984. Amended March 2001.
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M Civ JI 170.12 Will Contests: Decedent Signing Will by Mark
If the decedent makes a cross or mark as [ his / her ] signature, then the will is signed in the
manner required by law.
Comment
In re McIntyre Estate, 355 Mich 238; 94 NW2d 208 (1959).
History
M Civ JI 170.12 was added January 1984.
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Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.13 Will Contests: Requirements for Witnessing Will
A will is witnessed in the manner required by law if [ each witness / at least two witnesses ]
signed the document within a reasonable time after [ he / she ] did any one of the following:
(a) saw the decedent sign the document, or
(b) heard the decedent say or otherwise acknowledge that the signature on the
document was [ his / her ] signature, or
(c) heard the decedent say or otherwise acknowledge that the document was
[ his / her ] will.
It is not necessary that each witness be a witness to the same act of the decedent as just
described to you.
The witnesses are not required to sign the document at the same time.
Comment
MCL 700.2502(1)(c).
Section 2502(1)(c) of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC) departs from prior
law by permitting each witness to sign “within a reasonable time” after seeing the testator
sign the will or acknowledge the signature or will as his or her own. The new language
derives from §2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) (1990) and the UPC comment
explains: “There is, however, no requirement that the witnesses sign before the testator’s
death; in a given case, the reasonable-time requirement could be satisfied even if the
witnesses sign after the testator’s death.” Michigan case law under the predecessor statute
(MCL 700.122(1)) held that witnesses could not sign after the testator’s death. In re Estate
of Mikeska, 140 Mich App 116; 362 NW2d 906 (1985).
For effective date provisions of EPIC, see MCL 700.8101 reproduced in the Introduction
to this chapter.
History
M Civ JI 170.13 was added January 1984. Amended March 2001.
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M Civ JI 170.15A Will Contests: Proving Execution of Self-Proved
Wills
The law in this state recognizes what is known as a “self-proved” will. In the case of a self-
proved will, the proponent is not required to prove that the will was signed by the decedent
and two witnesses. Because this is a self-proved will, you may conclude that the will was
witnessed in the manner required by law even without the testimony of either of the
witnesses to the will, but you should consider all of the evidence in determining whether
the will was witnessed in the manner required by law.
*(If the contestant proves that there was fraud or forgery affecting the acknowledgment or
a sworn statement, then the will is not executed in the manner required by law.)
Note on Use
*The sentence in parentheses should be read to the jury if fraud or forgery affecting the
acknowledgment or a sworn statement is an issue in the case. If this sentence is used,
additional instructions on the meaning of fraud will need to be given.
Comment
MCL 700.3406(2).
The new statute on proof of execution of self-proved wills, MCL 700.3406(2), creates a
conclusive presumption that the signature requirements for execution have been met and a
rebuttable presumption that the other requirements of execution have been met. Subsection
(2) states:
If a will is self-proved, compliance with signature requirements for execution is
conclusively presumed and other requirements of execution are presumed subject to
rebuttal without the testimony of any witness upon filing the will and the acknowledgment
and sworn statements annexed or attached to the will, unless there is proof of fraud or
forgery affecting the acknowledgment or a sworn statement.
History
M Civ JI 170.15A was added March 2001.
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Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.15B Will Contests: Proving Execution of Will That Is Not
Self-Proved
You may find that the will was executed in the manner required by law based upon any of
the following:
(a) the testimony of one of the witnesses who signed the will; or
(b) the testimony of any person who did not actually sign the will as a witness
but has personal knowledge of the signing of the will by the decedent and by
the witnesses; or
(c) any other evidence.
*(In this case, the testimony of at least one of the witnesses who signed the will is required
if at least one of them is competent, able to testify, and within the state.)
Note on Use
*If the will is attested, the sentence in parentheses should be read to the jury. If the will is
not attested, this sentence should not be read.
Comment
MCL 700.3406(1).
This instruction has been formulated to prevent the jurors from erroneously concluding that
the testimony of both witnesses is necessary to prove the execution of the will.
History
M Civ JI 170.15B was added March 2001 to replace M Civ JI 170.15.
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M Civ JI 170.16 Will Contests: Proving Execution of Will Where
Witnesses Cannot Be Found [ Instruction Deleted ]
Note on Use
See M Civ JI 170.15A Will Contests: Proving Execution of Self-Proved Wills and M Civ
JI 170.15B Will Contests: Proving Execution of Will That Is Not Self-Proved.
History
M Civ JI 170.16 was added January 1984. Deleted March 2001.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-17
Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.17A Will Contests: Execution—Witness Not
Remembering or Denying Contents of Witnessing Clause (Self-
Proved Will)
There is near the end of the document presented as the will of the decedent a clause that
reads as follows: [ Read the acknowledgment clause exactly as it appears in the will. ]
You may conclude that the will was witnessed in the manner required by law even though
the [ witness / witnesses ] may have stated—
(a) *(that the will was not properly witnessed, or)
(b) *(that [ he does / she does / they do ] not remember what [ he / she / they ]
signed, or)
(c) *(that [ he denies / she denies / they deny ] what [ he / she / they ] signed.)
Note on Use
*The court should choose from subsections a–c those that are applicable to the case.
This instruction should be preceded by M Civ JI 170.15A Will Contests: Proving Execution
of Self-Proved Wills.
Comment
MCL 700.3406(2). In re Dettling Estate, 351 Mich 335; 88 NW2d 252 (1958).
History
M Civ JI 170.17A was added March 2001.
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M Civ JI 170.17B Will Contests: Execution—Witness Not
Remembering or Denying Contents of Witnessing Clause (Will That
Is Not Self-Proved)
There is near the end of the document presented as the will of the decedent a clause that
reads as follows: [ Read the attestation clause exactly as it appears in the will. ]
If you find from the evidence that the [ witness / witnesses ] signed the will, you may
conclude that the will was witnessed in the manner required by law even though the
[ witness / witnesses ] may have stated —
(a) *(that the will was not properly witnessed, or)
(b) *(that [ he does / she does / they do ] not remember what [ he / she / they ]
signed, or)
(c) *(that [ he denies / she denies / they deny ] what [ he / she / they ] signed.)
Note on Use
*The court should choose from subsections a–c those that are applicable to the case.
This instruction should be preceded by M Civ JI 170.15B Will Contests: Proving Execution
of Will That Is Not Self-Proved.
Comment
MCL 700.3406(1). In re Dettling Estate, 351 Mich 335; 88 NW2d 252 (1958).
History
M Civ JI 170.17B was added March 2001 to replace M Civ JI 170.14.
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Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.21 Will Contests: Lost, Destroyed or Otherwise
Unavailable Will
The proponent of a [ lost / destroyed / otherwise unavailable ] will has the burden of
proving:
(a) that the will was in existence;
(b) that it was executed in the manner required by law;
(c) all or part of the contents of the will;
(d) *(that the [ lost / destroyed / otherwise unavailable ] will revoked the
previous [ will / wills ].
Note on Use
*Subsection be used in any case where a prior will is presented for probate.
This instruction should be preceded by the appropriate instruction or instructions on
execution of a will.
Comment
MCL 700.3402. See also In re Francis Estate, 349 Mich 339; 84 NW2d 782 (1957).
The mandate of the predecessor statute (§149 of the Revised Probate Code) that a “lost,
destroyed or suppressed” will could not be admitted to probate unless its execution and
contents were established by at least two reputable witnesses is not continued in MCL
700.3402, which also replaces the word “suppressed” with “otherwise unavailable.”
History
M Civ JI 170.21 was added January 1984. Amended March 2001.
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M Civ JI 170.31 Will Contests: Revocation of Will by Physical Means
A [ will / part of a will ] may be revoked by being [ burned / torn / canceled / obliterated /
destroyed ] by [ a decedent / another person in decedent’s conscious presence and by [ his
/ her ] direction ] with the intent and for the purpose of revoking [ the will / any part of the
will ].
*(Canceling can include a striking out, as drawing one or more lines through, crossing out
or otherwise marking out.)
*(Obliteration can include a blotting out and erasing or a smudging.)
*(There is no requirement as to what amount or in what manner the [ cancellation /
obliteration ] is accomplished as long as it is done with the decedent’s intention of revoking
[ the will / any part of the will ].)
*(A [ burn / or / tear / or / cancellation ] can be a revocation even if it does not touch any of
the words on the will.)
The contestant has the burden of proving that [ the will / a part of the will ] was revoked by
being [ burned / torn / canceled / obliterated / destroyed ] by [ the decedent / another person
in the decedent’s conscious presence and by [ his / her ] direction ] with the intent and for
the purpose of revoking [ the will / any part of the will ].
Note on Use
*These paragraphs should be read to the jury only if they are applicable to the case.
The definitions of “canceling” and “obliteration” are not intended to be exclusive.
Comment
MCL 700.2507(1)(b).
Revocation can be as to the whole will or to a part of the will. MCL 700.2507(1)(b); In re
Fox’s Estate, 192 Mich 699; 159 NW 332 (1916).
Cancellation includes a striking out, such as the drawing of one or more lines through, or
the crossing out of, the will provisions. Obliteration includes a blotting out, an erasure, a
smudging, a total lining out of the will provision. Anno: Effect of testator’s attempted
physical alteration of will after execution, 62 ALR 1367, p 1383. It does not matter whether
the cancellation is done by pencil or pen. Fox’s Estate. One line as well as many could be
a cancellation. Id.; In re Houghten’s Estate, 310 Mich 613; 17 NW2d 774 (1945).
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Chapter 170: Will Contests
Cancellation can also include cutting out of the testator and witnesses signatures. Anno:
Effect of testator’s attempted physical alteration of will after execution, 24 ALR2d 514,
§10.
The new Michigan statute adds the following provision not found in the predecessor statute:
“A burning, tearing, or canceling is a revocatory act on the will, whether or not the burn,
tear, or cancellation touches any of the words on the will.” MCL 700.2507(1)(b). See the
comment to §2-507 of the Uniform Probate Code from which this sentence derives.
The new statute requires the “conscious presence” of the testator when another person
performs the act of revocation for the testator, whereas the prior statute (MCL 700.124(1))
used the word “presence.” “Conscious presence” focuses more on the testator’s
consciousness of what is going on rather than physical proximity or actual viewing. See
Michigan cases in the Comment to M Civ JI 170.11 Will Contests: Will Signed by Another
for Decedent.
History
M Civ JI 170.31 was added January 1984. Amended March 2001.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 170-22 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 170.32 Will Contests: Revocation—Presumption from
Failure to Produce Original Will Retained by Decedent
A will that is known to have existed and to have been in the decedent’s custody during [ his
/ her ] lifetime and which cannot be found at [ his / her ] death raises a presumption that
such will was destroyed by the decedent with the intention of revoking it.
In determining whether this presumption has been overcome, you may take into
consideration all the surrounding circumstances which would tend to show that there was
no intent to revoke, including what the decedent said.
Note on Use
This instruction should be preceded by M Civ JI 170.31 Will Contests: Revocation of Will
by Physical Means.
Comment
Where the will cannot be found at the death of the testator and especially where the will is
not traced out of possession of the testator, the presumption of revocation can be met by
declarations of the testator, and whether or not the presumption is rebutted is a question of
fact. In re Taylor’s Estate, 323 Mich 101; 34 NW2d 474 (1948); In re Estate of Thomas,
274 Mich 10; 263 NW 891 (1935); In re Keene’s Estate, 189 Mich 97; 155 NW 514 (1915);
In re Bradley’s Estate, 215 Mich 72; 183 NW 897 (1921); In re Smith Estate, 145 Mich
App 634; 378 NW2d 555 (1985).
History
M Civ JI 170.32 was added January 1984.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-23
Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.33 Will Contests: Revocation—Presumption from
Failure to Produce Executed Duplicate Will Retained by Decedent
If there have been executed duplicate wills made by the decedent but only one copy had
been retained by [ him / her ], the failure to find the will in the custody of the decedent at
the time of [ his / her ] death, even though a duplicate executed copy is found elsewhere,
raises a presumption that decedent destroyed the will with the intention of revoking it.
In determining whether this presumption has been overcome, you may take into
consideration all the surrounding circumstances which would tend to show that there was
no intent to revoke, including what the decedent said.
Note on Use
This instruction should be preceded by M Civ JI 170.31 Will Contests: Revocation of Will
by Physical Means.
Comment
Where a duplicate executed copy of the will left in the testator’s possession could not be
found after his death, there is a presumption that he destroyed the will with the intention of
revoking it. In re Walsh’s Estate, 196 Mich 42; 163 NW 70 (1917).
History
M Civ JI 170.33 was added January 1984.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 170-24 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 170.34 Will Contests: Conditional Revocation of Will
(Dependent Relative Revocation)
If [ the decedent / a person in the decedent’s presence by [ his / her ] direction ] [ burned /
tore / canceled / obliterated / destroyed ] the [ will / part of the will ] with the intention of
making a substitute [ will / part of the will ] thereafter, and if the substitute [ will / part of
the will ] is not made or is not valid for any reason, then you may find that the original [ will
/ part of the will ] that was [ burned / torn / canceled / obliterated / destroyed ] is valid.
However, you may also find that the decedent intended to revoke the original [ will / part
of the will ] absolutely whether or not the substitute [ will / part of the will ] would be valid.
Note on Use
This instruction should be preceded by M Civ JI 170.31 Will Contests: Revocation of Will
by Physical Means.
Comment
In re Bonkowski’s Estate, 266 Mich 112; 253 NW 235 (1934); In re Houghten’s Estate, 310
Mich 613; 17 NW2d 774 (1945); In re McKay Estate, 347 Mich 153; 79 NW2d 597 (1956);
Revocation of Wills (pt II): Dependent Relative Revocation, St B Mich Sec Prob & Tr L
Newsletter, Mar 1962.
History
M Civ JI 170.34 was added January 1984.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-25
Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.41 Will Contests: Mental Capacity—Definition
A decedent had sufficient mental capacity to make a will if at the time [ he / she ] made the
document [ he / she ]
(a) had the ability to understand that [ he / she ] was providing for the
disposition of [ his / her ] property after [ his / her ] death, and
(b) had the ability to know the nature and extent of [ his / her ] property, and
(c) knew the natural objects of [ his / her ] bounty, and
(d) had the ability to understand in a reasonable manner the general nature and
effect of [ his / her ] act in signing the will.
The contestant has the burden of proving that at the time the decedent made the document
[ he / she ] did not have sufficient mental capacity to make a will.
Comment
The statutory presumption of mental competency of the decedent to make a will, MCL
600.2152, has been construed to place on the contestant the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. In re
Hallitt’s Estate, 324 Mich 654; 37 NW2d 662 (1949); In re Paul’s Estate, 289 Mich 452;
286 NW 680 (1939).
An early case referred to blood relations as the natural objects of one’s bounty, Spratt v
Spratt, 76 Mich 384; 43 NW 627 (1889), while more recent cases refer to “relatives.” In re
Sprenger’s Estate, 337 Mich 514 (1953); In re Walker’s Estate, 270 Mich 33 (1935).
MCL 700.2501 was amended effective April 1, 2010. The prior provision only stated that
an individual be of sound mind. The amended statute draws a distinction between an ability
to know or understand in subsections (2)(A),(B), and (D) and actual knowledge in
subsection (2)(C).
History
M Civ JI 170.41 was added January 1984. Amended June 2010.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 170-26 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 170.42 Will Contests: Mental Capacity—Will Made before or
after Adjudication of Incompetency, after Commitment or While
under Guardianship or Conservatorship
The fact that a decedent was [ adjudged mentally ill / adjudged mentally incompetent /
committed to a mental hospital / under guardianship / under conservatorship / adjudged a
legally incapacitated person ] before or after the will was made does not of itself imply lack
of mental capacity at the time the will was made. However, such fact may be considered
together with all the other evidence in determining whether the decedent had sufficient
mental capacity to make a will.
Note on Use
This instruction assumes that the adjudication as recited in the instruction has been properly
admitted into evidence.
Comment
The fact that the testator was declared incompetent and committed to an institution after he
executed the will in question does not of itself prove that he lacked sufficient mental powers
to execute the will. See In re Nickel’s Estate, 321 Mich 519; 32 NW2d 733 (1948).
The fact that a guardian of the person or of the estate was appointed for the testator does
not of itself necessarily imply that he would not be sufficiently competent to make a will.
See, e.g., In re Paquin’s Estate, 328 Mich 293; 43 NW2d 858 (1950) (guardian of the
person and of the estate was appointed after the testator executed the will in question); In
re Vallender’s Estate, 310 Mich 359; 17 NW2d 213 (1945) (guardian of the person and of
the estate was appointed before the testator executed the will in question).
See also In re Merritt’s Estate, 286 Mich 83; 281 NW 546 (1938); In re Cummins’ Estate,
271 Mich 215; 259 NW 894 (1935) (guardian of the estate was appointed before testatrix
executed the will in question).
History
M Civ JI 170.42 was added January 1984.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-27
Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.43 Will Contests: Insane Delusion—Definition
An insane delusion exists when a person persistently believes supposed facts which have
no real existence and so believes such supposed facts against all evidence and probabilities
and without any foundation or reason for the belief, and conducts [ himself / herself ] as if
such facts actually existed.
It is not an insane delusion if the decedent capriciously or arbitrarily disliked [ contestant /
[ other ] ] or harbored unjust suspicions or prejudices against [ contestant / [ other ] ].
It is not an insane delusion if the decedent had mistaken beliefs, unjust suspicions, arbitrary
dislikes or prejudices as long as there were facts upon which the decedent may have based
[ his / her ] belief, regardless of what little evidential force such facts may possess. While
on consideration of those facts the belief may seem illogical or without foundation, a
decedent cannot be said to suffer from an insane delusion simply because [ he / she ] has
not reasoned correctly.
However, if the decedent was suffering from an insane delusion at the time [ he / she ] made
the will, and if that insane delusion influenced the decedent in disposing of the property in
the manner [ he / she ] did, then the will is not valid.
The contestant has the burden of proving that decedent was suffering from an insane
delusion at the time [ he / she ] made the will.
Comment
Lack of mental capacity to make a will and an insane delusion affecting the making of a
will are different and require separate instructions. Where there is evidence of a delusion
by the decedent, it is mandatory to instruct the jury in regard to the delusion; otherwise the
jury may mistakenly conclude that a person subject to delusions was incompetent to make
a will. In re Powers Estate, 375 Mich 150; 134 NW2d 148 (1965).
This instruction was adapted from approved instructions on insane delusion in In re
Bolger’s Estate, 226 Mich 545; 198 NW 404 (1924), and In re Johnson’s Estate, 308 Mich
366; 13 NW2d 852 (1944).
See also Rivard v Rivard, 109 Mich 98; 66 NW 681 (1896); In re Rockett’s Estate, 191
Mich 499; 158 NW 12 (1916).
History
M Civ JI 170.43 was added January 1984.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 170-28 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 170.44 Will Contests: Undue Influence—Definition; Burden
of Proof
The contestant has the burden of proving that there was undue influence exerted on the
decedent in the making of the will.
Undue influence is influence which is so great that it overpowers the decedent’s free will
and prevents [him / her] from doing as [he / she] pleases with [ his / her ] property.
To be “undue,” the influence exerted upon the decedent must be of such a degree that it
overpowered the decedent's free choice and caused [ him / her ] to act against [ his / her]
own free will and to act in accordance with the will of the [ person / persons ] who
influenced [ him / her ].
The influence exerted may be by [force / threats / flattery / persuasion / fraud /
misrepresentation / physical coercion / moral coercion / ( other) ]. A will which results
from undue influence is a will which the decedent would not otherwise have made. It
disposes of the decedent’s property in a manner different from the disposition the decedent
would have made had [ he / she ] been free of such influence.
The word “undue” must be emphasized, because the decedent may be influenced in the
disposition of [ his / her ] property by specific and direct influences without such influences
becoming undue. This is true even though the will would not have been made but for such
influence. It is not improper for a [ spouse / child / parent / relative / friend / housekeeper
/ (other) ] to—
(a) *([ advise / persuade / argue / flatter / solicit / entreat / implore ],)
(b) (appeal to the decedent’s [ hopes / fears / prejudices / sense of justice /
sense of duty / sense of gratitude / sense of pity ],)
(c) *(appeal to ties of [ friendship / affection / kinship ],)
(d) *([ (other) ],)
provided the decedent's power to resist such influence is not overcome and [ his / her ]
capacity to finally act in accordance with [ his / her] own free will is not overpowered. A
will which results must be the free will and purpose of the decedent and not that of [ another
person / other persons ].
Mere existence of the opportunity, motive or even the ability to control the free will of the
decedent is not sufficient to establish that the decedent's will is the result of undue
influence.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-29
Chapter 170: Will Contests
If you find that [ name ] exerted undue influence, then your verdict will be against the will.
If you find that [ name ] did not exert undue influence, then your verdict will be in favor of
the will.
Note on Use
*The Court should choose among subsections (a)-(d) those which are applicable to the case.
This instruction should be accompanied by M Civ JI 8.01, Meaning of Burden of Proof.
Comment
In re Estate of Karmey, 468 Mich 68; 658 NW2d 796 (2003); Widmayer v Leonard, 422
Mich 280; 373 NW2d 538 (1985); Kar v Hogan, 399 Mich 529; 251 NW2d 77 (1976); In
re Willey Estate, 9 Mich App 245; 156 NW2d 631 (1967); In re Langlois Estate, 361 Mich
646; 106 NW2d 132 (1960); In re Paquin’s Estate, 328 Mich 293; 43 NW2d 858 (1950); In
re Balk’s Estate, 298 Mich 303; 298 NW 779 (1941); In re Kramer’s Estate, 324 Mich 626;
37 NW2d 564 (1949); In re Reed’s Estate, 273 Mich 334; 263 NW 76 (1935); In re Curtis
Estate, 197 Mich 473; 163 NW 944 (1917); Nelson v Wiggins, 172 Mich 191; 137 NW 623
(1912).
History
M Civ JI 170.44 was added January 1984. Amended December 2003; October 2014,
January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 170-30 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 170.45 Will Contests: Existence of Presumption of Undue
Influence—Burden of Proof [ Instruction Deleted ]
The Committee deleted M Civ JI 170.45, but it is continuing to review the issue of
the presumption of undue influence and how the jury is to be instructed, if at all, when that
presumption has not been rebutted.
To establish that the decedent made the will as a result of undue influence, the contestant
has the burden of proving all three of the following propositions:
That [ name ] had a fiduciary relationship with the decedent.
That [ name ] (or a person or interest he represented) benefited from the will, and
That by reason of the fiduciary relationship [ name ] had an opportunity to influence the
decedent in giving that benefit.
Your verdict will be against the will if you find that all three propositions have been
proven. Otherwise, your verdict will be in favor of the will.
A “fiduciary relationship” is one of inequality where a person places complete trust in
another person regarding the subject matter, and the trusted person controls the subject of
the relationship by reason of knowledge, resources, power, or moral authority.
Note on Use
In cases involving the presumption of undue influence, this instruction is applicable only
where two conditions coexist: 1) the putative fiduciary has not introduced evidence to “meet” or
“rebut” the presumption, i.e, the fiduciary hasn’t introduced evidence tending to show that the
bequest was not made as a result of undue influence, and 2) there is an issue of fact whether one or
more of the three components of the presumption of undue influence exists, MRE 301; Widmayer
v Leonard, 422 Mich 280; 373 NW2d 538 (1985).
Where evidence has been introduced to meet the presumption, and in cases that do not
involve the presumption of undue influence, the applicable undue influence instruction is M Civ JI
170.44 - Will Contests: Undue Influence - Burden of Proof.
A presumption casts on the opposing party only the obligation to come forward with
evidence opposing the presumption, and if that is done, the effect of the presumption disappears,
other than to prevent a directed verdict against the party having the benefit of the presumption, and
the burden of proof remains with the person claiming undue influence. MRE 301; Widmayer,
supra. If there is no genuine dispute that all elements of the presumption exist, and there is no
evidence opposing the presumption, the party having the benefit of the presumption is entitled to a
directed verdict. MRE 301; Widmayer, supra.
Often there will be no triable dispute on one or more of the elements of the presumption,
in which case the court should not submit that element to the jury for decision. Typically, for
example, there will be no dispute that the putative fiduciary benefited from the will. While it is
said generally that the existence of a confidential relationship is a question of fact, In re Kanable
Estate, 47 Mich App 299; 209 NW2d 452 (1973), there are a number of relationships which are
fiduciary as a matter of law, e.g., principal-agent, guardian-ward, trustee-beneficiary, attorney-
Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-31
Chapter 170: Will Contests
client, physician-patient, clergy-penitent, accountant-client, stockbroker-customer. Unless there is
a dispute that the named relationship exists, it will be deemed a fiduciary relationship as a matter
of law. See, In re Estate of Karmey, 468 Mich 68,74 fn 2,3; 658 NW2d 796 (2003). For that reason
the definition in the instruction does not attempt to encompass all of them. A marriage relationship
does not create a presumption of undue influence. In re Estate of Karmey.
The instruction uses the term “fiduciary relationship” instead of “confidential or fiduciary
relationship” on the conclusion that the terms “fiduciary relationship” and “confidential or
fiduciary relationship” have identical meanings. See, In re Estate of Karmey.
This instruction should be accompanied by M Civ JI 8.01, Meaning of Burden of Proof.
Comment
In re Estate of Karmey
; Widmayer; Kar v Hogan, 399 Mich 529; 251 NW2d 77 (1976).
See also In re Cox Estate, 383 Mich 108; 174 NW2d 558 (1970) (fiduciary relationship of attorney
and clergyman); In re Vollbrecht Estate, 26 Mich App 430; 182 NW2d 609 (1970) (substantial
benefit derived by charitable foundation wherein testatrix’s attorney and her accountant were also
trustees of foundation); In re Spillette Estate, 352 Mich 12; 88 NW2d 300 (1958); In re Haskell’s
Estate, 283 Mich 513; 278 NW 668 (1938) (will in favor of attorney upheld where testatrix
obtained independent advice; presumption of undue influence rebutted); In re Eldred’s Estate, 234
Mich 131; 203 NW 870 (1926) (doctor); In re Hartlerode’s Estate, 183 Mich 51; 148 NW 774
(1914) (clergyman).
History
M Civ JI 170.45 was added January 1984. Amended March 1990, December 8, 2003.
Deleted October 2014.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 170-32 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 170.46 Will Contests: Fraud in Procurement of Will
A will is not valid if it was made as a result of fraud. Fraud exists if—
(a) there was a misrepresentation of [ a material fact / material facts ] to the
decedent, and
(b) the decedent relied on and was influenced by that misrepresentation in
disposing of [ his / her ] property by will.
The contestant has the burden of proving that there was fraud in the making of the will.
Comment
In re Spillette Estate, 352 Mich 12; 88 NW2d 300 (1958); In re Hannan’s Estate, 315 Mich
102; 23 NW2d 222 (1946); In re Barth’s Estate, 298 Mich 388; 299 NW 118 (1941).
History
M Civ JI 170.46 was added January 1984.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 170-33
Chapter 170: Will Contests
M Civ JI 170.51 Will Contests: Burden of Proof
The proponent has the burden of proving:
(a) *(that the will is a holographic will as defined by law;)
(b) *(that the [ will / codicil ] was signed by [ the decedent / another person at
decedent’s direction and in [ his / her ] conscious presence ];)
(c) *(that the [ will / codicil ] was witnessed in the manner required by law;)
(d) *(that the document was intended by the decedent to be [ his / her ] will
and transferred [ his / her ] property after death and not during [ his / her ]
lifetime;)
(e) *(by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the
document or writing to constitute [ a will / a partial or complete revocation of
a will / an addition to or alteration of a will / a partial or complete revival of [ a
formerly revoked will / a formerly revoked portion of the will ] ].)
On the other hand, the contestant has the burden of proving:
(a) *(that the will was the result of undue influence;)
(b) *(that the decedent did not have the mental capacity to make a will;)
(c) *(that the will was the result of an insane delusion;)
(d) *(that the will was revoked by [ the decedent / another person at the
direction of and in the conscious presence of the decedent ];)
(e) *(that the will was procured as a result of fraud.)
Your verdict will be that the will is valid if the proponent has proved all of those elements
(and the contestant has failed to prove the defense of [ describe defense ].)
Your verdict will be that the will is not valid the proponent has failed to prove any one of
those elements (or if you find that the contestant has proved the defense of [ describe
defense ].)
Note on Use
*The court should select from the alphabetical listings only those matters that are issues in
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 170-34 Michigan Supreme Court
the case.
The instruction may have to be modified if partial invalidation of a will, such as partial
revocation, is an issue.
This instruction must be modified where a lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable will is
involved. For guidance, see M Civ JI 220.05.
Comment
MCL 700.3407(b), (c) specifies the issues on which the contestant or proponent has the
burden of proof.
History
M Civ JI 170.51 was added January 1984. Amended March 2001, January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 171-1
CHAPTER 171
Mental Illness
M Civ JI 171.01 Mental Illness: Involuntary Treatment—Defining Legal Names of
Parties and Counsel.................................................................................................... 171-2
M Civ JI 171.02 Mental Illness: Involuntary Treatment—Elements and Burden of
Proof........................................................................................................................... 171-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 171-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 171.01 Mental Illness: Involuntary Treatment—Defining
Legal Names of Parties and Counsel
This case involves a petition to determine whether [ name of respondent ] is a person
requiring treatment as defined by the Michigan Mental Health Code.
The person who brings the petition is called the petitioner. The petitioner is [ state name
and indicate where seated ]. The attorney for the petitioner is [ state attorney’s name and
indicate where seated ]. The individual who is alleged to be a person requiring treatment is
called the respondent. The respondent is [ state respondent’s name and indicate where
seated ]. A respondent is one who responds to a petition. The attorney for the respondent is
[ state attorney’s name and indicate where seated ]. [ If any other persons are at the
counsel table, identify them and describe their function. ]
Note on Use
In hearings for involuntary hospitalization, involuntary treatment or for discharge, this
instruction should be substituted for M Civ JI 1.02.
In the case of a hearing on a petition for discharge, this instruction must be modified to
show that the alleged person requiring treatment is the petitioner.
History
M Civ JI 171.01 was added May 1984.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 171-3
Chapter 171: Mental Illness
M Civ JI 171.02 Mental Illness: Involuntary Treatment—Elements and
Burden of Proof
Two requirements must be met for you to find that an individual is a person requiring
treatment.
First, the person must be mentally ill. Mentally ill means that the person suffers from a
substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs [ his / her ] judgment,
behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.
However, mental illness is not the only requirement.
The second requirement is that the person, as a result of that mental illness, is subject to one
or more of the following conditions:
(a) the person can reasonably be expected within the near future to
intentionally or unintentionally seriously physically injure [ himself / herself ]
or another person and has engaged in an act or acts or made significant threats
that substantially support this expectation, or
(b) the person is unable to attend to those of [ his / her ] basic physical needs
such as food, clothing or shelter, which must be attended to in order for the
person to avoid serious harm in the near future; and the person has
demonstrated that inability by failing to attend to those basic physical needs, or
(c) the person’s judgment is so impaired that [ he / she ] lacks an
understanding of [ his / her ] need for treatment, which has caused [ him / her
] to demonstrate an unwillingness to voluntarily participate in or adhere to
treatment that is necessary, on the basis of competent clinical opinion, to
prevent a relapse or harmful deterioration of [ his / her ] condition, and presents
a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm to [ himself / herself ]
or to others.
An individual who meets both requirements is considered to be “a person requiring
treatment.”
The petitioner has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent is a person requiring treatment.
If you find that the petitioner has met [ his / her ] burden of proving that the
respondent is a person requiring treatment, your verdict will be:
“We find that the respondent is a person requiring treatment.”
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 171-4 Michigan Supreme Court
If you find that the petitioner has not met [ his / her ] burden of proving that the
respondent is a person requiring treatment, your verdict will be:
“We do not find that the respondent is a person requiring treatment.”
Note on Use
In the case of a hearing on a petition for discharge, this instruction must be modified to
show that the alleged person requiring treatment is the petitioner.
If there is evidence of senility, epilepsy, alcoholism or drug dependence, to determine if this
instruction should be given, see §401(2) of the Mental Health Code, MCL 330.1401(2).
This instruction should be followed by the definition of clear and convincing evidence in
M Civ JI 8.01.
Comment
See MCL 330.1401 for the definition of “person requiring treatment,” and MCL
330.1400(g) for the definition of “mental illness.”
This instruction is designed for use in any of four types of hearings under the Mental Health
Code. See MCL 330.1452.
The first type of hearing is initiated by a petition filed in the probate court for involuntary
mental health treatment of a person. The hospitalization portion of an initial order may not
exceed 60 days. An initial order of assisted outpatient treatment may not exceed 180 days.
An initial order of combined hospitalization and assisted outpatient treatment shall not
exceed 180 days. The hospitalization portion of the initial order may not exceed 60 days.
MCL 330.1472a(1). The person may not be retained beyond the expiration of the initial
order without a further hearing.
The second hearing involves a petition by the hospital director or assisted outpatient
treatment supervisor that asserts that the person continues to be a person requiring
treatment and requests further involuntary mental health treatment for a period of not more
than 90 days. MCL 330.1472a(2). The person may not be retained beyond the expiration
of the second order without a third hearing. At the third hearing, the court may issue a
continuing order of involuntary mental health treatment for not more than one year. MCL
330.1472a(3). Succeeding continuing orders for involuntary mental health treatment may
not exceed one year. MCL 330.1472a(4).
After a continuing (one-year) order of involuntary mental health treatment, the hospital
Michigan Supreme Court Page 171-5
Chapter 171: Mental Illness
director or alternative treatment program supervisor must review the person’s status and
report it to the court and notify the person, his or her attorney, his or her guardian, or a
person designated by the individual, as well as other enumerated persons every six months.
MCL 330.1482, and .1483. If the report concludes that the person continues to require
treatment, the person is entitled to challenge it in a hearing on a petition for discharge. MCL
330.1484.
In each of these hearings, the person is entitled to have the question whether he or she
requires treatment heard by a jury. MCL 330.1458; In re Wagstaff, 93 Mich App 755; 287
NW2d 339 (1979). In each type of hearing, it must be shown that the person is a “person
requiring treatment” as that term is defined in the statute. MCL 330.1401. The standard of
“person requiring treatment” applies equally to continuing orders and the initial order.
People ex rel Book v Hooker, 83 Mich App 495; 268 NW2d 698 (1978). The burden is on
the petitioner (or the hospital director in the case of a petition for discharge) to meet this
standard by clear and convincing evidence. MCL 330.1465; Addington v Texas, 441 US
418; 99 S Ct 1804; 60 L Ed 2d 323 (1979).
Once the jury determines that the person is a “person requiring treatment,” the judge
determines the appropriate treatment, and the person has no right to have the jury determine
appropriate treatment or hospitalization. In re Portus, 142 Mich App 799; 371 NW2d 871
(1985).
History
Added May 1984. Amended June 2000, July 2012, October 2019.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 171-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 172-1
CHAPTER 172
Guardians and Conservators
M Civ JI 172.01 Appointment of Guardian or Conservator or Termination of Guardianship
or Conservatorship: Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel ........................... 172-2
M Civ JI 172.02 Appointment of Guardian of an Adult .............................................. 172-3
M Civ JI 172.03 Termination of Guardianship of an Adult ......................................... 172-5
M Civ JI 172.11 Appointment of Conservator of an Adult ......................................... 172-6
M Civ JI 172.12 Termination of Conservatorship of an Adult .................................... 172-8
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 172-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 172.01 Appointment of Guardian or Conservator or
Termination of Guardianship or Conservatorship: Defining Legal
Names of Parties and Counsel
This is a proceeding to determine whether [ a [ guardian / conservator ] should be appointed
for [ name of respondent ] / *a [ guardianship / conservatorship ] should be ended for
[ name of incapacitated individual / name of protected person ] ].
The person seeking [ the appointment of a [ guardian / conservator ] / *to end the
[ guardianship / conservatorship ] ] is called the petitioner. The petitioner is [ state name
and indicate where seated ]. The attorney for the petitioner is [ state attorney’s name and
indicate where seated ]. The person [ who is alleged to be the person requiring a [ guardian
/ conservator ] / *who does not agree that the [ guardianship / conservatorship ] should
end ] is called the respondent. The respondent is [ state respondent’s name and indicate
where seated ]. A respondent is one who responds to a petition. The attorney for the
respondent is [ state attorney’s name and indicate where seated ]. [ If any other persons are
at the counsel table, identify them and describe their function. ]
Note on Use
In a hearing for the appointment of a guardian or conservator or in a hearing for the
termination of a guardianship or conservatorship, this instruction should be substituted for
M Civ JI 1.02.
*If the hearing is for termination of the guardianship or conservatorship, the alternatives
preceded by the asterisks should be used.
History
M Civ JI 172.01 was added January 1985. Amended June 2000.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 172-3
Chapter 172: Guardians and Conservators
M Civ JI 172.02 Appointment of Guardian of an Adult
A guardian may be appointed by the court for [ name of respondent ] if the petitioner proves
by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) [ name of respondent ] is an incapacitated person and
(b) a guardian is necessary as a means of providing continuing care and
supervision of [ name of respondent ].
An incapacitated person is someone who is impaired by reason of [ mental illness / mental
deficiency / physical illness or disability / chronic use of drugs / chronic intoxication /
[ other cause ] ]; to the extent that [ he / she ] lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate informed decisions.
The court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers to
the questions in the Special Verdict Form will assist the court in making its final disposition
in this case.
Note on Use
This instruction is not to be used for the appointment of a guardian of a minor (see MCL
700.5204 et seq.) or the appointment of a guardian of a developmentally disabled person
(see MCL 330.1600 et seq.).
This instruction should be preceded by the definition of clear and convincing evidence in
M Civ JI 8.01.
Comment
MCL 700.1105(a), .5303, .5304, .5306.
Mental illness is defined in MCL 330.1400(g).
1998 PA 386, the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), changed the term “legally
incapacitated person” in prior law (MCL 700.8) to “incapacitated individual” and altered
the definition by deleting the words “concerning his or her person” from the phrase “… to
the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate
informed decisions.” MCL 700.1105(a).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 172-4 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 172.02 was added January 1985. Amended January 1990, June 2000.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 172-5
Chapter 172: Guardians and Conservators
M Civ JI 172.03 Termination of Guardianship of an Adult
The guardianship of [ name of incapacitated individual ] will be terminated by the court
unless the respondent shows by clear and convincing evidence that [ name of incapacitated
individual ] continues to be an incapacitated person and that a guardian continues to be
necessary as a means of providing continuing care and supervision of [ name of
incapacitated individual ].
An incapacitated person is someone who is impaired by reason of [ mental illness / mental
deficiency / physical illness or disability / chronic use of drugs / chronic intoxication /
[ other cause ] ] to the extent that [ he / she ] lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate informed decisions.
The court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers to
the questions in the Special Verdict Form will assist the court in making its final disposition
in this case.
Note on Use
This instruction is not to be used for the termination of a guardianship of a minor (see MCL
700.5204 et seq.) or the termination of a guardianship of a developmentally disabled person
(see MCL 330.1600 et seq.).
This instruction should be preceded by the definition of clear and convincing evidence in
M Civ JI 8.01.
Comment
MCL 700.5310. Mental illness is defined in MCL 330.1400(g).
History
M Civ JI 172.03 was added January 1985. Amended January 1990, June 2000.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 172-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 172.11 Appointment of Conservator of an Adult
A conservator may be appointed by the court if the petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(a) by reason of [ mental illness / mental deficiency / physical illness or
disability / chronic use of drugs / chronic intoxication / confinement / detention
by a foreign power / disappearance / [ other ] ],
(b) [ name of respondent ] is unable to manage [ his / her ] property and
business affairs effectively, and
(c)
(i) [ name of respondent ] has property that will be wasted or dissipated
unless proper management is provided, or
(ii) money is needed for the support, care, and welfare of [ name of
respondent ] or those entitled to be supported by [ name of respondent ]
and that protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or provide money.
The court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers to
the questions in the Special Verdict Form will assist the court in making its final disposition
in this case.
Note on Use
This instruction should be preceded by the definition of clear and convincing evidence in
M Civ JI 8.01.
This instruction should not be used for the appointment of a conservator for a minor’s estate
and affairs under MCL 700.5401(2).
Comment
MCL 700.5401(3), .5406.
Mental illness is defined in MCL 330.1400(g). Mental incompetency is discussed in In re
Swisher’s Estate, 324 Mich 643; 37 NW2d 657 (1949) and cases cited therein.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 172-7
Chapter 172: Guardians and Conservators
History
M Civ JI 172.11 was added January 1985. Amended June 2000.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 172-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 172.12 Termination of Conservatorship of an Adult
M Civ JI 172.12 Termination of Conservatorship of an Adult
The conservatorship of [ name of protected person ] will be terminated by the court unless
the respondent proves by clear and convincing evidence that:
(a) by reason of [ mental illness / mental deficiency / physical illness or
disability / chronic use of drugs / chronic intoxication / confinement / detention
by a foreign power / disappearance / [ other ] ],
(b) [ name of protected person ] continues to be unable to manage [ his / her ]
property and business affairs effectively.
The court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers to
the questions in the Special Verdict Form will assist the court in making its final disposition
in this case.
Note on Use
This instruction should be preceded by the definition of clear and convincing evidence in
M Civ JI 8.01. On the applicability of the clear and convincing standard for termination of
conservatorships established before April 1, 2000, see MCL 700.8101(2)(b).
This instruction should not be used for the termination of a conservatorship for a minor’s
estate and affairs. See MCL 700.5401(2).
Comment
MCL 700.5431.
Mental illness is defined in MCL 330.1400(g). Mental incompetency is discussed in In re
Swisher’s Estate, 324 Mich 643; 37 NW2d 657 (1949) and cases cited therein.
History
M Civ JI 172.12 was added January 1985. Amended June 2000. Amended October 2018.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 173-1
CHAPTER 173
Bank Accounts
M Civ JI 173.01 Determination of Title to Bank Accounts—Defining Legal Names of Parties
and Counsel................................................................................................................ 173-2
M Civ JI 173.02 Determination of Title to Bank Account ........................................... 173-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 173-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 173.01 Determination of Title to Bank Accounts—Defining
Legal Names of Parties and Counsel
This is a proceeding to determine the ownership of (a) certain [ bank account(s) / credit
union account(s) / savings and loan association account(s) / [ other ] ].
The person seeking to obtain ownership of the [ account / accounts ] is called the petitioner.
The petitioner is [ state name and indicate where seated ]. The attorney for the petitioner is
[ state attorney’s name and indicate where seated ]. The person who claims to be the owner
in opposition to the petitioner is called the respondent. The respondent is [ state
respondent’s name and indicate where seated ]. A respondent is one who responds to a
petition. The attorney for the respondent is [ state attorney’s name and indicate where
seated ]. [ If any other persons are at the counsel table, identify them and describe their
function ].
Note on Use
In a hearing to determine title to bank, credit union and savings and loan accounts, this
instruction should be substituted for M Civ JI 1.02.
History
M Civ JI 173.01 was added October 1985.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 173-3
Chapter 173: Bank Accounts
M Civ JI 173.02 Determination of Title to Bank Account
The law provides that when a [ bank account / credit union account / savings and loan
association account / [ other ] ] is in the name of more than one person, providing for
payment to either person or to the surviving person, the balance of the money in the account
upon the death of either person belongs to and becomes the property of the survivor.
The petitioner has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ name of decedent ] did not intend the account to become the property
of the survivor, or
(b) that when the account was opened, [ name of decedent ] did not have the
mental capacity to know or understand that the account would become the
property of the survivor, or
(c) that [ the account was opened / the survivor’s name was added to the
account ] as a result of fraud, or
(d) that [ the account was opened / the survivor’s name was added to the
account ] as a result of undue influence.
Note on Use
This instruction must be modified in cases where proof by clear and convincing evidence
is required. See MCL 490.58 (credit union accounts). The definition of clear and
convincing evidence is found in M Civ JI 8.01.
The Michigan statute on savings and loan joint accounts makes the opening of such account
“conclusive evidence” of the intent of the deceased to vest title in the survivor. In such a
case, subsections (a) and (b) of this instruction would not be applicable.
This instruction should be accompanied by M Civ JI 170.46, which defines “fraud,” or M
Civ JI 170.44, which defines “undue influence,” if they are applicable. However, those
instructions should be modified to substitute a reference to bank, credit union or savings
and loan accounts whenever those instructions refer to a will.
Comment
Joint bank accounts are subject to statutory regulation. See MCL 487.703, (bank and trust
companies); MCL 490.52, .56 (credit unions); MCL 487.711 et seq. (statutory joint
accounts).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 173-4 Michigan Supreme Court
See also Bannasch v Bartholomew, 350 Mich 546; 87 NW2d 78 (1957); Senauit v Barr, 53
Mich App 525; 220 NW2d 81 (1974); Snow v National Bank of Ludington, 16 Mich App
595; 168 NW2d 482 (1969).
An action brought after the death of a joint tenant to recover monies in a joint bank account
may be brought at law or by a suit in equity for an accounting. Mineau v Boisclair, 323
Mich 64; 34 NW2d 556 (1948). Where the suit is in equity, there is no right to a jury trial.
Jacques v Jacques, 352 Mich 127; 89 NW2d 451 (1958).
History
M Civ JI 173.02 was added October 1985. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 174-1
CHAPTER 174
Felonious and Intentional Killing
M Civ JI 174.01 Felonious and Intentional Killing—Defining Legal Names of
Parties and Counsel.................................................................................................... 174-2
M Civ JI 174.02 Felonious and Intentional Killing—Definition ................................... 174-4
M Civ JI 174.03 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Aiding and Abetting—Definition . 174-6
M Civ JI 174.11 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Self-Defense—Definition............. 174-8
M Civ JI 174.12 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Defense of Others—Definition.. 174-10
M Civ JI 174.13 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Legal Insanity—Definition ......... 174-11
M Civ JI 174.14 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Accident—Definition ................. 174-13
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 174-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 174.01 Felonious and Intentional Killing—Defining Legal
Names of Parties and Counsel
This is a proceeding to determine whether [ name of respondent ] did or did not
[ feloniously and intentionally kill / aid and abet in the felonious and intentional killing of ]
[ name of decedent ] ], and whether [ name of respondent ] is or is not entitled to:
(a) *(receive any benefits under the last will and testament of [ name of
decedent ])
(b) *(receive or inherit any benefit or property by reason of the death of [ name
of decedent ])
(c) *(succeed to the full and complete ownership of [ a joint bank account /
joint bank accounts ] owned jointly between [ name of decedent ] and [ name
of respondent ])
(d) *(succeed to the full and complete ownership of the real estate owned
jointly between [ name of decedent ] and [ name of respondent ])
(e) *(succeed to the full and complete ownership of [ stock certificates / bonds
/ debentures / [ other ] ] owned jointly between [ name of decedent ] and
[ name of respondent ])
(f) *(receive any benefit, payment or proceeds of any kind as the beneficiary
or the person designated to receive such payment on [ a policy / policies ] of
life insurance)
(g) *(receive any benefit, payment or proceeds of any kind by reason of an
agreement or contract [ describe agreement or contract in simple terms ]
where [ name of respondent ] was to be paid or receive benefits at the death of
[ name of decedent ])
(h) *(acquire, receive or benefit from any property of any kind because of the
death of [ name of decedent ])
(i) *(receive a disposition or appointment of property / or / exercise any power
of appointment ] made by [ name of decedent ] in [ describe governing
instrument ])
(j) *(serve as [ personal representative/ trustee/ other fiduciary or
representative capacity ] as nominated by [ name of decendent ] in [ describe
governing instrument ])
Michigan Supreme Court Page 174-3
Chapter 174: Felonious and Intentional Killing
The person who claims that [ name of respondent ] is not entitled to the benefit or property
is called the petitioner. The term “decedent” is used to refer to the person who is deceased.
The petitioner is [ state name and title, e.g., personal representative of estate, and indicate
where seated ]. The attorney for the petitioner is [ state name and indicate where seated ].
The person who claims to be entitled to the benefit or property is called the respondent. A
respondent is one who responds to a petition. The respondent is [ state name and indicate
where seated ]. The attorney for the respondent is [ state name and indicate where seated ].
[ If any other persons are seated at the counsel table, identify them and describe their
function ].
Note on Use
*The Court should choose among subsections a through j those that are applicable to the
case.
The term “fiduciary” is defined in MCL 700.1104(e).
In felonious and intentional killing cases, this instruction should be substituted for M Civ
JI 1.02.
Comment
See MCL 700.2803. The current statute, enacted as part of the Estates and Protected
Individuals Code that took effect April 1, 2000, adds a provision that a felonious and
intentional killing revokes certain revocable provisions made by a decedent in a governing
instrument regarding the killer: a) disposition or appointment of property; b) provision
conferring a general or nongeneral power of appointment; and c) nomination or
appointment to serve in a fiduciary or representative capacity. MCL 700.2803(2)(a).
The predecessor statute explicitly precluded sharing in proceeds of a wrongful death action
(MCL 700.251(4)). The current statute does not name wrongful death proceeds, but under
the residual provision (MCL 700.2803(5)) the killer is precluded from any wrongful
acquisition of property or interest. Also, prior to the enactment of the predecessor statute,
the courts applied the common law principle that a person may not benefit from his or her
own wrong. Garwols v Bankers Trust Co, 251 Mich 420; 232 NW 239 (1930).
History
M Civ JI 174.01 was added February 1986. Amended December 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 174-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 174.02 Felonious and Intentional Killing—Definition
A person commits a felonious and intentional killing if [ he / she ]:
(a) death or in great and serious bodily injury, or
(b) commits an act that causes the death of another and commits the act
intending that it result in knowingly creates a situation that has a very high risk
of death with the knowledge that it would probably cause death or great and
serious bodily injury and commits the act that causes the death of another.
However, the killing is not felonious if the person committing the act has a valid defense,
such as:
(a) *(self-defense. [ Insert M Civ JI 174.11 Felonious and Intentional Killing:
Self-defense—Definition ])
(b) *(defense of another. [ Insert M Civ JI 174.12 Felonious and Intentional
Killing: Defense of Others—Definition ])
(c) *(legal insanity. [ Insert M Civ JI 174.13 Felonious and Intentional Killing:
Legal Insanity—Definition ])
(d) *(accident. [ Insert M Civ JI 174.14 Felonious and Intentional Killing:
Accident—Definition ])
(e) *(other defense).
The petitioner has the burden of proving that the respondent feloniously and intentionally
killed [ name of decedent ].
The respondent has the burden of proving the defense of [ self-defense / defense of others
/ legal insanity / accident / (other defense) ].
Note on Use
*The court should select the defense or defenses that are applicable.
This instruction should be preceded by an instruction on the preponderance of the evidence
standard as stated in M Civ JI 8.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 174-5
Chapter 174: Felonious and Intentional Killing
Comment
See MCL 700.2803. Under both the current statute, MCL 700.2803(6) enacted as part of
the Estates and Protected Individuals Code that took effect April 1, 2000, and its
predecessor, MCL 700.251(6), a final judgment of conviction conclusively establishes a
felonious and intentional killing, but in the absence of a conviction the determination of
whether there has been a felonious and intentional killing is made using a preponderance
of evidence standard. In Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Reist, 167 Mich App 112; 421 NW2d
592 (1988) decided under the predecessor statute (MCL 700.251), the appellate court
decided that summary disposition was improper where there were genuine issues of
material fact about motive, opportunity and credibility of the wife who claimed her
husband’s death was accidental. Cases decided under common law prior to the enactment
of the predecessor statute include Goldsmith v Pearce, 345 Mich 146; 75 NW2d 810
(1956); Budwit v Herr, 339 Mich 265; 63 NW2d 841 (1954); and Garwols v Bankers Trust
Co, 251 Mich 420; 232 NW 239 (1930).
See People v Dykhouse, 418 Mich 488, 495; 345 NW2d 150 (1984) for a discussion of first
and second-degree murder. See also the Commentary to CJI2d 16.5 Second-degree Murder.
History
M Civ JI 174.02 was added February 1986. Amended December 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 174-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 174.03 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Aiding and
Abetting—Definition
*[ In this case it has already been determined that [ name of killer ] feloniously and
intentionally killed [ name of decedent ], and you must determine whether [ name of
respondent ) aided and abetted in that killing. / In this case you must determine whether
there was a felonious and intentional killing and whether [ name of respondent ] aided and
abetted in that felonious and intentional killing. ]
(a) To aid and abet means to encourage or assist. Aiding and abetting includes
all forms of assistance rendered to the one who actually caused the death, and
it includes all words or deeds that may support, encourage or incite the act of
causing the death. It does not matter how much assistance or encouragement is
given, so long as it has the effect of inducing the death of the deceased.
(b) **(Aiding and abetting also includes being present or available to render
assistance if necessary, although the person’s mere presence at the scene, in
and of itself, is not sufficient to make a person an aider and abettor.)
(c) The aider and abettor must possess the following intent or know that the one
who caused the death possessed the following intent:
(i) to kill, or
(ii) to cause great and serious bodily injury, or
(iii) to create a situation that has a very high risk of death or great and
serious bodily injury with the knowledge that it would probably cause
death or great and serious bodily injury.
The petitioner has the burden of proving that [ respondent aided and abetted in the killing
of [ name of decedent ] / [ name of decedent ] was feloniously and intentionally killed and
the respondent aided and abetted in the killing ].
Note on Use
*If there has been a final judgment of conviction of the killer, the first sentence in brackets
should be used. If there has not been a final judgment of conviction of the killer, the second
sentence in brackets should be used, and this instruction should be preceded by M Civ JI
174.02 Felonious and Intentional Killing—Definition. MCL 700.2803(6).
**This section should be used only if applicable.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 174-7
Chapter 174: Felonious and Intentional Killing
This instruction should be preceded by an instruction on the preponderance of the evidence
standard as stated in M Civ JI 8.01 Meaning of Burden of Proof. See Comment to M Civ JI
174.02 Felonious and Intentional Killing—Definition.
Comment
See MCL 700.2803. While the current statute does not use the words “aids and abets the
killing” as did the predecessor statute (MCL 700.251), use of the phrase “criminally
accountable” in MCL 700.2803(6) is intended to include both a direct perpetrator as well
as an accomplice or co-conspirator. See the comment to Section 2-803 of the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC) (1990). (MCL 700.2803(6) is taken from UPC 2-803(g). Also, under
Michigan criminal law the distinction between principal and accessory is eliminated. MCL
767.39.
See, People v Palmer, 392 Mich 370; 220 NW2d 393 (1974) (aid and abet defined); People
v Simmons, 134 Mich App 779; 352 NW2d 275 (1984) (required mens rea). See also the
Commentary to CJI2d 8.1 Aiding and Abetting, CJI2d 8.4 Inducement, and CJI2d 8.5 Mere
Presence Insufficient.
History
M Civ JI 174.03 was added February 1986. Amended December 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 174-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 174.11 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Self-Defense—
Definition
The killing was in self-defense if, at the time of the act, all of the following existed:
(a) [ Name of respondent] honestly and reasonably believed that [ he I she] was in danger
of being killed or receiving serious bodily harm.
(b) Respondent honestly and reasonably believed that the use of force was immediately
necessary to defend [ himself/ herself] from this danger.
(c) Respondent used only the amount of force that appeared to [ him / her ] necessary at the
time to defend [ himself/ herself] from this danger.
Although [ he I she ] may have been mistaken as to the extent of the actual danger, [ he I
she ] is to be judged by the circumstances as they appeared to [ him/ her ] at the time of the
act.
*(The law requires a person to avoid using deadly force if [ he I she ] can safely do so. The
respondent was required to retreat if it appeared to [him/ her] safe to do so. However, the
respondent was not required to retreat if it did not appear to [him/ her] safe to do so.)
*(The respondent was not required to retreat if [ name of decedent ] [ assaulted the
respondent in the respondent's own home/ forcibly entered the home of the respondent].)
*(A person who begins an assault upon another [ with deadly force/ with a dangerous or
deadly weapon ] cannot claim the right of self-defense. However, if [ he / she ] has
withdrawn from the fight in good faith and clearly informed the other person of [ his / her ]
desire for peace and an end to the fight, and the other person continues the assault or
resumes it at a later time, the respondent has the same rights of self-defense as any other
person and is justified in using force to save [ himself/ herself] from imminent bodily harm.)
*(A person who [ assaults another with fists or a nondeadly weapon/ insults another with
words/ trespasses upon another's property/ attempts to take another's property in a
nonviolent manner ] does not lose [ his / her ] right of self-defense by such actions and, if
assaulted with a deadly weapon, may lawfully act in self-defense.)
Note on Use
*These paragraphs should be used only if applicable to the facts of the case.
This instruction should be inserted in the second section a of
M C
iv JI 174.02 if applicable.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 174-9
Chapter 174: Felonious and Intentional Killing
Comment
See People v Heflin (People v Landrum), 434 Mich 482, 502-503; 456 NW2d 10 (1990).
See also the Commentary to CJI2d 7.15 Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense; CJI2d 7.16
Conditions for Using Force or Deadly Force; CJI2d 7.17 No Duty
to Retreat While in Own
Dwelling; and CJI2d 7.18 Deadly Aggressor-Withdrawal.
The October 2023 amendments reflect the combination of M Crim JI 7.16 and 7.19 and
name change to M Crim JI 7.16.
History
M Civ JI 174.11 was added February 1986. Amended December 2002, October 2023.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 174-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 174.12 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Defense of
Others—Definition
A killing is in defense of another if, at the time of the act, all of the following existed:
(a) [ Name of respondent ] honestly and reasonably believed that [ name of
person defended ] was in danger of being killed or of receiving serious bodily
harm.
(b) Respondent honestly and reasonably believed that the use of force was
immediately necessary to defend [ name of person defended ] from this danger.
(c) Respondent used only the amount of force that appeared to [ him / her ]
necessary at the time to defend [ name of person defended ] from this danger.
Although [ he / she ] may have been mistaken as to the extent of the actual danger, [ he /
she ] is to be judged by the circumstances as they appeared to [ him / her ] at the time of the
act.
Note on Use
This instruction should be inserted in the second section b of M Civ JI 174.02 if applicable.
Comment
See People v Heflin (People v Landrum), 434 Mich 482, 502-503; 456 NW2d 10 (1990).
See also the Commentary to CJI2d 7.21 Defense of Others-Deadly Force and CJI2d 7.15
Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense.
History
M Civ JI 174.12 was added February 1986. Amended December 1, 2002.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 174-11
Chapter 174: Felonious and Intentional Killing
M Civ JI 174.13 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Legal Insanity—
Definition
[ Name of respondent ] has a valid defense if, at the time [ he / she ] caused the death of
[ name of decedent ] [ he / she ] was legally insane.
[ Name of respondent ] was legally insane if, as a result of [ mental illness / and / or / mental
retardation ], [ he / she ] lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and
quality or the wrongfulness of [ his / her ] conduct or to conform [ his / her ] conduct to the
requirements of law.
However, [ name of respondent ] was legally sane if:
(a) [ he / she ] was not mentally ill or mentally retarded, or
(b) despite [ mental illness / and / or / mental retardation ], [ name of
respondent ] possessed substantial capacity both to appreciate the nature and
quality and the wrongfulness of [ his / her ] conduct and to conform [ his / her ]
conduct to the requirements of law.
*(“Mental illness” means a substantial disorder of thought or mood that significantly
impairs a person’s judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with
the ordinary demands of life.)
*(“Mental retardation” means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that
originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive
behavior.)
*(If [ name of respondent ] was under the influence of voluntarily consumed or injected
alcohol or controlled substances at the time of the alleged killing, [ he / she ] is not
considered to have been legally insane solely because of being under the influence of the
alcohol or controlled substances.)
Note on Use
*The court should select the paragraphs that are applicable to the case. This instruction
should be inserted in section c of M Civ JI 174.02 if applicable.
Comment
See MCL 768.21a. (legal insanity); MCL 330.1400(g) (mental illness); MCL 330.2001a(6)
(mental retardation). See also the Commentary to M Crim JI 7.11 Legal Insanity; Mental
Illness; Intellectual Disability; Burden of Proof.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 174-12 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 174.13 was added February 1986. Amended December 1, 2002.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 174-13
Chapter 174: Felonious and Intentional Killing
M Civ JI 174.14 Felonious and Intentional Killing: Accident—
Definition
An accident is anything that happens that is not anticipated, not foreseen and not expected,
and takes place without design or intention.
Note on Use
This instruction should be inserted in section d of M Civ JI 174.02 if applicable.
Comment
See Guerdon Industries, Inc v Fidelity & Casualty Co of New York, 371 Mich 12; 123
NW2d 143 (1963); Brant v Citizens Mutual Automobile Insurance Co, 4 Mich App 596;
145 NW2d 410 (1966).
History
M Civ JI 174.14 was added February 1986. Amended December 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 174-14 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 175-1
CHAPTER 175
Pretermitted Heirs
M Civ JI 175.01 Pretermitted Heirs—Defining Legal Names of Parties and
Counsel .............................................................................................................................. 2
M Civ JI 175.02 Omission of Child or Issue of Deceased Child in Will As a Result of Mistake
or Accident ................................................................................................................. 175-3
M Civ JI 175.11 Omission of Spouse in Will As a Result of Oversight or Mistake ...... 175-5
M Civ JI 175.12 Omission of Spouse in Will Made Prior to Marriage Where There Are
Transfers Made in Lieu of Will Provision.................................................................... 175-6
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 175-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 175.01 Pretermitted Heirs—Defining Legal Names of Parties
and Counsel
Caution: The instructions in this chapter should be used only for estates of decedents dying
before April 1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code
(EPIC). MCL 700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the instructions in chapter 178 for estates of
decedents dying on or after April 1, 2000.
This is a proceeding to determine whether [ name of child / name of other issue / name of
husband / name of wife ] is entitled to the same share of [ name of decedent ]’s estate that
[ he / she ] would have received if [ name of decedent ] died without a will.
The person seeking the share of the decedent [ name of decedent ]’s estate is called the
petitioner. The petitioner is [ state name and indicate where seated ]. The attorney for the
petitioner is [ state attorney’s name and indicate where seated ]. The person who claims
that [ name of child / name of other issue / name of husband / name of wife ] is not entitled
to the same share of [ name of decedent ]’s estate that [ he / she ] would have received if
[ name of decedent ] died without a will is called the respondent. The respondent is [ state
respondent’s name and indicate where seated ]. A respondent is one who responds to a
petition. The attorney for the respondent is [ state attorney’s name and indicate where
seated ]. [ If any other persons are at the counsel table, identify them and describe their
function ].
Note on Use
Caution: This instruction should be used only for estates of decedents dying before April
1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC). MCL
700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the instructions in chapter 178 for estates of decedents dying on or
after April 1, 2000.
In pretermitted heirs cases for estates of decedents dying before April 1, 2000, this
instruction should be substituted for M Civ JI 1.02.
History
M Civ JI 175.01 was added February 1986.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 175-3
Chapter 175: Pretermitted Heirs
M Civ JI 175.02 Omission of Child or Issue of Deceased Child in Will
As a Result of Mistake or Accident
Caution: The instructions in this chapter should be used only for estates of decedents dying
before April 1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code
(EPIC). MCL 700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the instructions in chapter 178 for estates of
decedents dying on or after April 1, 2000.
The law provides that if a decedent fails to provide in [ his / her ] will for any of [ his / her ]
[ children / [ *other issue ] ], and if it appears that the omission was not intentional, but was
made as a result of a mistake or accident, the [ child / [ *other issue ] ] is entitled to the same
share of the decedent’s estate that [ he / she ] would have received if the decedent died
without a will.
The petitioner has the burden of proving that the omission of [ name of child / *name of
other issue ] from the will of [ name of decedent ] was not intentional, but was as a result
of a mistake or accident.
You must determine whether the omission was intentional or whether it was made as a
result of a mistake or accident. In making this determination, you may consider the
provisions of the will and all of the surrounding circumstances.
Note on Use
Caution: This instruction should be used only for estates of decedents dying before April
1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC). MCL
700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the instructions in chapter 178 for estates of decedents dying on or
after April 1, 2000.
*When this instruction is used, if the omitted person is the issue of a deceased child, the
appropriate relationship (i.e., grandchild, great-grandchild) should be inserted.
Comment
See MCL 700.127(2).
See In Re Estate of Stebbins, 94 Mich 304; 54 NW 159 (1892); Bachinski v Bachinski’s
Estate, 152 Mich 693; 116 NW 556 (1908). O’Neall v Her, 254 Mich 631; 236 NW 890
(1931); In re Potts’ Estate, 304 Mich 47; 7 NW2d 217 (1942); and In re Karch’s Estate,
311 Mich 158; 18 NW2d 410 (1945).
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 175-4 Michigan Supreme Court
History
M Civ JI 175.02 was added February 1986.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 175-5
Chapter 175: Pretermitted Heirs
M Civ JI 175.11 Omission of Spouse in Will As a Result of Oversight
or Mistake
Caution: The instructions in this chapter should be used only for estates of decedents dying
before April 1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code
(EPIC). MCL 700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the instructions in chapter 178 for estates of
decedents dying on or after April 1, 2000.
The law provides that if a decedent fails to provide in [ his / her ] will for [ his / her ] spouse,
and if it appears that the omission was as a result of oversight or mistake, [ his / her ] spouse
is entitled to the same share of the decedent’s estate that [ he / she ] would have received if
the decedent died without a will.
The petitioner has the burden of proving that the omission of [ name of spouse ] from the
will of [ name of decedent ] was as a result of oversight or mistake.
You must determine whether the omission was as a result of oversight or mistake. In
making this determination you may consider the provisions of the will and all of the
surrounding circumstances.
Note on Use
Caution: This instruction should be used only for estates of decedents dying before April
1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC). MCL
700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the instructions in chapter 178 for estates of decedents dying on or
after April 1, 2000.
Comment
See MCL 700.126(2).
History
M Civ JI 175.11 was added February 1986. Amended May 2016.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 175-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 175.12 Omission of Spouse in Will Made Prior to Marriage
Where There Are Transfers Made in Lieu of Will Provision
The law provides that if a decedent fails to provide for [ his / her ] spouse to whom [ he /
she ] was married after the execution of decedent’s will, the spouse shall receive the same
share of the decedent’s estate that [ he / she ] would have received if the decedent died
without a will, unless the decedent provided for [ his / her ] spouse by transfers of property
that were outside the will, which the decedent intended to be instead of provisions for [ his
/ her ] spouse in [ his / her ] will.
The petitioner has the burden of proving that [ name of decedent ] failed to provide for
[ name of spouse ] by transfer of property outside the will, or that [ name of decedent ] did
not intend [ that transfer / those transfers ] to be instead of provisions in [ his / her ] will.
You must determine whether the decedent provided for [ his / her ] spouse by transfer of
property outside the will and whether decedent intended [ that transfer / those transfers ] to
be instead of provisions in [ his / her ] will. In making this determination, you may take into
consideration all of the surrounding circumstances.
Note on Use
Caution: This instruction should be used only for estates of decedents dying before April
1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC). MCL
700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the instructions in chapter 178 for estates of decedents dying on or
after April 1, 2000.
For estates of decedents dying before April 1, 2000, this instruction should not be used if
the court determines from the will itself that the omission of the spouse was intentional.
MCL 700.126(1).
Comment
See MCL 700.126(1). See In re Cole Estate, 120 Mich App 539; 328 NW2d 76 (1982).
History
M Civ JI 175.12 was added February 1986. Amended May 2016.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 176-1
CHAPTER 176
Claims for Services Rendered
M Civ JI 176.01 Claim for Services Rendered—Defining Legal Names of Parties and
Counsel....................................................................................................................... 176-2
M Civ JI 176.02 Claim for Services Rendered ............................................................. 176-3
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 176-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 176.01 Claim for Services Rendered—Defining Legal Names
of Parties and Counsel
This case involves a claim against the estate of a deceased person. The person who is
making a claim against the estate is called the claimant. The claimant is [ state name and
indicate where seated ]. The attorney for the claimant is [ state attorney’s name and
indicate where seated ]. The person who contests the claim, saying that it is not a valid
claim against the estate of [ name of decedent ], is called the contestant. The contestant is
[ state contestant’s name and indicate where seated ]. The attorney for the contestant is
[ state attorney’s name and indicate where seated ]. [ If any other persons are seated at the
counsel table, identify them and describe their function ].
Note on Use
In claim cases, this instruction should be substituted for M Civ JI 1.02.
History
M Civ JI 176.01 was added February 1987.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 176-3
Chapter 176: Claims for Services Rendered
M Civ JI 176.02 Claim for Services Rendered
You are to determine if the claimant has a valid claim against the estate of [ name of
decedent ] for services performed. The claimant has the burden of proving:
(a) that [ he / she ] performed services beneficial to [ name of decedent ] or at
the request of [ name of decedent ], and
(b) that [ he / she ] performed these services expecting to be paid, and
(c) that [ name of decedent ] accepted the benefits of these services expecting
to pay the claimant.
*([ If you find that / Since ] the claimant and [ name of decedent ] were related by [ blood
/ marriage ], you may infer that neither the claimant nor [ name of decedent ] expected
payment to be made for the services. However, you should weigh all of the evidence in
determining whether the claimant and [ name of decedent ] expected payment to be made.)
†A. If you find that the claimant has proved [ his / her ] claim, then you must determine
the reasonable value of the services. The claimant has the burden of proving the reasonable
value of the services.
‡B. If you find that the claimant has proved [ his / her ] claim, then you must determine
whether [ name of decedent ] intended to have the claimant paid after death from [ his / her ]
estate. If you determine that [ name of decedent ] did intend to have the claimant paid after
death, then you must determine the reasonable value of the claimant’s services. The
claimant has the burden of proving that [ name of decedent ] intended to have the claimant
paid after death and the burden of proving the reasonable value of the services. If you
determine that [ name of decedent ] did not intend to have the claimant paid after death out
of [ his / her ] estate, then you must determine what services the claimant performed
between [ date 6 years prior to death ] and [ date of death ], and then determine the
reasonable value of the services performed during that period.
Note on Use
*If the claimant and the decedent are related by blood or marriage, or if this is an issue in
the case, this paragraph should be used.
†Paragraph A is to be used in cases where it is not disputed that the services were wholly
performed within six years preceding the decedent’s death or where it is not disputed that
the decedent intended to have the claimant paid after death out of his or her estate.
‡Paragraph B is to be used in all other cases.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 176-4 Michigan Supreme Court
Comment
For cases on the inference of services rendered gratuitously when blood relations are
involved, see Pupaza v Laity, 268 Mich 250, 252; 256 NW 328 (1934); In re Jorgenson’s
Estate, 321 Mich 594, 598; 32 NW2d 902 (1948). See also Widmayer v Leonard, 422 Mich
280; 373 NW2d 538 (1985).
For the elements of a claim, see In re Wigent’s Estate, 189 Mich 507, 512; 155 NW 577
(1915); In re Pierson’s Estate, 282 Mich 411, 415; 276 NW 498 (1937); In re Estate of
Donley, 3 Mich App 458, 461; 142 NW2d 898 (1966).
Regarding reasonable value, see In re Parks’ Estate, 326 Mich 169, 174; 39 NW2d 925
(1949); In re Mazurkiewicz’s Estate, 328 Mich 120, 124; 43 NW2d 86 (1950).
Regarding the limitation on period of recovery, see Pupaza v Laity, 268 Mich at 253–254;
256 NW at 329; Lafrinere v Campbell’s Estate, 343 Mich 639, 644; 73 NW2d 295 (1955).
History
M Civ JI 176.02 was added February 1987. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 178-1
CHAPTER 178
Pretermitted Heirs (EPIC)
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 178-2
M Civ JI 178.01 Pretermitted Heirs: Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel
(EPIC) .......................................................................................................................... 178-4
M Civ JI 178.02 Pretermitted Child: Will Executed Prior to Birth or Adoption of Child
Omitted from Will (EPIC)............................................................................................ 178-5
M Civ JI 178.03 Pretermitted Child: Omission of Living Child from Will Because of Mistaken
Belief Child Is Dead (EPIC) .......................................................................................... 178-8
M Civ JI 178.12 Pretermitted Spouse: Will Executed Prior to Marriage (EPIC) ........ 178-10
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 178-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introduction
The instructions in this chapter are to be used for estates of decedents dying on or after April
1, 2000. MCL 700.8101(1), (2)(a), (d). For decedents who died before April 1, 2000, the
pretermitted heirs provisions of the Revised Probate Code are applicable, and the
instructions in Chapter 175 must be used.
MCL 700.2302(1)(a)–(b), (4) set forth the share of a decedent’s estate allotted to a
pretermitted child:
Sec. 2302. (1) …
(a) If the testator had no child living when he or she executed the will, an
omitted after-born or after-adopted child receives a share in the estate equal in
value to that which the child would have received had the testator died
intestate, unless the will devised all or substantially all of the estate to the other
parent of the omitted child and that other parent survives the testator and is
entitled to take under the will.
(b) If the testator had 1 or more children living when he or she executed the
will, and the will devised property or an interest in property to 1 or more of the
then-living children, an omitted after-born or after-adopted child is entitled to
share in the testator’s estate subject to all of the following:
(i) The portion of the testator’s estate in which the omitted after-born or
after-adopted child is entitled to share is limited to devises made to the
testator’s then-living children under the will.
(ii) The omitted after-born or after-adopted child is entitled to receive the
share of the testator’s estate, as limited in subparagraph (i), that the child
would have received had the testator included all omitted after-born and
after-adopted children with the children to whom devises were made under
the will and had given an equal share of the estate to each child.
(iii) To the extent feasible, the interest granted an omitted after-born or
after-adopted child under this section must be of the same character,
whether equitable or legal, present or future, as that devised to the
testator’s then-living children under the will.
(iv) In satisfying a share provided by this subdivision, devises to the
testator’s children who were living when the will was executed abate
ratably. In abating the devises of the then-living children, the court shall
preserve to the maximum extent possible the character of the testamentary
Michigan Supreme Court Page 178-3
Chapter 178: Pretermitted Heirs (EPIC)
plan adopted by the testator.
(4)In satisfying a share provided by subsection (1)(a), devises made by the will abate under
section 3902.
MCL 700.2301(1)(a)–(c), (3) set forth the share of a decedent’s estate allotted to a
pretermitted spouse:
Sec. 2301. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), if a testator’s surviving spouse marries
the testator after the testator executes his or her will, the surviving spouse is entitled to
receive, as an intestate share, not less than the value of the share of the estate the surviving
spouse would have received if the testator had died intestate as to that portion of the
testator’s estate, if any, that is not any of the following:
(a) Property devised to a child of the testator who was born before the testator
married the surviving spouse and who is not the surviving spouse’s child.
(b) Property devised to a descendant of a child described in subdivision (a).
(c) Property that passes under section 2603 or 2604 to a child described in
subdivision (a) or to a descendant of such a child.
(3)In satisfying the share provided by this section, devises made by the will to the testator’s
surviving spouse, if any, are applied first, and other devises, other than a devise to a child
of the testator who was born before the testator married the surviving spouse and who is not
the surviving spouse’s child or a devise or substitute gift under section 2603 or 2604 to a
descendant of such a child, abate as provided in section 3902.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 178-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 178.01 Pretermitted Heirs: Defining Legal Names of Parties
and Counsel (EPIC)
This is a proceeding to determine whether [ name of child / name of surviving
spouse ] is entitled to a certain share of [ name of decedent ]’s estate.
The person seeking the share of the decedent [ name of decedent ]’s estate is
called the petitioner. The petitioner is [ state name and indicate where seated ].
The attorney for the petitioner is [ state attorney’s name and indicate where
seated ]. The person who claims that [ name of child / name of surviving
spouse ] is not entitled to the share of [ name of decedent ]’s estate is called the
respondent. The respondent is [ state respondent’s name and indicate where
seated ]. A respondent is one who responds to a petition. The attorney for the
respondent is [ state attorney’s name and indicate where seated ]. [ If any
other persons are at the counsel table, identify them and describe their
function ].
Note on Use
In pretermitted heirs cases in which the provisions of the Estates and Protected Individuals
Code (EPIC) apply, this instruction should be substituted for M Civ JI 1.02.
If the estate is the petitioner on a petition for determination of heirs, this instruction, the
remaining pretermitted heirs instructions, and verdict forms must be modified.
History
M Civ JI 178.01 was added April 1, 2002.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 178-5
Chapter 178: Pretermitted Heirs (EPIC)
M Civ JI 178.02 Pretermitted Child: Will Executed Prior to Birth or
Adoption of Child Omitted from Will (EPIC)
The law provides that a child who was born or adopted after the parent executed [ his / her ]
will and who was omitted from the will is entitled to a certain share of the deceased parent’s
estate. However, the child is not entitled to a share of decedent’s estate if:
*(a) it appears from the will that the omission of the child was intentional,
(or))
*(b) decedent provided for the child by transfer of property outside the will and
intended the transfer to substitute for provision for the child in [ his / her ]
will.)
In this case, the share of [ name of decedent ]’s estate that [ name of child ] would receive
is [ describe share child would be entitled to under MCL 700.2302(1)(a) or (b) ].
The respondent has the burden of proving (either of) the following:
*(a) The will expresses an intention of [ name of decedent ] to omit [ name of
child ] from the will, (or))
*(b) [ Name of decedent ] **(provided for [ name of child ] by transfer of
property outside the will, and) intended that the transfer of property outside the
will substitute for provision for [ name of child ] in [ his / her ] will.)
You must determine whether respondent has met [ his / her ] burden of proof.
The Court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers to
the questions in the Special Verdict Form will provide the basis on which this case will be
resolved.
Note on Use
*The Court should delete either subsection if it is not an issue in the case. Subsection a.
should be deleted if the will is unambiguous and there is no issue for the jury. See Hankey
v French, 281 Mich 454; 275 NW 206 (1937); Carpenter v Snow, 117 Mich 489; 76 NW
78 (1898).
**If the parties do not dispute the transfer or transfers of property outside the will, the Court
should delete this first part of subsection b.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 178-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Decedent’s intent to substitute transfers outside the will may be shown by his or her
statements or reasonably inferred from the amount of the transfer or other evidence. MCL
700.2302(2)(b).
The provision of EPIC that sets forth the share of the estate allotted to a pretermitted child
is reproduced in the Introduction to this chapter.
The child claiming under MCL 700.2302 must show that he or she is a child of the testator,
that he or she was born or adopted after the will was executed, and that the will failed to
provide for him or her. If any of these present issues of fact, this instruction must be
modified.
MCL 700.2302 is taken almost verbatim from the 1990 version of the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) §2-302. The UPC comment explains that the moving party has the burden of
proof on the elements of subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) (numbered (2)(a) and (2)(b) in the
Michigan statute).
Comment
MCL 700.2302.
Under EPIC there are two grounds that disqualify an after-born or after-adopted child
omitted from the will from claiming pretermitted status: (1) that it appears from the will
that the omission was intentional; and (2) that the testator made other provisions for the
child meant to substitute for provision in the will. Prior law contained only the first of the
two grounds. MCL 700.127(1).
Under prior law, any of a testator’s children (and issue of a deceased child) not provided
for in the will could claim pretermitted status if the omission was due to mistake or
accident. MCL 700.127(2). EPIC eliminates these claims and allows a child living when
the will was executed to claim pretermitted status only if the testator’s sole reason for
omitting the child was a belief that the child was dead. See M Civ JI 178.03 Pretermitted
Child: Omission of Living Child from Will Because of Mistaken Belief Child is Dead
(EPIC). EPIC also eliminated the special provision in prior law for a child who was the
offspring of nonconsensual sex. MCL 700.127(3).
EPIC retains the provision of prior law precluding an omitted after-born or after-adopted
child from claiming pretermitted status if “[ i]t appears from the will that the omission was
intentional.” MCL 700.2302(2)(a). Prior law expressed this provision as “unless it is
apparent from the will that it was the testator’s intention not to make a provision for the
child.” MCL 700.127(1). In Carpenter, the court construed a substantially identical earlier
statute and held that the trial court should have considered only the will on the issue
whether the decedent intended to omit the after-born child and erred in considering
extraneous testimony. See also Hankey. However, in some cases, courts have permitted
Michigan Supreme Court Page 178-7
Chapter 178: Pretermitted Heirs (EPIC)
extrinsic evidence to construe an ambiguity in a will. See In re Estate of Kremlick, 417
Mich 237; 331 NW2d 228 (1983); Anno: Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence to Show
Testator’s Intention as to Omission of Provision for Child, 88 ALR2d 616 (1963).
Like prior law, under EPIC only a child omitted from the will can claim pretermitted status.
Two pre-EPIC cases have addressed the meaning of omitted. In one case, the court held that
an after-adopted child was not omitted from the will where testator provided for the child
in a contingent devise that failed because the contingency did not occur. In re McPeak
Estate, 210 Mich App 410; 534 NW2d 140 (1995) (rejecting an argument that the child was
omitted because the will provided for the child as a stepchild, but not as an adopted child).
In another case, the court held that a child named in a will but given a mere memento was
not precluded from claiming that the testator omitted to provide for her. In re Estate of
Stebbins, 94 Mich 304; 54 NW 159 (1892).
History
M Civ JI 178.02 was added April 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 178-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 178.03 Pretermitted Child: Omission of Living Child from
Will Because of Mistaken Belief Child Is Dead (EPIC)
The law provides that if at the time a decedent executed [ his / her ] will, [ he / she ] omitted
from the will any of [ his / her ] living children solely because [ he / she ] mistakenly
believed that the child was dead, that child is entitled to a certain share of the deceased
parent’s estate.
In this case, the share of [ name of decedent ]’s estate that [ name of child ] would receive
is [ describe share child would be entitled to under MCL 700.2302(1)(a) or (b) ].
The petitioner has the burden of proving that:
(a) at the time [ name of decedent ] executed [ his / her ] will, [ he / she ]
believed that [ name of child ] was dead, and
(b) the sole reason that [ name of decedent ] omitted [ name of child ] from the
will was the mistaken belief that [ name of child ] was dead.
You must determine whether petitioner has met [ his / her ] burden of proof.
The Court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers to
the questions in the Special Verdict Form will provide the basis on which this case will be
resolved.
Note on Use
The statute setting forth the share of a pretermitted child is reproduced in the Introduction
to this chapter.
Comment
See MCL 700.2302(3).
Under section 2302(3) of EPIC, a child living at the time the will was executed can claim
pretermitted status only if the testator mistakenly believed that the child was dead and that
was testator’s sole reason for omitting the child. The mistaken belief must be the sole
reason, and not one of several reasons, for the exclusion.
Under prior law, any child, issue of deceased child, or child born out of wedlock omitted
from a testator’s will could claim pretermitted status if the omission was not intentional but
was made by mistake or accident. MCL 700.127(2). Except for a mistaken belief that a
child is dead, EPIC eliminated mistake or accident as a grounds for claiming pretermitted
Michigan Supreme Court Page 178-9
Chapter 178: Pretermitted Heirs (EPIC)
status. EPIC also changes prior law by providing only for claims by a child, and not claims
by issue of a deceased child. The definition of child in EPIC specifically excludes
grandchild. MCL 700.1103(f).
Prior case law under section 127(2) of the Revised Probate Code held that decedent’s intent
and whether the omission was by mistake or accident are issues for the jury (In re Estate of
Stebbins, 94 Mich 304; 54 NW 159 (1892)), and that the omitted child or issue of deceased
child has the burden of proof on these issues (In re Potts’ Estate, 304 Mich 47; 7 NW2d
217 (1942); Brown v Blesch, 270 Mich 576; 259 NW 331 (1935); In re Estate of Stebbins).
The cases also held that the fact-finder is not limited to the will, but can consider extrinsic
evidence on these issues. O’Neall v Her, 254 Mich 631; 236 NW 890 (1931); Bachinski v
Bachinski’s Estate, 152 Mich 693; 116 NW 556 (1908).
One pre-EPIC case decided that children were not omitted from a will where the will
included a specific bequest for each child to be funded from a life policy even though the
testator failed to make the estate the policy beneficiary. In re Estate of Norwood, 178 Mich
App 345; 443 NW2d 798 (1989).
History
M Civ JI 178.03 was added April 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 178-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 178.12 Pretermitted Spouse: Will Executed Prior to Marriage
(EPIC)
The law provides that a surviving spouse who married [ his / her ] spouse after the spouse
executed [ his / her ] will is entitled to a certain share of the deceased spouse’s estate.
However, the surviving spouse is not entitled to this share of decedent’s estate if:
*((a)the will was made in contemplation of the marriage, (or))
*((b)the will expresses decedent’s intention that it is to be effective despite a marriage after
the will is made, (or))
*((c)the decedent provided for [ his / her ] spouse by transfer of property outside the will
and intended the transfer to substitute for provision for [ his / her ] spouse in [ his / her ]
will.)
In this case, the share of [ name of decedent ]’s estate that [ name of surviving spouse ]
would receive is the same share as [ he / she ] would have received if [ his / her ] spouse
died without a will **(except that [ he / she ] may not receive any part of the estate held in
trust for the benefit of, or set aside by or passing under the will to [ name(s) of decedent’s
child / children born prior to the decedent’s marriage to the surviving spouse but not the
surviving spouse’s child/children, or name(s) of descendant of decedent’s child /
children ]).
The respondent has the burden of proving (any of) the following:
*((a)the will was made in contemplation of the marriage, (or))
*((b)the will expresses an intention of [ name of decedent ] that it is to be effective despite
a marriage after the will is made, (or))
*((c)[ name of decedent ] ***(provided for [ name of surviving spouse ] by transfer of
property outside the will, and) intended that the transfer of property outside the will
substitute for provision for [ his / her ] spouse in [ his / her ] will.)
You must determine whether respondent has met [ his / her ] burden of proof.
The Court will furnish a Special Verdict Form to assist you in your duties. Your answers to
the questions in the Special Verdict Form will provide the basis on which this case will be
resolved.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 178-11
Chapter 178: Pretermitted Heirs (EPIC)
Note on Use
*The Court should delete any subsection that is not an issue in the case. Subsection (b)
should be deleted if the will is not ambiguous and there is no issue for the jury.
** This phrase should be read to the jury if there is part of the estate that the surviving
spouse is not eligible to share. See MCL 700.2301(1)(a)–(c). The provision of EPIC that
sets forth the share of the estate allotted to a pretermitted spouse is reproduced in the
Introduction to this chapter.
***If the parties do not dispute the transfer or transfers of property outside the will, the
Court should delete this first part of subsection (c).
The will or other evidence may be used to show that the will was made in contemplation of
the marriage; decedent’s intent to substitute transfers outside the will may be shown by his
or her statements or reasonably inferred from the amount of the transfer or other evidence.
MCL 700.2301(2)(a), (c).
EPIC states one of the grounds for denying pretermitted spouse status as: “The will
expresses the intention that it is to be effective notwithstanding a subsequent marriage.”
MCL 700.2301(2)(b). For cases construing a similar provision in prior law, see the
comment to M Civ JI 178.02 Pretermitted Child: Will Executed Prior to Birth or Adoption
of Child Omitted from Will (EPIC).
The spouse claiming under MCL 700.2301 must show that he or she is the surviving spouse
and that he or she married the testator after the will was executed. If either of these present
issues of fact, this instruction must be modified.
MCL 700.2301 is taken almost verbatim from the 1990 version of the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) §2-301. The UPC comment explains that the moving party has the burden of
proof on the exceptions contained in subsections (a)(1), (2), and (3) (numbered (2) (a), (b),
and (c) in the Michigan statute).
Comment
MCL 700.2301.
The pretermitted spouse section of EPIC departs substantially from prior law. First, EPIC
discards the requirement that to claim pretermitted status, the surviving spouse needs to be
omitted from the will altogether. Second, under EPIC, only a spouse who married the
testator after the will was executed may claim as a pretermitted spouse. Prior law permitted
any surviving spouse to make a claim if his or her omission from the will was based on
“oversight or mistake.” Third, EPIC eliminates “oversight or mistake” as specific grounds
for a claim as a pretermitted spouse.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 178-12 Michigan Supreme Court
Under prior law, where decedent’s will made prior to marriage to the surviving spouse
made a bequest to her as “a friend,” the spouse did not meet the statutory definition of an
“omitted spouse” for whom the “testator fails to provide by will” even though decedent
may not have contemplated the marriage when the will was made. In re Estate of Herbach,
230 Mich App 276, 284, 287; 583 NW2d 541 (1998). The EPIC revision changes this
result. Under EPIC, a surviving spouse who married the testator after the will was executed
may claim a share as a pretermitted spouse even if he or she receives some bequest in the
will unless it appears from the will or other evidence that the will was made in
contemplation of the marriage, or the will indicates it is to be effective despite a subsequent
marriage, or transfers outside the will are intended to substitute for a testamentary
provision.
Two pre-EPIC cases involved transfers outside the will to surviving spouses: In re Cole
Estate, 120 Mich App 539; 328 NW2d 76 (1982), and Noble v McNerney, 165 Mich App
586; 419 NW2d 424 (1988). In both cases, the appellate court affirmed trial court findings
that the decedent did not intend any of the transfers to substitute for a testamentary
disposition for the spouse. The Michigan Court of Appeals also held in Cole that a widow’s
right to elect a statutory share under MCL 700.282(1) (now MCL 700.2201) did not waive
her right to claim a share of the estate as a pretermitted spouse.
History
M Civ JI 178.12 was added April 1, 2002. Amended July 2012. Amended May 2016.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 179-1
CHAPTER 179
Trust Contests
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 179-2
M Civ JI 179.01 Trust Contests: Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel.......... 179-3
M Civ JI 179.02 Trust Contests: Definitions................................................................ 179-4
M Civ JI 179.03 Trust Contests: Creation of a Trust ................................................... 179-5
M Civ JI 179.04 Trust Contests: Sufficient Mental Capacity—Definition ................... 179-6
M Civ JI 179.05 Trust Contests: Intention to Create a Trust ...................................... 179-7
M Civ JI 179.06 Trust Contests: Trust Need Not Be in Writing................................... 179-8
M Civ JI 179.07 Trust Contests: Cautionary Instruction as to Settlor’s Right to Leave
Property by a Trust..................................................................................................... 179-9
M Civ JI 179.10 Trust Contests: Undue Influence—Definition—Burden of Proof.... 179-10
M Civ JI 179.12 Trust Contests: Fraud in Procurement of Trust............................... 179-12
M Civ JI 179.15 Trust Contests: Revocation or Amendment of Trust ...................... 179-13
M Civ JI 179.20 Trust Contests: Burden of Proof...................................................... 179-14
M Civ JI 179.25 Trust Contests: Existence of Presumption of Undue Influence—Burden of
Proof [ Instruction Deleted ] .................................................................................... 179-16
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 179-2 Michigan Supreme Court
Introduction
In 2009, the Michigan Legislature enacted the Michigan Trust Code. The act took effect on
April 1, 2010.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 179-3
Chapter 179: Trust Contests
M Civ JI 179.01 Trust Contests: Defining Legal Names of Parties and
Counsel
This case is a trust contest. The term settlor is used to refer to the person who created the
trust. The person who claims a valid trust exists is called the proponent. The proponent is
[ state name and indicate where seated ]. The attorney for the proponent is [ state
attorney’s name and indicate where seated ]. The person who contests the validity of the
trust is called the contestant. The contestant is [ state the contestant’s name and indicate
where seated ]. The attorney for the contestant is [ state attorney’s name and indicate
where seated ]. [ If any other persons are seated at the counsel table, identify them and
describe their function. ]
Note on Use
This instruction should be substituted for M Civ JI 1.02.
Comment
This instruction is substantially similar to M Civ JI 170.01
History
M Civ JI 179.01 was added June 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 179-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 179.02 Trust Contests: Definitions
A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property. The person with title to the
property has certain duties to hold and deal with the property for the benefit of another
person. The person who has the duties is called the trustee.
Comment
MCL 700.1107(n). MacKenzie v Union Guardian Trust, 262 Mich 563 (1933).
Restatement Trusts, 2d, § 2.
History
M Civ JI 179.02 was added June 2011.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 179-5
Chapter 179: Trust Contests
M Civ JI 179.03 Trust Contests: Creation of a Trust
A trust is created only if all of the following apply:
(a) the settlor had capacity to create a trust, and
(b) the settlor indicated an intention to create the trust, and
(c) [ the trust beneficiary can be ascertained now or in the future / the trust is
either a charitable trust or a trust for a noncharitable purpose or for the care of
an animal ], and
(d) the trustee has duties to perform, and
(e) the same person is not the sole trustee and sole beneficiary of all beneficial
interests.
Note on Use
Use only the portion of the bracketed language that applies.
Comment
MCL 700.7402; Restatement Trusts, 3rd, §69; Restatement Trusts, 2d, §341.
History
M Civ JI 179.03 was added June 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 179-6 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 179.04 Trust Contests: Sufficient Mental Capacity—
Definition
A settlor had sufficient mental capacity to [ create / amend / revoke ] a trust if at the time
[ he / she ] did so [ he / she ]:
(a) had the ability to understand that [ he / she ] was providing for the
disposition of [ his / her ] property, and
(b) had the ability to know the nature and extent of [ his / her ] property, and
(c) knew who [ his / her ] closest family members were, in other words, those
who would be logical recipients of [ his / her ] estate, and
(d) had the ability to understand in a reasonable manner the general nature and
effect of [ his / her ] act in [ creating / amending / revoking ] the trust.
The contestant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that at the
time the settlor [ created / amended / revoked ] the trust [ he / she ] did not have sufficient
mental capacity to do so.
Note on Use
Preponderance of the evidence is defined in M Civ JI 8.01.
Comment
MCL 700.7601, 700.2501. Restatement Property, 3rd, §8.1
History
M Civ JI 179.04 was added June 2011.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 179-7
Chapter 179: Trust Contests
M Civ JI 179.05 Trust Contests: Intention to Create a Trust
(1)A trust may be created by any of the following:
(a) A transfer of property to another person as trustee during the settlor’s
lifetime or by will or other disposition taking effect upon the settlor’s death.
(b) A declaration by the owner of property that the owner holds identifiable
property as trustee.
(c) An exercise of a power of appointment in favor of a trustee.
(d) A promise by one person to another person, whose rights under the promise
are to be held in trust for a third person.
(2)The instrument establishing the terms of a trust may be valid even if the property or an
interest in property is not transferred to the trustee or made subject to the terms of the trust
at the same time the instrument is signed.
Comment
MCL 700.7401.
History
M Civ JI 179.05 was added June 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 179-8 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 179.06 Trust Contests: Trust Need Not Be in Writing
A trust need not be in writing to be valid, however, an oral trust and its terms may be
established only by clear and convincing evidence.
Note on Use
Clear and convincing evidence is defined in M Civ JI 8.01.
Comment
MCL 700.7407
History
M Civ JI 179.06 was added June 2011.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 179-9
Chapter 179: Trust Contests
M Civ JI 179.07 Trust Contests: Cautionary Instruction as to Settlor’s
Right to Leave Property by a Trust
*(The law does not require property to be given to heirs or relatives, including a settlor’s
spouse.) The law allows everyone who [ has sufficient mental capacity / is not under undue
influence / name other condition ] to create a trust and dispose of the trust property as [ he
/ she ] chooses. The court and jury have no right to substitute their judgment for the
judgment of the person making the trust or as to the wisdom or justice of the provisions of
the trust.
Note on Use
*This sentence should be read when applicable.
Comment
This instruction is virtually identical to M Civ JI 170.04
This instruction contains cautions as to the rights of a person in the making of his or her
trust. These cautions are believed necessary to prevent the often mistaken belief of most
jurors that the decedent cannot disinherit heirs and other relatives by his or her trust and to
prevent the jurors from improperly trying to substitute their judgment for the judgment of
the maker of the trust. See In re Allen’s Estate, 230 Mich 584 (1925).
The testator has a right to dispose of his or her property as he or she sees fit. In re Kramer’s
Estate, 324 Mich 626 (1949). The law does not require property to be disposed among the
testator’s heirs. In re Fay’s Estate, 197 Mich 675 (1917). It concerns no one what a person’s
reasons were in his or her distribution by will. Brown v Blesch, 270 Mich 576 (1935). The
jury has no right to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the testator. In re Hannan’s
Estate, 315 Mich 102 (1946). The jury has no right to consider that the testator did an
apparent injustice in his or her will. In re Livingston’s Estate, 295 Mich 637 (1940). While
the testator’s blood relations are the natural objects of his or her bounty, such bounty is not
limited by blood relationship, and his or her blood relations have no natural or inherent right
to his or her property. Spratt v Spratt, 76 Mich 384 (1889).
History
M Civ JI 179.07 was added June 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 179-10 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 179.10 Trust Contests: Undue Influence—Definition—
Burden of Proof
The contestant has the burden of proving that there was undue influence exerted on the
settlor in the [ creation / amendment / revocation ] of the trust.
Undue influence is influence that is so great that it overpowers the settlor’s free will and
prevents [ him / her ] from doing as [ he / she ] pleases with [ his / her ] property.
To be “undue,” the influence exerted upon the settlor must be of such a degree that it
overpowered the settlor’s free choice and caused [ him / her ] to act against [ his / her ] own
free will and to act in accordance with the will of the [ person / persons ] who influenced
[ him / her ].
The influence exerted may be by [ force / threats / flattery / persuasion / fraud /
misrepresentation / physical coercion / moral coercion / (other) ]. Action that results from
undue influence is action that the settlor would not otherwise have taken. It disposes of the
trust property in a manner different from the disposition the settlor would have made had
[ he / she ] been free of such influence.
The word “undue” must be emphasized, because the settlor may be influenced in the
disposition of the trust property by specific and direct influences without such influences
becoming undue. This is true even though the trust would not have been made but for such
influence. It is not improper for a [ spouse / child / parent / relative / friend / housekeeper /
(other) ] to—
(1) *([ advise / persuade / argue / flatter / solicit / entreat / implore ],)
(2) *(appeal to the decedent’s [ hopes / fears / prejudices / sense of justice /
sense of duty / sense of gratitude / sense of pity ],
(3) *(appeal to ties of [ friendship / affection / kinship ],)
(4) *([ (other) ],)
provided the settlor’s power to resist such influence is not overcome and [ his / her ]
capacity to finally act in accordance with [ his / her ] own free will is not overpowered. A
trust that results must be the free will and purpose of the settlor and not that of [ another
person / other persons ].
Mere existence of the opportunity, motive or even the ability to control the free will of the
settlor is not sufficient to establish that [ creation / amendment / revocation ] of the trust is
the result of undue influence.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 179-11
Chapter 179: Trust Contests
If you find that [ name ] exerted undue influence, then your verdict will be against the trust.
If you find that [ name ] did not exert undue influence, then your verdict will be in favor of
the trust.
Note on Use
*The Court should choose among subsections (1)–(4) those which are applicable to the
case.
This instruction should be accompanied by M Civ JI 8.01, Definition of Burden of Proof.
Comment
This instruction is virtually identical to M Civ JI 170.44.
In re Estate of Karmey, 468 Mich 68; 658 NW2d 796 (2003); Widmayer v Leonard, 422
Mich 280; 373 NW2d 538 (1985); Kar v Hogan, 399 Mich 529; 251 NW2d 77 (1976); In
re Willey Estate, 9 Mich App 245; 156 NW2d 631 (1967); In re Langlois Estate, 361 Mich
646; 106 NW2d 132 (1960); In re Paquin’s Estate, 328 Mich 293; 43 NW2d 858 (1950);
In re Balk’s Estate, 298 Mich 303; 298 NW 779 (1941); In re Kramer’s Estate, 324 Mich
626; 37 NW2d 564 (1949); In re Reed’s Estate, 273 Mich 334; 263 NW 76 (1935); In re
Curtis Estate, 197 Mich 473; 163 NW 944 (1917); Nelson v Wiggins, 172 Mich 191; 137
NW 623 (1912).
History
M Civ JI 179.10 was added June 2011. Amended October 2014, January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 179-12 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 179.12 Trust Contests: Fraud in Procurement of Trust
A trust is not valid to the extent it was [ created / amended ] as a result of fraud. Fraud exists
if—
(a) there was a misrepresentation of [ a material fact / material facts ] to the
settlor, and
(b) the settlor relied on and was influenced by that misrepresentation in
disposing of [ his / her ] property by trust.
The contestant has the burden of proving that there was fraud in the making of the trust.
Comment
This instruction is virtually identical to M Civ JI 170.46
In re Spillette Estate, 352 Mich 12 (1958); In re Hannan’s Estate, 315 Mich 102 (1946); In
re Barth’s Estate, 298 Mich 388 (1941).
History
M Civ JI 179.12 was added June 2011.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 179-13
Chapter 179: Trust Contests
M Civ JI 179.15 Trust Contests: Revocation or Amendment of Trust
If the settlor has sufficient mental capacity, [ he / she ] may revoke or amend a revocable
trust by substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of the trust.
If the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided in the trust is not
expressly made exclusive:
(a) A written trust may be [ revoked / amended ] by a separate writing
manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor’s intent to revoke or
amend the trust.
(b) If the trust is an oral trust, the trust may be [ revoked / amended ] by any
method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor’s intent.
Note on Use
Clear and convincing evidence is defined in M Civ JI 8.01.
Comment
MCL 700.7602(3); MCL 700.7601.
With two exceptions, unless the terms of a trust expressly provide that the trust is
irrevocable, the settlor may revoke or amend the trust if the trust was executed or restated
on or after April 1, 2010. MCL 700.7602(1).
History
M Civ JI 179.15 was added June 2011.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 179-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 179.20 Trust Contests: Burden of Proof
The proponent has the burden of proving:
(a) that the settlor had capacity to [ create / amend / revoke ] a trust,
(b) that the settlor indicated an intention to [ create / amend / revoke ] the trust,
(c) that [ the trust beneficiary can be ascertained now or in the future / the trust
is either a charitable trust or a trust for a noncharitable purpose or for the care
of an animal ],
(d) that the trustee had duties to perform, and
(e) that the same person was not the sole trustee and sole beneficiary of all
beneficial interests.
On the other hand, the contestant has the burden of proving:
(a) that the settlor did not have sufficient mental capacity to [ create / amend /
revoke ] a trust,
(b) that the trust was [ created / amended / revoked ] as the result of undue
influence, or
(c) that the trust was [ created / amended / revoked ] as a result of fraud.
Your verdict will be that the trust is valid if the proponent has proved all of those elements
(and the contestant has failed to prove the defense of [ describe defense ].
Your verdict will be that the trust is not valid if the proponent has failed to prove any one
of those elements (or if you find that the contestant has proved the defense of [ describe
defense ].
Note on Use
The court should select from the alphabetical listings only those matters that are issues in
the case. Use only the portion of the bracketed language that applies.
The instruction may have to be modified if partial invalidation of a trust, such as partial
revocation, is an issue.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 179-15
Chapter 179: Trust Contests
History
M Civ JI 179.20 was added June 2011. Amended January 2020.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 179-16 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 179.25 Trust Contests: Existence of Presumption of Undue
Influence—Burden of Proof [ Instruction Deleted ]
The Committee deleted M Civ JI 179.25, but it is continuing to review the issue of
the presumption of undue influence and how the jury is to be instructed, if at all, when that
presumption has not been rebutted.
To establish that the settlor [ created / amended / revoked ] the trust as a result of undue
influence, the contestant has the burden of proving all three of the following propositions:
1.that [ name ] had a fiduciary relationship with the settlor,
2.that [ name ] (or a person or interest he represented) benefited from the [ creation /
amendment / revocation ] of the trust, and
3.that by reason of the fiduciary relationship [ name ] had an opportunity to influence
the settlor in giving that benefit.
If you find that all three propositions have been proven, then the settlor’s action is invalid
as a result of undue influence. Otherwise, the settlor’s action is not invalid as a result of
undue influence.
A “fiduciary relationship” is one of inequality where a person places complete trust in
another person regarding the subject matter, and the trusted person controls the subject of
the relationship by reason of knowledge, resources, power, or moral authority.
Note on Use
In cases involving the presumption of undue influence, this instruction is applicable only
where two conditions coexist: 1) the putative fiduciary has not introduced evidence to
“meet” or “rebut” the presumption, i.e, the fiduciary hasn’t introduced evidence tending to
show that the bequest was not made as a result of undue influence, and 2) there is an issue
of fact whether one or more of the three components of the presumption of undue influence
exists, MRE 301; Widmayer v Leonard, 422 Mich 280 (1985).
Where evidence has been introduced to meet the presumption, and in cases that do not
involve the presumption of undue influence, the applicable undue influence instruction is
M Civ JI 179.10 Trust Contests: Undue Influence—Definition.
A presumption casts on the opposing party only the obligation to come forward with
evidence opposing the presumption, and if that is done, the effect of the presumption
disappears, other than to prevent a directed verdict against the party having the benefit of
the presumption, and the burden of proof remains with the person claiming undue
influence. MRE 301; Widmayer, supra. If there is no genuine dispute that all elements of
the presumption exist, and there is no evidence opposing the presumption, the party having
the benefit of the presumption is entitled to a directed verdict. MRE 301; Widmayer, supra.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 179-17
Chapter 179: Trust Contests
Often there will be no triable dispute on one or more of the elements of the presumption, in
which case the court should not submit that element to the jury for decision. Typically, for
example, there will be no dispute that the putative fiduciary benefited from the will. While
it is said generally that the existence of a confidential relationship is a question of fact, In
re Kanable Estate, 47 Mich App 299 (1973), there are a number of relationships which are
fiduciary as a matter of law, e.g., principal-agent, guardian-ward, trustee-beneficiary,
attorney-client, physician-patient, clergy-penitent, accountant-client, stockbroker-
customer. Unless there is a dispute that the named relationship exists, it will be deemed a
fiduciary relationship as a matter of law. See, In re Estate of Karmey, 468 Mich 68,74 fn
2,3 (2003). For that reason the definition in the instruction does not attempt to encompass
all of them. A marriage relationship does not create a presumption of undue influence. In
re Estate of Karmey.
The instruction uses the term “fiduciary relationship” instead of “confidential or fiduciary
relationship” on the conclusion that the terms “fiduciary relationship” and “confidential or
fiduciary relationship” have identical meanings. See, In re Estate of Karmey.
This instruction should be accompanied by M Civ JI 8.01, Definition of Burden of Proof.
Comment
This instruction is substantially similar to M Civ JI 170.45.
In re Estate of Karmey; Widmayer; Kar v Hogan, 399 Mich 529 (1976). See also In re Cox
Estate, 383 Mich 108 (1970) (fiduciary relationship of attorney and clergyman); In re
Vollbrecht Estate, 26 Mich App 430 (1970) (substantial benefit derived by charitable
foundation wherein testatrix’s attorney and her accountant were also trustees of
foundation); In re Spillette Estate, 352 Mich 12 (1958); In re Haskell’s Estate, 283 Mich
513 (1938) (will in favor of attorney upheld where testatrix obtained independent advice;
presumption of undue influence rebutted); In re Eldred’s Estate, 234 Mich 131 (1926)
(doctor); In re Hartlerode’s Estate, 183 Mich 51 (1914) (clergyman).
History
M Civ JI 179.25 was added June 2011. Deleted October 2014.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 179-18 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court Page 180-1
CHAPTER 180
Attorney Fees
M Civ JI 180.01 Attorney Fees—Defining Legal Names of Parties and Counsel......... 180-2
M Civ JI 180.02 Attorney Fees—Explanation of Statute ............................................ 180-3
M Civ JI 180.03 Attorney Fees—Reasonable Value of Legal Services ........................ 180-4
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 180-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 180.01 Attorney Fees—Defining Legal Names of Parties and
Counsel
This is a proceeding to resolve a dispute over a legal fee. The person requesting legal fees
is called the petitioner. The petitioner is [ state name and indicate where seated ]. The
attorney for the petitioner is [ state attorney’s name and indicate where seated ]. The
person who objects to the requested legal fee is called the objector. The objector is [ state
name and indicate where seated ]. The attorney for the objector is [ state attorney’s name
and indicate where seated ]. [ If any other persons are at the counsel table, identify them
and describe their function ].
Note on Use
In attorney fee contest cases, this instruction should be substituted for M Civ JI 1.02.
History
M Civ JI 180.01 was added October 1986.
Michigan Supreme Court Page 180-3
Chapter 180: Attorney Fees
M Civ JI 180.02 Attorney Fees—Explanation of Statute
The law provides that a [ title of fiduciary ] may employ [ an attorney / a law firm ] to
perform necessary legal services on behalf of the estate and that the [ attorney / law firm ]
shall receive reasonable compensation for the legal services.
The petitioner must show that:
(a) the [ attorney / law firm ] performed necessary legal services on behalf of
the estate, and
(b) the amount requested is reasonable.
*(In this case the only issue is whether [ select a or b above ].)
Note on Use
*This sentence should be read when there is only one issue.
Comment
An attorney may be employed by a personal representative under a will or a trustee and
shall receive reasonable compensation. MCL 700.3715(1)(w) (personal representatives),
and MCL 700.7817(w) (trustees). See also MCR 5.313, Compensation of Attorneys.
Cases on the issue of whether services were performed on behalf of the estate include In re
Baldwin’s Estate, 311 Mich 288; 18 NW2d 827 (1945); Marx v McMorran, 136 Mich 406;
99 NW 396 (1904) (attorney fees allowed); and In re Davis’ Estate, 312 Mich 258; 20
NW2d 181 (1945) (attorney fees disallowed).
History
M Civ JI 180.02 was added October 1986.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 180-4 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 180.03 Attorney Fees—Reasonable Value of Legal Services
Attorney fees can vary according to many factors. No one factor is controlling. In
determining reasonable value of the legal services, you should consider the following:
(a) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly.
(b) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(c) The experience, reputation, and ability of the [ attorney / attorneys ]
performing the services.
(d) The benefit of the services to the estate.
(e) *(The amount involved and the results obtained. The attorney should not
be deprived of reasonable compensation if the result obtained was not what the
client sought. If the attorney properly rendered services, [ he / she ] should be
reasonably compensated.)
(f) *(The nature and length of the professional relationship with [ name of
client ].)
(g) *(The time limitations imposed by [ name of client ] or by the
circumstances.)
(h) *(The likelihood, if apparent to [ name of client ], that the acceptance of the
particular employment would preclude other employment by the attorney.)
(i) *(Any fee agreement between the attorney and [ name of client ].)
(j) *(The expenses that have been incurred by the attorney.)
(k) *(The adverse or uncooperative attitude of the [ creditors / beneficiaries /
others ].)
(l) *(Any extensive litigation involving the estate.)
(m) *([ other factors ].)
Your verdict is to be in the amount of the total attorney fee. †(The court will deduct from
your verdict any amount that has already been paid.)
Michigan Supreme Court Page 180-5
Chapter 180: Attorney Fees
Note on Use
*These sections are to be used only if applicable.
†This sentence should be read only if applicable.
Comment
In re Estate of Weaver, 119 Mich App 796; 327 NW2d 366 (1982); In re Weiss’ Estate, 315
Mich 276; 24 NW2d 123 (1946); In re Ruel’s Estate, 308 Mich 692; 14 NW2d 541 (1944);
Becht v Miller, 279 Mich 629; 273 NW 294 (1937); see also Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-106(B).
Michigan cases that discuss specific factors used to determine reasonable value of legal
services include:
a. Result obtained not as desired: Crary v Goldsmith, 322 Mich 418; 34 NW2d
28 (1948); Babbitt v Bumpus, 73 Mich 331; 41 NW 417 (1889).
b. Expenses incurred: Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728; 211 NW2d 217
(1973); Crary; Reichert v Metropolitan Trust Co, 266 Mich 322; 253 NW 313
(1934).
c. Benefit of services to the estate: Crawley; Reichert.
d. Adverse or uncooperative attitude of interested parties: In re Finn’s Estate,
281 Mich 478; 275 NW 215 (1937).
e. Extensive litigation: In re Svitojus’ Estate, 307 Mich 491; 12 NW2d 324
(1943); McGraw v Township of Lake, 266 Mich 38; 253 NW 207 (1934).
History
M Civ JI 180.03 was added October 1986.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
Page 180-6 Michigan Supreme Court
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-1
CHAPTER 190-241
Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 190.01 Form of Verdict: Dram Shop—Sale to Minor ............................. 190-241-3
M Civ JI 190.02 Form of Verdict: Dram Shop—Sale to Visibly Intoxicated
Person ................................................................................................................. 190-241-9
M Civ JI 195.01 Form of Verdict: Paternity [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]............ 190-241-14
M Civ JI 196.01 Form of Verdict: Landlord-Tenant—Rent Action ..................... 190-241-15
M Civ JI 196.02 Form of Verdict: Landlord-Tenant--Termination Action .......... 190-241-16
M Civ JI 197.01 Form of Verdict: Child Protection Proceeding [ Form of
Verdict Deleted ] ............................................................................................... 190-241-17
M Civ JI 208.01 Form of Verdict: Libel............................................................... 190-241-18
M Civ JI 220.01 Form of Verdict: Will Contests ................................................. 190-241-21
M Civ JI 220.05 Form of Verdict: Will Contests—Lost, Destroyed or Otherwise Unavailable
Will .................................................................................................................... 190-241-23
M Civ JI 221.01 Form of Verdict: Mental Illness--Involuntary Treatment......... 190-241-24
M Civ JI 222.01 Form of Verdict: Appointment of Guardian of Adult ............... 190-241-25
M Civ JI 222.02 Form of Verdict: Termination of Guardianship of Adult .......... 190-241-26
M Civ JI 222.11 form of Verdict: Appointment of Conservator of Adult........... 190-241-27
M Civ JI 222.12 Form of Verdict: Termination of Conservatorship of Adult ..... 190-241-28
M Civ JI 223.01 Form of Verdict: Determination of Title to Bank Accounts...... 190-241-29
M Civ JI 224.01 Form of Verdict: Felonious and Intentional Killing................... 190-241-30
M Civ JI 225.02 Form of Verdict: Omission of Child or Issue of Deceased Child in Will As a
Result of Mistake or Accident ........................................................................... 190-241-31
M Civ JI 225.11 Form of Verdict: Omission of Spouse in Will As a Result of Oversight or
Mistake.............................................................................................................. 190-241-32
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-2 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 225.12 Form of Verdict: Omission of Spouse in Will Made Prior to Marriage Where
There Are Transfers Made in Lieu of Will Provision.......................................... 190-241-33
M Civ JI 226.01 Form of Verdict: Claim for Services Rendered ......................... 190-241-34
M Civ JI 228.02 Form of Verdict: Pretermitted Child: Will Executed Prior to Birth or
Adoption of Child Omitted from Will (EPIC)...................................................... 190-241-36
M Civ JI 228.03 Form of Verdict: Pretermitted Child: Omission of Living Child from Will
Because of Mistaken Belief Child is Dead (EPIC) ............................................... 190-241-37
M Civ JI 228.12 Form of Verdict: Pretermitted Spouse: Will Executed Prior to Marriage
(EPIC) ................................................................................................................. 190-241-38
M Civ JI 230.01 Form of Verdict: Attorney Fees................................................ 190-241-39
M Civ JI 241.01 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Delivery of
Nonconforming Goods Which the Buyer Accepts............................................. 190-241-40
M Civ JI 241.02 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s Breach by Failure to
Deliver/Repudiation/Delivery of Nonconforming Goods Rejected................... 190-241-42
M Civ JI 241.14 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s Breach by
Nonacceptance or Repudiation—Seller Resells—Seller’s Damages ................. 190-241-44
M Civ JI 241.15 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages--UCC: Buyer’s Breach by
Nonacceptance or Repudiation--Seller’s Damages ........................................... 190-241-46
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-3
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 190.01 Form of Verdict: Dram Shop—Sale to Minor
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the plaintiff [ injured / damaged ] by [ name of minor ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did [ name of defendant / name of agent / name of employee ] *(directly) [ sell
/ give / furnish ] alcoholic liquor to [ name of minor ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 3.
QUESTION NO. 3: Was [ name of minor ] under the age of 21 years at the time of the [ sale / giving
/ furnishing ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes” or “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 4.
QUESTION NO. 4: Was the [ selling / giving / furnishing ] of alcoholic liquor to [ name of minor ]
a proximate cause of plaintiff’s [ injury / damage ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 5.
QUESTION NO. 5: Did the plaintiff [ purchase / give / furnish ] alcoholic liquor [ for / to ] [ name
of minor ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 6.
QUESTION NO. 6: Did [ name of defendant / name of agent / name of employee ] demand and was
[ he / she ] shown [ a Michigan driver’s license / an official state personal identification card ] that
appeared to be genuine and showed that [ name of minor ] was 21 years of age or older?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 7.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-4 Michigan Supreme Court
QUESTION NO. 7: Was [ name of minor ] visibly intoxicated at the time of the [ selling / giving /
furnishing ] of alcoholic liquor to [ him / her ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer to QUESTION NO. 3 is “yes,” and your answer to QUESTION NO. 6 is “yes,” and
your answer to QUESTION NO. 7 is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer to QUESTION NO. 7 is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 8.
ALLOCATION OF FAULT
**NOTE: If you decided that more than one of the parties was at fault and their fault caused or
contributed to the plaintiff’s [ injury / damage ], then answer QUESTION NO. 8.
QUESTION NO. 8: Using 100 percent as the total, and for each party you decided was at fault,
consider the nature of the conduct and the extent to which the party’s conduct caused or contributed
to the plaintiff’s [ injury / damage ] and enter that party’s percentage of fault:
Answer: Defendant [ name of minor ]____ percent
Defendant [ name of licensee ] ____ percent
Plaintiff [ name of plaintiff ] ____ percent
(The total must equal 100 percent)TOTAL100 percent
ECONOMIC DAMAGES
QUESTION NO. 9: If you find that the plaintiff has sustained damages for [ describe past economic
damages claimed by the plaintiff such as lost wages, medical expenses, etc. ], give the total amount
of damages to the present date.
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 10: If you find that the plaintiff will incur costs for medical or other health care
in the future, give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will incur costs.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-5
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
QUESTION NO. 11: If you find that the plaintiff will sustain damages for [ lost wages or earnings
/ or / lost earning capacity / and / [ describe other economic loss claimed by the plaintiff ] ] in the
future, give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-6 Michigan Supreme Court
***NOTE: If you determined in QUESTION NO. 8 that the plaintiff was more than 50 percent at
fault, then do not answer any further questions. If you determined in QUESTION NO. 8 that the
plaintiff was 50 percent or less at fault, then go on to QUESTION NO. 12.
QUESTION NO. 12: If you find that the plaintiff has sustained damages for [ describe past
noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as M Civ JI 50.02 Pain and Suffering, Etc., M
Civ JI 50.03 Disability and Disfigurement, and M Civ JI 50.04 Aggravation of Preexisting Ailment
or Condition ], give the total amount of damages to the present date.
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 13: If you find that the plaintiff will sustain damages for [ describe future
noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff ] in the future, give the total amount for each year in
which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Signed,
______________________________________________
Foreperson Date
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-7
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
Note on Use
*If there is an issue whether the retail licensee directly sold, gave, or furnished alcoholic
liquor to the minor, the word directly” should be read to the jury. See the Comment below.
**QUESTION NO. 8 may have to be modified if fault of a named nonparty is an issue in
the case. MCL 600.6304. MCL 600.6304, requiring an allocation of fault, was adopted by
1986 PA 178 and made applicable to personal injury actions arising on or after October 1,
1986. 1986 PA 178, §2. It was amended by 1995 PA 248 to apply also to property damage
actions and to require allocation of fault between certain named nonparties as well as
parties. The 1995 amendments apply to cases filed on or after March 28, 1996. 1995 PA
248, §3.
***This note should not be read to the jury if the case was filed before March 28, 1996.
1995 PA 161, §3. The prohibition against noneconomic damages if the plaintiff is over 50
percent at fault applicable to all actions based on tort or other legal theory seeking damages
for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death is found in MCL 600.2959, added
by 1995 PA 161.
Where there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the appropriate questions should be asked
separately as to each one.
A separate Special Verdict sheet should be furnished to the jury for each plaintiff and each
defendant.
Omit any questions that are not an issue.
This verdict form should not be used if the plaintiff is over 60 years of age. See MCL
600.6311.
This form of verdict is appropriate in a case in which the evidence would allow an award
of damages for a 20-year period in the future. The form must be modified by the court to
add or delete lines in Questions No. 10, 11, and 13 in cases in which the evidence supports
an award of damages for a period longer or shorter than 20 years.
The jury should be instructed to complete the verdict form for the plaintiff’s case against
the defendant minor first because if the jury finds in favor of the defendant minor on any of
the complete defenses, the licensee defendant has the benefit of those defenses and the jury
will not have to complete this verdict form. For a discussion of defenses, see the Comment.
Comment
“Unlawful sale” to a minor may be interpreted with reference to subsection (2) of MCL
436.1801, which says that a retail licensee shall not directly sell, give, or furnish alcoholic
liquor to a minor. (The pre-1986 statute prohibited indirect as well as direct sales to
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-8 Michigan Supreme Court
minors.) If indirect sale means a situation where a licensee sells to a buyer who then
furnishes the liquor to a minor, the licensee may not be liable under the present statute if
the minor became intoxicated and injured someone. This may represent a departure from
case law that recognizes the potential liability of a licensee who knew or had reason to
know that the purchase of liquor was being made for the minor who ultimately caused the
injury. Maldonado v Claud’s, Inc, 347 Mich 395; 79 NW2d 847 (1956); Meyer v State Line
Super Mart, Inc, 1 Mich App 562; 137 NW2d 299 (1965); Verdusco v Miller, 138 Mich
App 702; 360 NW2d 281 (1984).
Actions against retail licensees are subject to the revised judicature act (MCL
436.1801(11)) including the section requiring specific findings as to types of damages
(MCL 600.6305) and the section requiring an allocation of fault among parties and named
nonparties (MCL 600.6304). See also Weiss v Hodge, 223 Mich App 620; 567 NW2d 468
(1997), lv den, 457 Mich 886; 586 NW2d 231 (1998); Brown v Swartz Creek Memorial
Post 3720—Veterans of Foreign Wars, Inc, 214 Mich App 15; 542 NW2d 588 (1995)
(allocation of fault provision applicable to all parties including licensee). See also the
prohibition against noneconomic damages if the plaintiff is over 50 percent at fault, MCL
600.2959, added by 1995 PA 161.
All defenses of the minor or alleged visibly intoxicated person are available to the licensee.
MCL 436.1801(7). Plaintiff’s comparative negligence is a defense available to the licensee.
Lyman v Bavar Co, 136 Mich App 407; 356 NW2d 28 (1984). A 1986 amendment to MCL
436.1801(7) deleted the word “factual” from “all defenses.” The most probable and
significant impact of the change was to allow the licensee to assert the no-fault threshold
defenses so, if the cause of action against the alleged visibly intoxicated person or minor is
a no-fault action and the jury finds that the injury does not meet the statutory threshold, then
a verdict may not be returned against the dram shop defendant.
History
M Civ JI 190.01 was added May 1988. Amended November 1989, January 2001.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-9
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 190.02 Form of Verdict: Dram Shop—Sale to Visibly
Intoxicated Person
We, the jury, answer the questions submitted as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the plaintiff [ injured / damaged ] by [ name of visibly intoxicated
person ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did [ name of defendant / name of agent / name of employee ] [ sell / give /
furnish ] alcoholic liquor to [ name of alleged visibly intoxicated person ] at a time when [ he / she ]
was visibly intoxicated?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 3.
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the [ selling / giving / furnishing ] of alcoholic liquor a proximate cause
of plaintiff’s [ injuries / damages ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” go on to QUESTION NO. 4.
QUESTION NO. 4: Did plaintiff actively contribute to the intoxication of [ name of visibly
intoxicated person ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “no,” go on to QUESTION NO. 5.
ALLOCATION OF FAULT
*NOTE: If you decided that more than one of the parties was at fault and their fault caused or
contributed to the plaintiff’s [ injury / damage ], then answer QUESTION NO. 5.
QUESTION NO. 5: Using 100 percent as the total, and for each party you decided was at fault,
consider the nature of the conduct and the extent to which the party’s conduct caused or contributed
to the plaintiff’s [ injury /damage ] and enter that party’s percentage of fault:
Answer: Defendant [ name of visibly intoxicated person ]____ percent
Defendant [ name of licensee ]____ percent
Plaintiff [ name of plaintiff ] ____ percent
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-10 Michigan Supreme Court
(The total must equal 100 percent)TOTAL 100 percent
ECONOMIC DAMAGES
QUESTION NO. 6: If you find that the plaintiff has sustained damages for [ describe past economic
damages claimed by the plaintiff such as lost wages, medical expenses, etc. ], give the total amount
of damages to the present date.
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 7: If you find that the plaintiff will incur costs for medical or other health care in
the future, give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will incur costs.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
QUESTION NO. 8: If you find that the plaintiff will sustain damages for [ lost wages or earnings /
or / lost earning capacity / and / [ describe other economic loss claimed by the plaintiff ] ] in the
future, give the total amount for each year in which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-11
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
**NOTE: If you determined in QUESTION NO. 5 that the plaintiff was more than 50 percent at
fault, then do not answer any further questions. If you determined in QUESTION NO. 5 that the
plaintiff was 50 percent or less at fault, then go on to QUESTION NO. 9.
QUESTION NO. 9: If you find that the plaintiff has sustained damages for [ describe past
noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff such as M Civ JI 50.02 Pain and Suffering, Etc., M
Civ JI 50.03 Disability and Disfigurement, and M Civ JI 50.04 Aggravation of Preexisting Ailment
or Condition ], give the total amount of damages to the present date.
Answer: $________.____
QUESTION NO. 10: If you find that the plaintiff will sustain damages for [ describe future
noneconomic damages claimed by the plaintiff ] in the future, give the total amount for each year in
which the plaintiff will sustain damages.
Answer:
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-12 Michigan Supreme Court
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
$________.____ for [ year ]
Signed,
______________________________________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
*QUESTION NO. 5 may have to be modified if fault of a named nonparty is an issue in the
case. MCL 600.6304.MCL 600.6304, requiring an allocation of fault, was adopted by 1986
PA 178 and made applicable to personal injury actions arising on or after October 1, 1986.
1986 PA 178, §2. It was amended by 1995 PA 248 to apply also to property damage actions
and to require allocation of fault between certain named nonparties as well as parties. The
1995 amendments apply to cases filed on or after March 28, 1996. 1995 PA 248, §3.
**This note should not be read to the jury if the case was filed before March 28, 1996. 1995
PA 161, §3. The prohibition against noneconomic damages if the plaintiff is over 50
percent at fault applicable to all actions based on tort or other legal theory seeking damages
for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death is found in MCL 600.2959, added
by 1995 PA 161.
Where there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants, the appropriate questions should be asked
separately as to each one.
A separate Special Verdict sheet should be furnished to the jury for each plaintiff and each
defendant.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-13
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
Omit any questions that are not an issue.
This verdict form should not be used if the plaintiff is over 60 years of age. See MCL
600.6311
This form of verdict is appropriate in a case in which the evidence would allow an award
of damages for a 20-year period in the future. The form must be modified by the court to
add or delete lines in Questions No. 7, 8, and 10 in cases where the evidence supports an
award of damages for a period longer or shorter than 20 years.
The jury should be instructed to complete the verdict form for the plaintiff’s case against
the defendant alleged visibly intoxicated person first because if the jury finds in favor of
that defendant on any of the complete defenses, the licensee defendant has the benefit of
those defenses and the jury will not have to complete this verdict form. For a discussion of
defenses, see the Comment.
Comment
Actions against retail licensees are subject to the revised judicature act (MCL
436.1801(11)) including the section requiring specific findings as to types of damages
(MCL 600.6305) and the section requiring an allocation of fault among parties and named
nonparties (MCL 600.6304). See also Weiss v Hodge, 223 Mich App 620; 567 NW2d 468
(1997), lv den, 457 Mich 886; 586 NW2d 231 (1998); Brown v Swartz Creek Memorial
Post 3720—Veterans of Foreign Wars, Inc, 214 Mich App 15; 542 NW2d 588 (1995)
(allocation of fault provision applicable to all parties including licensee). See also the
prohibition against noneconomic damages if the plaintiff is over 50 percent at fault, MCL
600.2959, added by 1995 PA 161.
All defenses of the minor or alleged visibly intoxicated person are available to the licensee.
MCL 436.1801(7). Plaintiff’s comparative negligence is a defense available to the licensee.
Lyman v Bavar Co, 136 Mich App 407; 356 NW2d 28 (1984). A 1986 amendment to MCL
436.1801(7) deleted the word “factual” from “all defenses.” The most probable and
significant impact of the change was to allow the licensee to assert the no-fault threshold
defenses so, if the cause of action against the alleged visibly intoxicated person or minor is
a no-fault action and the jury finds that the injury does not meet the statutory threshold, then
a verdict may not be returned against the dram shop defendant.
History
M Civ JI 190.02 was added May 1988. Amended November 1989, January 2001.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-14 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 195.01 Form of Verdict: Paternity [ Form of Verdict Deleted ]
Comment
The right to a jury trial in paternity actions found in MCL 722.715 was deleted by 1998 PA
113.
History
M Civ JI 195.01 was added March 1, 1981. Deleted May 2000.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-15
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 196.01 Form of Verdict: Landlord-Tenant—Rent Action
Your verdict can be returned in one of the following forms. You may return only one
verdict. We, the jury, find in favor of the landlord in the full amount of rent claimed. We,
the jury, find in favor of the landlord, but find that some of the rent [ should be excused /
has been paid / is a retaliatory increase ]. We determine that the amount of rent which
should be paid by the tenant is $________.____. We, the jury, find in favor of the tenant.
History
M Civ JI 196.01 was added April 1, 1981.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-16 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 196.02 Form of Verdict: Landlord-Tenant--Termination
Action
Your verdict can be returned in one of the following forms:
We, the jury, find in favor of the landlord. We, the jury, find in favor of the tenant.
History
M Civ JI 196.02 was added April 1, 1981.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-17
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 197.01 Form of Verdict: Child Protection Proceeding [ Form
of Verdict Deleted ]
History
M Civ JI 197.01 was added June 1998.
This verdict form was deleted in March 2005 as part of the revision of Chapter 97. The
current verdict forms are found at M Civ JI 97.60 and 97.61.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-18 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 208.01 Form of Verdict: Libel
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Did the defendant make the statement *(of fact) complained of to a third person
by [ printing / writing / signs / pictures / words / gestures ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the statement false in some material respect?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: Did the statement have a tendency to harm the plaintiff’s reputation?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 4: Did the plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statement was
of and concerning [ him / her ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 5: Did the plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had
knowledge that the statement was false or that the defendant acted with reckless disregard as to
whether the statement was false?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
ALTERNATIVE QUESTION NO. 4: Was the statement of and concerning the plaintiff?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
ALTERNATIVE QUESTION NO. 5: Did the defendant have knowledge that the statement was
false or did the defendant act with reckless disregard as to whether the statement was false?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 6: Did the plaintiff suffer some damage as a result of the statement?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-19
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 7: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s actual damages?
Answer: $________.____ (actual damages)
If your answer is “0” actual damages, do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 8: Did the defendant publish the statements complained of with bad faith or ill
will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 9: Before starting this lawsuit, did the plaintiff give notice to the defendant to
publish a retraction and allow the defendant a reasonable time to do so?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 10: Did the defendant incur some incremental or increased injury to [ his / her ]
feelings that was not compensated for in your award of actual damages?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 11: Was this incremental or increased injury to feelings attributable to the sense
of indignation and outrage experienced by the plaintiff caused by the defendant’s bad faith or ill
will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 12: What is the total amount of plaintiff’s exemplary damages for this incremental
or increased injury to [ his / her ] feelings?
Answer: $________.____ (exemplary damages)
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
*The words in parentheses should be used if the alleged defamatory statement is one of pure
fact. They should not be used if the alleged defamatory statement involves opinion.
Milkovich v Lorain Journal Co, 497 US 1; 110 S Ct 2695; 111 L Ed 2d 1 (1990);
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-20 Michigan Supreme Court
Restatement (Second) of Torts §566, at 170–171.
Questions No. 4 and 5 should be used if the case involves a constitutional privilege. See M
Civ JI 118.06. Alternative questions No. 4 and 5 should be used if the case involves a
common-law qualified privilege. See M Civ JI 118.07.
In a private plaintiff case, this verdict form may be used as a model, with the substitution
of the negligence standard (see M Civ JI 118.08) in Alternative QUESTION NO. 5 and
other appropriate modifications on the issue of damages (see MCL 600.2911(2)and MCL
600.2911(7)). Section 7 was added by 1988 PA 396 and made applicable to causes of action
arising on or after January 1, 1989 (1988 PA 396, § 2.).
In cases involving defamation per se of a private individual, compare Gertz v Robert Welch,
Inc, 418 US 323, 324; 94 S Ct 2997; 41 L Ed 2d 789 (1974) (“For the reasons set forth
below, we hold that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages,
at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth”), with Burden v Elias Bros Big Boy Restaurants, 240 Mich App 723;
613 NW2d 378 (2000), and its interpretation of MCL 600.2911, regarding whether
questions six and seven are appropriate or need to be deleted, and whether questions 10-12
should be revised to include a provision for actual damages.
History
M Civ JI 208.01 was added February 1986.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-21
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 220.01 Form of Verdict: Will Contests
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
*QUESTION NO. 1: Is the will a holographic will as defined by law?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 2: Was the [ will / codicil ] signed by [ the decedent / another person at
decedent’s direction and in [ his / her ] conscious presence ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 3: Was the [ will / codicil ] witnessed in the manner required by law?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 4: Was the document intended by the decedent to be [ his / her ] will and transfer
[ his / her ] property after death and not during [ his / her ] lifetime?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 5: Has it been shown by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
intended the document or writing to constitute [ a will / a partial or complete revocation of a will /
an addition to or alteration of a will / a partial or complete revival of [ a formerly revoked will / a
formerly revoked portion of the will ] ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 6: Was the will the result of undue influence?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 7: Did the decedent have the mental capacity to make a will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 8: Was the will the result of an insane delusion?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 9: Was the will revoked by [ the decedent / another person in the conscious
presence of and at the direction of the decedent ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 10: Was the will procured as the result of fraud?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-22 Michigan Supreme Court
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
*The Court should select the questions that are applicable to the case.
See also M Civ JI 170.21 Will Contests: Lost, Destroyed or Otherwise Unavailable Will;
M Civ JI 220.05 Form of Verdict: Will Contests—Lost, Destroyed or Otherwise
Unavailable Will.
Comment
The Court may question jurors and correct errors of form where the intent of the jurors is
ascertainable. In re Sorter’s Estate, 314 Mich 488; 22 NW2d 767 (1946).
History
M Civ JI 220.01 was added January 1984. Amended March 2001.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-23
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 220.05 Form of Verdict: Will Contests—Lost, Destroyed or
Otherwise Unavailable Will
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the purported will ever in existence?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the will executed in the manner required by law?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: Did the decedent revoke this will prior to [ his / her ] death?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 4: What were the contents of the will?
Answer: ____ (a or b)
a. We find that the copy of the will in evidence is identical to the original will.
b. We find the contents of the original will to be as follows:
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
History
M Civ JI 220.05 was added January 1984.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-24 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 221.01 Form of Verdict: Mental Illness--Involuntary
Treatment
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Is [ name of respondent ] mentally ill?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: As a result of that mental illness, is [ name of respondent ] subject to one or
more of the three conditions on which I have instructed you?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” your verdict is, We find that the respondent is a person requiring
treatment.”
If your answer is “no,” your verdict is, “We find that the respondent is not a person requiring
treatment.”
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
In the case of a hearing on a petition for discharge, insert the name of petitioner in both
questions.
The judge may wish to give the jury a copy of M Civ JI 171.02, Mental Illness: Involuntary
Treatment—Elements and Burden of Proof, to aid them in completing the verdict form.
History
M Civ JI 221.01 was added March 1995.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-25
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 222.01 Form of Verdict: Appointment of Guardian of Adult
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Is [ name of respondent ] an incapacitated person?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Is a guardian necessary as a means of providing continuing care and
supervision of [ name of respondent ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Comment
The court may appoint a guardian with limited powers if it is found by clear and convincing
evidence that the incapacitated individual lacks the capacity to do some, but not all, of the
tasks necessary to care for himself or herself. MCL 700.5306(3). Only if it is found by clear
and convincing evidence that the individual is “totally without capacity to care for himself
or herself,” may the judge appoint a full guardian, but in doing so the judge “shall specify
that finding of fact” in the order. MCL 700.5306(4).
History
M Civ JI 222.01 was added January 1985. Amended January 1990, June 2000.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-26 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 222.02 Form of Verdict: Termination of Guardianship of
Adult
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Does [ name of incapacitated individual ] continue to be an incapacitated
person?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Does a guardian continue to be necessary as a means of providing continuing
care and supervision of [ name of incapacitated individual ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Comment
MCL 700.5310.
History
M Civ JI 222.02 was added January 1985. Amended January 1990, June 2000.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-27
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 222.11 form of Verdict: Appointment of Conservator of Adult
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Is [ name of respondent ] [ mentally ill / mentally deficient / physically ill or
disabled / a chronic user of drugs / chronically intoxicated / confined / detained by a foreign power
/ disappeared / [ other ] ] ?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Due to [ insert alleged malady or situation ] is [ name of respondent ] unable
to manage [ his / her ] property and business affairs effectively?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
*QUESTION NO. 3: Will [ name of respondent ]’s property be wasted or dissipated unless proper
management is provided?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 4: Is money needed for the support, care, and welfare of [ name of respondent ]
or those entitled to be supported by [ him / her ] and is protection necessary or desirable to obtain
or provide money?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
*The court should select Questions No. 3, 4, or both, whichever are applicable to the case.
History
M Civ JI 222.11 was added January 1985. Amended June 2000.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-28 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 222.12 Form of Verdict: Termination of Conservatorship of
Adult
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Is [ name of protected person ] [ mentally ill / mentally deficient / physically
ill or disabled / a chronic user of drugs / chronically intoxicated / confined / detained by a foreign
power / disappeared / [ other ] ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Due to [ insert alleged malady or situation ] is [ name of protected person ]
unable to manage [ his / her ] property and business affairs effectively?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
History
M Civ JI 222.12 was added January 1985. Amended June 2000.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-29
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 223.01 Form of Verdict: Determination of Title to Bank
Accounts
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
*QUESTION NO. 1: Did [ name of decedent ] intend the account to become the property of the
survivor?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 2: When the account was opened, did [ name of decedent ] have the mental
capacity to know or understand that the account would become the property of the survivor?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 3: Was [ the account opened / the survivor’s name added to the account ] as a
result of fraud?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 4: Was [ the account opened / the survivor’s name added to the account ] as a
result of undue influence?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
*The court should select the questions that are applicable to the case.
History
M Civ JI 223.01 was added October 1985.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-30 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 224.01 Form of Verdict: Felonious and Intentional Killing
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
*QUESTION NO. 1: Did [ name of respondent ] feloniously and intentionally kill [ name of
decedent ]?
Answer: _____(yes or no)
*QUESTION NO. 2: Did [ name of respondent ] aid and abet in the felonious and intentional killing
of [ name of decedent ]?
Answer: _____(yes or no)
Signed,
_______________________ _______________________
Foreperson Date
Note on Use
*The court should select the question or questions that are applicable to the case.
History
M Civ JI 224.01 was added February 1986.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-31
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 225.02 Form of Verdict: Omission of Child or Issue of
Deceased Child in Will As a Result of Mistake or Accident
Caution: The forms of verdict in this chapter should be used only for estates of decedents
dying before April 1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code
(EPIC). MCL 700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the forms of verdicts in chapter 228 for estates of
decedents dying on or after April 1, 2000.
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the omission of [ name ] from the will of [ name of decedent ] intentional?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the omission as a result of mistake or accident?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Note on Use
Caution: This form of verdict should be used only for estates of decedents dying before
April 1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC).
MCL 700.8101(1),(2)(a). See the forms of verdicts in chapter 228 for estates of decedents
dying on or after April 1, 2000.
History
M Civ JI 225.02 was added February 1986.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-32 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 225.11 Form of Verdict: Omission of Spouse in Will As a
Result of Oversight or Mistake
Caution: The forms of verdict in this chapter should be used only for estates of decedents
dying before April 1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code
(EPIC). MCL 700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the forms of verdicts in chapter 228 for estates of
decedents dying on or after April 1, 2000.
We, the jury, make the following answer to the question submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was the omission of [ name of wife / name of husband ] from the will of [ name
of decedent ] as a result of oversight or mistake?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Note on Use
Caution: This form of verdict should be used only for estates of decedents dying before
April 1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC).
MCL 700.8101(1),(2)(a). See the forms of verdicts in chapter 228 for estates of decedents
dying on or after April 1, 2000.
History
M Civ JI 225.11 was added February 1986.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-33
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 225.12 Form of Verdict: Omission of Spouse in Will Made
Prior to Marriage Where There Are Transfers Made in Lieu of Will
Provision
Caution: The forms of verdict in this chapter should be used only for estates of decedents
dying before April 1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code
(EPIC). MCL 700.8101(1), (2)(a). See the forms of verdicts in chapter 228 for estates of
decedents dying on or after April 1, 2000.
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Did [ name of decedent ] provide for [ name of wife / name of husband ] by
transfers of property outside the will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did [ name of decedent ] intend [ that transfer / those transfers ] to be instead
of provisions in [ his / her ] will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Note on Use
Caution: This form of verdict should be used only for estates of decedents dying before
April 1, 2000, the effective date of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC).MCL
700.8101(1),(2)(a). See the forms of verdicts in chapter 228 for estates of decedents dying
on or after April 1, 2000.
History
M Civ JI 225.12 was added February 1986
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-34 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 226.01 Form of Verdict: Claim for Services Rendered
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Did the claimant perform services beneficial to [ name of decedent ], or at the
request of [ name of decedent ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the claimant perform these services expecting to be paid?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: Did [ name of decedent ] accept the benefits of these services, expecting to pay
the claimant?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
*PART A
QUESTION NO. A4: What is the reasonable value of the services?
Answer: $________.____
*PART B
QUESTION NO. B4: Did [ name of decedent ] intend to have the claimant paid after death from
[ his / her ] estate?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
QUESTION NO. B5: If your answer to Question No. B4 is “yes,” then state the reasonable value
of the claimant’s services:
$________.____
QUESTION NO. B6: If your answer to Question No. B4 is “no,” then state the reasonable value of
the services performed by the claimant between [ date 6 years prior to death ] and [ date of death ].
$________.____
Note on Use
*The Court must select part A or part B to submit to the jury.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-35
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
History
M Civ JI 226.01 was added February 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-36 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 228.02 Form of Verdict: Pretermitted Child: Will Executed
Prior to Birth or Adoption of Child Omitted from Will (EPIC)
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Does the will express an intention of [ name of decedent ] to omit [ name of
child ] from the will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 2: Did [ name of decedent ] provide for [ name of child ] by transfer of property
outside the will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer QUESTION NO. 3.
QUESTION NO. 3: Did [ name of decedent ] intend that the transfer of property outside the will
substitute for provision for [ name of child ] in [ his / her ] will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Note on Use
*The Court should delete any question that is not an issue in the case.
History
M Civ JI 228.02 was added April 1, 2002.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-37
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 228.03 Form of Verdict: Pretermitted Child: Omission of
Living Child from Will Because of Mistaken Belief Child is Dead
(EPIC)
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: At the time [ name of decedent ] executed [ his / her ] will, did [ he / she ]
believe that [ name of child ] was dead?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer QUESTION NO. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the mistaken belief that [ name of child ] was dead the sole reason that
[ name of decedent ] omitted [ name of child ] from the will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
History
M Civ JI 228.03 was added April 1, 2002.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-38 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 228.12 Form of Verdict: Pretermitted Spouse: Will Executed
Prior to Marriage (EPIC)
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was [ name of decedent ]’s will made in contemplation of [ his / her ] marriage
to [ name of surviving spouse ]?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 2: Does [ name of decedent ]’s will express [ his / her ] intention that it is to be
effective despite a marriage after the will is made?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
QUESTION NO. 3: Did [ name of decedent ] provide for [ name of surviving spouse ] by transfer
of property outside the will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer QUESTION NO. 4.
QUESTION NO. 4: Did [ name of decedent ] intend that the transfer of property outside the will
substitute for provision for [ his / her ] spouse in [ his / her ] will?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
Note on Use
*The Court should delete any question that is not an issue in the case.
History
M Civ JI 228.12 was added April 1, 2002. Amended May 2016.
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-39
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
M Civ JI 230.01 Form of Verdict: Attorney Fees
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Did the petitioner perform necessary legal services in behalf of the estate?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: What is the reasonable value of the legal services performed?
Answer: $________.____ (set forth the total dollar amount)
*Please note that the Court will deduct from your verdict any amount that has already been paid.
Note on Use
*Delete this sentence if it is not applicable to the case.
History
M Civ JI 230.01 was added October 1986.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-40 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 241.01 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s
Breach by Delivery of Nonconforming Goods Which the Buyer
Accepts
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was there [ a contract / an enforceable contract ] for the sale of goods between
the buyer and the seller?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Were the goods which the buyer accepted nonconforming?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: Did the buyer notify the seller of the nonconformity within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovered or should have discovered the nonconformity?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” make the following determinations:
QUESTION NO. 4: Did the buyer incur any reasonable expenses incident to the seller’s delay or
other breach?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount:
$______.____
QUESTION NO. 5: Did the buyer incur any other losses resulting from the general or particular
The value the goods would have had if they
had conformed to the contract:
$______.____
SUBTRACT
The value of the goods at the time and
place of acceptance, their actual value:
$______.____
Subtotal for QUESTION NO. 3 $______.____
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-41
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
requirements or needs which the seller had reason to know about at the time of contracting, and
which the buyer could not reasonably have prevented?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount:
$______.____
QUESTION NO. 6: Did the buyer sustain an injury to person or property as a proximate result of
any breach of warranty?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount:
$______.____
ADD the amounts in the answers to Questions No. 4 through No. 6 to the subtotal in QUESTION
NO. 3.
These are the buyer’s TOTAL DAMAGES: $______.____
History
M Civ JI 241.01 was added February 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-42 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 241.02 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages—UCC: Seller’s
Breach by Failure to Deliver/Repudiation/Delivery of
Nonconforming Goods Rejected
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was there [ a contract / an enforceable contract ] for the sale of goods between
the buyer and the seller?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the seller breach the contract?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” make the following determinations:
1. [ Cost of substitute goods the buyer pur-
chased / The market price of substitute goods
at the time the buyer learned of the breach ]:
$______.____
2. The amount the buyer paid to the seller: $______.____
ADD 1 and 2. This is the subtotal A: $______.____
3. The contract price: $______.____
4. The expenses the buyer saved: $______.____
ADD 3 and 4. This is subtotal B: $______.____
SUBTRACT subtotal B from subtotal A. $______.____
Subtotal A $______.____
minus
Subtotal B $______.____
This is subtotal C: $______.____
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-43
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
QUESTION NO. 3: Did the buyer reasonably incur expenses in [ inspection / receipt /
transportation / care / custody ] of goods the buyer rightfully rejected?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount: $______.____
QUESTION NO. 4: Did the buyer incur commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses /
commissions ] in connection with the purchase of substitute goods?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount: $______.____
QUESTION NO. 5: Did the buyer incur other losses resulting from general or particular
requirements or needs which the seller had reason to know at the time of contracting and which the
buyer could not reasonably have prevented by the purchase of substitute goods or otherwise?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount: $______.____
QUESTION NO. 6: Did the buyer sustain an injury to person or property as a proximate result of
any breach of warranty?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount: $______.____
QUESTION NO. 7: Did the buyer sustain any other reasonable expenses incident to the seller’s
delay or other breach?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount: $______.____
ADD the amount in the answers to Questions No. 3 through No. 7 to the amount in QUESTION
NO. 2, subtotal C.
These are the buyer’s TOTAL DAMAGES: $______.____
History
M Civ JI 241.02 was added February 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-44 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 241.14 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages—UCC: Buyer’s
Breach by Nonacceptance or Repudiation—Seller Resells—Seller’s
Damages
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was there [ a contract / an enforceable contract ] for the sale of goods between
the buyer and the seller?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the buyer breach the contract?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 3: Was the seller’s resale in good faith and commercially reasonable?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” make the following determinations:
Unpaid contract price: $______.____
SUBTRACT from this the resale price: $______.____
Subtotal A: $______.____
SUBTRACT from subtotal A expenses
the seller saved, if any: $______.____
Subtotal B: $______.____
QUESTION NO. 4: Did the seller incur any commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses /
commissions ] after the buyer’s breach in stopping delivery, or in [ transportation / care / custody ]
of goods, or in connection with the return or resale of goods, or otherwise resulting from the buyer’s
breach?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount: $______.____
ADD the amount from QUESTION NO. 4 to subtotal B from QUESTION NO. 3.
Amount from QUESTION NO. 4:$______.____
Subtotal B from QUESTION NO. 3:$______.____
These are the seller’s TOTAL DAMAGES:$______.____
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-45
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
History
M Civ JI 241.14 was added February 1987.
Michigan Model Civil Jury Instructions
190–241-46 Michigan Supreme Court
M Civ JI 241.15 Form of Verdict: Contract Damages--UCC: Buyer’s
Breach by Nonacceptance or Repudiation--Seller’s Damages
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:
QUESTION NO. 1: Was there [ a contract / an enforceable contract ] for the sale of goods between
the buyer and the seller?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
QUESTION NO. 2: Did the buyer breach the contract?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “no,” do not answer any further questions.
If your answer is “yes,” make the following determinations:
Unpaid contract price: $______.____
SUBTRACT from this the market price: $______.____
Subtotal A: $______.____
SUBTRACT from subtotal A expenses
the seller saved, if any: $______.____
Subtotal B: $______.____
QUESTION NO. 3: Did the seller incur any commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses /
commissions ] after the buyer’s breach in stopping delivery, or in [ transportation / care / custody ]
of goods, or in connection with the return or resale of goods, or otherwise resulting from the buyer’s
breach?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount:$______.____
ADD the amount from QUESTION NO. 3
to subtotal B from QUESTION NO. 2:$______.____
These are the seller’s damages, unless you determine that these damages will not put the seller in
as good a position as [ he / she / it ] would have been in if the buyer performed. If [ his / her / its ]
position is as good, do not answer any further questions.
If [ his / her / its ] position is not as good, then make the following determinations.
NUMBER I: State the amount of profit, including reasonable overhead, which the seller would
have made if the buyer had performed:$______.____
NUMBER II:
Michigan Supreme Court 190–241-47
Chapters 190–240: Forms of Verdicts, Volume 2
ADD
a. the amount of payments the buyer made to the seller, if any: $______.____
to
b. the seller’s proceeds from resale, if any: $______.____
Total for NUMBER II: $______.____
SUBTRACT the total for NUMBER II
from the amount in NUMBER I.
This is subtotal X:$______.____
QUESTION NO. 4: Did the seller incur any commercially reasonable [ charges / expenses /
commissions ] after the buyer’s breach in stopping delivery, or in [ transportation / care / custody ]
of goods, or in connection with the return or resale of goods, or otherwise resulting from the buyer’s
breach?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount: $______.____
QUESTION NO. 5: Did the seller have costs reasonably incurred as a result of the buyer’s breach?
Answer: ____ (yes or no)
If your answer is “yes,” state the amount: $______.____
ADD the amounts from Questions No. 4 and 5 to subtotal X.
These are the seller’s TOTAL DAMAGES:$______.____
History
M Civ JI 241.15 was added February 1987.